00036499

Digitized with financial assistance from the
Government of Maharashtra
on 13 February, 2016

MEMOIRS

OF THE

WAR IN SPAIN,

FROM 1808 TO 1814.

B 36499 61

MARSHAL SUCHET,

DUKE D'ALBUFERA.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. II.

LONDON:
HENRY COLBURN, NEW BURLINGTON STREET.

1829.

God
946
Sur/Imam
36499.

CONTENTS

OF THE SECOND VOLUME.

Page

CHAPTER XI.—General Suchet is ordered to besiege Tarragona.—The 3rd corps assumes the name of Army of Arragon.—Its new organization.—Preparatory arrangements of the siege.—Surprise of Figueras.—General Suchet determines on the immediate siege of Tarragona.—The Army of Arragon marches upon that fortress.—Its investment.—Arrival of the English fleet.—Preparations for the siege.—Defeat of Campoverde under Figueras.—Battle of the Rapita under Tortosa.—Description of Tarragona.—Fort of the Olivo.—First operations of the siege.—Sorties of the garrison.—Opening of the fire.—Assault and capture of the Olivo. 1

CHAPTER XII. — Opening of the trenches against the lower town.—Construction of the batteries. — Assault and capture of fort Francoli.—Continuation of the works of the siege.—Assault and capture of the Prince's lunette.—Assault and capture of the lower town.—Opening of the trenches upon the upper town.—Campoverde approaches for the purpose of raising the siege.—The commander-in-chief marches against him.—Campoverde retires. — Construction of the last batteries.—Opening of a breach in the body of the place.—Assault and capture of Tarragona. 62

CHAPTER XIII.—Restoration of order in Tarragona.—General Suchet proceeds in the direction of Barcelona.—He returns to Tarragona.—Dispersion of Campoverde's army. — The commander-in-chief ad-

Page
vances against Vich.—He is appointed to the rank of marshal of France.—The army advances against Mont-Serrat.—Description of that position.—Attack and capture of Mont-Serrat.—Occupation of the whole of lower Catalonia.—Return of marshal Suchet to Saragossa.—Partial engagements.—Proposal for an exchange of prisoners. 11

CHAPTER XIV.—RETAKING OF FIGUERAS.—Marshal Suchet is ordered to march upon Valencia.—His preparation for that expedition.—Departure of the army.—Arrival before Saguntum.—Investment of the place.—Description of the fort.—Unsuccessful attempt to scale the walls.—Actions fought at Segorbe and Benaguazil.—Siege and capture of Oropesa.—Works of the siege of Saguntum.—The assault is repulsed.—Continuation of the works of the siege.—General Blake marches to the relief of the place.—The marshal accepts the battle offered to him.—Battle of Saguntum.—Capitulation of the fort. 14

CHAPTER XV.—STATE OF ARRAGON AND OF LOWER CATALONIA DURING THE SIEGE OF SAGUNTUM.—Inefficiency of the army for undertaking the siege of Valencia.—It establishes itself on the left bank of the Guadalaviar.—Position of Blake's army on the right bank.—State of defence of the city of Valencia.—Various engagements in the provinces of Arragon and Catalonia.—A reinforcement is sent to the army.—General Reille arrives at Segorbe with two divisions.—Passage of the Guadalaviar.—Battle, and investment of Valencia.—Siege of that city.—Opening of the trench.—Establishment of the batteries.—Occupation of the intrenched camp.—Capitulation of the city.—Entry of the French.—Arrival of general Montbrun at Almanza.—He approaches Alicante, and retreats.—Marshal Suchet is named duke d'Albufera. 18

Page

CHAPTER XVI.—Occupation of Denia.—Siege of Peniscola.—Capitulation.—Battle of Villaseca and Altafulla.—Departure of the Poles from the army.—The corps of general Reille is sent to the Ebro.—Reduction of the army of Arragon.—The Spanish army at Alicante is reinforced.—Interview between the marshal and general Decaen at Reuss.—Appearance of an English fleet.—Affair at Castella and Ibi.—An English division lands at Alicante.—Arrival of king Joseph and of the army of the Centre at Valencia.—Arrival of the army of the South at Fuente la Higuera.—Departure of the armies of the South and Centre for Madrid. 242

CHAPTER XVII.—Various affairs in Arragon, Lower Catalonia, and the province of Valencia, during the general operations. 275

CHAPTER XVIII.—Statistical details respecting the kingdom of Valencia.—Organization of the country by the marshal.—Ordinary contribution.—War contribution.—Tranquillity of the country.—Convocation of a Junta at Valencia. 285

CHAPTER XIX.—Arrival of general Murray at Alicante.—Actions at Yecla, Villena, Biar and Castalla.—General Murray lands before Tarragona.—He makes himself master of the col de Balaguer.—Rapid march of the marshal to Tarragona.—General Maurice Mathieu approaches the place.—General Murray re-embarks.—General Harispe is attacked on the Xucar.—He beats and repulses the Spaniards.—The marshal returns to Valencia by forced marches. 302

CHAPTER XX.—Battle of Vittoria.—Evacuation of Valencia.—The army returns to Arragon.—General Paris is under the necessity of evacuating Saragossa.—The army re-enters Catalonia, and establishes itself at Villafranca.—The Anglo-Spanish army attacks Tarragona.—The marshal relieves the place, and blows up the fortifications.—General operations.—Battle of Ordal.

—Passage of the Bidassoa by lord Wellington.—The army of Catalonia forms a junction with the army of Arragon under marshal Suchet's orders.—Administration in Catalonia.—Reduction of the army.—Treaty of Valençay. 3

CHAPTER XXI.—Invasion of France.—Arrangements made by marshal Suchet previously to his evacuating Barcelona.—Desertion of Vanhalen.—Departure of a division of ten thousand men for Lyons.—Treacherous surprise of the towns of Lerida, Mequinenza and Monzon. — The garrisons are taken prisoners. — A second column of ten thousand men is sent to Lyons.—The army falls back to Figueras.—Return of king Ferdinand to Spain.—Operations of the army under marshal Soult.—The army of Arragon and Catalonia recrosses the Pyrenees. — Occurrences at Paris; the armistice.—The duke d'Angoulême reviews the army at Narbonne.—The whole army of the South is placed under the command of marshal Suchet.—Return of the garrisons from Spain.—Conclusion. 3

Explanatory Documents. 4

MEMOIRS

OF

MARSHAL SUCHET.

CHAPTER XI.

General Suchet is ordered to besiege Tarragona.—The 3rd corps assumes the name of Army of Arragon.—Its new organization.—Preparatory arrangements for the siege.—Surprise of Figueras.—General Suchet determines on the immediate siege of Tarragona.—The Army of Arragon marches upon that fortress.—Its investment.—Arrival of the English fleet.—Preparations for the siege.—Defeat of Campoverde under Figueras.—Battle of the Rapita under Tortosa.—Description of Tarragona.—Fort of the Olivo.—First operations of the siege.—Sorties of the garrison.—Opening of the fire.—Assault and capture of the Olivo.

EVER since the reduction of Tortosa, General Suchet had been scouring part of the two Castiles and of Navarre, of the country of Valencia and of lower Catalonia, with corps of cavalry and infantry. He sought by rapid

marches to destroy the parties which were collecting in those different provinces, and incessantly attempting to penetrate into Arragon. Another object which he had in view was to ensure the subsistence of the 3rd corps, by protecting the administration by the presence of the troops. He wished, lastly, to facilitate the provision of the large supplies of grain requisite for the subsistence of the army of marshal Macdonald, during the siege of Tarragona, which it was about to undertake. In consequence of these measures twenty-five thousand quintals of wheat had already been collected at Mora and Lerida.

A considerable *matériel* of artillery had been brought together at Tortosa and put into good condition: a great quantity of implements, sandbags and other articles, composing the *matériel* of the engineer department, had been made at Saragossa, and conveyed also to Tortosa. These necessaries had been provided, not without difficulty, but without expense to France; for the army, though acting at no great distance from the Pyrenees, was supported upon that part of our frontiers which is most destitute of military establishments: it was obliged to create its own resources for the supply of those munitions which elsewhere are furnished in abundance by the arsenals of Douay, Metz, and Strasburg. Ever since the invasion of Spain in 1808 and 1809, the fortress of Pampeluna had supplied

us with artillery, muskets, projectiles, and stores. Victory had subsequently increased our means: the reduction of Lerida, Mequinenza, Tortosa, and the col de Balaguer, had put us in possession of a numerous artillery. The siege equipage assembled at Tortosa was disposable, to the amount of fifteen hundred draught horses, and a considerable corps of the artillery and engineers, the whole supported by ten battalions of infantry. These forces were ready to march upon Tarragona, at the first requisition of marshal the duke of Tarente. The rest of the 3rd corps was to keep Arragon.

Such was the state of affairs when the emperor directed general Suchet to prepare to lay siege to Tarragona, and for this operation he annexed to his command that of part of the army and province of Catalonia.* Marshal Macdonald

* "Paris, March 10, 1811.

"General count Suchet, commanding the 3rd corps d'armée "and governor of Arragon,

"The emperor has just determined that the government of "Arragon which is committed to you shall be augmented by "the provinces of Tortosa, Lerida, Tarragona, and the "country westward of a line running from the tower of "Garraf on the sea-coast to the col d'Ordal, following the "course of the Noya to Iborra, that of the river Llobregat to "the Segre, and thence the boundary of the province of Lerida "to the Noguera, which shall divide as heretofore the two "governments of Arragon and Catalonia as far as the Pyrenees.

"In giving this increase of territory to the government of

had recently sent to Paris general Guilleminot, the chief of his staff, and was himself at Lerida

" Arragon, the emperor has ordered that all the troops " forming part of the active army of Catalonia, shall pass " immediately under your command, viz.

" Four regiments of French infantry.
- " The 7th regiment of infantry of the line,
- The 42d. ——— ———
- The 1st. ——— light.
- The 16th. ——— of the line.

" The division of the Italian troops, that of the Neapolitan " troops, the 24th regiment of French dragoons, the Napoleon " regiment of dragoons, and that of royal Italian chasseurs.

" The minister at war will give the requisite orders to " marshal the duke of Tarente, that these troops may be " placed immediately under your command.

" It shall belong to the army of Catalonia to occupy Mont- " serrat and to besiege Cardona, Berga, and Urgel; and it " shall belong to the army of Arragon to besiege Tarragona.

" You will concert, M. le Comte, with marshal the duke " of Tarente, respecting his march upon Barcelona with the " detachment which he is to conduct thither. You will see " with him, whether it is advisable to cause a movement to " be made by the active army of Catalonia, altogether or in " part, either for the purpose of possessing itself definitively " of Montserrat, and driving the enemy back upon Tarra- " gona, or, if that operation should not be judged expedient " at present, for covering the return of the detachment of " the duke of Tarente to Barcelona: in this case the duke " of Tarente will threaten Montserrat with an attack, to " overawe the enemy there, and to prevent his leaving it for " the purpose of annoying the siege of Tarragona.

" The emperor leaves you at liberty to form your divisions " as you shall think fit, when incorporating the troops from " the army of Catalonia with those of the army of Arragon.

with part of his troops. General Suchet hastened thither to concert the execution of these new arrangements, and to learn the state of the active forces placed under his command. They amounted to nearly seventeen thousand men.

Thus the army of Arragon, according to the denomination given to it by the government, and which it ever afterwards retained, consisting of the 3rd corps and the active troops of the army of Catalonia, was to be raised to upwards of forty thousand men of all arms, French, Poles, Italians, and Neapolitans. But it will be seen that general Suchet could not operate upon Tarragona with more than half this army without danger of compromising the operation itself; for he had to provide against every contingency; and in order to reduce one town, it was necessary to hold or to overawe whole provinces.

He first directed his attention to the new organization of the army, agreeably to the knowledge which he had acquired of its elements in a first review of the troops of Catalonia.

The 16th of the French line*, which came from

"The reduction of Tarragona, M. le Comte, will crown the "military glory which you have won in this campaign, and "give you fresh claims upon the emperor.

"The prince of Wagram and Neufchatel, major-general,

Signed, "ALEXANDER."

* Commanded by colonel Gudin, now lieutenant-general, brother of the general of that name who fell gloriously at Valentina, in the Russian campaign.

Wagram, where it had greatly distinguished itself, was all that could be wished in regard to steadiness, equipment, and instruction. The other three French regiments, the 1st light and the 7th and 42nd of the line, were not at all inferior to it in valour and devotedness; but in regard to steadiness, they were somewhat affected by the arduous warfare in which they had been for two years engaged in Catalonia. The 24th dragoons, commanded by colonel Delort, inspired confidence by its intrepidity and by the excellent spirit which its chief had the skill to keep up.

In the Italian division there were many soldiers who had distinguished themselves in the first and memorable campaign in Italy. This corps had rendered good service in Catalonia, which it had entered under the command of general Pino. It had, however, sustained considerable loss under the walls of Girona, and was reduced from thirteen or fourteen thousand men to five or six thousand. According to a particular arrangement, they were paid by the exchequer of the kingdom of Italy; their pay arrived slowly and it was several months in arrear; the soldiers were in want of shirts and their clothing was in a bad condition. The commander-in-chief lost no time in causing advances to be made to them out of the chest of the army, and supplied their most urgent wants.

The Neapolitan corps, commanded by general

Férrier, under the orders of general Compère, had improved in steadiness and discipline.

General Suchet planned a new formation of the army. He proposed to put the different regiments together without any distinction or partiality; to accustom them to do justice to one another, to consider themselves as forming one whole, to lend each other mutual support, and to absorb all rivalry in a general desire for acquiring glory. But it was not so easy a matter to accomplish its speedy re-union, and to bring together, for the purpose of fighting on the same field, troops which were so wide asunder. The active part of the army of Catalonia, which passed under the command of general Suchet, was transferred to him at Lerida on the 26th of March; but a portion set out again immediately with the marshal duke of Tarente to protect his return to Barcelona through Manresa. Thus it was again removed to the distance of seven marches. General Harispe, who commanded it, brought it back by Villafranca, and it was towards the middle of April when he returned.

We have already seen how the greater part of the 3rd corps d'armée was spread over various points of Arragon. Navarre and Castile caused us continual uneasiness; and at this period the country of Valencia, where general Coupigni had just arrived, was preparing fresh means for attacking

us. It was easy to perceive that they were destined to act against Arragon as soon as we should be decidedly engaged in the siege of Tarragona. The commander-in-chief took the following measures for preserving the country and for employing the remainder of his forces in his important undertaking.

In consequence of the small number of French troops then acting in Navarre, three battalions of the 44th, 115th, and 1st of the Vistula, with the Napoleon dragoons, were destined for the left bank of the Ebro, already occupied by our gendarmerie. The forts of Jaca and Venasque continued to be defended by the two battalions of chasseurs of the Arriège and the Upper Garonne. Our couriers coming from Bayonne were frequently intercepted in Guipuscoa and Navarre. To obviate this inconvenience, the commander-in-chief, after organising fortified posts from Canfranc, by Jaca, to Saragossa, recommended to the government that despatches for the army of Arragon should be sent by Pau and Oleron. This measure was adopted and proved extremely favourable to our intercourse with France. It furnished us for several years, indeed up to the battle of Vittoria, with a speedy and safe channel of communication with our own country—a great consolation to all mankind and more especially to Frenchmen.

General Compère was stationed at Saragossa, to command that district, and also Borja, Tarragona, and Calatayud. In the latter town general Ferrier had two battalions of the 14th of the line: the convent of Mercy was embattled, armed, and provisioned. Saragossa itself was put into a state of defence, and received a garrison of two battalions of the 5th light and 117th of the line, with two Neapolitan squadrons, specially destined for the duty of the correspondence.

General Pâris covered Daroca and part of the principality of Molina, with four battalions of the 44th and 2nd of the Vistula, three hundred hussars, and four pieces of cannon. The little fort of Molina, defended by one hundred men, was provisioned and armed with muskets. At Teruel, general Abbé had five battalions of the 104th and 121st, three hundred cuirassiers and two pieces of cannon: he was directed to make head against the Valencians; the seminary, a large entrenched building, had a garrison, and was in a respectable state. These two brigades, destined to act separately or together, but always in a combined manner, served mutually for a reserve to each other.

From this point to Morella and Alcañiz, the communications were difficult across a mountainous country. Colonel Dupeyroux of the 115th, with fourteen hundred men of his regiment, oc-

cupied those two forts, protected the frontier of Arragon, repelled the Valencian parties, and especially covered the convoys and our magazines at Mora, destined for the besieging army.

Four hundred men of the 115th, occupied the Rapita; two battalions of the 121st, and one hundred dragoons of the 24th, formed the garrison of Tortosa; twelve hundred Poles lined the Ebro, and supplied garrisons for Batea, Caspe, and Mequinenza, three important points for our convoys; the mouths of the Ebro and the coasts were armed, and fresh batteries were to be erected as we advanced towards Tarragona.

The command of the right bank of the Ebro was given to general Musnier. The troops could be brought together in case of need, a great number of fortified posts affording the means of manœuvring without danger, though it was more than fourteen long marches from the right to the left. The commander-in-chief relied on the energy and activity of the generals and troops. He hoped besides to keep his communications constantly free, that he might be able in case of emergency to proceed himself to their succour with the corps of reserve.

According to this division of the army, about thirty battalions were to remain disposable, and to move from different points upon Tarragona, principally from Lerida, by way of Monblanch. The road from Tortosa to Tarragona had been

reserved for the artillery and engineers; and for a fortnight past the projectiles had been passing under the walls of fort San Felipe, to the col de Balaguer. Had any other convoys been directed by this communication, the small supplies of forage which it afforded for the horses of the train would have been speedily exhausted; besides, it was found necessary to choose the shortest road for the transport of provisions. Our principal supplies coming from Saragossa, Mequinenza, and Caspe, were deposited in store-houses at Mora; thence by Falset, they had but a short distance to go to Reuss, the general dépôt of provisions during the siege. The occupation of Monblanch and the direct road from Lerida towards Tarragona was intended to give greater security to the line of Falset.

The supply of butcher's meat, so important for the subsistence of the soldier, but so difficult to be obtained in a country like Arragon, exhausted by two years of warfare, had seriously occupied the attention of the commander-in-chief. He felt the utmost repugnance to have recourse to the measure of taking away the cattle from the people under his government. Prudence, not less than justice, induced him to spare their resources, and not to ruin agriculture, always so worthy of protection. Necessity nevertheless, compelled him to secure the supplies which he

needed. He directed his commissary to make a contract for meat to be brought from France. The communications established by Jaca, rendered practicable this operation, which would not have been so, had it been necessary to traverse districts out of his command. The effects of this contract were, however, as yet remote and uncertain. He ordered his generals who occupied the frontiers of Castile and Valencia to collect from the enemy's country as many sheep and oxen as possible, and to send them off towards Mora and Tortosa. As soon as the troops of general Harispe had arrived at Lerida on their return from Barcelona, the commander-in-chief sent a column, composed of the 42nd regiment and an Italian brigade, to the elevated valleys of Catalonia, to bring away the flocks. This column was to be back at Lerida on the 25th of April.

About the same period general Suchet expected the return of a trusty person, to acquire some certainty respecting the views and the next operations of the duke of Tarente. This marshal had promised, when they parted, to inform him speedily if the state of his corps d'armée in Upper Catalonia should permit him to cause Montserrat to be taken, a position, the occupation of which, might have a favourable influence on the siege of Tarragona. But instead of this, he

received intelligence of a very different kind on the 21st of April at Saragossa, by two messengers, the one from marshal Macdonald, the other from the governor of Lerida. Whenever the troops were a few marches distant, the only mode of communicating between one point of Catalonia and another was by messengers.

Note of Marshal the Duke of TARENTE *to the General-in-chief, Count* SUCHET.

"Barcelona, April 16th, 1811.

"Three hours ago a report was circulated to which it was impossible to give credit. It now proves to be but too true: the citadel of Figueras, the key to France, is in the power of the Spaniards. My dear general, in the name of the public welfare, the service of the emperor requires imperatively and without delay, the most speedy succour, otherwise upper Catalonia is lost. Roses, Girona, and Hostalrich are not provisioned. The consequences of this disastrous event, with the circumstances of which I am not acquainted, are incalculable. All the forces of the enemy are proceeding towards Figueras. General d'Hilliers, from whom I have no direct intelligence, has marched towards that place, which will infalli-

bly be retaken. Send me all the troops of Catalonia which have been transferred to you; let them come by forced marches: there is not a moment to be lost."

Signed, "MACDONALD."

General of Division, MAURICE MATHIEU, *governor of Barcelona, to the governor of Lerida.*

"Barcelona, April 16th, 1811.

"Fate decrees that I must acquaint you with a disaster in return for the good news which you have sent me. Figueras has fallen into the hands of the Spaniards. All is lost in upper Catalonia unless general Suchet sends the troops that have passed under his command to our succour. Provision them beforehand, with the authorisation of general Suchet, who no doubt will not refuse it."

Signed, "MAURICE MATHIEU."

After the first moments given to the grief caused by this unforeseen event,* general Suchet bent

* For those readers who may wish for some particulars respecting the surprise of Figueras, we give an extract from the work of Vacani, already quoted.

See notes and explanatory documents, No. 16.

all his thoughts to the consideration of the course which he ought to pursue, and the answer to be returned to marshal Macdonald. It behoved him to come to a speedy decision; it behoved him to anticipate the orders of the emperor without waiting for them, and to consult the good of the service alone. Figueras had been surprised in the night between the 9th and 10th of April. Was it expedient to send in all haste the troops required by the marshal? The possibility of this movement was not less doubtful than its utility. Eight battalions, as we have said, were despatched to the mountains; and three along the Ebro to protect the navigation. It would have been several days before they could have received fresh orders at Saragossa and assembled at Lerida: thence to Barcelona, they would have had six or seven marches, and as many more from Barcelona to Figueras. Now, during these twenty or twenty-five days lost, the enemy would have had time to do the only thing requisite for their new conquest, to provision it and reinforce the garrison. The only measure to be opposed to them on the part of the French was, to blockade the place at the first moment with such troops as were nearest to it. To send distant troops thither, and to accumulate them at a point destitute of subsistence was to incur the risk of bringing them up too late, and being afterwards embarrassed to support them. There was every

reason to believe that the government, having received the intelligence directly, before general Suchet himself,* would issue its orders, and that the surprise of a fort would not induce it to renounce the execution of a plan of campaign of the highest importance; for the reduction of Tarragona would deprive Catalonia of its last bulwark. Experience, moreover, had proved that to destroy the Spanish armies, it was necessary to besiege them in their fortresses; it was there only that any considerable number of prisoners could be made: eight hundred officers and eighteen thousand soldiers had been taken at Lerida, Mequinenza, and Tortosa. If, as the event proved, the Spaniards failed in the attempt to re-victual Figueras, after gaining possession of it, this success, by which they were at first dazzled, could not be very profitable to them. The army of Arragon, which was preparing for the siege of Tarragona, had now an additional motive for undertaking it. The most powerful diversion to be made upon Catalonia was to press that important operation already commanded and prepared, and to balance the effect of a reverse by instantly threatening Tarragona, stripped of part of its defenders. It could not be doubted

* Figueras was taken on the 10th of April; by Perpignan, the news might have reached the emperor at Paris on the 15th or 16th; general Suchet was not apprised of it at Saragossa till the 21st.

that general Campoverde would approach the Ampourdan with his army as soon as he should be informed of the event at Figueras. For the investment of Tarragona that circumstance was certainly favourable. Unfortunately the place was a sea-port, that is to say, it had always a door open for retreat or for succour, and that door it was not in our power to shut.

Influenced by all these considerations, general Suchet determined to march upon Tarragona. He was not deterred by the incomplete state of his preparations, or by the distance of the corps, most of which were on their march to form a junction, agreeably to the new organization of the army. To begin with what was ready, to dispose of the nearest troops, and to march against the enemy, such was his resolution. He lost no time in communicating it to the major-general. Shortly afterwards he had the satisfaction to know, that it was not only approved but praised by the emperor, who said, on being made acquainted with it, "That is soldier-like."

In war all depends on opportunity: the most valuable of all things is time. It would not, therefore, be wise, when we are provided with a considerable part of what is necessary, to wait for the remainder before we begin to act. The commander-in-chief had sufficient confidence in his administration to hope that he should

not lack either men or supplies for the operation which he was about to undertake. He left instructions for the Spanish authorities and for the intendant of Arragon. He regulated the different services with Bondurand, the commissary, and set them a-going. Generals Valée and Rogniat hastily completed what remained to be done for the artillery and engineers. In several regiments a great number of officers and subalterns were wanting; the commander-in-chief caused the vacancies occasioned by those who were prisoners or absent to be immediately filled up. Twelve hundred men, part of them severely wounded, part horse soldiers sent to be remounted, and the rest consisting of battalion skeletons, were despatched to France by Jaca.

Calculating that in the then state of affairs he could not hope for the co-operation of the army of Catalonia, the commander-in-chief ardently wished to be able to call to him, during the siege, some of the corps of his army which he was obliged to leave in Arragon. He had, for some time past, been soliciting of the government the immediate despatch of a division of the army of the north to Soria and Calatayud, to overawe the enemy's troops in Castile. He also recommended that Sanguessa should be occupied by the troops of Pampeluna, to prevent Mina from penetrating into the Cincovillas,

and annoying upper Arragon. But these dispositions not being yet assented to at the moment of his departure, he took his measures for securing behind him, in a solid manner, the establishments on the left bank of the Ebro. At this point he left, to his great regret, general Chlopiski, whom he would have wished to take with him to the siege, but whose activity, firmness, and ability, inspired him with great confidence. He gave him four battalions of the 14th of the line and of the 1st and 2nd of the Vistula, with two hundred hussars of the 4th, solely to watch Mina, and to fight him; for if this enterprising chief had succeeded in connecting himself with the Catalans in the elevated valleys, he might have hurried along with him the population of part of Arragon, and extended the insurrection, so as to endanger the subsistence of the besieging troops by cutting off the whole army from France.

On the 24th of April, general Suchet went to Lerida, and there reviewed the troops of general Harispe, including the Italians, who returned on the 26th. The whole army received a month's pay: the soldiers took with them provisions for six days; and two thousand six hundred quintals of flour, in carts or on mules, were to follow the march of the infantry.

On the 28th of April, general Harispe, at the head of three brigades, set out for Monblanch,

where he arrived on the 29th with the commander-in-chief. Frere's division followed, one march in the rear, as well as the convoy of flour; the cavalry was partly in advance, partly with the rear-guard.

On the 30th of April and the 1st of May, general Harispe was directed to repel some parties of the enemy, which made their appearance in the dangerous defile of Ribas. Three hundred labourers were employed in destroying the entrenchments and filling the cuts. The troops reached Alcover. Four hundred men of the 1st light and the 14th of the line, well officered, were left at Monblanch in an entrenched post, capable of resistance, to secure the communication between Tarragona and Lerida, and to cover the road from Mora to Reuss, which was also defended by fortified posts.

On the same day, the 1st of May, general Habert, who had left Tortosa with the 3rd division, arrived by the col de Balaguer at Cambrils.

On the 2nd, the commander-in-chief, followed by the main body of the army, fixed his head-quarters at Reuss, one of the most populous towns in Catalonia, and one of the most industrious in Spain. It had manifested some affection for the French at the beginning of the war; but this feeling had given place to a decided hatred, which it was necessary to moderate;

for that town was to be the centre of our operations. The commander-in-chief endeavoured to infuse confidence into the civil and religious authorities, and to conciliate the inhabitants by the strict discipline of his troops. He visited the brave Italian, general Eugene, who was mortally wounded in the last battle at Valls, and a few days afterwards paid him the funeral honours due to his rank and courage.

On the 3rd of May, the army approached Tarragona. Our advanced guard, composed of the 7th and 16th of the line, under general Salme, advanced to the bank of the Francoli, and drove the enemy's posts from the other side of the river. The Italian division, with general Harispe, was posted at Constanti; Frere's division, in the rear of the troops of general Harispe; and general Habert towards Villaseca, in advance of Reuss.

Yielding to circumstances, and not having time to intermingle the regiments of the two armies for the purpose of forming them into divisions, the commander-in-chief adopted, merely for the time that the siege should last, a provisional formation of the first troops which he was able to dispose of, and which were assembled before Tarragona. The besieging army consisted of twenty-nine battalions and ten squadrons, amounting in the whole to nearly twenty thousand men, including the artillery and en-

gineers. Those who are acquainted with the difficulties of a siege will appreciate the magnitude of the efforts which we were obliged to make with fourteen thousand infantry, before a place of immense strength, during two months of fighting and toil, being so far from our base of operation, and having to fear a relieving Spanish army, without any hope of support from French troops. This infantry needed to be spared; the commander-in-chief was aware of that. He, therefore, resolved within himself to do every thing to keep up its *moral*, which was excellent, and to ensure its well-being in health or in sickness, by all possible care and attention.

On the 4th of May, the commander-in-chief determined to drive back the enemy into Tarragona. General Harispe passed the Francoli; general Rogniat marched with him. The Spanish posts in advance of the Olivo, supported by the artillery of the fort, made a vigorous and obstinate defence. Salme's brigade attacked them several times; at length it succeeded in dislodging them, and gaining the ground requisite for establishing itself. This first action cost us one hundred and eighty men, killed or wounded, and among the latter eight officers, including lieutenant Brenier, of the 7th, who received four wounds, and lieutenant Bouthier, of the 16th, who would not quit his company. The troops, in

marching against the enemy, displayed an ardour which afforded a most cheering presage. General Harispe, who saw these regiments under fire for the first time, congratulated himself on having such brave fellows to command.

The Italian division, during the action of Salme's brigade, prolonged the movement, and established itself near the commanding point of the road to Valls, by which run the conduits of water, that proceed by the Olivo and the aqueducts to Tarragona. He then finished turning the place by taking the fort of Loretto, and a small neighbouring redoubt, and placing reserves within reach of the shore, on the road to Barcelona. General Frere approached the Francoli, and stationed the 1st regiment of infantry on the left bank, in such a manner as to connect himself by his left with the 7th of the line, and by his posts on the right with those of Habert's division. This general, on his part, had advanced beyond Canonge, facing the bridge of the Francoli; and, by supporting himself on the sea, he completed the investment on that side.

On the 5th, the enemy, regretting the ground lost the preceding day, endeavoured to recover it, but in vain. He then persevered in annoying, night and day, by the fire of his numerous batteries, the camps of the 7th and 16th, which, though under shelter, were too near not to be exceedingly harassed; during the first days,

indeed, the soldiers could scarcely make their soup; but their firmness was not shaken. The commander-in-chief, sensible of the importance of maintaining this dangerous position, went to congratulate and to encourage them.

The English fleet, which we had had in sight from the day of our arrival before the place, began to make us acquainted with the active part which it meant to take in its defence. On the 5th, it cannonaded our convoys of artillery, coming from Tortosa, on the road along the sea-shore, near Hospitalet: we lost some horses of the train. A battery of light artillery was sent to this point, and succeeded in keeping the enemy aloof; and coast-batteries were subsequently erected there.

The first establishment being made, the positions were every where soon rectified, the ground reconnoitred, and the communications secured; measures were taken in each camp for repelling attacks of the garrison, and affording support to the other camps. Three regiments of Frere's division, with a reserve of cavalry and artillery, were placed on the Francoli, higher up than the 1st light, to be disposable as a corps of observation, and to move in case of need either forward or backward. The park of siege artillery was stationed at Canonge, under the guard of the 117th of the line: it consisted of sixty-six pieces, provided with seven hundred rounds, and among these were twenty-four 24-

pounders, and eighteen mortars: there were besides in the divisions thirty-six field-pieces. With these hundred pieces we appeared before a place which had upwards of three hundred, exclusively of those in the English ships. One hundred thousand bags of earth, twelve thousand shovels, eight thousand gabions, a great quantity of fascines, ladders, and all the apparatus for a siege, arrived at the same point. The commander-in-chief fixed his head-quarters within sight of Tarragona, in the centre of his camps, at Constanti, an excellent position, which still exhibited some traces of the old entrenchments thrown up by the great Condé, in 1647, for the purpose of curbing the garrison of Tarragona.

Our communications with Reuss were covered, and our establishment in that town was protected by the occupation of several entrenched posts and convents. General Ficatier there commanded the troops and the country. Falset was occupied by general Buget, and Mora by colonel Kosinowski, with a thousand Poles and some cavalry. Intermediate posts, or escorts incessantly in motion, protected the arrival of our convoys of provisions.

The commander-in-chief foresaw a warm resistance from the place; and expecting to have a great number of wounded during the siege, he directed his attention to the medical department.

The commissary, seconded by the zeal and intelligence of Rampon, the physician-in-chief, provided in a short time spacious, well ventitilated hospitals, and furnished them with bedding and all the materials for dressing wounds, which we had very rarely found in Spain, but which he had taken care to collect beforehand. The hospital attendants were to do the duty of the trenches, and our surgeons made a point of braving danger in order to afford their useful assistance. All these preservative measures were known to the soldier, and filled him with confidence. It is but right to publish on every occasion, that the French soldier is grateful; he returns in zeal and affection all that is done for him. These means were necessary to command success in this war, in which general Suchet found himself continually obliged to make up for the number of the troops by their moral energy.

Two thousand Spaniards advanced upon Monblanch, and showed a disposition to attack the entrenched convent of la Virgen de la Sierra, where our little garrison lay. They employed various stratagems to draw it from within the walls. Finding that they could not succeed, they approached the gate, carrying fascines for the purpose of setting fire to it, being covered in front by a sort of wadded frame-work, drawn upon wheels. Disliking the fire of musketry

poured upon them, when close to the muzzles of the guns, they retired, leaving from fifteen to twenty killed or wounded. Apprehensive lest this attempt might be repeated, the commander-in-chief sent general Frere, with four battalions and two hundred horse, to that point: he beat and drove off the Spanish corps, threw a fresh supply of cartridges into our entrenched convent, and showed the garrison that an eye was kept upon them, and that they would be relieved. During this attack upon Monblanch, the peasants of the mountains near Reuss appeared in arms, and assembled in bodies. General Ficatier caused them to be dispersed, and took hostages from the villages. This measure produced a good effect; and, the commander-in-chief having released these hostages soon afterwards, at the same time exhorting them to confidence and tranquillity, those men, touched by this proceeding, contributed to keep the country quiet.

The reconnoitring parties of general Harispe pushed on as far as Torre den Barra, beyond the Gaya. Our soldiers were well received, and the officers strove to justify the confidence of the inhabitants by strict discipline. Some wounded Spaniards were found in the hospital. Agreeably to a convention concluded between the French and Spanish generals in Catalonia, the sick and wounded were placed reciprocally un-

der the protection of the local authorities, and were at liberty, on their recovery, to join their respective corps. At Valls, where we saw several wounded French and Italian soldiers, we convinced ourselves of the fidelity with which the Spaniards executed this convention. Desirous also of mitigating the evils of war, as far as lay in his power, the commander-in-chief issued orders that it should be adopted by the army of Arragon; and he began on his part to observe it most scrupulously, till he could by stipulations secure its reciprocal execution, persuaded that the humanity and honour of the enemy's generals would impel them to follow his example.

The troops of general Harispe, on arriving at their position, had cut off the waters which are conducted by the heights to the Olivo, and thence conveyed by the modern aqueduct to Tarragona. But this water-course, which begins at Armentara on the Gaya, six leagues above the town, was difficult for us to defend along its whole upper part: partisans soon came and cut it in different places, and intercepted the water from our troops, who experienced a severe privation on the sterile and elevated plateaux where they were encamped, far from the Francolí and the Gaya. It was necessary to repair the cuts, and to guard the waters. This was an arduous and incessant duty, which required

the employment of some light troops during the whole of the siege.

While the besieging army was taking up its positions round Tarragona, and generals Rogniat and Valée, at the same time that they urged forward their preparations, were causing the place and its environs to be reconnoitred, we received intelligence of the battle of the 3rd of May before Figueras, and the defeat of Campoverde, whom general Baraguay d'Hilliers had beaten when he was attempting to introduce a convoy of provisions into the fort. Disconcerted on this point, the occupation of which had prematurely raised all the hopes of Catalonia, the Spanish general, before he had time to recover from this check, found himself obliged to hurry to another point to the relief of Tarragona. He returned thither by sea with a reinforcement of troops, while general Sarsfield, with a division, kept the field at a little distance from Valls and Monblanch. This division excited alarm for our line from Mora to Reuss, so important in regard to subsistence.

About the same time an attempt was made by the English, united to the Valencians, in the environs of Tortosa. Commodore Adams, on board the Invincible of seventy-four guns, and commanding besides two frigates and ten xebecs, appeared off the post of La Rapita, at the mouths of the Ebro, on the morning of

the 9th of May, and summoned the commandant to surrender. Captain Pinot, of the engineers, who had but one hundred and twenty soldiers, replied like a man of courage.

La Rapita is situated about six hours' march from Tortosa, on the route from Valencia to Barcelona, at the foot of the Sierra de Monsiad, and on the sea coast near the entrance of the roadstead of the Alfaques. The commander-in-chief, having ascertained the importance of that post, had ordered it to be occupied and armed. The defence of La Rapita was connected with that of the tower of Codoñol, about eight or nine hundred toises distant, and likewise situated on the high road. This tower had also been armed, and it was garrisoned by twenty men.

The attack of the English was at first directed against this tower, which they soon laid in ruins; the brave serjeant of the 115th, who commanded there, after firing about a hundred cannon-shot, fell back, under favour of the night, upon the post of La Rapita. On the following day, the English advanced against that fort, while a column of Valencians approached it by land, after detaching an advanced guard of eight hundred men against the little castle of Amposta. The fire of the English was very brisk, and lasted sixteen hours: captain Pinot answered it with all his guns, and fired more

than a thousand cannon-shot. A cutter, injured in her masts, was obliged to stand off; the other vessels returned at night to their anchorage. The enemy had landed five guns, and their preparations announced that they intended to open the trenches. Captain Pinot, seeing his ammunition exhausted, and his enclosure thrown down, evacuated the fort at night, proceeding by the marshes toward Amposta. The same night, the governor of Tortosa had despatched, in all haste, the chef-de-bataillon Bugeaud of the 116th, with eight hundred picked men and fifty horse, for the purpose of first relieving Amposta, and then marching to the succour of La Rapita. The Valencians surrounded the fort of Amposta; surprised in the town, where they were negligently guarded, they betook themselves to flight. Without loss of time, Bugeaud, the commandant, took with him one hundred and fifty men belonging to the garrison of the fort, and continued to push forward. He soon met the little column of captain Pinot and joined it to his own. Hastening his march, he came at day-break in presence of the Valencians, who were engaged in forming a battery with the guns landed by the English. Notwithstanding their number, he did not hesitate to charge them, before they had recovered from the surprise occasioned by a collision so sudden and so unexpected. Captain Roussel, one of the

bravest grenadiers in the army, attacked alone, with his company of one hundred and twenty men, the reserve of the Valencians, which was covered by their artillery, put it to the rout and captured five guns. A company of grenadiers and one of voltigeurs of the 115th took the tower of Codoñol, defended by eight hundred Valencians. The enemy, pursued in his flight, left behind eighty killed, among whom was the colonel of the regiment of Savoy; the lieutenant-colonel was wounded and made prisoner, with about fifty of his men and six English sailors. The chef-de-bataillon, Bugeaud, who directed this affair, exhibited proofs of ability and intrepidity. Captain Pinot, though twice wounded, ceased not to fight: he furnished a prelude on this occasion to more signal services which he was destined afterwards to perform in the glorious defence of the castle of Burgos.

The commander-in-chief found himself, to his regret, under the necessity of deferring the re-establishment of the post of La Rapita till after the siege, at the risk of seeing the English repeat their landings and attacks on the coast. He wished not to disperse his forces, but, on the contrary, to concentrate them still more, if possible, on the single point of Tarragona. Upon the fate of that place depended, in fact, the whole success of the campaign. Before we relate the operations of the siege, it may not be

amiss to give some idea of the place which we were about to attack.

Tarragona, the capital of the ancient Roman province in Spain, is situated on the sea-coast, at the extremity of the heights which separate the waters of the Gaya from those of the Francoli: it is seated on a rock of considerable height, isolated, and scarped on the three sides looking to the north, east, and south. Towards the west and south-west the ground slopes with a gentle declivity towards the port and the Francoli. The upper town is surrounded by ancient walls crowning the summit of the rock, the contours of which are followed by a second enclosure provided irregularly with bastions. The east side, with the road to Barcelona, was moreover covered by five lunettes, forming a line which supported itself upon the sea. Two other large lunettes protected the north side. These two fronts presented to the besiegers nothing but a bare rock, upon which the labours of attack would have been extremely arduous: whereas the side next to the Francoli offered gentle and cultivated slopes, and a deep soil favourable to the attacks. The lower town, built in this quarter, at the extremity of the harbour, was protected on the land side by Fort Royal, a small bastioned quadrangle, situated about three hundred toises from the enclosure of the upper town, and about two hundred toises

from the sea. This fort itself, as well as the lower town, was encompassed by a second enclosure, supported on one side upon the upper town and on the other upon the harbour, defended by three regular bastions and some other works. Thus the general outline of the two towns, upper and lower, formed a large parallelogram twice as long as broad.

This formidable position and all these works, repaired and put in good condition, presented imposing means of defence, which, in an ordinary war, would certainly have appeared adequate to the part that suited the fortress of Tarragona. But what limits can confine the will and the resources of a nation animated by enthusiasm? The longest and the most arduous labours, which governments are always careless about undertaking or unable to accomplish, the mass of the population, when once roused and strongly excited, completes rapidly and without difficulty, at the summons of chiefs who possess the skill to direct their efforts.

In the very commencement of the war, a division of the French army of Catalonia had advanced from Barcelona upon Tarragona. This was the time when an improper estimate being formed of the state of the Peninsula, corps were sent imprudently to immense distances, as into a conquered or friendly country—general Dupont's into Andalusia and marshal Moncey's to

Valencia. Chabran's division of the 7th corps was ordered to lend a hand to the corps of that marshal, by traversing the whole of Catalonia, and passing the Ebro; but the fierce and universal resistance with which it found itself suddenly surrounded, prevented it, fortunately no doubt, from venturing further. It paused at Tarragona, then turned back, and without striking a blow, abandoned a position, the conquest of which was destined subsequently to cost us so much blood. The Spaniards immediately appreciated its importance, and applied themselves to increase its strength. We have already seen that they had made of it an entrenched camp, whence their army manœuvred with advantage on the Llobregat, the Segre, and the Ebro, against our corps of troops, according as we made progress in the interior of the province. A multitude of hands were meanwhile employed in rendering this fortress in some measure impregnable; for, after the loss of Barcelona, it was the only medium of communication for the Catalans with Cadiz, Valencia, and the English. Considerable additions had been made to the fortifications which we have just described. The mouth of the Francoli had been occupied by a redoubt, placed on its left bank, the object of which was, in the first place to secure to the town the communication with fresh water, after the besiegers should have cut off that conveyed by the aque-

ducts, and, in the next, to protect the harbour and the anchorage. This work, which formed a very advanced point, was connected with the enclosure of the lower town by a long line parallel to the sea, supported intermediately by the lunette called the Prince's. Lastly, batteries had been placed on the Mole to protect the gorge of these new works.

But what served more particularly to augment the strength of Tarragona, was the erection of a new fort on the plateau of the Olivo, a point of equal elevation with the town, and only four hundred toises distant from it.

Its occupation rendered the two-fold service of ridding the place of an inconvenient neighbourhood, and taking reverses upon any attacks which the besiegers might have attempted against the north and west sides. This fort had the form of an irregular horn-work, with a front of two hundred toises. The ditches, twenty feet deep, and forty wide, were cut out of the rock, and preceded by a covered way, partly finished. An embattled gallery, backed by a wall, surmounted by a palisade *en fraise*, closed the gorge. Upon this there were two gates defended by redans; the right side was not completed, but a scarp two hundred feet in height partly compensated for it. The branches of the horn, as well as the gorge, were well protected by the fire of the place. Within this extensive work, on the right side, was a safety entrenchment which was also

in the shape of a small horn-work: it was surmounted by a platform, armed with three pieces of cannon, casemated, which threw their shot far upon the plateau, and into the ravines of the contiguous country. The left bastion was separated from the rest of the work by a ditch bordered by a parapet, and thus formed a sort of entrenchment. The fort of the Olivo, armed with about fifty guns, was manned habitually by twelve hundred soldiers.

The generals of the engineers and artillery multiplied their reconnaissances on all the points of the town and forts, which altogether presented a defence of vast extent; the commander-in-chief, aided by their skill, examined the different fronts and calculated the chances; and after a thorough discussion of the subject, it was decided to attack it by the lower town and the Francoli. The works which the enemy had there accumulated presented themselves in a point, so that the assailants might screen themselves from the great development of his artillery. This attack, which would have the immediate effect of cutting him off from the access to the Francoli, and very soon from the use of the port itself, afforded a hope of reducing the besieged to the brackish water of the wells, and of rendering the communication with the English squadron difficult and precarious.

The two other sides of the fortress presented

much greater obstacles. The northern, forming a right line of nearly a thousand toises, might be considered as inaccessible, as well from the impossibility of embracing it by our attacks, as on account of the steepness of the ground on which most of the works were seated. The east side was protected by the line of forts or lunettes, situated also upon bare and lofty rocks, for the attack of which we found neither soil suited to the operations, nor situations favourable for the establishment of breaching batteries. It was a serious but inevitable inconvenience to have to take the fort of the Olivo before we besieged the town; this could scarcely have been dispensed with, even in making the attack on the east front, on account of the long and laborious circuit which our guns and ammunition must have taken, in proceeding by the environs of this fort from Canonge to the point of attack. In opening the trenches on the side next to the Francoli we were sure to find a good ground, and the artillery would have no further obstacles; these two motives added to the preceding deserved the most serious consideration.

But in the first place it was necessary to remove the squadron and the gun-boats, which lay along the beach near the Francoli, and fired the moment any of our soldiers appeared upon the shore. In the night between the 7th and 8th of May, general Rogniat caused a great redoubt

to be marked out on the sea-shore, about six hundred toises from Fort Francoli, which was to afford a point of support against landings, and to protect the coast batteries which it was proposed to establish; it was itself to be armed with twenty-four pounders. The men worked quietly at it during the night; after it was light the ships approached and kept up an exceedingly brisk fire, which however did scarcely any damage; the works were prosecuted. On the following days three new coast batteries were commenced to the left of the redoubt, nearer to the place and to the mouth of the Francoli. To gain a solid establishment on that river, a grand communication was opened obliquely from the redoubt to the high road and the bridge, defiled by the fire of the Olivo and of the sea for a length of six hundred toises. Thence the right bank was crowned to its extremity for the length of five hundred toises, and a permanent fire of musketry was established for the purpose of annoying the watering-parties of the enemy. These first establishments of the artillery, armed with twenty-four pounders and mortars, soon caused the enemy's fleet to change its line of anchorage; it ceased its fire, which had till then annoyed our works and the camps, kept habitually beyond our reach, and thenceforward approached the coast only at intervals during the siege. On the 14th, however, some landings were attempted under the protection of a warm

cannonade, while two thousand men, sallying from the place, supported by one hundred and fifty horse and two field-pieces, advanced upon our works near the Francoli and the sea-shore. Captain Maillard of the engineers shut himself up with the labourers in the yet unfinished redoubt, and repulsed all the attempts that were made upon it. The troops of general Habert's camp marched immediately to his relief; the enemy was compelled to re-embark or to return precipitately to the place, without having been able to damage our works.

Salme's brigade was so near to the enemy in front of fort Olivo that our posts had been obliged to entrench themselves; and every day there was obstinate fighting on both sides. The Spaniards displayed extraordinary enthusiasm: having the advantage over us of being assisted by their artillery, they, though always repulsed, inflicted upon us serious losses. The brave 7th and 16th regiments bore these fights and a continual cannonade with admirable firmness: from fifty to sixty wounded were daily carried to the hospital. To diminish the dangerous effects of this forced situation, the commander-in-chief, in the night between the 13th and 14th, caused an attack to be made on two entrenchments, which supported themselves to the right and left upon a little knoll, occupying the centre of the plateau by which we could advance against the

fort, and which forbade the approach to it by commanding the ravines to a considerable distance. Eight companies of elite belonging to the French 7th and 16th of the line, and the Italian 2nd light and 4th of the line, carried them by the bayonet without firing a single shot. Four hundred labourers followed; as soon as the troops had established themselves, they turned the work; and in spite of the case-shot, they placed themselves, by means of the gabions and earth which they brought with them, in a condition to support a sortie in the day-time. The Spaniards actually had the audacity to advance in three columns, each led on by an officer marching at its head with the colours in his hand. Our brave men received them at the muzzles of their guns: the officers reached the foot of the entrenchment, and there perished while planting their colours; the troops were repulsed, and left upon the ground about forty killed and wounded. We tried to pick up some of them and to enter into a parley with the soldiers in the fort, for the purpose of sounding the dispositions of the garrison of the town: but cries of fury and musket-shots were the only answer. We saw beforehand that any proposal to capitulate, either before or during the siege, would be fruitless if such a state of mind was kept up.

Till the works of our engineers and artillery

should enable us to take the direct offensive, it was in some measure left to the garrison, which endeavoured several times, and at all points, to provoke to fight our troops stationary in their positions. On the 14th, six hundred Somatens approached our camps, and attacked a reconnoitring party of the Italian division at the village of Callar; at the same time the garrison made a sortie by the Barcelona gate. General Palombini vigorously repulsed it; a piquet of dragoons hastened to the succour of the Italians at Callar, and cut in pieces or dispersed the Somatens. Next day general Palombini, with his brigade, was sent upon Vendrell and Arbos to disperse the assemblages; he received the submission of several towns and villages.

On the 18th, at three in the morning, six thousand men sallied from the place, crossed the bridge, and advanced in several columns upon the two battalions of the 116th, encamped a little in the rear of the Francolí. At the first onset they had some success: the 5th light was near the spot, and served at first for a reserve; a sanguinary combat ensued, in which French valour had to contend with the utmost degree of Spanish obstinacy. General Habert, with the 117th, soon came up to the support of his first brigade, which was engaged, while the 1st light and a column of cavalry, directed by the commander-in-chief in person, pushed on by

the banks of the Francoli, under the cross-fire of the Olivo, the town, and the fleet. The enemy was forced to give way by this manœuvre, and returned with the loss of two hundred men. On our side we had one hundred and fifty killed and wounded; among the latter were colonel Rouelle, and chef-de-bataillon Alexandre of the 116th. Lieutenant Elie, of the 5th light, an officer of extraordinary valour, was slain at the moment when he was running his sword through the body of a Spaniard.

If Tarragona had not been a sea-port, and our land army had been able to blockade it completely, these daily conflicts would have afforded us the advantage of gradually exhausting the garrison, and depressing its spirit by the inutility of the results. But the case was totally different: the port was kept in continual bustle by the English and Spanish ships. A convoy arrived from Valencia, bringing ammunition, money, provisions, and a reinforcement of four thousand men. We learned from deserters that Campoverde, leaving a garrison of from seventeen to eighteen thousand men, had set out again with the rest of the troops to join general Sarsfield and baron d'Eroles, promising to keep the field, and to manœuvre without, in order to raise the siege while the garrison, on its part, was to redouble its efforts and activity.

A few days afterwards he returned to the town,

further reinforced the garrison, and definitively committed the defence of the place to general Senen de Contreras, who had just arrived from Cadiz. He was an able and at the same time an energetic man, equally capable of keeping up the courage and zeal of the troops of the line and of directing, by sharing, the ardour of an enthusiastic population.

On the 20th, at five in the afternoon, our posts on the sea-shore, upon the road to Barcelona, were attacked; and a column of eight hundred Spaniards, sallying from the gate of St. Anthony, audaciously advanced towards the little redoubt beside Loretto: meanwhile, another column, with two howitzers, advanced upon Fort Olivo, and marched straightway to our entrenchments: but we were solidly established there. In presence of our camps, which flew to arms and showed reserves ready on all sides, the voltigeurs of the 7th and 16th awaited the enemy without flinching, and repulsed him. Lieutenant Mangin of the 7th received three wounds, while advancing with captain Lacroix upon the howitzers of the enemy. General Salme directed the troops and animated them by his example. The 1st light took part in the action by bearing down upon the flank of the enemy's column. After a vain attempt it returned to the fort, at the very moment when the brave captain Colo, of the Italian 4th of the line, commanding the redoubt, threat-

ened by the eight hundred Spaniards, forced them to retire, after repulsing all their attacks. Captain Curioni, of the 5th of the line, stationed on the sea-shore, was equally successful.

On the same day, the 20th of May, a corps of Spanish chasseurs, of about twelve hundred men, commanded by general Sarsfield, advanced by Valls to Alcover, and took a position there. General Suchet resolved not to permit them to establish themselves so near to us; he first sent one hundred and fifty men of the garrison of Reuss to occupy the heights of Silva, and ordered general Boussard to march against Sarsfield, with two battalions of the 14th and of the 1st of the Vistula, one hundred and fifty cuirassiers, and some lancers. The Spaniards occupied the steep hill called Mount Calvary, and the convents which command Alcover; they had kindled fires to make known their arrival to the place and the fleet. Never was a position of such difficult access carried with greater ardour and rapidity. The cavalry being unable to act, general Boussard, on foot, put himself at the head of the tirailleurs, with colonels Kliski and Estève, and captain Desaix, aide-de-camp to the commander-in-chief. The voltigeurs clambered from stage to stage, under a destructive fire, to which they could only reply by hastening their progress and rushing to the at-

tack. They drove back the enemy every where, reached the top, put him to flight, and pursued him as far as fatigue would permit them. This action cost us eighty-one wounded, and eleven killed, among whom were two officers. Captain Torcy, of the voltigeurs, received a mortal wound.

Three days afterwards, Sarsfield marched to Monblanch, summoned the brave chef-de-bataillon Année, who commanded there, and threw in the fire of some howitzers. Année was not to be intimidated: generals Frere and Palombini arrived with succours, and forced Sarsfield to abandon his enterprise and to retire. These repeated attempts determined the commander-in-chief soon afterwards to evacuate Monblanch, and to re-annex the troops composing the garrison to their regiment.

Of all the distant points, the most vulnerable was our line of Mora, the principal dépôt of the corn and flour which supplied the army. Our convoys were frequently attacked between Mora and Falset. On one of these occasions, the Polish captain Mrozinski exhibited a proof of what courage combined with coolness is capable of effecting. Passing through Gratallops with a detachment of two hundred French and Poles, he was surrounded by a thousand Spaniards, made a desperate defence, exhausted his am-

munition and provisions, and afforded time to the troops at Mora to relieve him.*

The Spaniards and English made various attempts to seduce our soldiers. To this end proclamations in French, German, Italian, and Polish, were circulated through the country, and even close to the camps, but without producing any other effect than contempt. Our soldiers, who are sometimes guilty of desertion at home, are invincibly averse to desertion to the enemy. National feeling, esprit de corps, a great and glorious enterprise to accomplish, strongly attach them to their banners and their comrades. The following fact will serve to show the kindly affections that are met with in these men, frequently regarded as ferocious and destitute of humanity, and painted in these false colours by our enemies. At Tarragona, as in the preceding sieges, the commander-in-chief caused the bombs and cannon-balls that were brought back to be paid for. The chasseurs of the 5th light, from the position of their camp, were near the sea, and the fire of the place: they had an opportunity to collect a great quantity of balls thrown by the enemy, and having carried them to the park of artillery, had received the price of them, amounting to four hundred francs. From a generous feeling, they resolved to devote the

* See Notes and explanatory documents, No. 17.

whole of this sum to the comfort of their comrades wounded in the sortie of the 18th: the money was accordingly carried to Reuss, and immediately distributed in the hospital.

About this time the commander-in-chief suspended the works on the Francoli, for the purpose of directing his attention and his means to the attack of fort Olivo, for which it was at length possible for him to prepare seriously without further interruption. In the night between the 21st and 22nd, the officers of engineers, supported by picquets of infantry, opened a trench in zigzags, beginning at the left of our first parallel, (for such we considered the two entrenchments taken from the enemy in the night between the 13th and 14th,) and running on the right of fort Olivo, towards a small knoll, about sixty toises distant, which offered a little earth for the establishment of a breaching battery. The work proceeded slowly by sapping through the rocks, and by favour of a vein of earth which was discovered in this quarter. The fire of the town and fort killed and wounded many of our men by the shivers of stone.

In the night between the 22nd and 23rd, the crowning of the knoll was completed: the artillery immediately set about the establishment of the breaching battery, which was to consist of four 24-pounders. Three others were constructed at the same time; one of three eight-inch

mortars, to the right, in the parallel, another of three 16-pounders to the left, for a counter-battery; and the third of two six-inch howitzers, beyond the left of attack, to batter the fort on its right and to enfilade it in its whole length. The ground was so difficult that these batteries could not be got ready to fire before the morning of the 28th.

In the night between the 27th and 28th, the breaching battery being finished, it was necessary to remove thither the four 24-pounders with which it was to be armed. It was impossible to make use of horses; the soldiers therefore, eagerly harnessed themselves and drew them. Heard and almost seen by the enemy, at so small a distance, they were crushed by grape-shot; but their ardour was proof against every thing, and the places of those who fell were immediately filled up. Throughout the whole camp there was a general impatience to see our artillery, at length, answer the fire of the place, which had so long annoyed us. The besiegers seized this critical moment to make a vigorous sortie. General Salme, who watched without intermission over the success of the operation, had his reserves quite ready; he hastened up immediately and cried: "Brave 7th, forward!" when a Biscayan struck him upon the head and he fell dead. Our soldiers, enraged at the loss of their general, rushed upon the Spaniards,

overthrew them, and pursued them under the very walls of the fort. General Salme possessed the first military qualities in the highest degree: his boldness and intrepidity hurried away the men. The commander-in-chief felt sincere sorrow for the loss of this general officer, who had been but a short time under his command, but whose services he appreciated, and for whom he had obtained a reward, the intelligence of which did not arrive till some days after his death. The whole army regretted him; the soldiers of the 7th and 16th were particularly incensed and vowed to revenge him. These brave men, who were daily more and more excited by the increasing fury of the Spaniards, set an example of unshaken firmness. They had borne for twenty-five days a continual fire of artillery, and already numbered from five to six hundred men *hors de combat*. The commander-in-chief caused the body of general Salme to be buried beneath a portion of the Roman aqueduct, which was near the camp of his brigade; and his heart, which was embalmed, and was intended to have been interred in fort Olivo, was deposited under the tomb of the Scipios, on the road to Barcelona.

Eager to prosecute our works, we opened our fire against the Olivo on the morning of the 28th of May. The fort answered it briskly during the whole day, but slackened towards

night, in proportion as we acquired the superiority. The fire of the place never ceased to do us great injury; the gunners had much to suffer in their batteries. The parapets of the fort and those of the platform were thrown down; and a breach was opened in the angle of the right of the fort. Duchand, chef-d'escadron of artillery, who commanded this attack, signalized himself by his valour, and won admiration by the precision of his aim. Several different times he was seen standing up on the epaulements defying death, and by this act of rash courage electrifying the gunners. Natali, chef-d'escadron of artillery and captain Berri were wounded. On the 29th, the fire re-commenced at day-break: our first shots dismounted three pieces which the enemy had replaced during the night. The fire of the fort was almost silenced; ours was kept up all day to widen the breach. Preparations were made for the assault. The honour of it was specially reserved for the 7th and 16th regiments, for the same men who had carried and defended with such vigour the approaches to the fort. Such was the spirit of emulation which inflamed the army, that these brave fellows, fearing lest their losses should cause them to be judged too weak to form the columns of attack, begged their colonels to solicit of the commander-in-chief the preference to mount the breach as a

right which they had earned. This act of devotedness was a pledge of success.

It was probable that on the issue of this assault would depend that of the siege of Tarragona. A reverse might be attended with disastrous consequences; the spirits of Catalonia would be raised by it, especially at a moment so near to the surprise of Figueras, the effect of which it was of importance to diminish. It behoved us nevertheless to act; and prudence itself enjoined us to lose no time. We could not stir a step to attack the town till we were masters of the Olivo. In this state of things, to accelerate the assault was perhaps the surest way to avoid new difficulties. The danger was great and the obstacles were numerous; but circumstances were urgent and the soldiers excellent. The commander-in-chief ordered the columns of attack to be formed: he assembled their officers to explain to them the importance of the enterprize to which they were about to attach their names, and to give them his instructions in person. He passed among the ranks of the soldiers and saw that they had no need to be excited. Between eight and nine in the evening, as soon as it was dark, the signal was given for the assault of the fort and at the same time for a feint of a general attack on the town.

The whole army was in fact to take part in the action. On the one hand, general Habert,

with his division on the Francoli, on the other, general Balathier, with the Italians, on the road to Barcelona, answered the concerted signal with a long huzza, and pushed forward some hundreds of tirailleurs upon the advanced works of the place: all the drums of the two divisions, assembled at different points, beat the charge-step in quick time. The darkness of the night contributed to increase the alarm of the besieged, and their uncertainty respecting our real design. To this offensive movement, which was prolonged upon the entire line, the place could reply only by the fire of all its batteries and all its ramparts. The vast amphitheatre which Tarragona presents appeared to be in a blaze with the fire of the cannon, mortars, and musketry, and the *pots à feu* and grenades bursting on all sides amid the darkness: the fleet too, either by rockets and luminous projectiles, or by firing at random at different parts of the coast, added to the effect of this nocturnal conflict. A spectacle so magnificent would have sufficed to give energy, had it been needed, to our combatants engaged on the Olivo.

Shortly before the signal, several detachments of the 1st light were sent by general Laurency, some to feign, by a brisk fire of tirailleurs, an attack on the left of the fort, at the same time approaching as near to it as possible; the others to penetrate further between the fort

and the town, and to prevent the retreat of fugitives or the arrival of reinforcements. By a fortuitous circumstance, which might have been mischievous to us, but which, as things turned out, proved beneficial, a column of twelve hundred men, coming from the town to relieve the garrison of the fort, began to enter it just at the moment when the signal was given, and when our columns of assault were debouching from the trench.

The first, consisting of three hundred men of the 7th, leaving behind their sacks that they might be the lighter, was commanded by the chef-de-bataillon, Miocque, and proceeded directly towards the breach. The second, under the commandant Revel of the 16th, composed like the first, turned the right of the fort, to attack the gorge and to break open one of the gates. Captain Papigny, of the engineers, preceded it with thirty sappers, provided with axes and ladders. He reached the gate at the moment of its being shut; the column of twelve hundred Spaniards mentioned above had just entered precipitately, followed by a detachment of the 1st light, which pressed it so closely, that serjeant Delhandry and about thirty of our voltigeurs had rushed in pell-mell with it. The sappers endeavoured to break down the gate with their axes, but without success; the intrepid Papigny attempted to climb over for

the purpose of opening it inside. But, though there was some confusion within, a terrible fire was opened, and several of the sappers fell; Papigny himself received a mortal wound; his last words were about his mother. While the column was crowding up to the gate, the commandant Revel ordered some of the sappers and grenadiers to apply long ladders to that part of the scarp which was without ditch: our brave fellows, on reaching the top, rushed in to the gate, opened it, and admitted their comrades, who advanced with crossed bayonets.

At the same instant the commandant Miocque, accompanied by young Desaix, aid-de-camp to the commander-in-chief, arrived with his column facing the point battered by our artillery, descended into the ditch, and as the breach was neither sufficiently wide, nor very practicable, he caused the ladders to be applied in order to get upon the scarp, the parapets of which were destroyed. It was twenty feet in height, and the ladders were only fifteen. Serjeant Meunier, of the miners, placed himself on the top of the longest, and made the voltigeurs clamber up on his shoulders. His example was instantly followed, but this method was too slow, and the fire of the Spaniards was brisk and destructive. Fortunately the officer of engineers, Vacani, had previously observed, at the extremity of the ditch on our left, the conduit of the aqueduct

covered with brick, which the Spaniards had imprudently preserved, though it had brought them no water since the investment of the place. It was armed with a triple row of palisades: these soon fell under the axes of the Italian sappers, led on by their brave and intelligent captain. The grenadiers, closely following him and Meyer and d'Eschallard, aides-de-camp to the commander-in-chief, rushed forward into this narrow and dangerous passage. They penetrated into the interior of the fort, and proceeding along the rampart, overthrew, killed, or put to flight, such of the enemy as were engaged in firing upon the ditch and opposing the escalade. Revel's column hastened, on its part, to join that of Miocque; but the latter fell, struck by a ball which broke his thigh. The Spaniards, cooped up against the left of the Olivo—an isolated work, as we have said, within the fort itself—defended themselves there like lions, though embarrassed by their own number. The entrenchment and the platform redoubled their fire upon the assailants; the latter, masters of the gate, the breach, and part of the ground, were nevertheless stopped and taken between two fires at the moment when the cry of *Victory!* resounded from all parts, and proclaimed to the town and the camps as finished the sanguinary struggle which still continued.

General Harispe, commanding the reserves,

had approached: he narrowly escaped being crushed on the brink of the ditch by a bomb, which covered him with dirt and stones and scarified his face. He lost no time in despatching a reinforcement after the column of Miocque to reanimate the action and decide the victory. The execution of this important measure he assigned to the chief of his staff, colonel Mesclop, a spirited officer, equally brave and zealous. He hastened up with five hundred Italians of the 2nd light, and 4th, 5th, and 6th of the line, headed by the chefs-de-bataillon Marcogna and Sacchini. French and Italians rushed afresh upon the enemy. One of the columns, after prodigious efforts, broke into the entrenchments and penetrated to the platform, the fire of which was instantly extinguished. Conquerors and incensed, our soldiers could no longer be restrained; the Spaniards, crowded up on the left, were forced into their last entrenchment: they still continued to fight, but like desperate men, merely to sell their lives as dearly as possible, and were put to the sword. Colonel Mesclop had hastened to stop the carnage on the platform as soon as it was in his possession; at length, the firing and resistance having every where ceased, our soldiers began to listen again to the voice of their officers. Their bayonets rested, and quarter was given to enemies beaten down and throwing away their arms. About a

thousand soldiers, and sixty-six officers, among whom were the commandant covered with ten wounds, the chief of his staff, and six lieutenant-colonels, were made prisoners of war: all the rest had perished.

No sooner was the conquest of the Olivo completed, than measures were taken to secure the possession of it and to establish order there. The prisoners were conducted to the camp, the wounded carried away, and the dead thrown into the ditches. The officers of engineers took eight hundred labourers who followed the reserve of general Harispe, and employed them in making flights of steps on the breach, throwing bridges over the ditch, securing the lodgings and communications, sheltering the interior of the fort from the fire of the place, and organising its defence against the efforts of the garrison. The commander-in-chief, with generals Rogniat and Valée, examined the very same night the state of the fort, and gave the command of it to general Ficatier, who had been put at the head of Salme's brigade before the assault. We found one hundred and thirty thousand cartridges, ten thousand weight of powder, forty-seven pieces of cannon, fifty thousand sand-bags and a store of provisions.

Next morning three thousand men came out of the town, and, probably conceiving that the Olivo was not yet in a condition to defend itself,

marched to attack it under the fire of the ramparts; but such was the moral situation of our soldiers, that the task of repulsing them might have been safely left to the garrison of the fort alone. The camps, nevertheless, pushed forward reserves, and general Laurency advanced upon the flank of the column, which lost no time in returning, without daring to commit itself. Some prisoners, picked up by our men, were questioned respecting the impression which the capture of the Olivo had made in the town: they confessed that it had alarmed the soldiers and the inhabitants. One of them gave one of those characteristic answers which display all the *naïveté* of national pride blinded by enthusiasm. After recapitulating the means of defence of the fort, which had been considered as impregnable, and declaring his inability to comprehend how we had made ourselves masters of it, he added: *Nosotros mismos no le hubiéramos tomado*—"We ourselves should not have taken it." If, however, the Spanish officers were sensible of the magnitude of this loss, they soon effaced the impression of it from the minds of their soldiers; they found means to revive their confidence, and to inflame anew that animosity against us which was assiduously encouraged. It was doubtless for this reason that the governor persevered in rejecting all letters and flags of truce, even in spite of the most plausible motives.

General Suchet, on the contrary, sought to establish with him one of those relations which are authorized by the right of nations, and which might have had the effect of bringing about, towards the end of the siege, a mutual understanding, and checking the effusion of blood. He proposed a suspension of arms for a few hours, for the purpose of rendering the last duties to the dead. The number of dead Spaniards which surrounded the Olivo, in sight of the very ramparts of the place, naturally induced a belief that such a proposal would be well received by the Spanish soldiers, and that this consideration would cause it to be accepted. The governor, however, replied negatively in the rudest manner, and not one cannon or musket shot less was fired on that account. We were obliged, in hot weather and on a rocky soil, where no depth of mould was to be found, to burn the dead; and this practice we continued till the conclusion of the siege.

A multitude of daring deeds had marked the reduction of fort Olivo. It would be impossible to recapitulate them here, nor indeed could the commander-in-chief introduce them all in his report to the government; but he neglected not to make them known to the army, and congratulated his soldiers on the display of such bravery and firmness. Justice and gratitude impelled him to hold this language; he had no oc-

casion for it to excite their ardour, which was inflamed to the highest degree. The obstinacy and fury of the Spaniards kindled in their minds vehement anger and a desire of revenge. The difficulties which were yet to be overcome would not permit the commander-in-chief to weaken these sentiments. He considered with anxiety all that he had yet to accomplish before he could enter Tarragona. He was operating between an English fleet and an army of relief, which was manœuvring near him to cut him off from the town, and before a numerous garrison which defended itself with desperation. He had, therefore, no other course left but to bear up against difficulties, to make the most of all his resources, and to animate his soldiers by all the means calculated to keep up their emulation and their energy.

CHAPTER XII.

Opening of the trenches against the lower town.—Construction of the batteries.—Assault and capture of fort Francoli.—Continuation of the works of the siege.—Assault and capture of the Prince's lunette.—Assault and capture of the lower town.—Opening of the trenches upon the upper town.—Campoverde approaches for the purpose of raising the siege.—The commander-in-chief marches against him.—Campoverde retires.—Construction of the last batteries.—Opening of a breach in the body of the place.—Assault and capture of Tarragona.

The unexpected event which had urged our march upon Tarragona in the first days of May had not allowed time for collecting there the means of siege, coming by successive convoys from Tortosa and the col de Balaguer. We had been obliged to wait twenty days before we could open the trench or fire upon fort Olivo; and the artillery had been forced to make a long and toilsome circuit to bring the cannon upon a place so elevated and so steep. No more of these obstacles were to be encountered in the attack of the lower town, for which preparations were made without loss of time. It was decided that this attack should embrace the front of the bastions of

St. Charles and the Canons*, beginning first with the little fort Francoli, which formed a point in advance.

During the attack of fort Olivo the artillery had commenced the batteries, Nos. 9 and 10, which, placed on the right bank of the Francoli, near its mouth, had the double destination to keep off the enemy's fleet from the port and the coast, and subsequently to subserve to the principal attack. Our establishment on the Francoli was to support the right of the trenches which we were about to open.

In the night between the 1st and 2nd of June two thousand labourers were placed at the disposal of general Rogniat. These were supported by twelve hundred trench guards, both led and officered according to the regulations of service observed in the preceding sieges. The commander-in-chief sent colonel Meyer, his first aid-de-camp, with colonel Henri of the engineers, who in all the sieges of the army of Arragon was charged with the opening of the trenches and the direction of the principal attack. The first parallel was commenced nearly one hundred and thirty toises from the covered way of the bastion of the Canons and from fort Francoli, upon an extent of three hundred toises. It was connected by a communication in the rear with the stone

* The latter is called by Contreras the bastion of Orleans.

bridge of the Francoli; but as the passage of this bridge was much exposed, advantage was taken of the depth of the channel of the river to construct a bridge upon props close to the stone bridge, so that the latter served for an epaulement against the fire of the place. In order that the left of the parallel, though protected by the Olivo, might not be too weak in case of a night sortie, a redoubt was begun there. The right, in approaching the Francoli, was supported upon our first works on the right bank and on the batteries Nos. 9 and 10. In some parts of the trench the labourers found themselves upon the rock, and it was found necessary to set the miners to work. The enemy made in the day an ineffective sortie. The following night the communication was continued along the left bank of the Francoli four hundred toises above the stone bridge, where a new bridge upon props was erected, to facilitate the passage of the troops coming from the camps to the trench.

The parallel was prolonged the third night one hundred toises on the right to approach fort Francoli. The enemy had erected on the outside, at the distance of nearly fifty toises in advance, a small arrow, with which he communicated by a kind of counter-approach parallel to the river. We could not allow him to establish himself there; we therefore attacked and drove him out: serjeant Clause, of the sappers, at the head

of a detachment, pursued him to the palisade of the covered way, where that brave man was wounded. The arrow was destroyed and we could then continue our works at that point.

Some deserters came over to us from time to time from the town, and we were informed by them of all that was done and said there. We learned with certainty that Campoverde had rejoined the army of observation, and that Sarsfield had remained to take the command under Contreras, the governor, of what the Spaniards called the sea-line, that is the part which we were attacking, the lower town and the harbour. This change opposed to us, in our principal attack, a man of distinguished courage and talents, and who knew how to animate his troops. Campoverde, with his authority of commander-in-chief, hoped to act from without and to be able to raise the siege. He had despatched the English colonel Green and the adjutant-general Bassecourt to the generals of the two armies of Valencia and Murcia, to solicit succours and to prevail upon them to take our magazines at Mora. They could not in fact have struck a blow that would have affected us more sensibly; for this reason the commander-in-chief had resolved to leave to general Pâris alone the duty of covering at Daroca the right bank of the Ebro and Saragossa; he had directed general Abbé and colonel Dupeyroux to approach the lower Ebro. He even pro-

posed to himself, according to circumstances, to call them in to the siege, which he subsequently did. The succours of the Valencians were conveyed by sea direct to Tarragona. As the diversions which Campoverde suggested were not put in practice, his operations were affected by it. He nevertheless continued, in conjunction with baron d'Eroles and at the head of the active army of Catalonia, to manœuvre against the besieging army.

On the left of the parallel the redoubt was finished in the night between the 4th and 5th. We debouched in advance by two zig-zags, one hundred toises in extent, at the extremity of which was begun the second parallel in the night between the 5th and 6th. The work was pushed to within thirty toises of fort Francoli by full sap, for the very brisk fire of the enemy at so small distance forbade any other mode of proceeding. In the night between the 6th and 7th, general Montmarie, commanding the trench, directed captain Auvray, aid-de-camp to the commander-in-chief, to carry an enemy's post, which, placed on the glacis below the bastion of the Canons, severely annoyed our workmen. Auvray put himself at the head of fifty carbineers of the 1st light, and advancing at a run upon the post without firing, took it and maintained himself there in spite of the efforts of the enemy to dislodge him. It was a kind of redoubt of masonry;

he caused it to be destroyed immediately by the workmen who had followed him. A communication was made between the first and the second parallel, and we advanced to within ten toises of the covered way of fort Francoli.

In the first parallel the batteries Nos. 11, 12, and 13, had been erected in the very first nights and armed forthwith, excepting No. 11, which could not be got ready till the night between the 6th and 7th. It was so near the enemy that the moon, which was then full, gave a view of men, horses, and carriages. Colonel Ricci, the chief of attack, directed the arming of the batteries, with equal activity and courage. The gunners had to suffer much during this operation: captain Ocher, of the artillery, was wounded.

Fort Francoli had faced scarp and counterscarp, covered way, place d'armes, and outer ditch filled with water. On the 7th of June, we began to batter in breach. Our twenty-five pieces in battery opened their fire in the morning. The fire of the place was particularly directed against our breaching battery, No. 9: a battery which the enemy unmasked at the extremity of the mole annoyed us much, but could not prevent the effect of our combined fires upon the fort. Before the day was over, the breach was practicable. The commander-in-chief resolved that the assault should take place

the same night. The dispositions for it were as follows:—Three columns of attack, each composed of one hundred picked men, belonging to the 1st and 5th light infantry, were formed in the trenches, and destined to debouch together and to push on into the fort, preceded by some sappers and the officers of engineers, Béquerel, Foucault, and Guillemain. Adjutant-commandant Saint Cyr Nugues, was that day on duty in the trench. The functions of chief of the general staff, to which he had been appointed by the commander-in-chief, and which he performed five years with the army of Arragon, did not exempt him from the service of the trenches. He had solicited the honour of concurring in it with all the colonels, and he was charged to command the assault of fort Francoli. On the 7th of June, on the signal given, at ten at night, he rushed from the right of the trench, with captain Foucault and captain d'Aramon, followed by one hundred and twenty carbineers of the 1st light, commanded by captain Bouillet. At the same time, captain-assistant Servat de Laisle, with the left column, advanced upon a breach of the communication, with the intention of entering the fort by the gorge; and captain Avis, of the 5th light, with the right column, crossed the Francoli at its mouth, to force his way into the fort on the sea-side. In the centre, the principal column crossed two ditches, having

water up to the waist, and mounted at the breach, under a brisk fire, but of short duration. As soon as the Spaniards saw us come up, they abandoned three pieces of cannon and evacuated the fort, retiring along the beach to the bastion of St. Charles, behind the Prince's lunette. Our soldiers, in their ardour, pursued them to that fort, shouting: "To the town! to the town!" but they were stopped by the obstacle before them, and a tremendous fire of musketry close to their breasts. Colonel Saint Cyr Nugues was directed by his instructions merely to secure possession of the fort and to establish his troops there; he strove, but to no purpose, to check the first excitement of the soldiers, and, in concert with colonel Henri, who came immediately to reconnoitre the work, he conducted them back. They put the soldiers under cover, stationing them in such a manner as to defy the enemy's fire, and to resist the shock of a night attack. They had to turn up the parapets, to make zigzags in the places d'armes to the gorge, where an embattled casemate afforded shelter, to open communications, and to form a passage over a propped bridge, across the ditch full of water. This difficult and dangerous operation, which lasted the whole night, under a shower of case-shot, cost the lives of about thirty men; but it was indispensable, and we were happy at day-light to be under shelter and in safety: for the con-

fined space which we had just occupied became, as if by general agreement, the point aimed at by all the batteries of the lower town and mole, and by the fleet.

The next night, a battery, No. 14, for six 24-pounders, was constructed at the very gorge of fort Francoli: some alterations were made in the old batteries, and preparations commenced for completely closing the harbour, counter-battering the mole, and destroying the works supported on the sea.

The 8th and 9th nights were employed in carrying on the second parallel three hundred toises further, to the communication of fort Francoli. Its centre was only twenty-five toises distant from the salient of the covered way of the bastion of the Canons. At the same time, a new communication was opened from the first parallel to the right of the second. The nearer we approached, the more the artillery of the place annoyed our works. In the day-time, the men proceeded by full sap, at night by flying sap. The labourers were sometimes beaten off, but the officers of engineers and artillery led them back to the work. These two branches of the service, all the men of which are picked, set an example of patience, courage, and intelligence; and their loss was proportionably greater, amidst the dangers which they more than shared. It is only those who have seen these men in trenches

that are capable of appreciating their true value.

On the 12th and 13th, two sorties were made against the Italians on the Barcelona road: both were repulsed with loss, the first time, by major Rossini and captain Curioni, the second by the chef-de-bataillon, Olini, and captain Oletta. The upper town of Tarragona directed the fire of its batteries against all the points that we occupied within its reach, particularly against the left of our trenches, and fort Olivo. We had the misfortune to lose the commandant of that fort, the chef-de-bataillon Revel, whose head was carried away by a ball: he was a distinguished officer, called by his merit to the first military posts and greatly regretted by the commander-in-chief.

General Campoverde had established himself at Monblanch, and made great exertions to collect an imposing corps of troops; he threatened, at one and the same time, the besieging camps and our line of Mora, still hoping for the co-operation of the Valencians in this object. The commander-in-chief despatched general Abbé with his brigade to Mora, whence he proceeded to Cornudella, and into the mountains of Prades. A considerable body of men under one of Campoverde's superior officers, was establishing itself there, with the manifest intention of attacking our convoys. General Abbé attacked it with his

characteristic activity and vigour, routed and dispersed it, and made prisoners of its chief and a great number of his men; this was a signal service rendered to the besieging army.

From the 10th to the 15th, three debouches were made on the point of attack, in advance of the 2nd parallel: the one upon the bastion of the Canons, by two large zigzags in full sap; the second in full sap, double, *debout*, and traversed, advanced upon the capital of the half-moon; by the third, directed against the bastion of St. Charles, we had proceeded by three zigzags to the covered way of the place d'armes, which was crowned. The artillery, on its part, had constructed five new batteries, numbered 15, 16, 17, 18, and 19, embracing in their attack the Prince's lunette and the whole front of the lower town, from the bastion of the Canons to that of St. Charles.

After the example of the gunners and sappers, the infantry soldiers displayed all their energy in these works, executed so near to the enemy, and annoyed by a continual and destructive fire: every day put many men *hors de combat* and a very great number of officers. The commander-in-chief had occasion to distinguish several wounded in the trenches, and among them the chef-de-bataillon d'Eschellard, whom he had long esteemed, the brave chef-de-bataillon adjoint Grange, captain Dupau, of the engineers, whose

modest valour he appreciated, and also captains Lefranc and Morvan.

An English squadron, of two ships of the line, four frigates, the same number of brigs, and thirty transports, had anchored, on the 14th, in the waters of Tarragona, where it had landed two thousand fresh men, and among them some gunners, the most valuable reinforcement that the place could receive since the loss sustained at the Olivo. Thence the English had proceeded to Villanova, where they put on shore six thousand Valencians to reinforce the army of Campoverde. The arrival of these succours raised the spirits of the garrison, and revived the hopes of the whole Catalan population. The enemy's reconnoitring parties came close in our rear, and carried off our foragers; and at Torre den Barra our piquets met with strong detachments of Spanish cuirassiers and chasseurs. The garrison of Tarragona made an attempt to put itself in communication with these troops outside. A detachment of cavalry went out by the Barcelona road, and withdrew the post which defended the cut; and in this manner one hundred and fifty dragoons reached Torre den Barra.

Since the progress of our attacks had brought us so near the place, the trenches and ramparts were on either side manned by infantry, to fire principally on the batteries and the gunners.

Besides the case-shot, and showers of glass grenades, the fire of the musketry redoubled on the part of the besiegers, when our fifty-four pieces in battery opened their fire, on the morning of the 16th, upon the front of attack: it was accompanied with abuse and shouts of rage, which we could hear distinctly. All the parapets were provided with battlements, formed of bags of earth: crowds of Spaniards there succeeded each other, defying the fire of our musketry, though brisk and persevering, and directed their efforts entirely and without relaxation to the silencing of our batteries. They succeeded for a moment in slackening their fire, so severely did our gunners suffer. Towards the close of the day, our principal battery, No. 16, was in disorder, and the centre of our parallel beaten down by the artillery of the place; we had a great number of killed and wounded. The enemy, on his part, had also suffered much; our bombs had set on fire two magazines of the place; a breach was begun in the bastion of the Canons. This conflict became so sanguinary, that it was indispensably necessary to abridge it. It was resolved to make an effort to gain possession of the Prince's lunette, all the parapets of which were destroyed, though the scarp, which was well covered by the glacis, had been merely grazed at top. It had been remarked, that the ditch on its left face, was not carried out to the margin of

the sea. This was the fault of the cuirass, by which it was rendered possible to penetrate to the gorge. The assault was ordered to take place at nine in the evening of the 16th.

General Buget, commandant of the trench, formed two columns of the 1st light, under the chef-de-bataillon Javersac, and kept in readiness a reserve of three hundred and fifty men of the 116th. At the given signal, the fist column dashed on, and, profiting by the weak point which had just been discovered on the beach, turned the enemy, while the second column threw itself into the ditch of the unflanked face, cut down the palisade, planted the ladders, and mounted to the assault. The Spaniards resolutely defended themselves: Javersac, the commander, one of our veterans of Austerlitz, fell dead, as did several of the brave men who followed him. The loss of the commanding officer might have been attended with disastrous consequences. Adjutant-commandant Balathier, and colonel Meyer, who were on duty in the trench, eagerly supplied his place; and the column, redoubling its efforts, remained master of the breach, at the moment when the other column was penetrating by the gorge. About one hundred Spaniards perished; the rest fled, leaving in our hands seven pieces of cannon, and eighty prisoners, among whom was a colonel. Lieutenant Alberspit, of the carbineers of the 1st light, known

in the army for his extraordinary valour, with fifty brave fellows, followed with the bayonet close at the heels of the fugitives. He overtook them at the drawbridge of the cut, which closed the quay in the prolongation of the right face of the bastion of St. Charles: he crossed it pell-mell with them, and though presently assailed by a great number, he determined to maintain his ground and defend himself there. A second Cocles, long did he withstand the continually increasing force. At length he fell, wounded; sergeant Labre supplied his place, and fell in his turn, as did most of the carbineers. A reserve hastened up to their support, and rescued them from the hands of the enemy.

Colonel Henri, with captain Marion de Beaulieu, lost no time in making a lodgment in the work, turning up the parapet, and establishing the communication. In the sap on the half-moon, which, as well as the crown-work, was continued upon the salient place d'armes of the bastion of the Canons, captain Guillemain, of the miners, was wounded, and captain Salimbeni killed. This interesting officer, eager to tread in the steps of his father, a distinguished general of engineers, came from Italy to learn the system of sieges.

The resistance of the Spaniards only increased and became more obstinate, and we were able to estimate it by the loss already sustained. Since the

investment we had had one general, two colonels, fifteen chefs-de-bataillon, nineteen officers of engineers, thirteen of artillery, and one hundred and forty either of infantry or of the staff, killed or wounded; and in the whole two thousand five hundred men, many of whom were gunners sappers, and miners, put *hors de combat*. The commander-in-chief, who sometimes felt anxious about the future, when he considered the consequences of this protracted struggle, saw with pleasure, that the soldiers, full of ardour and energy, longed but to mount the breach again: he had need of this confidence. Resolved to conquer, in spite of all obstacles, he called in Abbé's brigade, and also the 115th regiment, to the siege. The Spanish colonel Villamil, who, at the head of ten thousand men, was watching Mora and Falset, conceived the moment favourable, and appeared, on the 16th of June, before Mora. Colonels Kosinowski and d'Aigremont, with a few companies of infantry, supported by a reserve of cuirassiers, succeeded in breaking his line and putting him to the rout.

All efforts, all hopes, all fears, were concentrated upon Tarragona; it was a combat to the death between the army and the garrison. In the 17th night the batteries were repaired: their fires were so directed as to protect the attack which was about to be made on the bastion of St. Charles, and to cover the establishment of the

breaching battery. Its site was fixed on the terre-plain of the Prince's lunette, where a lodgment had been made the preceding night, and the entire parapet of which required to be moved forward, in order to obtain sufficient space for the recoil of the pieces. This was a difficult operation, at so small a distance from the bastion of St. Charles, the fire of which was not silenced. By means of ten thousand bags of earth an epaulment was quickly made to that battery, which took the No. 20, and was armed with four twenty-four pounders, for the purpose of making a breach in the right face of the bastion of St. Charles, which was sufficiently discovered from that point. The same night a zigzag way was made at the bottom of the ditch of the right face of the lunette to the angle of epaulement, where a third parallel was begun: but the men came to water, which prevented their going deeper, and when it was light they were obliged to abandon part of the work. The sap *debout* was continued nearly to the salient of the place d'armes of the half-moon, and the third parallel was begun. A lodgment was made in the place d'armes of the bastion of the Canons as far as the counterscarp, in order to prepare the descent of the ditch.

The third parallel was finished in the night of the 18th. The descent of the ditch of the bastion of the Canons was commenced as a subterranean

gallery. The men were fired down upon from all quarters: thirty-seven howitzers fell in the crown-work of the counterscarp, which they were obliged to abandon in the day-time. The following night, captain Marion made a strict reconnaissance of the ditch, and the work was resumed. The débouché on the bastion of St. Charles was enlarged and completed: banquettes were formed in the third parallel; and places d'armes and communications were established, to facilitate the passage and the movements of columns of infantry at the moment of the assault. At the bastion of the Canons the palisades were cut, and the barriers of the covered way thrown down. The miners made a flight of steps to render the breach more accessible: this work reflected honour on lieutenant Vacrenier. Captain Marion and lieutenant Raffard were wounded.

It is quite superfluous to repeat any more that the fire of the besieged was terrible and annoyed us exceedingly; on the two points of our works each day cost us at least sixty wounded. From the incessant sound of musketry intermingled with discharges of artillery, one might have conceived it to be a most tremendous battle; and a battle indeed it was, both obstinate and bloody. The best troops of Tarragona, and an energetic commander, general Sarsfield, defended with desperation the port and that lower town,

the fall of which was soon to leave the body of the place uncovered. The fire of the mole and of the English warmly supported the defence of the attacked front. On the 21st of June at day-break, the battery, No. 20, of four twenty-four pounders gave, by opening its fire, a signal which was answered by all the others. Scarcely had we fired a few shots, when an enemy's howitzer caused the explosion of the powder-magazine of that battery: it was overthrown and its embrasures damaged. Colonel Ricci was almost buried under the rubbish; but no sooner was he extricated than he turned his thoughts to the re-establishment of the battery: in two hours the whole was repaired, and the battery in a condition to resume its fire. Our gunners, animated by the cries of the infantry, who demanded the breach and the assault, redoubled their efforts and activity.

At four in the afternoon, three breaches were opened in the two bastions and in fort Royal; the works of the quay appeared to be damaged, and scarcely were a few of the enemy's pieces on the front attacked still in a condition to answer us. The commander-in-chief drew up the columns of attack and reserve in the parallels, and entrusted the command of the assault to general Palombini, who was that day on duty in the trench. Fifteen hundred grenadiers and voltigeurs, with sappers, provided with axes and

ladders, were collected and in readiness to march in the different débouchés. General Montmarie, on the left, formed the reserve, at the head of the 5th light and 116th, either to second the attack, in case of necessity, or to repel the sorties of the upper town. It was supported further to the left by all the fires of the Olivo, and by two battalions of the 7th of the line. Lastly, at the extremity of the line, general Harispe threw howitzers upon the town and shipping, and made demonstrations on the Barcelona road, to amuse and alarm the garrison.

At the given signal, at seven in the evening, the first column, commanded by colonel Bouvier of the engineers, and composed of three hundred picked men, of the 116th, 117th, and 121st, started from the bottom of the ditch of the bastion of the Canons, and rapidly mounted the breach of the *fausse-braie* and that of the bastion. The Spaniards, taken by surprise and briskly pressed, retired fighting to the redan of the gorge. There they stood firm, and stopped short the foremost of our voltigeurs by whom they were pursued; but the grenadiers hastening up behind the voltigeurs, overthrew the Spaniards, and passing over their bodies, cleared the redan and the curtain which is at the back of it. A small auxiliary column of fifty grenadiers of the 115th, commanded by captain Thiébaut of the engineers, aid-de-camp to general Rogniat, had set out

from the crown-work of the covered way of the half-moon: throwing itself into the ditch of that work, and turning it by its right shoulder, it had forced the Spaniards to abandon it. It followed them closely and arrived in time to assist the column of colonel Bouvier, which was at the foot of the breach of fort Royal. This breach was hardly practicable; the earth had scarcely fallen down from it: no time was lost in applying the ladders.

Meanwhile, a second column, under the command of the Polish chef-de-bataillon, Fondzelski, composed of three hundred picked men of the 1st and 5th light, and 42nd of the line, had dashed at the same signal towards the breach of the bastion of St. Charles, likewise supported on its right by fifty grenadiers of the 115th, under captain Baccarini, who, issuing from the ditch of the Prince's lunette, made directly for the quay and the head of the jetty. Fondzelski met with a stout resistance, but he redoubled his efforts. A third column followed him closely and added to the impulsion: the Spaniards at length gave way and fled towards the lower town, whither Fondzelski pursued them, leaping the cuts and overthrowing the palisades. This third column, composed of three hundred carbineers of the 1st light, commanded by colonel Bourgeois, was a reserve destined by the commander-in-chief to support the assault of the bas-

tion of St. Charles, and to push on immediately to the aid of the assault on fort Royal. This officer accordingly, without loss of time, proceeded to the left, and reached the south fronts of fort Royal at the very moment when colonel Bouvier was scaling the opposite side. The Spaniards died defending themselves to the last extremity; we remained masters of that fort and of the bastion of St. Jago, where one hundred and fifty men perished in like manner.

Meanwhile the chef-de-bataillon Fondzelski, having pushed on by the interior of the quay as far as captain Baccarini, fell in there with a strong reserve of Sarsfield's, who, mortified at the loss of so many works, rallied all the men that he had left to defend the harbour and the batteries of the mole. The direction given to the commanders of columns was to entrench themselves in the houses, and to embattle and maintain themselves there if the enemy opposed with considerable force. But colonel Robert of the 117th, specially charged with the right of the attack, advanced immediately by the sea shore, with a reserve of voltigeurs and grenadiers of the 5th light, 42nd 115th, and 121st of the line. His coming restored the combat. The enemy, pressed on all sides, made fruitless efforts; he was broken: driven back to the sea and the mole, he found his retreat cut off; with the exception of a small number, all were put to the sword in the lower town, at the har-

bour, in the houses, as far as the gates of the town, where Douarche, major of the trenches, and de Rigny, aid-de-camp to the commander-in-chief, with a handful of brave men, pursued the hindmost fugitives. Four of our grenadiers arrived pell-mell with them under the very gateway of St. John, where they found an honourable death. At eight o'clock fort Royal, the bastion of the Canons, that of St. Charles, the Mill battery, and the whole of the lower town, were in our possession. The enemy had there lost eighty pieces of cannon.

The first dispositions for placing the troops were immediately made by general Palombini, assisted by colonel Henri. Under favour of an inequality of the ground and a hollow way, which was turned into a sort of trench, the troops were posted in advance of fort Royal, supporting their left on the gorge of the bastion of Santo Domingo. On the right, all the houses of the lower town were occupied; on the morning of the 22nd, we already presented a formidable aspect to the garrison behind its walls, and to the English, useless but not indifferent spectators of a night so disastrous to their allies. Considerable magazines of merchandize fell a prey to the flames; the port was thenceforward in our possession. All the ships, set sail, one after another, proceeded along shore, from the great redoubt to beyond the mole, and passing rapidly before our flank, fired their

broadsides by turns. They poured upon our camps, into our trenches, and on the lower town, a shower of balls which did us no mischief. Encouraged by all this noise, the garrison displayed for a moment the heads of columns and seemed disposed to attempt a sortie; but our soldiers, who had sheltered themselves in the houses from the fire of the English, showed themselves ready to march, and the enemy returned into the place.

The commander-in-chief, with generals Rogniat and Valée, went to reconnoitre the ground occupied, and that upon which the last works against the town were about to be constructed. The first parallel against the upper town was to embrace the front of the bastions of St. Paul and St. John. The position of the posts and reserves was fixed. Order was established as much as possible in the lower town, which consisted in great part of warehouses, and houses without inhabitants, and encumbered with dead. The first cares were bestowed on our wounded, whose number amounted to no fewer than three hundred and seventy-two: we had one hundred and twenty killed. Five thousand Spaniards had there defended themselves against us, and we had scarcely two hundred prisoners, mostly wounded, who had escaped the fury of the soldiers; the rest had perished or gained the inner harbour and the

town; we burned thirteen hundred and fifty-four bodies.

General Suchet thought this day, so fit to suggest serious reflexions to the victor and the vanquished, a seasonable moment for once more proposing honourable conditions to a garrison which had withstood four assaults before the body of the place was touched. On the banquette of our most advanced trench, an officer showed himself at a distance, waving a white handkerchief, but not the least notice seemed to be taken of him upon the rampart. This arrogant refusal only served to augment the fury of our soldiers, which was more and more incensed by every new assault.

In the night of the 22nd, general Montmarie and colonel St. Cyr Nugues, who relieved the trenches, caused the port to be armed against the road, with a view to prevent the embarkations which the enemy still attempted on the inner beach though with great difficulty. Two mortars had already been planted for this purpose near fort Loretto. Two twenty-four pounders and a howitzer were, with infinite labour, drawn from the bastion of St. Charles, and placed in battery at the extremity of the lower town. The guns which the enemy had upon the mole were unspiked and turned against the road.

The first parallel was opened and the site of the breaching batteries was decided upon. The

utmost activity was indispensable in these last works. The nearer we approached to the catastrophe the more the general found himself obliged to accelerate it: delays always raised fresh difficulties. Baron d'Eroles had moved, on the 20th of June, with five thousand men, infantry and cavalry, between Mora and Falset. One of our convoys was attacked; adjutant-major Godleski, who commanded it, managed to place a considerable part of it in safety in a fortified post, and, being unable to save the rest, made fight, retired slowly upon Mora, and succeeded in bringing back his detachment. But at this stage of the siege of Tarragona the loss of a convoy could not compromise the subsistence of the army. Through the care of the purveyor, our magazines at Reuss were supplied for several days beforehand; this was as much as we should want, at least so the commander-in-chief began to flatter himself. He conceived that the movement of baron d'Eroles was designed to draw off his attention from the trenches and to induce him to send a detachment to Mora, whence, on the contrary, he had just called in the 114th, 115th, and 121st regiments, and general Abbé. Had he fallen into this snare, then no doubt baron d'Eroles would quickly have rejoined Campoverde, and the latter, with all his collected forces, profiting by the division of ours, would have attacked the besieging army in the trenches, either to force it to raise the siege, as

the governor daily urged him to do, or to facilitate the sortie of the whole garrison before the catastrophe. This conjecture seems to be confirmed by the printed correspondence of Contreras and Campoverde. General Suchet, however, did not suffer himself to be diverted from his principal operation. Now that the decisive moment was at hand, it was indispensably necessary for him to keep in the trenches and in the camps all the forces that he had at his disposal, in order to be prepared either for the relieving army or for the sorties which the enemy in his desperation might yet attempt.

On the 24th of June, we were able to observe that the garrison kept under arms, and that the town and fleet were in very active correspondence by signals. The reports made mention at the same time of movements of the Spanish army, the scouts of which had shewn themselves at a little distance. The commander-in-chief chose rather to wait for it in his positions than to march against it. Certain of the energy of all the soldiers of his army, he relied sufficiently upon the labourers and trench-guards, on the gunners and sappers, and on our batteries, to resist all the efforts of the garrison for several hours: a few reserves, suitably posted, well disposed and well officered, were to support this resistance. With part of Frere's and Harispe's divisions, the cavalry and the field artillery, the commander-

in-chief presented himself in order of battle beyond the camps, but without moving further than a few cannon-shot from the town. The Spanish general was on the Gaya, and approached our lines, accompanied by general Caro, brother of La Romana, commanding the cavalry, by generals San Juan and d'Eroles, by Sarsfield, who was slightly wounded on the 21st, and had left Tarragona, and lastly by Miranda, at the head of a Valencian division of six thousand men. Thus Campoverde had with him about fourteen thousand infantry and two thousand horse.

The commander-in-chief, though much inferior in strength, yet confident in his troops, hoped for a fortunate issue if he could but grapple with the enemy. Two reconnoitring parties, sent the preceding day towards Callar and Torre den Barra, had fallen in with the Spanish cavalry, cut it up, and brought back about sixty prisoners. But, instead of the combined attack from without and within, which the besieging army expected, on the 25th, with more impatience than uneasiness, it learned from some deserters or prisoners, brought in towards evening, that general Campoverde had moved off in the direction of Villanova, where a landing of fresh troops was announced. That general was desirous of collecting a still greater force before he ventured to attack us; he lost valuable time by this delay, of which general Suchet hastened to take ad-

vantage. Leaving his cavalry to follow and harass the enemy, he led back his troops to the camp, and occupied himself wholly and solely in the preparations for the final assault. On the 26th, we perceived a fleet coming from the coast of Valencia and steering for Villanova de Sitges; the English squadron was also strengthened by several ships from Cadiz. We were informed that they brought two thousand English under the command of colonel Skerret. Every day and every hour rendered it more and more necessary that we should conquer.

The parallels had been finished and improved since the night of the 22nd: the attack embraced, from left to right, nearly the whole front of the upper town, supporting itself on the one hand upon the long curtain in the rear of the bastion of Santo Domingo, on the other upon the cliff next the sea, and traversing the gardens and houses nearest to the bastion of St. John.

The artillery quickly threw up four new batteries. In the evening of the 26th, their construction was completed, but they could not be armed by the next morning. The shortness of the night, and the difficulty of the roads through the works recently established, proved insurmountable obstacles, notwithstanding the unparalleled exertions of the gunners. General Suchet, to his great regret, found himself obliged

to defer the opening of the fire for twenty-four hours longer. He was informed that English officers had landed in the town, that Campoverde was preparing to return with augmented force against our camps, and that a general and combined attack for the purpose of raising the siege was fixed for the 29th. There was not a moment to be lost. Accompanied by generals Valée and Rogniat, he went to hurry on the works in the day-time of the 27th; he every where used expressions of praise and encouragement, and promised the assault for the following day. He was answered by shouts of joy and enthusiasm, which were to him a favourable omen. In the night between the 27th and 28th, the batteries were completely ready. We saw the next morning dawn with the hope that this day would be the last of the defence of Tarragona. The fire was opened early in the front of attack: fort Olivo and all the old batteries which could take part in it fired upon the town: but Nos. 20 and 21 were charged with the principal object, and were to endeavour, in particular, to open the angle of the curtain and of the bastion of Saint Paul. Three pieces, which covered the left face of that bastion, were quickly dismounted. The powder magazine of the narrow bastion of Cervantes exploded, and that work was reduced to silence. The commander-in-chief, uneasy about what was doing abroad, kept the whole morning

in the camps: there he received hourly bulletins from the trench. The aid-de-camp on duty thus wrote to him:

"General, we are performing wonders: two hundred and fifty grenadiers and voltigeurs commenced before day-light a very brisk fire of musketry on the embrasures of the place. Our artillery opened its fire at four o'clock, and it continues in such a manner as to prove that it is superior. The whole of the lower town is shaken. The enemy answers our musketry with perseverance. It appears that the six hundred bombs of this night have produced their effect: they have exasperated the Spaniards, who have greatly annoyed us. The loss of last night exceeds sixty men; but it is, I hope, the last. Accept the augury of this from your most devoted brother,"

Signed, "CHEVALIER DE SAINT JOSEPH."

"From the trench, half-past five in the morning."

At noon, the commander-in-chief was apprised that the breach was well begun, and at one he repaired to the spot. The ramparts were covered with Spaniards, shouting forth abuse and frantically provoking our soldiers. The place answered our fire with a tremendous musketry and cannonade. The epaulements of our breaching batteries were thrown down; but few of our

pieces had suffered, and our intrepid gunners, erect and unprotected, amidst the bodies of the slain and rubbish, continued, with admirable accuracy and coolness, to demolish the face of wall which presented itself as a mark to their pieces.* The breach was perceptibly enlarged; the impatient soldiers watched its progress, burning with desire to mount it immediately. The general had sent on into the lower town, fifteen hundred picked men, whom he destined for the assault. He reviewed them, spoke to almost each individual, and found them to be all that he could wish: ardent, full of spirits, confident in their chief, whom Fortune had hitherto seconded in his enterprises, and eager to signalize themselves by a new exploit, at his command, and under his inspection. He went and congratulated the brave gunners; he saw that the breach was becoming practicable, and summoning generals Habert, Ficatier, and Montmarie, he settled the dispositions for the assault.

All the regiments disputed the honour of being selected; the commander-in-chief adhered to the order of service. Sixteen companies of *élite*, of the 1st and 5th light, the 14th, 42nd, 114th, 115th, 116th, 117th and 121st, and the 1st of the Vistula, were formed into three columns, and given to colonels Ordioni and Saint Paul, and the chef-de-bataillon Felici, all three of the Italian division, under the command of the same general

Habert, who was the first that mounted the breaches of Lerida. Captains Valessie, Maillard, and Pinot, of the engineers, preceded, with the sappers. After the passage of the columns of attack, general Ficatier, who commanded the trenches, was to keep in perfect readiness a reserve of twelve hundred men, of the French 1st and 5th light, and of the Italian 4th, 5th, and 6th of the line, to follow up and support the movement of general Habert. The rest of the army was to be in the trenches or in the camps, under arms, ready to march and to fight; and general Harispe had special directions to guard the Barcelona road. General Montmarie commanded a reserve on the left of the trenches of the lower town, to support the assault directly in case of need. But we learned from the report of a deserter that the Rambla, the principal place or street of Tarragona, was put into a state of defence by cuts, cross-bars, and entrenchments, and that the neighbouring houses were embattled, and manned by soldiers or armed peasants. It was expedient to avoid having to carry on a warfare with houses, when once we should have entered. General Montmarie had orders to take part in the action from the very commencement, by pushing on at the signal for the assault with his reserve to the bastion of the Rosary, and endeavouring to break open the gate for the purpose of getting into the town. To second this opera-

tion, the columns which should have passed the breach were, as they advanced, to throw men to the right and left along the ramparts, and thus turn all the interior defences. For the same reason the time of the assault, which till then had been fixed for the beginning of the night, was changed to an earlier hour, that these movements might be executed without confusion.

At five in the afternoon the signal was given, our fire ceased, and that of the enemy redoubled at the sight of our brave men who issued from the trenches, ran over an uncovered space of sixty toises, and dashed on to the breach. Large aloes, forming a line, at the distance of ten fathoms from the wall, forced the head of our column to turn aside. The Spaniards then hurried up, lining the breach with the most valiant of their officers and men: armed with muskets, halberts, and grenades, and supported by the warmest fire of musketry, they repulsed the assailants, the foremost of whom tottered upon a moving soil, which gave way under their feet. A shower of case-shot poured upon the head of the column. For a moment fortune seemed to waver. The commander-in-chief ordered a reserve to be brought up; all his aides de camp rushed forward: a battalion of officers hastened up: general Habert, colonel Florestan Pepe, the chef-de-bataillon Ceroni, the officers of engineers, the aides-de-camp Meyer, Saint-Joseph, Ricard,

Auvray, Desaix, de Rigny, d'Aramon, the chiefs of the columns and companies, all led the way with intrepidity. Several fell; the columns rallied, the mass formed anew, dashed on, reached the summit, and, like an irresistible torrent, poured through the breach and inundated the ramparts.

This decisive moment was marked by an act of courage, which would figure amongst the brightest recorded in history. At the time of the assault of fort Olivo, Bianchini, corporal of grenadiers of the 6th Italian regiment, had made prisoners, at the very foot of the walls of the town, of some Spanish soldiers, and taken them to the commander-in-chief, who, admiring his courage, asked what reward he could offer him. "The honour of being foremost in the assault of Tarragona," replied Bianchini. This answer might have been no more than presence of mind: it was really heroism. On the 28th of June, this brave man, promoted to serjeant, presented himself, at the moment of the assault, in full equipment, to the commander-in-chief, and claimed the favour which he had promised him. He dashed on among the foremost, received a wound, continued coolly to mount, exhorting his comrades to follow, was struck twice, but still continued to advance, till at length he received a ball in his breast and fell.

Three battalions of picked men, which gene-

ral Contreras had placed behind the breach, were overthrown by our first onset, and pursued into the town, while our detachments proceeded to the bastions along the walls to occupy them according to the directions given. The commander-in-chief immediately ordered the fresh troops of general Ficatier to pass the breach. General Montmarie had rushed forward at a run with the 116th, and made for the gate at the end of the Rambla, preceded by forty voltigeurs, led by two intrepid officers, lieutenant Casalta, and sub-lieutenant Taunay. These, having arrived at the palisades of the covered way, were greeted by the fire of the bastion and of the neighbouring ramparts: they threw themselves into the ditch. The 116th came up, and the sappers broke down the barrier with their hatchets. The voltigeurs discovered a knotted rope, which the enemy had used to let themselves down at night by the embrasure of a casemated battery: by this they penetrated into the interior, and were followed by as many brave men as the narrow passage allowed to enter. An unequal combat ensued between them and the Spaniards, who, by their fire cut up the troops in the ditch outside, and within maintained a struggle with bayonets and the butt-ends of muskets, with the foremost voltigeurs who had entered. In an ordinary circumstance, and at an isolated point, the disad-

vantage would have been too great for the assailants reduced to such a predicament. But this was only an episode of the great scene, and the besieged saw and heard what was passing around them. The chef-de-bataillon Matis, at the head of the 117th, came up behind the 116th, with colours flying and his band playing; and at the same moment shouts of *Victory!* and *Forward!* proceeded from the side towards the breach. Along the ramparts all began to flee. Still, however, the 116th were detained before the gate, which was barricaded and walled up: at this juncture, captain Vacani, who had passed the breach with the Italian sappers, reached the inside of it: they opened the gate, and the column at length penetrated into the interior of the town.

The commander-in-chief sent fresh reserves, and passed the breach in person, while general Rogniat with a few companies of voltigeurs turned the town along the beach, by the Cervantes bastion, caused a battery to be occupied from the cut below, and with the cannon of the Spaniards battered the Queen's lunette, and cut off the retreat of the fugitives to the sea. The defence, which had ceased for a moment when the breach was carried, was renewed with fresh vigour as soon as general Habert's columns reached the Rambla. There a brisk fire of musketry and

obstacles on all sides suspended our impetuous progress.* But this last effort could be productive of no other result than to exasperate the conquerors in the highest degree, not to stop them. The enclosure and several parts of the town were already taken possession of by other troops, which continually succeeded each other: general Habert with a loud voice excited the voltigeurs of the 1st light, the 14th and the 42nd, who rushed upon the intrenchments of the Rambla. The Spaniards made a desperate resistance; a great number of our brave men perished, but by their fall they finally ensured victory to their companions. After this last convulsion, the defence of Tarragona expired; there was no further resistance than that of individuals who, in their flight, still fought for their lives. From that moment the language and the part acted by the generals and officers were changed: till then they had animated the men; they now strove to restrain and to calm them. But their excitement

* The defences of the Rambla are thus described: "Embattled houses, occupied by the regiment of Almanza, which defended them, prevented the French from penetrating, and detained them in the Rambla, till the troops which defended the cut of the old enclosure, above the gate of St. Francis, abandoned it; this opened the passage, and the French, descending by the steps, took that regiment in the rear: it was then obliged to retire, leaving the Rambla covered with killed and wounded."

had reached the highest pitch; it was not possible in so short a time, amid such a scene, to moderate them by words. They were inebriated as it were, by the noise, smoke, and blood, by the recollection of danger, by the desire of victory, by the thirst for revenge. Their uncurbed fury would listen to nothing; nay, they were almost deaf to the voice of their officers. It must be said, however, that a considerable number of Spaniards, pursued into the presence, nay, into the very arms of French officers, whose protection they implored, owed their lives to those same officers who solicited mercy for them of their own soldiers. Contreras, the governor, who had received a wound from a bayonet, had the good fortune to be saved by an officer of engineers. A mass of Spaniards had retired to the cathedral, a spacious and solid edifice, elevated and difficult of access. Our soldiers pursued them, and had to sustain a galling fire in ascending the sixty steps which lead up to the entrance. They soon made themselves masters of it: after so obstinate a resistance, their rage against the combatants knew no bounds; but they paused at the sight of nine hundred wounded stretched within it, and their bayonets spared them. The commander-in-chief was informed of this trait of humanity, and expressed his satisfaction with it. Flandin, the carbineer, of the 1st light, was conducting from thirty to forty prisoners, the first

that were taken on that dreadful day; perceiving the commander-in-chief, he led them up to him. The commander congratulated him, took his name, and promised him a reward, which he subsequently obtained. An officer of the staff was directed to receive in the lower town all the prisoners who should be collected and sent to him during the night. Next morning he had upward of a thousand, most of whom were wounded.

The victory was destined to be crowned by the capture of the garrison. We have seen that precautions had been taken for the attainment of this important result. Seven or eight thousand Spaniards, fleeing from almost certain death in the town, had hurried from the ramparts by the embrasures, or by the gate of St. Antony, to the Barcelona road. General Harispe was there in position with his division and the Italians. The dragoons and the hussars, with the field-artillery, stopped this column in disorder, cut it up and drove it back upon the sea. The English, firing at us, aggravated the horrors of the situation of the vanquished mingled with the victors. The Spaniards threw down their arms, and no time was lost in removing them from the shore. Some drowned themselves, others attempted to flee again towards the town. Our dragoons pursued them, and we saw, with surprise, a column of cavalry entering at full trot a

town taken by assault. Colonel Delort solicited permission for his regiment to defile through the breach, as if to associate it more closely with the victory; the Napoleon dragoons obtained the same honour.

In the night, we succeeded by degrees in restoring order, rallying the troops, and making them bivouac in the Rambla and the public square. The commander-in-chief appointed general Habert to the command of Tarragona, and it was not till he had made such arrangements as circumstances required, that he returned to his head-quarters. Near the Francoli he met young d'Aramon, who had had his leg broken on the breach, borne upon a hand-barrow. This officer, of brilliant courage, had come as a volunteer to the siege of Tarragona, and soon afterwards became aid-de-camp to the commander-in-chief. To the words of consolation which were addressed to him, he replied with warmth: "General, I can bear any thing, since we are in Tarragona."

The majority of the population of Tarragona, having quitted the town before or during the siege, in great part by sea, thus escaped the disasters which the governor and garrison brought upon the place by defying the last assault, which the laws of honour excused them from awaiting, and with which the conqueror would rather have dispensed.

We took nearly ten thousand men and twenty pair of colours; including the guns of Olivo and the lower town, we were in possession of three hundred and thirty-seven pieces of ordnance, fifteen thousand muskets, one hundred and fifty thousand weight of powder, forty thousand cannon-balls and bombs, and four millions of cartridges. These useful results, which we had bought at so dear a rate, we might have lost by a delay of twenty-four hours. Campoverde, who meant to attack us the following day, would not have beaten us; of that we were confident: but, by retarding the assault, he would have augmented the difficulties and afforded new chances; and the 29th might perhaps have been as disastrous a day to us as the 28th was glorious.

A detailed account of the operations and exploits which distinguished this memorable siege is a sufficient eulogy for the army by which it was undertaken and finished. A reference to the plan will enable the military reader to appreciate the labours of the engineers, which were remarkable for boldness of conception, as well as vigour of execution. They made trenches to the extent of five thousand toises, two thousand of which were by full or flying sap; they crowned four covered ways; they made descents and passages to ditches, and flights of steps on the

breaches. Twenty officers of engineers and one hundred and eighty-seven sappers and miners were killed or wounded.

The artillery constructed twenty-four batteries, which were armed with sixty-four pieces of artillery, and opened nine breaches. The enemy had fired one hundred and twenty thousand cannon-shot; we, forty-two thousand, of which thirty thousand were with balls, bombs, or howitzers of the place, sent back after our soldiers had picked up and been paid for them. Nineteen officers of artillery and two hundred and seventy-eight gunners were killed or wounded; and to this number must be added sixty-eight infantry soldiers, who were lent to the artillery as auxiliaries, and perished in the batteries.

Harispe's and Habert's, Frere's and Palombini's divisions displayed admirable zeal, firmness and valour. The Italian and Polish troops were no longer distinguishable from the French. We might be said to have undertaken five successive sieges, or at least, we had made five assaults and stormed nine breaches. The infantry had three thousand seven hundred and fifty men put *hors-de-combat;* one hundred and forty-two officers, thirteen of whom were of the staff, were killed or wounded.

The surgeons and commissioners did the duty of the trenches with zeal: a company of hos-

pital attendants, organised in the military way, appeared for the first time in the army. Through their attentions our wounded men were picked up and carried off: several soldiers of these companies were wounded on the field of battle.

The total of our ascertained loss amounted to four thousand two hundred and ninety-three men, of whom nine hundred and twenty-four were killed; and of the three thousand three hundred and sixty-nine wounded, scarcely half could be restored to the service or survive their wounds, so dreadfully were they mutilated.

In lamenting the miseries and the catastrophe which the vanquished drew upon his head by his obstinacy, or his perseverance, if you please to term it so, it is but just to consider also, what it cost the conqueror, and from what he did to judge what he could have done. A demonstration of this will be found in the Report of general Contreras.*

* See notes and explanatory documents, No. 18.

CHAPTER XIII.

Restoration of order in Tarragona.—General Suchet proceeds in the direction of Barcelona.—He returns to Tarragona.—Dispersion of Campoverde's army.—The commander-in-chief advances against Vich.—He is appointed to the rank of marshal of France.—The army advances against Mont-Serrat.—Description of that position.—Attack and capture of Mont-Serrat.—Occupation of the whole of lower Catalonia.—Return of marshal Suchet to Saragossa.—Partial engagements.—Proposal for an exchange of prisoners.

On the 29th of June, at sun-rise, a very different scene met the eye at Tarragona, in the camps, and along the sea-shore. The fleet had stood out to sea, after having picked up some fugitive Spaniards; nor was it any longer in its power to afford shelter to the rest of the garrison, or to save it from the fate of war. The city, which was blocked up with the wounded and slain, still offered a gloomy spectacle, but it had ceased to be a theatre for the display of unrestrained political fury. It became necessary to take such immediate measures as were most conducive to the public health and tranquillity. General Montmarie, who was entrusted with the temporary command, had issued orders for col-

lecting the wounded and transporting them to the hospitals of Reuss; he also brought together the inhabitants, who were scattered in every direction, and employed them as pioneers in breaking up and removing our trenches and batteries, taking care at the same time that they should be furnished before-hand with rations of provisions from the magazines belonging to the army. No more troops were kept within the city than were indispensable for the maintenance of public tranquillity; the remainder were directed to join their respective colours. The regiments took up arms, and ranged themselves in military order round the numerous Spanish garrison which had fallen into our hands, whether outside the city or within its ramparts. It was collected in an open spot at a short distance from Constanti, and amounted, including the wounded, to nine thousand seven hundred and eighty-one men, amongst whom we reckoned four hundred and ninety-seven officers, several general and other superior officers.

The commander-in-chief passed these troops in review. They presented all the elements of an excellent corps of infantry, well trained officers in the vigour of manhood, active and athletic soldiers, whose appearance bespoke their perfect discipline; it was, unquestionably, a picked garrison, which had just given signal proofs of

its high military character by its powerful defence of the city. He ordered that it might be treated with all the attention that was due to gallant though unfortunate soldiers; directed his surgeon to dress the wounds of the governor, general Contreras, which were fortunately not of a dangerous nature; sent a letter to that officer, and had him removed to his head-quarters. He complained, on the arrival of general Contreras, that all the officers, bearers of his flags of truce, had been sent away unheard, a circumstance which gave rise to the storming of the town, whilst he had intended to offer a capitulation on honourable terms.

The Spanish general neither disavowed his sentiments nor his conduct. After a few explanations worthy of a man of spirit, he received those testimonies of esteem to which his gallantry so justly entitled him. Count Suchet offered him every assistance of which he stood in need, and provided the means for his safe removal to Saragossa and eventually to France*. He made at the same time the requisite arrangements for the departure of the captive garrison in three columns, under the escort of a division of the

* What general Contreras has since written against marshal Suchet, with reference to the storming of Tarragona, is not only at variance with the facts, but with his own previous assertion. See notes and explanatory documents, No. 19.

army, and despatched captain Anthony de Saint Joseph to Paris with intelligence of the taking of Tarragona.

These arrangements had scarcely been carried into effect, when he sent, during the night between the 29th and 30th, the division of general Frere towards Villafranca, and that of general Harispe towards Villanova de Sitges, and followed them in person with general Abbé's brigade of infantry and the cavalry under general Boussard. The object of this sudden movement was to prevent the embarkation of the Valencian forces, and to defeat or disperse the army which was still under the command of general Campoverde, and had attempted a few days before to make us raise the siege of Tarragona. During the whole march along the sea shore, our columns were cannonaded by the English, and the advanced guard on its entrance into Villanova found a great number of vessels collected in the port; detachments of the enemy's troops or stragglers were seen flying in all directions and endeavouring to reach the shipping. Our dragoons charged them on the beach and as far as the water's edge; the greater part of the fugitives fell into our hands, together with about forty officers who were found concealed in the town. The hospitals were filled with eight or nine hundred wounded soldiers of the garrison of Tarragona, who were also made prisoners, and the surgeons of our army were

placed near them, and directed to afford every assistance in their power. General Frere took a few prisoners at Vendrell and Villafranca; some deserters presented themselves with arms and baggage, and we learned that Campoverde had precipitately retreated in the direction of Igualada. The commander-in-chief, feeling satisfied that the Valencian corps had not succeeded in re-embarking, resolved to avail himself of the respite now afforded him, and to repair to Barcelona, for the purpose of conferring with general Maurice Mathieu, who was in command of that city. He reached it with a reserve, by performing a rapid march across the col de Ordal, having left the divisions of generals Frere and Harispe in the positions which they then occupied.

He crossed the bridge of Molinos del Rey, and after reconnoitring the field of battle where marshal Gouvion-St.-Cyr had so completely defeated general Reding in 1808, he reached the foot of the ramparts of Barcelona without falling in with a single French outpost. Experience had demonstrated the necessity of never allowing our troops to quit the city except in strong detachments, in order to avoid the daily and unavailing losses of gallant soldiers, who, when sent out in small numbers, were exposed to incessant attacks from swarms of Miquelets hovering about them. The inhabitants of Catalonia had been roused to the highest pitch of excitement.

It required all the sagacity, prudence, and firmness of count Maurice Mathieu to keep a numerous population in check by means of a weak garrison of five or six thousand men. With a view to calm and bring under subjection a province, to the possession of which he justly attached the highest value, Napoleon had made choice of those officers who were most distinguished for honorable and elevated sentiments. The duke of Tarentum was commander-in-chief of the province; his friend, general Maurice Mathieu, was governor of Barcelona; generals Baraguey d'Hilliers, and Maximien Lamarque were respectively in command of divisions. Confidence had not yet found its way to the breasts of the Catalonians; but their animosity could not fail to exhaust itself and wear away in the course of time, when they beheld the prudence of our measures and the uniformity of our system of government.

During the few hours of his stay at Barcelona, general Suchet acquired a general knowledge of the situation of the country, concerted his measures with general Maurice Mathieu for preventing the re-embarkation of the Valencian forces, and for operating some movement of our troops with a view to promote the success of the blockade of Figueras. In consequence of these arrangements, he immediately returned to Tarragona, in order to make such preparations as would enable him to absent himself for a few

days from that quarter. He sent general Habert, with the 4th division to occupy Tortosa and the frontier of the kingdom of Valencia: that general was instructed to re-establish the post of La Rapita at the mouth of the Ebro, and to strengthen that position so effectually as to enable it to oppose any further attempt of the English, and to protect French vessels seeking shelter in the port.

General Musnier, who commanded the 1st division, was entrusted with the defence of Tarragona and Villafranca; he was to direct the construction of little forts and batteries along the sea-shore, to keep the country in check, and secure the due assessment and payment of the contributions which we were under the necessity of levying for the subsistence of the army, a measure which it was the more painful to resort to, as it alienated the public mind, and augmented the difficulties and dangers with which we were beset, amongst a people whose proud and vindictive spirit keeps pace with their poverty.

The advance of our troops against Villafranca, on the 30th, having prevented the Valencians from embarking at Villanova, Campoverde, on commencing his retreat, had no other object in view than to gain the start of our columns, by forced marches. He at first effected his retreat as far as Cervera, whence, not deeming himself safe here, he removed to

Agramonte. He then called a council of war, which adopted the resolution of withdrawing from Catalonia. This determination was no sooner made public, than the Catalonians deserted rather than be removed from their province; part of the Valencians, on the contrary, crossed the Segre and the Cinca, and threw themselves into upper Arragon. The whole army was a prey to disorder and insurrection. Campoverde now took upon himself to change the direction of the forces: he returned to Cervera, and endeavoured to approach the sea-shore; this was the only means of calming the discontent of general Miranda, who claimed, in menacing language, the accomplishment of the promise guaranteed by the English, that he should be brought back by sea, with his division, to Valencia, which was really in need of his assistance, whereas he could no longer be of service in Catalonia.

The commander-in-chief, being determined to break up and disperse the remains of that army, and to make his operations tell with good effect in the neighbourhood of Figueras, with a view to prevent the blockade from being disturbed by any unforeseen event, set his troops in motion, on their return to Barcelona, where he arrived on the 9th of July. Part of the garrison sallied that very night from the city, under the orders of general Maurice Mathieu, and proceeded towards

Mataro, where the enemy had just arrived. The attack took place at day-break; the Spaniards were routed, and precipitately fled towards the mountains, being protected in their retreat by four hundred horse. Our troops secured possession of the town, and found in it one hundred and fifty thousand rations of biscuit, which had been brought thither by the English; but we acquired, at the same moment, the positive information that three thousand Valencians had reached Arens-del-Mar, and taken shelter on board the English fleet. We had not had sufficient time to overtake them, and they were escaping from our grasp whilst general d'Eroles was making a feint resistance at Mataro.

We learnt, after this engagement, that the Catalonian army was in a state of rapid disorganization. General Campoverde, being threatened by his soldiers and the peasantry, was compelled to fly for his life, and general Lacy had come to replace him in the command. General Suchet immediately set himself in motion for the purpose of attacking him; he first directed Montmarie's brigade to move towards Lerida, and whilst the brigade of general Palombini was advancing by San-Feliù de Cudinas, he entered in person the defile of Centellas, by the valley de Congost, and passed on his way the most formidable positions, which were left wholly defenceless. On his arrival at Tona,

he sent general Harispe towards Moya, and entered Vich with the division of general Frere. Thence he pushed forward some columns as far as Olot and Ripoll, threatened Manresa, and placed himself in communication with marshal the duke of Tarentum.

The Catalonian army which had proved itself inadequate to the object of relieving Tarragona, was now still farther reduced in strength by the loss of the auxiliary division of Valencia, and too much weakened and dispersed to excite any serious uneasiness respecting the blockade of Figueras. General Lacy, the new commander-in-chief of that army, was using every exertion to rally it at Cardona, the Seu d'Urgel, and other points. We were apprised that he was causing the fortifications of Berga to be blown up, and had stationed general d'Eroles at Mont-Serrat, a central and commanding position, where extensive works had been undertaken, and magazines collected long beforehand. The French government had already issued directions for the occupation of that point; we have seen that marshal Macdonald was to have taken possession of it at the period when the siege of Tarragona was contemplated, and that he had been prevented by the circumstance of the enemy having taken Figueras by surprize, an event which called away his attention. Although general Suchet had received no orders to that effect, he deemed

it proper to take this duty upon himself, since he had the means of accomplishing it, and it would be attended, at the present time, with obvious advantages. He combined the execution of the work in such a manner as to leave his forces as long as possible in the vicinity of Figueras. Generals Frere and Harispe remained at Vich and Moya, and received instructions to direct their operations towards Mont-Serrat at a given moment. The commander-in-chief returned with his reserve, concerted measures on his way with count Maurice Mathieu, and arrived at Reuss on the 20th of July, thus anticipating the orders of his government and the news about to reach him from France. Accordingly, he found on his arrival an officer who had been despatched to him by the prince of Neufchatel, with the decree appointing him a marshal of the empire; it bore date the same day on which the intelligence of the fall of Tarragona was received at Saint Cloud, and was of the following tenor:

Palace of Saint-Cloud, 8th of July, 1811.

"Napoleon, emperor of the French, &c..

"Wishing to give a proof of our satisfaction and confidence to the commander-in-chief Suchet, for the various services he has rendered us on repeated occasions, and in the taking of Lerida, Mequinenza, Tortosa, and Tarragona;

"We have decreed and decree as follows:

"Art. 1. The general of division Suchet is appointed marshal of the empire.

Art. 2. Our minister of war is charged with the execution of the present decree.

Signed NAPOLEON."

This despatch was accompanied by an order to demolish the fortifications of Tarragona, with the exception of a single reduit, to effect the surrender of Mont-Serrat, and to get every thing in readiness for the advance of the army of Arragon towards the kingdom of Valencia.

The necessary means were immediately placed at the disposal of the engineer department. General Rogniat suggested that the enclosure of the upper town should be preserved. The facility which was thereby afforded of defending the town with a thousand men, induced the commander-in-chief to adopt that advice, which was fully approved of in Paris. The works were actively pushed forward, as the government urged the necessity of completing them within the space of fifteen days. The greater part of the artillery was transported to Tortosa.

We have just seen that every thing was in readiness for an attack upon Mont-Serrat. General Montmarie proceeded from Montblanch to Igualada on the 22nd of July, whilst generals Frere and Harispe were advancing by the road

of Manresa, and general Maurice Mathieu was occupying Esparaguera with a column which had arrived by the road of Martorell. Marshal Suchet repaired in person, on the 23rd, to Igualada, through Sarreal and Santa-Coloma. This was the first time since he had carried his arms into Catalonia, that he saw the inhabitants either returning to their homes or remaining quiet, and he took special care to encourage this dawn of rising confidence, which, if the force of example should give it greater extension, might be attended with salutary effects. On the 24th, he called together the general officers at the inn of Bruch, and instantly made every preparation for an attack.

Mont-Serrat, a position of great importance in a military point of view, presents a very remarkable appearance. Situated within a short distance from Barcelona, Igualada, and Manresa, it commands the main roads and the heights in the centre of Catalonia. Its imposing natural character renders it of difficult access, being washed to the eastward by the waters of the Llobregat, and defended on all sides and from a considerable elevation, by extensive escarpments. On a narrow and elevated plateau, which opens in an eastern direction, stands the convent of Nuestra-Señora, a vast and solid edifice, which, with the buildings attached to it, serves the purpose of a fortress, where troops might defend themselves for a

long time and with great advantage, if well supplied with all kinds of provisions. Above this convent, and in the region of the clouds, the summit of the mountain is indented in its whole extent, and crowned with peaks or rocks in the shape of pyramids or needles, to which several hermitages are attached like swallows' nests. Its flanks and base, furrowed by ravines, are in many parts without soil or vegetation, wholly barren and unproductive, owing to which circumstance it is called the skeleton of a mountain. The character of the spot, and the veneration in which it is held by the inhabitants concurred in augmenting its importance; accordingly, ever since the breaking out of the war, it had been chosen as the point d'appui of the movements of the Catalonian army. The friars of Mont-Serrat had removed its wealth and taken shelter at Majorca. Two or three thousand soldiers, under the orders of baron d'Eroles, now occupied their places. The latter had secured his means of defence by an entrenchment at the very entrance of the convent, and by two batteries, with coupures in the rock along the road which winds its way down from the north of the mountain, between an escarpment and a precipice as far as Casa-Masans; this was the road from Igualada to the convent, and on this side only could the attack be attempted. An isolated narrow pass, of difficult access in the southern

direction, led to the village of Colbato; in which pass a battery had been erected. The road of Monistrol had been broken up, and the slopes to the eastward, as far as the banks of the Llobregat were so steep and rugged, that they might be considered wholly inaccessible.

Marshal Suchet was desirous of carrying the position without loss of time, and avoiding if possible an engagement which could not but be attended with great loss, if fought on a spot so unfavourable to an invading army; he prepared his arrangements accordingly. Montmarie's brigade was stationed at Colbato in order to threaten and intercept from the enemy that point of retreat; generals Frere and Harispe occupied the roads from Igualada and Manresa, and the troops brought by general Maurice Mathieu from Barcelona were placed at the foot of the mountain near Bruch, and served the purpose of a reserve either to general Montmarie or to the brigade of general Abbé, which was entrusted with the main attack. The latter established himself, in the evening of the 24th of July, in the post of Casa-Masans, after having routed the Spaniards who fell back upon their intrenchments. At an early hour on the 25th, general Abbé, at the head of the 1st light infantry and 114th of the line, with a battery of three pieces of cannon, advanced in columns upon the road leading to the convent, and was followed by a few battalions of the army

of Catalonia led by general Maurice Mathieu; the commander-in-chief accompanied this reserve corps. The advanced guard was only arrested at first by natural obstructions, which it overcame without much difficulty. It filed along under the fire of musketry kept up by the Somatens, who occupied on its left the heights beyond the ravine; its right was protected by the declivity of the mountain, and by a hundred and fifty riflemen who were pushed forward to reach the summit, and to search the hollow grounds and grottoes which were likely to conceal any ambush of the enemy.

On reaching the elbow at which is situated the chapel of Santa-Cecilia, the column of troops was assailed by a discharge from the first battery which intercepted the road. The column formed itself in order of battle, and halted at a spot beyond reach of the guns; but no purpose could be answered by its remaining for any length of time in that position. Voltigeurs were detached to the right, with directions to ascend under cover of the windings of the rock towards the summit of the mountain, so as to enable them to bear down upon and turn the intrenchments of the road. They succeeded through numberless obstacles, and with the utmost difficulty, in reaching some favourable points, where, sheltering themselves from the enemy, they began to annoy the Spaniards in the battery. General Abbé at this moment sent forward two companies of grenadiers,

under captain Ronfort of the 14th regiment, with orders to march to the redoubt at a quick pace. The enemy were scarcely allowed time to make any further discharge of artillery; the grenadiers rushed to the foot of the intrenchment, notwithstanding the pieces of rock and the fragments of stone hurled upon them. This obstacle only stimulated the voltigeurs to increase their fire; and still gaining ground, they fired in rear upon the artillerymen who stood by their cannon: disorder began to spread among the Spaniards; they fled in great alarm towards the second battery; the grenadiers took possession of the first, and closely pursued the enemy, with whom they were mixed pell-mell amidst the scene of confusion. A battalion of the 1st light infantry, led by captain Ehrard, was immediately despatched to the support of the two companies of grenadiers. On finding that fortune was on the point of declaring in our favour, the battalion accelerated its march; the voltigeurs on their side redoubled their efforts of daring courage; the grenadiers overtook the fugitives; the second intrenchment was carried like the first. Nevertheless, a few Spaniards made a bold though unavailing resistance; and their captain of artillery and his men were killed on the spot. We remained in possession of ten pieces of cannon and about thirty prisoners, and the road was now open to us as far as the entrance of the convent.

The column rallied and continued to ascend in good order with the artillery, for the purpose of attacking the last of the enemy's intrenchments. According as we made progress in our ascent up the mountain, we heard in the distance a brisk firing which led us to anticipate the success of general Montmarie's attack on the road of Colbato. We redoubled our march and our exertions with a view to second that attack; great, however was our surprise on arriving, to find the Spaniards flying in the utmost disorder, and the French hastening in pursuit of them from the interior of the convent, and throwing open the gates which we were preparing to carry at the point of the bayonet. They were a detachment of about three hundred men from the 1st light infantry and the 114th of the line, forming part of those who had been sent in succession to turn the mountain on our flank. Wandering through the rocks, they had leaned considerably towards the right, and whilst the redoubts arrested our progress, they had imperceptibly gained the summit and occupied one or two of the hermitages nearest to the convent. They did not hesitate a moment as to their future course, but acting with that quick penetration and presence of mind which characterise the French soldier in the moment of action, even when his officer is not at hand to direct his movements, they attacked the convent with all the advantages which they derived from their

commanding position and their unexpected attack. It was defended by the enemy's reserve, which opposed at first a powerful resistance; and it would have easily annihilated the small number of the assailants, who were endeavouring to drive it into the redult, had they presented themselves in a body arrayed in order of battle on even ground. But the communication from the convent to the hermitages was cut through numberless rugged paths, and in some places by means of ladders or steps hewn in the rock and in so perpendicular a form that in the descent it was very difficult, and quite impossible in the ascent, to make any progress under the fire of an enemy upon the alert. Emboldened by their success, the French were gaining ground; by dispersing themselves amongst the rocks, they constantly drew closer to the Spaniards, who were collected in the courts and intrenchments behind the battlements, ditches and palisadoes. They at last surprised a gate which admitted them into the enclosure. The firing was kept up in the cloisters, the corridors, and the galleries, and considering the inequality of numbers, the scuffle might have been of doubtful issue; but the Spaniards learned at this moment, from the fugitives from the two redoubts, that their chief defence was forced, and that they had no chance of escaping except by a precipitate flight. On the first intimation received, on the preceding day, of

the approach of the French troops, baron d'Eroles had ordered the batteries to be supplied with ammunition for eight days' consumption, whether through a bombastic motive and with a view to encourage his troops, or that he really imagined himself competent to resist in so strong a position any attack of the enemy. He was soon undeceived by the promptness and combination of our efforts, and whilst he was forced to abandon the convent, his retreat was threatened by the occupation of the road to Colbato in his rear. With a view to escape our main column, which was advancing flushed with success, he fell back upon the Llobregat, making his way through ravines and precipices, where none could pass but Spaniards who were perfectly acquainted with the country, and even then not without incurring danger and severe losses. We took possession of the convent, of its avenues, and of the whole of Mont-Serrat; two stand of colours, ten pieces of cannon; and all the enemy's stores of ammunition, arms, provisions, and clothing, also fell into our hands. Our troops established themselves in the convent and its vicinity: they visited and occupied the thirteen hermitages, two of which were still inhabited by pious recluses, who were treated with the utmost respect. Every precaution was adopted to prevent any accident happening to the church, and to preserve untouched the stores and provisions found in the monastery, in order that

they might be made available to the garrison we intended to leave on this spot.

The capture of Mont-Serrat, which so closely followed upon the fall of Tarragona, produced over the whole of Catalonia, in the first moments at least, a strong moral effect. Many towns formally submitted to us, and villages came to surrender their arms; an effect painful beyond measure to so warlike a population as that of Catalonia. The Catalonian army, by being thus deprived of its central position, would necessarily find greater difficulty in rallying, and in recovering that effective state which might enable it to attempt any movement for the relief of Figueras.

But the preservation of this new conquest imposed, at the same time, upon the army of Arragon the necessity of again dispersing its forces. General Abbé was placed in command of Mont-Serrat, during the first days of its occupation. The government did not intend to employ more than one regiment in the defence of that position; but its extent and importance determined the marshal to leave two regiments to protect it. Shortly afterwards, general Palombini, with his brigade and some artillery, relieved general Abbé, who returned by Villafranca to general Musnier's division to which he belonged. General Frere, who had general Palombini under his orders at Mont-Serrat, established himself

at Igualada, a town of some consequence, which it was necessary to keep under subjection; and he opened a communication with Lerida, through Cervera and the plain of Urgel, where the royal Italian chasseurs were stationed with the 24th regiment of dragoons, and the 42nd of the line. Thus the whole of lower Catalonia was, if not completely subdued, at least occupied by the army of Arragon. This was the portion of territory which was added to the command of marshal Suchet, since he had been ordered to undertake the sieges of Lerida, Tortosa, and Tarragona. His operations were afterwards directed to the object of seconding the French army of Catalonia, which was still detained before Figueras by the force of circumstances. The place was at that time reduced to the last extremity; our recovering possession of it was a final operation which marshal the duke of Tarentum might easily accomplish at a later period, by seizing upon Cordona and the Seu d'Urgel, with a view to the complete subjugation of the province.

Leaving therefore a portion of his army in Catalonia for a short time, marshal Suchet resumed the road to Saragossa, in order to make every preliminary arrangement for the expedition to Valencia. He felt that the province of Arragon stood in need of his presence. The dispersion of Campoverde's army had given rise to occurrences on the left bank of the Ebro;

the Valencian deserters who had crossed the Segre and the Cinca, had proceeded towards the frontier of Navarre. General Reille, the governor of that province, was apprised of this movement, and took his measures for arresting it. General Chlopiski, on the other hand, kept in close pursuit of them, and detached columns of troops in every direction to arrest their progress and offer them battle. A great number of men and horses were taken. Those who effected their escape into Arragon or Navarre, consulted their safety by completely dispersing, crossing the Ebro, and falling back in the direction of the Moncayo towards the frontiers of Castille, with a view to approach the frontier of Valencia. This event took place in the course of the month of August.

At this period of time, generals Villacampa and Obispo had reinforced themselves whilst we we were prosecuting the siege of Tarragona; they threatened the whole right bank of the Ebro, from Teruel to Albarracin, with a body of troops, amounting to four thousand infantry, and seven hundred cavalry. The Spanish brigadier-general Duran advanced from Soria towards Calatayud with three thousand men, for the purpose of effecting a junction with them. He met at the latter town general Ferrier, who boldly stood his ground at the head of the Neapolitans and of a battalion of the Vistula, and succeeded in routing him. Soon afterwards, the

partizan leader Campillo, who had been set in motion by Villacampa in the direction of Montalvan, ventured as far as Cariñena and Longarès: captain and adjutant Domanget, at the head of fifty cuirassiers, came up with and attacked him, took two hundred and twenty-eight prisoners, and completely dispersed his forces.

The commander-in-chief could not allow the southern part of Arragon, through which he would shortly have to carry on operations against Valencia, to be exposed to dangerous attacks during his absence.

As soon as the columns of troops which had escorted to France the garrison of Tarragona had returned to Saragossa, instead of giving to those divisions which had been engaged in active operations the repose they perhaps stood in need of, he made them take part in another combined movement on the right bank of the Ebro. General Harispe advanced towards Teruel, and brought relief to the chef-de-bataillon Lefebvre, of the 14th regiment of the line, who had, for a long time been blockaded with his weak garrison, without allowing himself to be intimidated by the summons or threats of the enemy, any more than by their direct attacks upon him. General Compere who had been sent to Calatayud, proceeded as far as Medina-Cœli in Castille, at the head of two

thousand men, in order to open a communication with a division of the French army of the centre. The Italian general Peyri, with Balathier's brigade, advanced to Castellote between Alcañiz, Morella, and Montalvan, towards the frontiers of the kingdom of Valencia. Those movements had the effect of clearing Arragon from the enemy, and enabled us to re-establish our authority in every quarter, and thereby to secure the payment of the contributions and the means of subsistence. Villacampa and the other chiefs withdrew on our approach, as they had not advanced with the intention of fighting a battle. Their object was to collect corn for the city of Valencia, by wresting from us what we had in store; a plan the more dangerous in its possible consequences, as the harvest of the present year, in Arragon, was the most unproductive within the memory of man. Marshal Suchet found his magazines empty; it required time and persevering exertions to enable him to prepare and collect his resources, and to dispose of the whole of his forces for his impending enterprise. A great portion of them was still in Catalonia. The occupation of Mont-Serrat, whilst it dispossessed the enemy of an important position, had also the effect of chaining us down to the spot, and imposing upon us the arduous duty of keeping its garrison properly supplied. Accordingly, the Catalonians having soon recovered from their first surprise, began to

annoy our troops, and to attack our advanced posts. General Palombini had placed four companies of the 2nd Italian regiment of the line at Monistrol, at the foot of Mont-Serrat; they were attacked on the 9th of August, by about one thousand peasants. A reinforcement from the convent became necessary to enable us to defeat those bands which fought with surprising obstinacy. After a sharp action, the enemy retreated with the loss of sixty men killed; we had, on our side, to regret the loss of twenty-three chasseurs. Captains Bay and Bentivoglio greatly distinguished themselves; the latter was wounded in the engagement.

On the 16th of August, which was a few days after the above event, general Frere despatched from Igualada a hundred soldiers of infantry to convey the correspondence to Mont-Serrat, for the communication from one point to another demanded great precaution and an armed force to protect it from attack. There was a motive for this course of conduct; fifteen hundred Somatens had taken possession of all the heights commanding the road. It became necessary to hasten to the relief of the detachment; general Palombini immediately despatched ten companies for that purpose. We did not succeed in dislodging the Spaniards until after an obstinate engagement, when we compelled them to take to flight; but we lost thirteen men killed, and

reckoned eighty-four men amongst the wounded. These examples proved to the marshal the impossibility of withdrawing his troops from Catalonia until after the fall of Figueras, the intelligence of which event was daily expected. He accordingly determined, contrary to expectation, to send through Caspe and Lerida, the Italian brigade of general Balathier, under the orders of general Peyri,* to relieve Palombini's

* Immediately after the fall of Tarragona, and whilst Palombini was advancing with Suchet in pursuit of Campoverde, general Peyri had proceeded to Arragon with two Italian regiments, taking the road from Reuss through Dosaguas, Falset, Mora, Batea, Caspe, La Puebla de Ixar, Zeila, Fuentes, and Saragossa, and conducting three thousand prisoners, who reached the Pyrenees and entered France by way of Jaca. He did not fall in with any of the enemy on his way, and his troops experienced no sufferings, excepting from the heat in the parched plains of the right bank of the Ebro. This was the only general, during the war, who had led Italian soldiers to Arragon; it was soon perceived how great was the difference between the inhabitants of that province, and those of Catalonia. The latter, on the mere approach of an enemy's corps, abandoned, for the most part, their dwellings; the former, on the contrary, came to offer to our soldiers whatever they might stand in need of. In return for so generous an hospitality, they were rewarded by the observance, on our part, of the most strict discipline.....
After fulfilling the object of his mission in Arragon, general Peyri joined at Lerida the Italian corps of artillery and the 1st light Italian regiment, who kept garrison at that place, whilst Villate and Palombini, with the remainder of the Italian division, occupied, jointly with general Frere's division, the

brigade, at Mont-Serrat. The latter brigade took its departure for Barcelona, and was ordered to proceed to Figueras, and place itself at the disposal of marshal Macdonald. General Musnier, who was stationed at Tarragona, and general Reyri at Igualada, were to support that

other points of Cervera and Mont-Serrat. There existed a great contrast between the state of the troops in Arragon, and their condition in Catalonia. In the latter province, they were always under arms and exposed to every want, whether they occupied positions in the open country, or were shut up in the intrenched posts; in the former, on the contrary, they quietly enjoyed rest in the villages or fields, because the local authorities were charged with the duty, and strictly performed it, of supplying them with provisions, or informing them of the enemy's movements, and because the inhabitants obeyed the injunctions of the local authority on this subject. If the troops were set in motion, the roads were pointed out to them by guides on whose fidelity they might depend, and they were relieved from the continual apprehensions of being attacked, as it frequently happened in Catalonia, where the soldier was often kept on the alert, harassed by false alarms, and thereby rendered incapable of displaying the activity and vigour so requisite in a moment of real emergency. In Arragon, a few men intrenched in a house were sufficient to secure the tranquillity of the villages, on a long line of operations from Saragossa to the frontiers; in Catalonia, on the contrary, a large body of troops, however strongly intrenched, were insufficient for the purpose of maintaining order amongst the inhabitants, and preventing them from engaging in a partizan warfare, to which their habits, and the varied character of the country so naturally instigated them on every occasion. (Vaccani, vol 3, page 108, and following.)

movement if deemed necessary, whilst general Frere should remain temporarily charged with the duty of supplying their place, and keeping the country under subjection.

General Habert ordered Montmarie's brigade to proceed in the direction of Morella, in order to avoid any inconvenience from the removal of Balathier's brigade. But the presence of the Italians on the frontiers of Valencia had already been productive of a salutary effect; availing himself of this reinforcement on his left, general Harispe had compelled the corps of Villacampa and Obispo to fall back, and had advanced as far as Sarrion, on the one side, and Utiel on the other. He established his troops in camps, or kept them exercised by frequent marches, so as effectually to secure the submission of the whole country in his rear, and to threaten the kingdom of Valencia in front, as well as the enemy's corps which were entrusted with the duty of defending it. Preparations were making in all directions to resist us; the Valencians were recovering their former confidence, and even appeared to brave the French army. Already, on the 7th of August, a corps of nearly four thousand men, commanded by brigadier-general Andriani, had advanced to attack our establishments at Amposta, La Rapita, and the mouths of the Ebro. Captains

Menu and Bussa, of the 117th regiment, displayed no less sagacity than firmness on this occasion; they repelled the first attack, and afforded time for two hundred and fifty chosen men to hasten to their assistance, under command of captain Labarcerie, of the 5th light regiment.

Whilst captains Menu, Bussa and Labarcerie, by the judicious combination of their forces, rather than by their numbers, kept in check the head of the columns of brigadier-general Andriani, general Habert had left Tortosa at the head of six hundred infantry and fifty cuirassiers, and advanced in a direct line, and with the utmost rapidity, against the enemy's rear. On reaching the rear-guard, he charged and routed it, and lost not a moment in attacking the mass of the column. The gallant soldiers of the 5th light regiment and of the 114th, charged at the same moment in front; disorder spread among the Spaniards; and our cuirassiers attacked and put them to flight. Upwards of two hundred Valencians remained on the field of battle. General Habert kept in pursuit of the enemy during the whole of the following day, and returned with two hundred and fifty prisoners and a standard belonging to the second regiment of Savoy. This check, and our general arrangements along the frontiers of Valencia soon had the effect of over-awing the

Valencians; this was the last time of their venturing to resist us beyond the limits of their own province.

Whilst marshal Suchet's attention was directed to the events in Catalonia, he was at the same time making preparations for a campaign against general Blake, who was again returning to measure his forces against him. He redoubled his exertions to procure wheat and barley at any price, whether from Castille, Navarre, or other provinces, in which the harvest had been more productive than in Arragon. He ordered the troops to be reviewed, and the pay of the army to be discharged. He sent back to France, by way of Jaca, about three thousand veterans, who partly belonged to the dismounted cavalry and train, partly able soldiers destined for the imperial guard, or men unfit for service, returning home to be put upon the list of invalids or the pension list, as wounded and disabled from further duty. These losses were repaired by means of conscripts, who joined him in marching battalions or squadrons, with the skeletons which had been sent beforehand to the dépôts to fetch them.

In the month of August, a Spanish major landed at Tarragona as the bearer of a flag of truce, and of a letter from captain-general Cuesta, governor of the Balearic islands, to mar-

shal Suchet, wherein he proposed a cartel for the exchange of prisoners of war. He offered to open an immediate negociation, and transmitted to that effect, with his letter, a list containing the names of ninety French officers, and statements, according to corps, of three thousand six hundred and sixty-one subalterns or soldiers who were detained prisoners in Majorca. The marshal had long endeavoured to establish an intercourse of this nature with the Spanish generals with whom he had come into contact. He had thus been indebted to general Blake's interference for the release of his brother-in-law, captain de St. Joseph. He gladly seized an opportunity of putting an end to the misfortunes which oppressed our gallant countrymen, who had, for the most part, been taken prisoners in the year 1808, and were confined in the island of Cabrera. Without waiting for the sanction of government, and feeling assured of its approbation, he did not hesitate a moment in giving an affirmative answer to general Cuesta, and signed a plan of a cartel founded upon a system of reprocity which was alike honourable to both nations. He detained six hundred prisoners in Arragon, besides a few generals and other superior officers of the garrison of Tarragona, and requested, at the same time, the major-general prince of Neufchâtel to send three thousand

Spanish prisoners from France, by the road of Perpignan, towards Roses, where the exchange might easily be effected. Previously, however, to his being enabled to carry this arrangement into execution, he received a second letter from general Cuesta, who, whether in obedience to orders, or yielding to a superior influence, brought the negociation to a close. We annex a copy of that letter, which will exhibit in his real character, that old and venerable warrior, who had measured his forces against the French and was fully sensible of their merit;* it was a source of

* Copy of the letter from Don Gregorio de la Cuesta, governor of the islands of Majorca, to his Excellency marshal Suchet.

"I have just received the despatches which your excellency has done me the honour of addressing to me, under date Saragossa the 31st of last August, in reply to mine, and I have the mortification to announce to you that the council of regency of Spain and the Indies, as soon as it became apprised of the negociation I was carrying on with your excellency respecting an exchange of prisoners, unreservedly disapproved of it, and has forbidden my concluding it on any account. It is, consequently, out of my power to fulfil the proposal which I made on that subject, and to which I had been exclusively prompted by a desire of affording relief to suffering humanity. But my government, who had not authorised such a measure, have not thought it expedient.

I make this open declaration to your excellency in order that you may satisfy yourself of the impossibility under which

unfeigned disappointment to him to be frustrated in his wish of completing a convention which had been proposed on the one hand, and accepted on the other, with reciprocal good faith.

I labour of giving effect to my promises; this is the first time in my life that I am compelled to break them. I accordingly send orders to major Cervera to desist immediately from further negociation or arrangement for an exchange of prisoners, and to return to this island.

I renew to your excellency the assurance of my respect and consideration, and pray that your life may be preserved many years.

Signed, GREGORIO DE LA CUESTA.

Palma de Majorca, 1st October, 1811.

CHAPTER XIV.

Retaking of Figueras.—Marshal Suchet is ordered to march upon Valencia.—His preparations for that expedition.—Departure of the army.—Arrival before Saguntum.—Investment of the place.—Description of the fort.—Unsuccessful attempt to scale the walls.—Actions fought at Segorbe and Benaguazil.—Siege and capture of Oropesa.—Works of the siege of Saguntum.—The assault is repulsed.—Continuation of the works of the siege.—General Blake marches to the relief of the place.—The marshal accepts the battle offered to him.—Battle of Saguntum.—Capitulation of the fort.

THE aspect of our affairs in the Peninsula had been materially altered by the taking of Tarragona, an event which could not fail to give to the French army of Arragon a direction and an attitude different from what it had hitherto assumed. Nevertheless, the fort of Figueras still held out against us. The success of the blockade of that place was of so much importance as to claim our undivided attention to every object calculated to promote it. Marshal Suchet had already co-operated towards it by the occupation of Mont-Serrat; the same consideration had influenced him when he left a great part of his

forces in lower Catalonia; and the Italian brigade of general Palombini approached the gates of Barcelona in obedience to the orders it received from the marshal, as we had occasion to state in the thirteenth chapter of these Memoirs. It then halted for the first time on the 30th of August, and made a retrograde movement on being informed that the marshal duke of Tarentum had succeeded in taking possession of Figueras. Martinez had attempted a sortie on the 16th of August, at the head of his garrison, under favour of an attack made by Rovera, in the direction of Llers: but general Baraguey d'Hilliers defeated the latter, kept the former in check, and drove him back into the place. Martinez, being compelled to surrender at discretion, marched out of the town on the 19th of August, was made prisoner of war with the troops under his orders, and escorted into France.

The emperor meanwhile was all impatience at Paris, and could hardly wait for intelligence of the retaking of Figueras, before he issued orders for the conquest of Valencia. The major-general addressed to Marshal Suchet, on the 25th of August, a despatch the concluding part of which was of the following tenor:

"Every thing, monsieur le maréchal, induces the belief that terror reigns within the walls of Valencia, and that after the capture of Murviedro, and a defeat of the enemy in the open plain, the

city will surrender to our arms. Should you be of a different opinion, and deem it necessary to wait for your besieging train, before you lay siege to the place, or to suspend your operations until the season be more favourable for prosecuting them, I am to acquaint you with the emperor's positive orders that, happen what may, your head-quarters be within the territory of Valencia, and as near as possible to the gates of that city, on or about the 15th of September next."

The instructions which accompanied the above order appeared to take for granted, that a few distant manœuvres of the armies of the centre and of the south would be sufficient to paralyse every attempt of the Valencians to defend their city, and that a rapid and bold advance of the army of Arragon would secure to us the possession of one of the finest provinces in Spain. The marshal, however, could not so soon forget what had happened to him in the preceding year. His march upon Valencia, which had been censured in Paris at the time, although it was undertaken in pursuance of instructions from Madrid, had been attended with a result which ought not to be lost upon him. He was well acquainted with the nature of the country, and the spirit of its inhabitants. Roused to the highest pitch of excitement at the breaking out of the revolution, they gave the first manifes-

tation of their sentiments by the massacre of a hundred and eighty Frenchmen. They had witnessed on two occasions, in 1808 and 1810, the failure of the attack made by the 3rd corps of the French army against the ramparts of Valencia, and had since found leisure to make ample preparations of defence. The Valencian army, the command of which had just been transferred from the marquis del Palacio to general Charles O'Donnell was supported by the army of Murcia under the orders of general Freyre. The captain-general Blake had just brought from Cadiz the corps of troops called the expeditionary army, consisting of two divisions of infantry commanded by generals Zayas and Lardizabal. The supreme government of Spain was centered at this time in three individuals; and general Blake was one of the number. The mission of this officer sufficiently indicated the determination of the regency to defend Valencia by every means in its power. Invested with a species of dictatorial authority, under the title of generalissimo, general Blake was placed in command of the 2nd and 3rd Spanish armies, and of all the forces in the eastern part of the Peninsula. He accelerated the completion of the immense works which the Valencians were throwing up in defence of their capital, and availed himself of the uninterrupted intercourse by sea, to procure arms, provisions, money, and every kind of assistance of which he stood in

need. Taking advantage of the spirit of the inhabitants, he excited them to resist the advance of the French, and called out all the male population, between the ages of fifteen and fifty, for militia duty; the people of the country were likewise enjoined to take up arms, or to retreat on our approach.

Convinced that he would stand in need of a powerful artillery and of very imposing forces, marshal Suchet reported to the government the difficulties which would necessarily attend an attack upon Valencia, and the danger of undertaking it without having collected every means requisite for ensuring the success of the operations. The army of Arragon consisted of about thirty-six thousand men; the divisions of general Frere and Musnier, and the Italian division, forming together about one half of those forces, held possession of lower Catalonia; seven or eight thousand men were in garrison at Mequinenza, Alcañiz, Jaca, Saragossa, and the numerous fortified places in the province of Arragon. The remainder of the forces which could be rendered available, amounting to from ten to twelve thousand men, were distributed along the frontiers of Navarre, Castille, and Valencia, for the purpose of protecting Arragon from the invasion of any hostile armies, till the fall of Figueras. As soon as we recovered pos-

session of that fort, the army of Catalonia became less fettered in its movements, and was enabled, by approaching Barcelona, to facilitate those of the army of Arragon. On the other hand, an army of reserve was forming in Navarre, under the command of general Reille. Marshal Suchet anticipated the prospect of some positive assistance from each of the above quarters; but he was no less sanguine in his hopes of co-operation from the armies of the centre and of the south, which he was nevertheless strongly assured would create a diversion, by threatening Murcia and Cuenca. He knew by experience how little was to be expected from those distant co-operations of independent armies, having no direct communication with each other, and carrying on their movements in opposite lines. He could not effectually rely upon any other troops than those which he had actually at his disposal, and they were scarcely adequate to the fulfilment of the first portion of the task just imposed upon him.

The major general was of opinion, that Valencia would open its gates after the fall of Murviedro and the loss of a pitched battle; but that indispensable preliminary was in itself a first-rate operation, which was no less complicated than it was difficult of attainment. On reaching Murviedro, which was nothing more than an open

town, our progress would be arrested by the rock of Saguntum, now converted into a regular fortress, which required a formal siege. In venturing to undertake it in the presence of a numerous army hastening to its relief, it was not enough for him that he could rely upon the valour of our soldiers; it behoved him also to calculate their number, and to diminish a disproportion of forces which might have endangered the success of the operation. Notwithstanding the most strenuous exertions, marshal Suchet could accomplish only in part the object which he had in view.

He urged the necessity of immediately ordering the advance towards Arragon of a division of five thousand men belonging to the corps of reserve, which had been directed to remain in Navarre, and to hold itself in readiness to support his movement. On the eve of absenting himself from the former province, he felt no apprehension that its tranquillity would be disturbed, so great was his confidence in the talents and personal character of general Reille. Of the three divisions which he had in lower Catalonia, he was under the necessity of leaving one to occupy Lerida, Mont-Serrat, and Tarragona, as well as to protect the navigation of the Ebro, a duty which was assigned to Frere's division. Marshal Suchet regretted the absence of that corps, but he deemed it proper to restore to marshal

Macdonald's army the French division which had been previously separated from it. The Italians had won the esteem of marshal Suchet by their conduct at the siege of Tarragona; he felt a pleasure, therefore, in again associating them with the labours of the army of Arragon; that division, the command of which had been assumed by general Palombini, received orders to proceed in the direction of Caspe and Alcañiz. Whilst general Harispe was advancing towards Teruel, Musnier's division approached the Ebro. The town of Tortosa was to be our principal dépôt of provisions; it was supplied from Mequinenza by fourteen boats which were constantly stationed on the lower Ebro, under the charge of an active and intelligent staff officer, the chef-de-bataillon Bardout. Another dépôt was formed at Morella; the corn requisite for the subsistence of the army was to be sent after it from those two points, by the means of transport which we had at command. Meat was distributed amongst the troops for two months' consumption, as each marching regiment drove before it the cattle which was intended for its use. This course was definitively resolved on, because experience had demonstrated its advantage both in respect to expediting the service as well as to the comfort of the soldiers. The organization of the besieging train was completed

at Tortosa, in which town the *personnel* and *matériel* of the engineer and artillery departments were respectively collected. The various points of our line of operations multiplied in proportion as we proceeded in our advance movement; that line had for its basis the province of Arragon, which was placed under the command of general Musnier, as well as all those troops which took no part in the expedition. Marshal Suchet, therefore, after leaving six or seven thousand men to protect Arragon, and as many for the defence of lower Catalonia, could only muster a disposable force of between twenty and twenty-two thousand effective men.

Being urged by formal orders from the emperor, marshal Suchet did not delay his movement until all his preparations were completed, or the fresh reinforcements had joined him; he determined to advance at once with his twenty thousand men, and enter into the kingdom of Valencia, not with the intention of reaching the capital, but of penetrating as far as Saguntum, which is situated within four leagues of it, at the point of junction of the roads leading to the towns of Tortosa and Teruel.

Those two main communications, which thus opened to us on commencing our movement from Arragon, were the only roads admitting of any

kind of vehicles, and were therefore alone adapted to the establishment of our line of military operations. They were completely isolated from each other, and both terminated at the same obstacle. The road from Teruel by Segorbe was the shortest, but it was unprotected by any fortified town, and at too great a distance from the dépôts established on the Ebro and from the besieging train collected at Tortosa. We had no choice but to resort to the road from Tortosa which runs along the sea shore, since the train could not proceed by any other; but the forts of Peniscola and Oropesa presented two obstacles in the way; the former was, fortunately for us, at some distance from the road, and it was possible to mask it, and thereby to neutralise its influence. But the fort of Oropesa had a full command of the road. It was discovered, however, that there existed a road near Cabanes scarcely available except for the infantry, which road on leaving Alcañiz crossed the mountains of Morella, and running through San-Mateo fell into the Tortosa road near the bridge of Villareal. By this means the fort of Oropesa would be avoided on the left, a circumstance very immaterial in respect to the march of troops, owing to the weakness of its garrison; not so however with regard to the passage of the convoys and of the artillery, as it presented a very serious inconvenience to them, which it was impossible to avoid.

The army of Arragon commenced its movement on the 15th of September agreeably to the emperor's orders, and, forming itself into three columns, entered the kingdom of Valencia. General Harispe broke up from Teruel at the head of the third division. Instead of proceeding in the direction of Segorbe, he cut his way through an extremely difficult road or pass across the mountains of Ruvielos with a view to rejoin the army at Villafames. The Italian division of general Palombini, in the rear of which followed general Compere with the Neapolitan division, advanced through Morella and San-Mateo. The commander-in-chief placed himself at the head of the principal column at Tortosa, where the cavalry, the field-artillery of the whole army, Habert's division and the reserve or brigade under general Robert, forming part of the first division, had already assembled.

The first day's march brought us to Benicarlo. A battalion of infantry and twenty-five horsemen were placed in observation in front of Peniscola. On reaching Torre-blanca on the 19th, with the advanced guard of his army, the marshal ordered a battalion of the 5th light infantry and fifty dragoons of the 24th cavalry regiment to approach Oropesa. An engagement was the consequence, in which lieutenant Dufillon of the carbineers greatly distinguished himself and was severely wounded. Young Mondragon at the head of

his detachment routed two of the enemy's squadrons and took a few prisoners. The garrison having re-entered the fort, we occupied the village of Oropesa and reconnoitred the position. The cannon of the fort had a full sweep of the road, so that no convoy could have passed without being intercepted. The marshal continued his advance by Cabanes, and thence opened a communication with the column which had quitted Morella. On the 20th, previously to reaching Castellon de la Plana, the column under general Harispe also rallied in the direction of Villafames. The army thus united marched forward to meet general Blake, who according to report was hastening up to Murviedro with his forces, and had already moved his advanced guard towards the town of Almenara.

On the 21st, the army took possession of Villareal. The Minjares is crossed at this place by a stone bridge, although it is nothing more than a torrent which is almost dry and every where fordable. The ruins of the castle of Almansora, on the left bank and at the entrance of the bridge, cover a height on which some intrenchments had already been commenced; but the Spaniards had not placed sufficient dependence on this position to run the risk of shutting themselves up in it; they lined the right bank to the amount of five or six hundred men. The 24th regiment of dra-

goons instantly crossed the bridge, routed, and put them to flight. On the two following days we expected to meet the enemy, but the army reached Almenara and came in sight of Murviedro without encountering any obstacles on the way. After having made an advance movement for the purpose of completing the garrison and the means of defence of the fort of Saguntum, general Blake had deemed it more prudent to fall back to his lines, and to postpone an engagement until we had commenced operations.

On the 23rd, general Habert, who formed the advanced guard of our army, was ordered to make himself master of the town of Murviedro. His division crossed the river which runs in front of its walls; and whilst it was moving to the left with a view to invest the fort on the eastern side, six companies of élite and a hundred dragoons penetrated into the streets from two different quarters, dislodged and drove back into the fort all the troops that had quitted it, and in spite of a sharp fire of musketry and artillery which was directed against them, they obtained possession of the houses, embattled them, barricadoed the approaches, established posts and reserves, and effectually succeeded in compelling the garrison to remain shut up within the limits of the fort, and in preventing any sortie. General Harispe's division, having at the same time turned to the

opposite side, crossed the river on the right, pressed the fort within pistol shot by posts of voltigeurs, and falling down upon the Valencia road to the south of Saguntum, joined general Habert's division. The Italian division, on the right of general Harispe, established itself at Petrès and at Gillet on the road to Segorbe, thereby completing the investment of the south-western side of the place. The reserves occupied the road in the rear of Murviedro and the village of Almenara. Reconnaissances were pushed forward on the following day as far as Alvalate, a distance of a league and a half from Valencia. We did not fall in with the enemy's forces, and we were given to understand that they were stationed behind the Guadalaviar.

The course adopted by general Blake was alike recommended by prudence and sound judgment. Although aware of his numerical superiority, it was good policy in him to draw our army towards his positions, and to fight us with all the advantages he could command. He occupied, on the right bank of the Guadalaviar, an intrenched camp bordered on the one side by the sea, and embracing in its development a large fortified city, containing a numerous population, and abounding in every kind of resources. He had in his rear the army of Murcia, as a reserve corps, and he brought into line, besides the Valencian troops, the two

divisions of generals Zayas and Lardizabal, proud of having fought at Albuera by the side of the English army. His cavalry was commanded by generals Loy, Caro, and San-Juan. The two divisions of Obispo and Villacampa, which had been recalled by his orders from the frontier of Castille and Arragon, formed his left wing, and kept the field. The total of his forces might amount to twenty-five thousand infantry, and two thousand cavalry. Nothing was farther from marshal Suchet's intention, than to attack his adversary in that position; to have left Saguntum with a garrison of three thousand five hundred men in his rear, for no other purpose than to fight a battle at the distance of a few leagues only from it, would have been an act of temerity which there existed no sufficient prospect of success to justify. Our line of operations extended over a surface of thirty leagues, from Tortosa to Valencia, without affording us a single place of shelter for our wounded, and it was commanded by three intermediate fortresses, which were in the hands of the enemy. Our only course, therefore, was to protect that line of communications, and first of all to obtain possession of Saguntum.

The attack of that fort presented difficulties which no ordinary means of aggression appeared calculated to overcome. When we visited it in 1810, curiosity alone had guided us to a spot so

pregnant with historical recollections, and replete with valuable fragments of antiquity. We had admired the position in a military point of view, but without foreseeing that on the next occasion we might have to fight our way to it. The Spaniards applied themselves to fortify it, and spared no means by which they might render it formidable to their enemies: they had even, after long discussions, and by order of the supreme junta, sacrificed to this object a Roman theatre hitherto untouched, and kept in a state of preservation which rendered it the admiration of foreigners. Portions of that splendid edifice had been demolished with a view to improve the defence of the fort, and some ancient ruins and old Moorish walls had been repaired and connected by modern constructions adapted to the nature of the ground.

The enclosure, which embraced the whole summit of the mountain, was divided internally into four distinct parts, each susceptible of being defended when the others should have given way. The rock which was extremely elevated, and rose in a perpendicular form through nearly the whole of its circuit, did not present any slope that was in the least accessible, except on the western side. The projections which intersected this slope, might favour the approach of the infantry; but it was the more difficult to carry on the engineer works, or to es-

tablish batteries, as the ground was a bare rock. The fort terminated in a point, at that spot, by a large round tower of very old construction, which was formerly called the tower of San-Pedro, and since has been denominated the battery of the 2nd of May.* There appeared little chance of our effecting a breach of sufficient breadth to enables us to storm the fort. That part of it, moreover, although it was connected with the enclosure, was in reality nothing more than a projecting work, in the rear of which was the reduit of San Fernando, on the most elevated summit of the mountain. The Spaniards had hoisted their colours at this place; It could only be attacked, even after the storming of the advanced work by proceeding along the crest of the solid rock, for the purpose of placing the miners at its revetement, and even then it was impossible to counterbatter its cannon.

Marshal Suchet was greatly mortified at finding that he had so many difficulties to contend with, and that the occupation of Saguntum could only be the work of time. General Rogniat had proceeded to France after the fall of Tarra-

* The 2nd of May, 1808, was the day on which the city of Madrid had risen against prince Murat and the French army; one of the means resorted to by the chiefs of the Spanish insurrection to keep up the enthusiasm of the soldiers and of the people, was to recall to their remembrance the blood that had been shed on that occasion.

gona; he was still absent, and his return, which was daily expected, was to be the signal for our opening the trench. The officer who was temporarily in command of the engineer department was daily engaged in making himself acquainted with the fort, and in reconnoitring the approaches leading to every part of it. From this close examination, there appeared to us a possibility of overcoming, by a coup-de-main, every obstacle which now stood in our way. We discovered in that part of the wall looking towards the town of Murviedro, two old breaches which had not been completely repaired. This defect had, in some measure, been obviated by wooden intrenchments, visible to the naked eye in the day-time, and behind which the garrison was busily employed during the night, in raising intrenchments of masonry. The two breaches were a very short distance asunder, and it was easy to open an external communication from one to the other. About half way down the mountain, at the distance of sixty toises, there was a cistern, behind which, as in a place d'armes, columns of troops could be formed, and moved towards the points which it might be deemed expedient to scale. The marshal himself repaired to the advanced posts of the town, with a view to ascertain, by a personal inspection, whether it

was possible to effect a surprise from that quarter; after having completed this reconnoitring, he adopted the plan, and issued orders for its being carried into execution. Although the attempt was eventually unsuccessful, he has no hesitation in admitting the fact of this reverse of fortune, whilst he makes known, at the same time, the motives which influenced his conduct. It was by a bold attack of the same nature that he had succeeded at the col de Balaguer; nevertheless, he adhered, on the present occasion, to every consideration of prudence and to a strict observance of forms. He always made it a point to consult the opinions of the engineer officers, whose profession enjoins them to resist any departure from the rules of military tactics. In this case, the head of that department held out to the marshal the well founded hope of obtaining possession of Saguntum, without resorting to a regular siege. The disadvantage of failure in an attempt to surprise it did not appear to him of sufficient weight to counterbalance the advantage, in his then position, of gaining time, and of avoiding a siege so fraught with danger, within a distance of four leagues from an army numerically superior to his own, which had assembled for the purpose of relieving the fort.

Two columns, each consisting of three hundred picked men, and supported by a third co-

lumn of equal strength, provided with ladders and guided by a few sappers, were ordered to advance to the foot of the two breaches for the purpose of scaling them. Six Italian companies, supported by a battalion of the line, were at the same time to approach the wall below the town of San-Pedro, and draw off the enemy's attention by feint attacks in that quarter. A reserve of two thousand men was in readiness to march wherever their presence was required, and general Habert was appointed to direct the movements of the troops at Murviedro. Three o'clock in the morning of the 28th of September was the hour agreed upon. The commander-in-chief proceeded to the camp of general Harispe, who passed the whole night on the *qui-vive*, as did also general Palombini's division, whilst reconnoitring parties were pushed forward on the roads to Valencia and Segorbe, with a view to our obtaining timely information of any operation which the enemy might be meditating against us in the open country.

An unforeseen accident frustrated all the measures adopted for scaling the fort, the success of which measures mainly depended on our lulling the vigilance of the garrison and throwing them off their guard. Whether it originated in their suspecting our contemplated movement, or in mere chance, the enemy made a sortie during the night, and penetrated as far as our first line

of advanced posts. They were driven back, and tranquillity was restored for the moment. But the alarm once given, our soldiers, who ever since the taking of Tarragona, considered an assault as a mere amusement, could with difficulty be kept within bounds. They moved towards the cistern at a brisk pace and in the utmost silence; on arriving at that spot at an earlier hour than that which had been agreed upon for commencing operations, they perceived and overheard the voices of some Spaniards, and a musket-shot was suddenly fired from our party. This act of imprudence proved doubly fatal to us; the Spaniards, warned by it, retorted from the summit of the ramparts, and our columns rushed forward as soon as they heard the report of the firing, without allowing us either time or power to contain them. The intended surprise could not possibly take effect unless our soldiers had succeeded in reaching with their ladders the foot of the breaches without being discovered. Their gallantry, however, had well nigh retrieved the effect of their imprudence. They placed the ladders against the walls, and appeared to vie with each other in zeal to scale the rampart; an officer of sappers and a few grenadiers and voltigeurs reached the summit; but they met with the most obstinate resistance, and were either killed or driven back, whilst the shot and gre-

nades filled with glass were poured in torrents upon the body of assailants who were hurrying to the foot of the rampart.

The other columns had set themselves in motion from various quarters, as soon as they heard the report of the firing. The approach of the Italians in a direction distant from the spot where the contest was going on, made the governor apprehend for a moment that he would be forced in his intrenchments. He sent forward some reinforcements, and the whole rampart on the northern and western side was soon covered with Spaniards, shouting in the midst of a brisk fire of musketry kept up by the contending parties. The gallant colonel Gudin took advantage of the occasion to make a fresh attempt to scale the walls with the grenadiers of the 16th and 117th regiments; but he was wounded in the head by a grenade; other officers who relieved him were also wounded; the ladders were broken down, and the Spaniards remained triumphant on the breaches. Notwithstanding the efforts of our officers and the orders of the commander-in-chief, the soldiers could not be induced to quit the foot of the ramparts and fall back to the town. Day-light was, however, fast approaching; the murderous effects of the fire kept up from the fort, had already occasioned a loss to which it was high time to put an end. General Habert found great difficulty in bringing

away all his men. The killed and wounded exceeded three hundred in number, including many officers, and the attempt completely failed.

It now became necessary to make preparations for a regular siege, in furtherance of which object, it may be said that no time had been lost, since the besieging train had not yet arrived. Meanwhile Saguntum was more closely invested, and our head quarters were established at Petres. The approaches to the fort were reconnoitred with care and in detail on the western side, that being the only side at all accessible to the artillery, or admitting the possibility of an attack. Colonel Henri directed the engineer branch of the service with indefatigable activity. His first work, which was preparatory to every other, was to trace and open a road or slope from the banks of the river to the plateau where it had been found practicable to establish batteries against the salient of the projecting work. But in order to turn that road into a direction which would conceal it from the view of the tower, it became necessary, owing to the steepness of the declivities, to give it a considerable development, and to adopt many windings, as it was intended for the ascent of artillery of heavy calibre; these circumstances greatly increased the natural difficulties of constructing it on an extended space of ground, which consisted of nothing but rock. Whilst

this work was going on, the marshal determined to take possession of Oropesa, and disengage his right flank, which the enemy were beginning to annoy by their too near approaches.

General Obispo had marched to Segorbe; generals Charles O'Donnell, Villacampa, and San-Juan occupied Benaguasil and Betera, as well as the plains of Liria and the mountains of the Carthusian convent of Porta-Cœli. Balathier's brigade, belonging to the Italian division, was ordered to advance on the 30th of September against general Obispo's division, and was supported by the reserve under general Robert. Marshal Suchet had detached his aid-de-camp de Rigny, with the advanced guard, composed of Napoleon's dragoons, commanded by colonel Schiazzetti, a gallant and intelligent officer; it was the first to come up with the enemy near Soneja, and closely pursued them as far as the position in advance of Segorbe, where their main body was ranged in order of battle across the high road, and occupied the heights. Our infantry reached the ground soon after the cavalry. General Palombini, the officer in charge of the expedition, sent forward the 2nd and 6th Italian regiments of the line, in columns of attack, and directed the French battalions to move upon the enemy's flank; the latter gave way, and immediately commenced their retreat, which the close pursuit of our cavalry

soon converted into a complete rout. They then had no sooner passed Segorbe, than they dispersed among the mountains, after losing some prisoners and a considerable number of killed and wounded.

This operation was scarcely completed, when the marshal, after ordering general Palombini's troops back to the camp before Saguntum, put himself in motion in the night of the 1st of October, for the purpose of attacking the enemy's corps, which covered Liria and protected the dangerous position taken up by general Obispo at the town of Segorbe. General Harispe marched to Betera at the head of his division, and was followed by general Robert's reserve, and the cavalry commanded by general Boussard. The main body of the Spanish infantry, under general O'Donnell, was ranged in order of battle at the Puebla de Benaguasil in the Huerta, behind an irrigating canal; it occupied a chapel in advance of its front, and was supported on its right and left by several squadrons of cavalry; in its rear was a covered and broken ground, which was well calculated to favour its retreat. The marshal ordered the cuirassiers, the reserve, and part of Harispe's division, to deploy in line. General Pâris carried the chapel at the head of the 7th regiment formed in column, and moved towards the canal, which it was necessary to cross under

the fire of a line of soldiers placed within half musket shot of our troops. The voltigeurs and hussars were the first to rush forward, with general Harispe at their head; general Pâris had a horse killed under him; major Durand led the gallant 7th regiment of the line to the charge. After the first fire, which wounded many of our men, the passage of the canal was forced, and the enemy abandoned the position, and retreated in two different directions. The brigades of generals Pâris and Chlopiski, as well as the hussars and cuirassiers commanded by general Boussard, pursued them as far as the Guadalaviar, which they re-crossed in the utmost disorder. Being thus driven to the right bank of the river, they retreated within their lines, after suffering in the two engagements of Benaguasil and Segorbe a loss of four hundred infantry and two hundred horse.

Immediately after the scalade of the 28th of September, an order had been sent to Tortosa, directing that the besieging train should be forwarded to Murviedro. The convoys of artillery were forthwith put in motion; it was determined that the first pieces of artillery that might reach Oropesa should batter down its walls, on their way to Saguntum. General Compere was ordered to proceed to the spot; he encamped his troops at a short distance from Oropesa, and made immediate preparations for besieging the place.

The marshal felt desirous of reserving that small trophy for the Neapolitan division, which scarcely consisted at that time of fourteen hundred men, including two hundred and fifty horse, but which, through emulation, and the care bestowed upon it by general Compans, was in a condition to render efficient service. A brigade of French engineers advanced with the Neapolitan division. On the next and the succeeding days, the village was carried by main force, and our troops intrenched themselves in it, and encamped in such a manner as to cut off the garrison from all retreat towards the King's tower. This tower stood at a distance from us of four hundred toises, on a rock rising from the sea-shore; it was armed and occupied by a few men, and might serve to protect an embarkation. With respect to the fort situated near the royal road which it was intended to command, it consisted of a large square tower, surrounded on three sides by a first enclosure, flanked with turrets, but without any ditch, owing to the steepness of the rock. On the southern side, the tower was open at its base; the entrance gate, as well as the slope leading to it, were within a very short distance of the first houses of the village. It was deemed possible to effect a breach in the reduit itself without a moment's delay; but our troops were too near to commence the works of attack, and had

to select another spot better adapted to the purpose. The chefs-de-bataillon Michaud of the engineer department, and Charrue of the artillery, opened a trench, and constructed a battery on the high road, about one hundred toises from the northern part of the enclosure of the fort. A company of Italian artillery-men came to join the French sappers; and on the 8th of October, three twenty-four pounders and a ten-inch howitzer arrived from Tortosa. The battery was completed and armed on the 9th, and, in the night between the 9th and 10th, the marshal made his appearance, followed by a battalion of the regiment of the Vistula.

He ordered the fire to open on the 10th at day-break: the artillery of the fort was soon silenced, and at three in the afternoon, a practicable breach was effected in the first enclosure. General Ferrier drew up four Neapolitan companies of *élite* to mount the breach and take possession of an advanced post. The assault was on the point of taking place; but the enemy did not think proper to await the issue of the event, and hoisted a white flag. We entered the fort, and found in it two hundred and fifteen men, with four pieces of cannon and a quantity of ammunition. As the King's tower refused to capitulate, a trench was opened against it, and preparations were made for battering it in breach. In the course of the 11th, some

Spanish vessels arrived from Valencia, with the intention of carrying off the garrison which was shut up in the fort. We found it impossible to prevent this notwithstanding the attempts made by the Italian light artillery, and by the grenadiers and voltigeurs of the Vistula, who advanced to the sea-shore in order to oppose the embarkation. Two pieces of cannon were found in the tower. Our loss at Oropesa consisted of thirty one men, six of whom were killed. The occupation of this castle had the effect of clearing the road from all obstructions, and opening a passage for the whole of the artillery which was intended for the siege of Saguntum.

The arrival at our camp of generals Valée and Rogniat, who had repaired to France after the siege of Tarragona, gave a sudden stimulus to the works, by which the artillery and engineers were commencing the operations of the siege. The opening of the road before the front of attack was attended with great difficulties; and in many places it was found necessary to have recourse to mining. On the 12th of October, the road was in a condition to admit of the 24-pounders. The artillery instantly commenced battering in breach at the distance of a hundred and fifty toises from the tower of San Pedro Several trenches and debouches were opened in advance towards the right, and two howitzers and five mortars were

stationed at different points for the purpose of simultaneously battering and annoying the long and narrow enclosure of Saguntum. The cannon of the fort, owing to its great elevation, and the shortness of the distance, was scarcely able to bear upon us. But the garrison constantly interrupted our works by a very sharp firing of musketry, which placed every day fifteen or twenty of our men hors de combat. If it had been mounted with 24-pounders, our weak epaulements would have been unable to resist them. We have already had occasion to observe that the Spaniards had considerably augmented their means of defence in that quarter, where we had no alternative left between effecting a breach or confining ourselves to a blockade of the fort. We were, in fact, taking the bull by the horns; but in so doing, we submitted to the law of necessity.

In the evening of the 16th of October, the batteries were in readiness, and our cheminemens had reached to within thirty-five toises of the walls. The completion of these works had been attended with considerable dangers and difficulties.

On the morning of the 17th, ten pieces of cannon began to batter the salient of the advanced work. This mode of opening our operations afforded a prospect of our effecting a breach without much difficulty or loss of time; the new

walls soon gave way; but they concealed some old constructions which resisted our shot as effectually as the hardest rock could have done. The breach was not much enlarged on the first day, though each of our cannon fired a hundred and fifty balls; we had to renew the fire on the following day.

It was kept up more vigorously on the 18th; and with a more satisfactory result. In the afternoon, the generals commanding the artillery and engineers reconnoitred the breach; and, in conformity with their advice, the marshal determined to order the assault for the hour of five the same evening.

Colonel Matis was placed in command of a column of four hundred picked men of the 5th light regiment, the 114th and 117th of the line, and the Italian division. So early as the hour of noon, the movement of the guards relieving each other at the trench, which it was impossible to conceal from the view of the fort in broad day-light, had led the Spaniards prematurely to suppose that the moment of the assault was come. The breach was immediately covered with men excited to the highest pitch of rage and enthusiasm. They answered every cannon-shot by a volley of musketry, replaced the earth-bags which had been thrown down, and, standing on the ramparts with an unparalleled obstinacy, which they maintained for the space of five or six hours,

under the uninterrupted fire of four 24-pounders in full play upon them, they relieved each other with extraordinary emulation, brought fresh soldiers to supply the places of the slain, repaired with the utmost eagerness the damages done by the cannon-shot, and provoked us with shouts to come to closer quarters with them.

We had noticed, from a steeple in the town, that the communication between the interior of the fort and the advanced work was kept up along the right profile of the upper platform of the reduit of San-Fernando, by means of a path intersected by a small ditch, which was crossed by a moveable bridge scarcely admitting two or three men at a time. In the event of the first column succeeding in taking possession of the breach and driving back the enemy, it was directed to keep in close pursuit of them as far as the ditch in question, and to endeavour to cross the bridge and enter the fort pell-mell with the fugitives; this would give us the possession of San-Fernando, and, necessarily, of the whole fort. Should this attempt fail, the column was, at least, to carry the bridge, and deprive the besieged of every means of returning to the attack; in which latter case, our efforts were to be directed to the exclusive object of securing the lodgment on the breach and in the interior of the advanced work.

At a given signal, our gallant soldiers, placed

in column of attack and in reserve, sallied forth from the shelter under which they had been formed, and hastened to the breach with as much rapidity as the steepness of the declivity would allow. They were preceded by many of the officers, amongst whom were colonels Matis and Henri; captains Auvray, Lamezan, Gattinari, Adhemar, and a few resolute sappers. The most active cleared two thirds of the slope which was contracted at the summit into a rentrant angle scarcely accessible to two men abreast, and terminated in a vertical escarpment; but as there was no solid footing on so inclined a plane, the earth and stones sunk under the trampling of the besiegers, and they were overwhelmed with musket-shot, grenades, stones, and earth-bags. It was impossible for the column to reach the summit otherwise than in detached bodies, and almost in single file. The soldiers in the rear began to fire at random and waver, whilst those at the head of the column still advanced with undiminished courage, and ascended towards the summit of the breach in spite of every difficulty. But this brilliant display of heroism availed them little against the bayonets and musket-shot fired with such unerring aim. Many of our men suffered themselves to be killed on the spot without attempting to retreat; the remainder kept up, for some time, a loose firing, which was as unavailing as it proved dan-

gerous to them in their unprotected situation. Our artillery, which had suspended its fire against the breach, instantly resumed it; the troops retreated at last within the trenches, upon a final order from the marshal to that effect, after suffering a very serious loss; our wounded amounted to one hundred and thirty men, including the chef-de-bataillon Laplace, of the 114th regiment, captains d'Esclaibes and Lamezan, aides de-camp to generals Valée and Rogniat, and lieutenants Adhemar and Gattinari; the slain amounted to forty-three, including captain Saint-Hilaire, aid-de-camp to general Musnier, lieutenants Turno, aid-de-camp to general Bronikowski, Giardini, of the Italian division, and Coutanceau, an officer of the mountain chasseurs, attached to the staff of the army.

The failure of the attack on the 18th of October increased marshal Suchet's regret at the previous ill success of the scalade attempted on the 28th of September. The first reconnoitring of the fort of Saguntum had made him fully sensible of the difficulty which would attend a regular attack. He had eagerly embraced the prospect of sparing his men and avoiding the loss of time by resorting to a coup-de-main. In spite, however, of recent events, he was still impressed with the conviction that if a surprise could ever be attempted a second time with any hopes of success, that course afforded the surest

chance of overcoming difficulties of such magnitude; but the success which had fortunately crowned his efforts at the col de Balaguer, and which he had won at Olivo by the vigour of his attack, was twice denied him before the walls of Saguntum. He returned with perseverance, though not without uneasiness, to the only course left him, that of prosecuting the works against the front, which had withstood his attacks, and of augmenting the force to be brought against it. He ordered the construction of a fresh battery of six twenty-four pounders at a shorter distance from the fort than the former battery; it was established on the right of the attacks, within about sixty toises of the town. The cheminemens and debouches were directed to be prolonged to the foot of the breach; but in proportion as they advanced, the town gained such command over them, that, however slight was the inclination taken by the trace, two gabions placed over each other were no longer sufficient to protect the pioneers, but it was impossible to reach the limits of the approaches without being exposed to the fire of the assailants.

We anticipated great advantages from the new battery, and had reason to hope that it would now tell with a decisive effect, although the failure of two attempts naturally created doubts of the success of a third. Our soldiers had too

much energy of mind, especially since the fall of Tarragona, to give way to despondency. The garrison, on the other hand, must have been inspired with renewed confidence by late occurrences. The rock of Saguntum, which stood isolated in the plain of Murviedro, at the distance of two miles from the sea-shore, was in open communication with the ships in the offing. Telegraphic signals had brought information from Valencia to Andriani, the governor, that rewards had been granted to the corps under his orders, and that he had been nominated to the rank of maréchal-de-camp, to which his gallant resistance so justly entitled him. The distribution of rewards, however, was no longer sufficient to protract the resistance of a garrison which had not resisted the concentrated fire of our batteries without experiencing very severe losses. The ardour they had displayed on the day of the assault was too extraordinary an effort to be easily renewed. Nevertheless, the difficulties attending the attack, and the vigour of the defence afforded matter to the French general for the deepest meditation. The chance which presented the greatest prospect of recovering the advantages he had lost was to be found in any attempt of general Blake to bring relief to the place.

Marshal Suchet flattered himself that he had no surer means of subduing Saguntum than by

defeating the army of Valencia. The alarming situation of Arragon, to which we shall advert at a later period, operated, besides, as a powerful motive with him for bringing the enemy to a general engagement. He could not weaken his forces for the purpose of relieving that province, without endangering all his operations in the kingdom of Valencia. The apprehension, however, of losing Teruel, which was closely pressed by the enemy, made him determine, between the 20th and 22nd of October, to send general Palombini in that direction with the reserve and a part of the cavalry, for the purpose of attacking the Spanish general, Obispo. General Palombini drove back the enemy's troops, which occupied the road leading to Segorbe: but he had been cautioned not to proceed too far from the main body, in order that he might return as soon as his presence should be required. This measure of precaution was fully justified by the event, and he returned on the 24th to the camp in the utmost haste.

Two spies, who had left the castle of Saguntum after the assault, and been taken with their despatches, confirmed to us the fact that the garrison stood in great need of assistance. The reports circulated in the country, and the advance of a corps of troops belonging to the army of Murcia, under the orders of general Mahy, were indications of an ap-

proaching engagement. It was, in fact, incumbent upon Blake not to delay operations any longer. After allowing Oropesa to be surprised, and two of his divisions to be defeated, almost under his own eyes, he not only ran the risk of losing Saguntum, but of forfeiting the confidence of his army and of the whole Spanish nation, if he abandoned to the chance of a third assault a fortress so well calculated to protect Valencia, and a garrison which had so gallantly resisted our attacks. He accordingly determined to give battle, and broke up from his encampment, leaving the capital and the intrenched camp under the protection of the civic guard and of the inhabitants, whose zeal for the service had been stimulated by the most powerful appeals.* With respect to his army, he

* Nuestra Señora de los Desamparados, (Our Lady of the Unprotected) was the name of a miraculous image of the Virgin, which was an object of special veneration in Valencia, and was deposited in a chapel adjoining the cathedral. A report having been spread of its removal to Majorca, with the rich offerings made to it, the clergy calmed the fears of the Valencians in a pastoral letter, and assured them that even in the event of an actual attack from the enemy, that image of the patroness of the faithful would not desert the city. This declaration mainly contributed to quiet the alarm of the inhabitants. The disappearance of the image would unquestionably have been productive of unpleasant effects on the public mind, for Our Lady of the Unprotected was treated as the generalissimo of the Valencians. The marquis del Palacio, when appointed captain-general of the province,

appealed to their courage in a brief and impressive proclamation, which we transcribe as a model of military eloquence, conciseness, and energy.

Proclamation of the commander-in-chief Blake.

Head Quarters at Valencia, the 24th of October, 1811.

"Don Joaquim Blake, commander-in-chief "of the 2nd and 3rd armies, to the generals, "chiefs, officers, and soldiers whom he has the "honour to command.

"We are marching to attack, and with the "help of God, to defeat Suchet's army. If I "were addressing mercenary or venal soldiers, "led on by the mere instinct of obedience to "force, as is the case with the enemy, I should "be content with holding up to your view the "rewards which must be the result of our "victory.

"I find another motive for emulation, with "respect to those who are not insensible to "military glory, in drawing their attention to the

solemnly recognized her as such. She bore, in all the gazettes of the country, in all pastoral letters, the title of *generalissimo por mar y por tierra*, and her image was accordingly adorned with the decorations of the captain-general, and with the gold-bordered red scarf, as commander-in-chief. (Extract from a Spanish account of the campaign of general Blake in 1811).

" battlements of Saguntum, to the walls and " terraces of Valencia, from the summit of which " we shall be followed by the anxious looks of " those whose safety depends upon our conduct. " The least act of weakness, a moment of hesita- " tion, whilst we are marching against the " enemy, would, on this occasion more than " any other, stamp indelible disgrace upon our " character.

" But I am addressing Spaniards who fight " for the freedom of their country, for their reli- " gion and for their king; and I should be cast- " ing a reflection upon the elevated sentiments " which animate them, were I to say more " than that our duty enjoins us to vanquish the " enemy or to perish in the struggle."

Signed, " BLAKE."

On the 24th, the army of general Blake was formed in order of battle half-way between Valencia and Murviedro. The right consisted of Zayas' division; it had arrived by the road along the sea-shore, and occupied the heights of Puig, which were lined with artillery. A Spanish flotilla supported by an English corvette, stood along the coast, and flanked the line of the Spanish army. On the left of general Zayas, Lardizabal's division had advanced by the high road as far as the Carthusian convent; it formed the centre with the cavalry

under general Caro, which leaned against Miranda's division. The latter, with the divisions of generals San-Juan and Villacampa, formed, under general Charles O'Donnell, the left of the army. This wing extended behind a ravine called *del Picador*, in a parallel line with the road of the Calderona, as far as the hill called *los Germanels*, thereby covering the road leading to Betera; its reserve consisted of the corps of general Mahy, and its extremity was further flanked, at some distance, by Obispo's division, in the direction of Naquera.

Marshal Suchet found himself placed in the alternative of either abandoning his artillery and raising the siege in order to seek a more favourable field of battle, or to fight between two fortresses, against superior numbers, and with scarcely any chance of being able to effect a retreat. But, in spite of the serious disadvantages of his position, he did not hesitate to accept the battle on a spot in advance of Saguntum. The plain which extends from Valencia to Murviedro is considerably contracted near the latter town, between the sea and the heights of the Val-de-Jesu, and of Sant-Espiritu; on this plain we determined to encounter the enemy. The line of battle was formed of Harispe's division, which was made to take up a position in front of his camp, with its right adjoining the mountains, and its left reaching the high road, and of Habert's

division which occupied the left of general Harispe, between the road and the sea. Behind these divisions were ranged, in second line, general Palombini with part of the Italian infantry, and general Boussard as a reserve, with the 13th regiment of cuirassiers, and the 24th regiment of dragoons. General Robert, with his brigade and the Napoleon dragoons, was stationed on the extreme right, at the gorge of Sant-Espiritu. On discovering the arrangements of the enemy, who had moved considerable forces towards his left, the marshal deemed it proper to keep general Chlopiski detached from the main body, with the 44th regiment, with a view to his reinforcing general Robert, and occupying the crest of the mountains. This general, having thus assumed the command of the right wing, was ordered to defend to the last extremity the defile leading from Betera to Gilet. This was a point of the highest importance; if the French army had lost it, the loss of the battle must have necessarily followed, and perhaps every means of retreat would have been cut off. In order the more effectually to protect it, general Compere, at the head of the Neapolitans, took possession of Petres and Gilet, and was thereby enabled to watch the road leading to Segorbe.

The marshal was unwilling that the garrison of Saguntum should indulge the hope of his being compelled to interrupt the siege in consequence

of the battle which was about to take place. The engineer corps had succeeded in forming a lodgment within three toises of the foot of the breach, and the artillery had mounted a battery of nine 24-pounders, three howitzers, and six mortars. Four Italian battalions and two battalions of the 117th regiment were left before the fort, and placed under command of general Bronikowski. At an early hour on the 25th of October, the fire from our breach-batteries was re-opened; and at a short distance from, and within sight of the fort, our army, ranged in line of battle, quietly awaited the attack of the Spanish army, which was advancing to meet it. The marshal had proceeded to the Ostalets near Pouzol, with a view to his forming a more accurate opinion of the enemy's movements in the midst of the olive and carob trees, which bear the resemblance of a forest, and cover those plains with the richest culture. He had scarcely left that spot, when our line of sharp-shooters extending along the whole front, fell back as soon as the enemy's divisions were put in motion. He noticed on the right an isolated eminence which is detached from the heights in advance of the Val-de-Jesu, and commanded the ground upon which Harispe's division was about to be engaged. Having determined to occupy it without a moment's delay, he repaired thither with the utmost speed, with the fifty hussars com-

posing his escort. He ordered at the same moment Harispe's division to advance with a view to establish his right on that eminence. But the time which our infantry employed in marching over the ground which separated them from the eminence, was not lost by the Spaniards, who hastened to the same spot, ascended and took possession of the eminence, our hussars being unable to offer any effectual resistance. The enemy instantly planted some cannon on the spot.

Being forestalled on this point, we perceived at the same moment the Spanish columns advancing upon the high road, and in the direction of Pouzol, with a regularity and determination which they had not yet displayed on any former occasion in the open field. These first movements gave to their army, on its march, an attitude of confidence and superiority which appeared a sure presage of success; such was, at least, the impression produced by that spectacle upon the garrison of Saguntum intently watching, from the summit of the rock, the event which was about to determine its fate. On perceiving the advance of the army destined to relieve it, the garrison fancied that the hour of its rescue was at hand. The soldiers broke out in loud acclamations, and threw their shakos into the air. They paid no attention to our artillery, although their shouts were deadened by

its roar. During the whole of the engagement the artillery continued to batter the ramparts; but the besieged appeared totally indifferent to the progress of the breach.

On arriving in front of the eminence, Harispe's division immediately attacked it, the 7th of the line being placed in columns by battalion, and the 116th regiment with the 3rd regiment of the Vistula having deployed in echelons at a short distance in the rear. It was of the utmost consequence that we should obtain possession of the eminence in question, and it behoved the French army to commence the battle by a resolute blow, which might have the effect of paralysing the enthusiasm just displayed by the Spaniards. The generals placed themselves at the head of the columns, and the troops ascended the hill at a moderate pace, and without firing a shot; they met the most determined resistance, and a sanguinary conflict took place as soon as they reached the summit of the eminence. General Pâris was seriously wounded, as well as the aides-de-camp Peridon and Troquereau; general Harispe, colonel Mesclop, and several officers had their horses killed under them. The gallant 7th regiment commanded by major Durand, after withstanding the enemy's fire, reached the summit with crossed bayonets, drove back the Spaniards, and compelled them to retreat in disorder as far as the ravine of the Picador. [Ge-

general Harispe's division remained in possession of the spot.

Meanwhile the left of the Spaniards was setting itself in motion against general Chlopiski, whilst Zayas was debouching from Pouzol on their right, and appeared to be manœuvring with a view to outflank our left and to approach the town of Murviedro. This effort of general Blake's two wings, at the moment when we were obtaining the advantage in the centre, determined marshal Suchet to follow up that advantage to the utmost of his power, and to cut the enemy's army in two in the middle. He calculated that generals Robert and Chlopiski would effectually resist the attacks made upon them from the favourable position in which they were placed. He contented himself with desiring general Habert to keep the division of Zayas in check; and, leaving the cuirassiers in their position as a reserve, he ordered general Palombini, who was in the second line, to advance to the attack. The Spaniards, having been driven from the height, were pursued by general Harispe as far as the plain; but their troops were not slow in rallying; they again stood their ground, attacked us in turn, with the assistance of their cavalry under generals Loy and Caro, and marched forward a second time with the determination of recovering possession of the eminence. The chef d'escadron Duchaud, commanding the artillery of Harispe's

division, moved forward to encounter the masses of Spanish infantry, and succeeded for a moment by a fire of grape-shot in arresting their progress. Our hussars, in their attempt to support him were charged and driven back. Our artillery was attacked by the enemy sword in hand, and a few pieces of cannon fell into their power. This moment might have proved fatal to us had our infantry given way; but the 116th made a timely alteration in its movement, and defeated the charge by a well sustained fire which they kept up with unflinching steadiness. The marshal hastened up to the cuirassiers, being well aware of what he might expect from such a reserve; he addressed them in a few words expressive of his esteem and confidence, reminded them of Margalef, and the other places where their impetuous charge had decided the victory in our favour. Whilst he was speaking these words of encouragement, a ball struck him in the shoulder; fortunately the wound was not of a serious nature; he remained on horseback, and without a moment's delay sent general Boussard forward against the Spanish cavalry. General Palombini, in his advance along the right of the high road, was already placed in such a situation as to have it in his power to fire upon the rear of that cavalry which already fancied itself secure of victory. The cuirassiers charged and drove it back upon the infantry.

We not only recovered our artillery, but a part of the enemy's cannon fell into our hands. Generals Harispe and Palombini, by a movement in advance, completed the defeat of the Spaniards. The centre of general Blake's army was irretrievably broken. The cavalry escaped with difficulty after encountering a severe loss; the infantry had many men put hors de combat independently of those who laid down their arms. General Caro was wounded and fell into our hands, with a brigadier-general and two other officers. He was brought to marshal Suchet during the action, together with four standards and five pieces of cannon.

After having struck a decisive blow and broken the enemy's attack, the marshal had yet to crown his success by operating upon the wings. General Habert was ordered to attack general Zayas. The latter, although isolated by Lardizabal's retreat, maintained an obstinate fight in which we suffered a severe loss. The young aide-de-camp de Billy had his arm shot off by a cannon ball. General Habert took possession of the village of Pouzol, by sending forward general Montmarie with the 5th light regiment and the 116th of the line, and proceeding in person against the enemy with a battalion of the 117th and a troop of dragoons. The Spaniards, being forced from their position in the village, retreated, leaving eight hundred prisoners in our hands. Colonel Delort,

having very seasonably proceeded in all haste towards the high road with the principal part of the 24th regiment of dragoons, broke through the fugitives, overtook the infantry under general Lardizabal, attacked it sword in hand, followed in pursuit as far as the Carthusian convent beyond the ravine of the Picador, and took two pieces of cannon. Whilst these occurrences were taking place, general Zayas was moving towards the heights of Puig, where general Blake, the commander-in-chief of the Spanish army, had remained during a part of the day, having from thence a full view of his army from one extremity to the other of the field of battle; he had left there a brigade of artillery under brigadier-general Velasco. General Habert was ordered to dislodge Zayas from those heights. General Montmarie advanced in front of them, whilst general Palombini was proceeding along the right. The battalion of the 117th regiment, led by captain Passelac, reached the summit, carried the position, and took five pieces of cannon which defended it. Zayas effected his retreat towards the Grao of Valencia by the road along the sea-shore.

Our right wing had been equally successful in another direction. At the commencement of the action, Obispo's division had advanced by the road of Naquera, threatening our flank, with a view to reach the defile of Sant-Espiritu; ge-

neral Robert had kept it in check, and repeatedly defeated it. General Chlopiski contented himself, at first, with watching the corps of general Mahy and Villacampa's division, which were in front of his positions. But when he found them preparing to attack him in front, he formed his infantry into masses, kept his cavalry in readiness to charge, and at the moment when the Spanish infantry descended from the heights of the Germanels, and began to deploy in the plain, he gave colonel Schiazzetti the signal to attack. The latter, accompanied by the chef-d'escadron Saint-Joseph, aid-de-camp to the commander-in-chief, hastened forward at the head of the Italian dragoons, routed the advanced guard, and rushed upon the enemy's line, which he broke, and threw into disorder. This was the signal for general Chlopiski to advance; the enemy were not allowed time to rally and to form anew; part of them being cut off and put to the sword, were under the necessity of laying down their arms. At this moment general Harispe made his appearance, in full pursuit of the other divisions under general O'Donnell, which he had completely routed. He united to his own corps the troops of general Chlopiski, and began a close pursuit of general Mahy, who had taken up a position in the rear with the troops he had been able to rally, and he at last forced him to quit the field

of battle, and to make a precipitate retreat towards Betera. Our cavalry arrived in time to compel several battalions to lay down their arms, previously to crossing the torrent of Caraixet. The marshal, after having had his wound dressed on the field of battle, proceeded in person to Betera during the night, and ordered the pursuit of the enemy to be kept up until the hour of ten. He did not return to the camp at the foot of the rock of Saguntum until he had acquired the certainty that all the Spanish corps had recrossed the Guadalaviar. The French army took up a position at Puig, Alvalate, and Betera. Its loss amounted to a hundred and twenty-eight men killed, and five hundred and ninety-six wounded. The loss of the enemy exceeded a thousand men placed hors de combat. They suffered a further loss of four thousand six hundred and eighty-one prisoners, including two generals, forty superior officers, and two hundred and thirty officers of inferior rank, besides four standards, four thousand two hundred muskets, mostly of English manufacture, and twelve pieces of cannon with their caissons.*

This engagement appeared to have decided the fate of Saguntum; the Spanish army was disabled for a long time from making an of-

* See notes and explanatory documents No. 20.

fensive movement; independently of which circumstance, the progress of the siege had never been suspended. Our artillery had widened the breach, and on the 26th in the morning, the tower and its two protecting flanks offered a wide passage through which several men could mount abreast to the assault. The marshal resolved to take advantage of the state of despondency into which the result of the battle must have necessarily thrown the garrison. After the losses it had experienced, it found itself deprived of its last prospect of relief. This was, therefore, a favourable moment for offering terms of capitulation.

The marshal wrote to propose to the governor that he should surrender the fort, announcing to him, at the same time, the defeat of general Blake's army, and the impossibility of his ever obtaining any assistance from that quarter. He offered to receive at his head-quarters an officer belonging to the garrison, if he would send one who enjoyed his confidence, adding, that he would place that officer in communication with the prisoners taken on the preceding day, that he might satisfy himself of the correctness of the facts.

A lieutenant-colonel of artillery was the bearer of general Andriani's reply. He was conducted to general Caro, and was shewn the prisoners, the standards, and the cannon taken by our army. These proofs, and the declara-

tions of his own countrymen, clearly demonstrated to him, what had been the result of the late defeat. In consequence of this officer's report, the governor determined to treat for terms; the capitulation was signed at nine o'clock the same night; at that hour, and by the light of the moon, the garrison left the fort as prisoners of war, and, according to the terms agreed upon, filed off by the breach, which was yet so difficult of access, that our sappers were under the necessity of cutting a slope to facilitate the descent of the Spaniards. They amounted to two thousand five hundred and seventy-two men. We took possession of the fort, in which we found seventeen pieces of cannon, six standards, two thousand four hundred muskets, eight hundred thousand cartridges, ten thousand pounds of gunpowder, besides a supply of provisions and ammunition.

Thus terminated the siege of Saguntum, twenty-one days after the opening of the trenches. Notwithstanding the exertions of the artillery and engineer corps, we could by no means have relied upon the success of a fresh assault. It was clearly demonstrated to us by an inspection of the place, that we had neither been mistaken in our choice of the point of attack, nor respecting the nature of the difficulties we had to contend with. The existence of obstacles which we could only have hitherto surmised at a distance, was now

proved beyond all doubt. The taking of the advanced work, would not have secured to us the possession of the reduit. The professional skill displayed in the attacks, and the valour of our troops, might still have been unavailing, and this arduous siege might never, perhaps, have been brought to a successful close, except through the exhausted state to which the garrison must eventually have been reduced, or the want of provisions, had it not been for the result of the battle of Saguntum. More skilled in the art of war than Henry O'Donnell had proved himself at Margalef, general Blake had marched to the relief of the place at the moment when the works of the besiegers were considerably advanced; and he had driven his adversary to the necessity of fighting on a disadvantageous field of battle. Fortune, it is true, proved unfavourable to him; but he was left in a condition to defend Valencia, with an army still formidable in point of numbers, though weakened by the loss of several thousand men, and especially by the fall of Saguntum, which became a useful point-d'appui for the French army.

CHAPTER XV.

State of Arragon and of lower Catalonia during the siege of Saguntum.—Inefficiency of the army for undertaking the siege of Valencia.—It establishes itself on the left bank of the Guadalaviar.—Position of Blake's army on the right bank.—State of defence of the city of Valencia.—Various engagements in the provinces of Arragon and Catalonia.—A reinforcement is sent to the army—General Reille arrives at Segorbe with two divisions.—Passage of the Guadalaviar.—Battle, and investment of Valencia.—Siege of that city.—Opening of the trench.—Establishment of the batteries.—Occupation of the intrenched camp.—Capitulation of the city.—Entry of the French.—Arrival of general Montbrun at Almanza.—He approaches Alicant, and retreats.—Marshal Suchet is created duke of Albufera.

One of the principal motives which induced marshal Suchet to accelerate his operations before Saguntum, was the uneasiness he felt at the occurrences which were taking place in Arragon during his absence. It was a source of no small satisfaction for him to find Villacampa's troops drawn up in line with Blake's army, a circumstance which relieved him from the apprehension of that officer's operating in his rear; nevertheless, brigadier-general Duran, and Don Juan (Martin), surnamed el Empeci-

nado, had replaced that active Guerilla chieftain on the frontier of Castille, and Mina was daily assuming a more formidable attitude in Navarre and in upper Arragon. Even in lower Catalonia, where the whole of Frere's division had remained, the French were soon driven to adopt a weak and timid system of defence. Notwithstanding our being in possession of the fortified towns of Tarragona, Tortosa, San-Felipe de Balaguer, Lerida, and several strong-holds, such as Mont-Serrat, Cervera, Belpuig, and Monblanch, that division was wholly engaged in overrunning the plains of Urgel, for the purpose of securing the payment of the contributions, as well as the supply of provisions for the abovementioned towns and strong-holds. Its dispersion over an extended space of country afforded the enemy an opportunity of gaining ground, as the division found itself under the necessity of abandoning Cervera, Belpuig, and Mont-Serrat. The governor of Lerida bestowed his particular attention on the object of preventing, as much as possible, the Spanish Guerilla bands from approaching the Priorate and the left bank of the Ebro, and exerted all his endeavours to protect from obstruction the transport of corn from Mequinenza to Tortosa. The chef-de-bataillon Bardout had to sustain a fight near Ribaroya, on the 3rd of October, in order to protect the passage of seventeen boats, and he came out of

the engagement with honour, owing to a reinforcement brought to him by the Polish captain Plater, who was in command on the lower Ebro. There was reason, however, to apprehend that general Lacy, who was displaying great activity in re-organizing the Catalonian army, would eventually succeed in depriving us of the navigation of the river. The marshal, whose attention was directed to the operations carrying on before Saguntum, could not detach any of his troops to protect his convoys; and the Catalonian army, which was concentrated in the vicinity of Gerona, was at too great a distance from general Frere to supply reinforcements, or hold out a point-d'appui to him.

The state of Arragon was not more encouraging: we had in vain flattered ourselves that for some time at least the tranquillity of the Cincovillas would be maintained undisturbed, owing to the capture of Pezzoduro, one of the most cruel and enterprising Guerilla leaders of the left bank of the Ebro. He was surprised at Biota by lieutenant Foison of the gendarmerie, who acted under the orders of colonel Plicque, and the destruction of his band had put an end to a lawless system of warfare which spread terror over the country. Mina had succeeded, however, in raising at this period a numerous and well disciplined corps, which was fully competent to keep a whole division in check. He moved from one

bank of the Ebro to the other; and, whether his force was scattered over the country or united in a compact body, his activity rendered him at all times a dangerous and formidable enemy. The province of Navarre, which he had chosen for the basis of his operations, was in some respects less exposed than any other to his inroads. The security of the province exclusively depended upon the possession of the capital, a large and well fortified town, which we occupied since the commencement of the war. General Reille had under his orders in that province, independently of a French division, the 2nd Italian division commanded by general Severoli. Accordingly, general Mina who was as much distinguished for prudence as for activity, chiefly struck his blows at a distance, in the provinces of Alava, La Rioja, Castille or Arragon. Duran and el Empecinado, who had assembled a force amounting to nearly five thousand infantry and eight hundred cavalry in the vicinity of Soria, approached Calatayud soon after marshal Suchet's departure for his expedition against Valencia. General Musnier, who commanded in Arragon, was at Saragossa amidst several fortified places or strong-holds, the respective garrisons of which were competent to defend themselves against any attack, but he had no disposable forces at his command to enable him to proceed to the relief of any point which might be seriously threatened. Severoli's division

had brought from Italy three battalions belonging to Palombini's division, and intended as reinforcements to it. They reached Arragon on the 13th of September, but did not proceed immediately to join their corps, and were established at the points where their assistance was most required. One of those battalions had been placed at Calatayud, with a view to reinforce the weak garrison which occupied the convent of La Merced under the orders of the French commandant Muller. Every defensive preparation had been completed which the situation of the place admitted of, when on the 29th of September the Spaniards made their appearance. Their advanced guard had proceeded at the same time towards Epila, Almunia, and the defile of el Frasno. The post of Calatayud, being thus isolated from all prospect of relief, was boldly attacked by Duran, the Guerilla leader, who, after summoning it to surrender, erected a battery of a few mountain pieces of artillery of a small calibre which accompanied him in his movements. On perceiving, however, the little effect they produced, he set the mines to work at the angle of the convent-church, which was defended by the chef-de-bataillon Favalelli at the head of a hundred and fifty Italians. These gallant soldiers prepared intrenchments, began a countermine, and, after a first explosion, drove back the Spaniards on the 3rd of October. Another and a wider breach was opened on the following day;

many of the besieged were killed; and the remainder of the garrison capitulated under the influence of fear. This result, which might by a more persevering defence have been avoided, was brought about by an unpleasant misunderstanding amongst the troops composing the garrison.

On the first intelligence of this attack, general Musnier had lost no time in sending to Calatayud a corps of a thousand men which he had collected from various garrisons on the right bank of the Ebro; but that column was not sufficiently strong to force the dangerous defile of el Frasno, and was compelled to retrace its steps. General Musnier had likewise urged general Reille to send immediate assistance, and he had withdrawn all the troops which he could safely remove from the left bank for the purpose of forming a second column of relief. The latter reached Calatayud under cover of a movement of general Bourke, whom general Reille had hastened to send to its aid, and who was in full march along the left bank of the Xalon. Their united forces entered Calatayud on the 5th of October; but they no longer found the enemy, any more than the garrison, which had been marched away as prisoners of war, with the exception of its officers, who were brought to trial for having separated their fate from that of their men. Bourke's brigade instantly resumed the road to Navarre, and our

column also returned to Almunia. Calatayud was again occupied by the enemy.

The marshal had long foreseen the danger of leaving forces in Arragon which were insufficient for its defence; he had applied for fresh assistance; and he at last received information that Severoli's division, consisting of seven thousand infantry and six hundred cavalry would be placed forthwith at his disposal. Accordingly, it reached Saragossa on the 9th of October. General Musnier immediately led it to Calatayud where it arrived on the 12th. The enemy retreated and was pursued in the directions of Molina and Medina-Cœli. General Mazzuchelli's brigade was sent to Uzed and Daroca, whilst the remainder of the division proceeded to Ateca on the road to Madrid.

This was the moment selected by Mina, with his wonted skill and activity, for advancing along the left bank of the Ebro, almost to the very gates of Saragossa, and for availing himself of one of those favourable opportunities which it was his peculiar talent to watch the approach of or to originate. He presented himself before the Cincovillas at the head of three thousand infantry and three hundred cavalry, and attacked the detachment of gendarmerie which formed the garrison of Exea. This post, after a gallant defence of two days, succeeded in effecting its

escape during the night through the hostile line which surrounded it, and fell back upon Saragossa. Mina ordered it to be pursued as far as Las Pedrosas; his object in so doing was to spread alarm in the capital of Arragon; and in this object he completely succeeded. But he was unable to venture beyond a mere demonstration on that point. He shortly afterwards marched against Ayerbe and Huesca, the fortified posts of which he invested, and intercepted the road to France by way of Jaca. During the absence of general Musnier, the commandant of Saragossa, who was not sufficiently alive to the extent of the danger, very incautiously adopted measures wholly inadequate to the object of repelling this attack. He despatched to the relief of Exea an Italian battalion of the 7th regiment of the line, with a company of voltigeurs of the 2nd regiment, and fifty horse chasseurs. Ceccopieri, the officer who commanded that battalion, met, near Zuera, on the 15th of October, the small garrison of Exea, which had eluded Mina's vigilance. He proceeded thence towards Ayerbe, with a view to restore the interrupted communication, met the whole of the enemy's forces, which were united at that place, and found himself involved in a most perilous situation. Being unable to attack, or to avoid being attacked, he formed his men into a square, and marched towards Huesca in a compact body,

and in perfect order, trusting to the chance of his reaching that town, which was only at the distance of four leagues, and defending himself there with a better prospect of success than in the open country. But the battalion was completely surrounded in its march, and so closely pursued, that, finding itself overpowered by superior numbers, having lost its chief and several of its officers and men, who were either killed or wounded in the retreat, it was compelled to surrender at three o'clock in the afternoon of the 17th of October, within two leagues of the town of Huesca.

General Musnier was no sooner apprised of Mina's incursion, than he hastened back to Saragossa, and lost no time in sending all his disposable troops to reinforce the Italian battalion. General Reille, on the other hand, had despatched four hundred horse from the province of Navarre to Exea. These reinforcements arrived too late to prevent the catastrophe. In the midst of the columns which threatened him, Mina succeeded by the skill and rapidity of his operations in avoiding a contact with our troops; he brought away his detachment through the Cincovillas and Navarre, and marched his prisoners to the province of Biscay, where he sent them off by sea to Corunna.

Marshal Suchet was informed of the disastrous occurrences in Arragon whilst he was contending

before Saguntum with difficulties of the most serious nature, which not only retarded his expedition against Valencia, but rendered its success extremely doubtful. He was anxious to be joined by Severoli's division, and was, nevertheless, under the necessity of leaving it with general Musnier, who separated that division into two corps, in order that it might carry on simultaneous operations on both banks of the Ebro. Bertoletti's brigade proceeded to the Cincovillas, and restored the communications between Saragossa and France by way of Jaca. Mazzuchelli's brigade was sent to Calatayud and Daroca, with directions to keep off the enemy. We had in the fort of Molina a small garrison, which was besieged from the 14th to the 26th of October. Captain Brochet of the 44th had made a firm resistance, fully relying on the promise made to him of a reinforcement being sent to his assistance. General Mazzuchelli, in fact, moved forward with the intention of relieving that officer. On his way, however, to the fort, he had to fight a battle against the united forces of el Empecinado at Cubillejo de la Sierra. Five thousand men were drawn up in a strong position to oppose his advance. He attacked and defeated those troops, and completely routed them. The first Italian regiment of the line and the royal chasseurs displayed great courage on the occasion. The chefs-de-bataillon Sala and

Dolder, with many other gallant men, were killed in the action. General Mazzuchelli reached Molina on the 25th of October, and rescued the besieged garrison. He deemed it advisable, however, to abandon that post, ordered the fort to be blown up, and brought back captain Brochet and his detachment to Arragon.

Marshal Suchet earnestly represented to the major-general, during the siege of Saguntum, how much he stood in need of powerful reinforcements, not only with a view to protect his rear, but also to bring to a close the arduous operation in which he was engaged. After the victory of Saguntum, he laid still greater stress than he had hitherto done on the importance of taking advantage of that occurrence to attack Valencia, and he solicited to be furnished with adequate means for carrying that object into execution. But although his representations were attended to, he did not experience their good effect until the month of December following. General Reille, who was stationed in Navarre, had merely been instructed to hold himself in readiness to support Severoli's division in Arragon. General Decaen had just relieved marshal Macdonald in the command of the army of Catalonia, and was detained in upper Catalonia by the constantly recurring necessity of provisioning the city of Barcelona.

Nevertheless, marshal Suchet felt it incumbent

upon him not to remain inactive until the moment when he might be joined by the expected reinforcements. Having obtained possession of Saguntum, he determined to take up a position in front of general Blake, and to approach and threaten Valencia. He ordered general Harispe to make a strong reconnoitring with his division, for the purpose of ascertaining the exact positions occupied by the defeated army. He further directed him to summon the inhabitants, not so much from any hope that he entertained of their submitting to a capitulation, as for the purpose of estimating the degree of energy which might still animate the population, and of reserving to himself the means of reverting, at a later period, and in a more authoritative tone, to proposals of a similar nature. In making his appearance before a populous, opulent, and industrious city, it was far from his intention to obtain possession of it by resorting exclusively to destructive means of warfare. The well-being of his own army led him to adopt the most considerate course, since the resources of the rich province of Valencia were concentrated within its capital. The summons proved wholly unavailing; but, notwithstanding the state of excitement to which the city had been raised, it made no preparations for following the example held out by Saragossa in the obstinacy of its defence. With respect to the army encamped round its walls, it was preparing

to dispute our meditated conquest. We were therefore called upon to fight another battle and commence a fresh siege, objects which necessarily required a great augmentation of forces. The army was not only without any new reinforcements, in the early part of November, but it was even diminished by our having detached two thousand men, for the purpose of escorting the prisoners of war. Nevertheless, the marshal directed the advance of the divisions which had occupied, since the 26th of October, the towns of Liria, Betera, Alvalate, and Puig. General Harispe established himself at Paterna on the 3rd of November. Habert's division took possession of the suburb of Seranos, and occupied with his left the Grao, or port, of Valencia. The reserve brigade, Palombini's division, and the cavalry, were cantoned on the second line.

On considering the geographical position of the spot, it will be seen that both armies were only a short distance asunder, and were even within sight of each other. The city and the Spanish camps bordered the right bank of the river, which formed the only separation between us. The enemy had broken down two of the five stone bridges, which were constructed over it; but they retained possession of a few houses in their front, on the left bank of the river, with the convents of Pio-Quinto and of Santa-Clara. The other three bridges were protected by works which

were proof against a coup-de-main; and the enemy might avail themselves of these bridges to debouch upon us. Our position from right to left exceeded two leagues in extent; the troops which occupied it were too weak in point of numbers, and at too great intervals asunder, to be able to make head in every direction. The marshal determined to fortify his line by some defensive works; his object was not only to resist the sorties of the garrison, but to have it also in his power to leave the whole left bank of the Guadalavìar to the care of a small body of troops, when the moment should have arrived for offensive operations on the right bank with the main body of his army. The Spaniards were, accordingly, attacked in the houses of which they retained possession in the suburb of Seranos. They disputed every inch of ground: an old palace on the quay, called el Real, which we had noticed and occupied in 1810, had been completely demolished; but the convent of Santa-Clara, an elevated building, commanding all the adjoining streets, was strongly defended and opposed a warm resistance to our attack. We could only advance by the aid of sapping and mining. Two chambers were dug, and their explosion effected a breach, through which our soldiers penetrated into the interior of the convent; the garrison fled and recrossed the river. This convent became one of the points d'appui of our position, and our

sharp-shooters established themselves in it. The openings leading to the streets were baricadoed, and battlements were formed in the houses along the quay, in order that we might keep up a fire of musketry against any troops that ventured beyond the enclosure of the city. Our advanced posts, being thus scattered, had little to apprehend from the cannon of the place. The convent of the Esperanza, nearly facing the upper bridge, was fortified with a view to support the right of the suburb of Seranos. The same course was adopted with respect to the Capuchin convent on the left; and three redoubts were erected in the plain still further to the left, in the direction of the Grao, and facing the two lower bridges; these redoubts were surrounded with a ditch full of water, and connected together by abattis. This work was carried on under cover of the cannon of the tête-de-pont near the sea, and within sight of the lines which bordered the right bank of the Guadalaviar, between Mount Olivete and the Lazaretto.

The establishment of this line of countervallation on the left bank being completed, we had yet to prepare the means of crossing the river and attacking Blake in his camps. After the battle of Saguntum, this general had rallied his army in the defensive position which he had secured for his troops on the right bank. The several canals which open at the Guadalaviar for

the purpose of irrigating the plains of Valencia, formed so many lines of natural defence, which were the more formidable as their width and depth rendered it difficult to cross them. At the point at which they begin to branch out on separating from the common source, stands the village of Manisses, at the distance of a league and a half from Valencia. It had been fortified, and the intrenchments raised round the place had rendered it, as well as the village of Quarte, and the hermitage of Sant-Onofre, the head of all the defensive works of the city of Valencia; the line extended from thence towards Mislata and as far as the city. The same works had been carried on down the river from the sea-bridge and Mount Olivete to the Lazaretto and the mouth of the Guadalaviar. All these intrenchments were lined with troops and artillery. The Spanish cavalry occupied Aldaya and Torrente, for the purpose of covering the left of the army, and preventing it from being turned.

The city of Valencia, in the centre of the enemy's position, contained the stores and provisions, as well as the reserves of the enemy. It was even in a respectable state of defence. Its wall of inclosure, of a nearly circular form, was thirty feet high and ten thick, with a road for making rounds on its summit. The want of terrace had been supplied by strong timber-work, raised at stated distances, upon which

cannon had been mounted in battery. At the foot of the wall, and along a part of its circumference, there was a ditch full of water, with a covered way. A bastion had been recently constructed on the side next to the suburb of Ruzafa, and the gates were covered with works of earth, armed with cannon. Independently of these means of defence, a vast intrenched camp surrounded the town, and enclosed the suburbs of Quarte, Ruzafa, and San-Vicente. The enemy had constructed in a short space of time, by dint of labour, a continued line of earthen bastions, redans, and cremailleres, the ditch of which was twelve feet deep in every part, with talus sufficiently steep to prevent any attempt to scale them without the assistance of ladders. The line was extended from Ruzafa as far as the intrenchments of Mount Olivete. Its development did not fall short of four thousand toises.

Such was the position in which captain-general Blake had established his army, in order to restore to it that self-confidence which it had lost by its defeat on the 25th of October. Independently of the peasantry, who had been previously summoned to arms, and of the militia organized within the city, he called in from every quarter all the soldiers and detachments, with which he could reinforce his army, and ordered general Freyre to join him.

By these means he was enabled to assemble, in a short space of time, an army of thirty thousand infantry and about three thousand cavalry.

The troops which marshal Suchet had it in his power to oppose to him fell far short of this number; but it was not merely a question of offering battle in the open plain; he had to cross the Guadalaviar in presence of the enemy's army, to attack it in its intrenchments, to force it back into the city, to invest that city, which was of considerable extent, and to lay siege to it. Pending the arrival of the fresh troops for which he had applied, the marshal bestowed his attention to the object of forming a large park of artillery. Murviedro presented, ever since the fall of Saguntum, a safe and commodious dépôt; all the artillery and ammunition requisite for a siege was accordingly transferred from Tortosa to that place. Their transport commenced as early as the 27th of October, and continued along the high road, under cover of the batteries established at Benicarlo, Oropesa, and Benicassi, until we had collected at Murviedro a field train consisting of sixty pieces of cannon, each of them provided with seven hundred balls, and three millions of musket cartridges.

Colonel Millet, who was stationed at Segorbé with the 121st regiment, was frequently under the necessity of breaking up his encampment, or of

detaching the chef-de-bataillon Meneau to the mountains of Onda, for the purpose of dispersing the Guerilla bands who were exciting the country to rise against us, and threatened the road in the immediate vicinity of Castellon de la Plana. The band of Messeguer, a Guerilla leader, having proceeded to Peñarova, a village on the frontier of Arragon, in the direction of Morella, gave rise to an act of firmness which marshal Suchet did not fail to appreciate and extol as it deserved: some young men whom that chief attempted to carry off against their will boldly resisted him, killed some of his men, and put his band to flight. This village solicited and obtained permission to take up arms. The marshal was anxious to encourage the zeal which the inhabitants of various parts of Arragon resolutely manifested. They had been brought not only to desert but even to oppose the armed bands who compelled us to be incessantly engaged in a petty warfare, which was as unpleasant to us as pregnant with dangerous consequences. This friendly disposition towards us always proved our most powerful auxiliary in the midst of the incessantly renewed efforts of Mina, el Empecinado, and the inferior leaders who were scattered over Arragon. Whilst general Mazzuchelli was on his way, on the 7th of November, to relieve the post of Almunia which he was, however, unable to rescue, he had to maintain a sanguinary conflict, with his eighteen hun-

dred men, against Duran's united forces, on which occasion he defeated and routed them with a heavy loss; his own did not fall far short of two hundred killed and wounded.

On the 23rd of November, Campillo's Guerilla band was overtaken at Monfuerte and at Añadon by the chef-de-bataillon Bugeaud and completely defeated. A detachment of the enemy's cavalry was attacked near Maynar by the chief d'escadron Colson of the 4th regiment of hussars, and met with a similar fate. In the latter part of the month, Severoli's division effected a movement which brought it nearer to the principal army, having established itself at Teruel, where it collected a considerable supply of corn.

Meanwhile, the marshal was hastening the return of the troops that he had sent as an escort with the prisoners. The garrison of Peniscola repeatedly attempted to interrupt our communications, and to establish a post with artillery at a tower on the sea shore, called Torrenueva; a Spanish officer of engineers had already proceeded thither with a hundred men including forty sappers. A battalion of the 114th regiment, under the orders of captain Ronfort, was encamped in front of Peniscola for the purpose of keeping its garrison in check; and captain Bonafous of the artillery was in command at Torreblanca, a short distance off. Both officers advanced against Torrenueva by a combined movement;

two eight-pounders were formed into a battery before the enemy had received the cannon which they expected. Some gun-boats which had been sent from Peniscola to the relief of the tower made their appearance; but our grenadiers rushed towards the gate with a barrel of gunpowder in order to blow it up: the garrison alarmed at our determination surrendered, and the fire of our two cannon compelled the gunboats to sail off. We abandoned the position after blowing up the tower.

Our troops which were encamped on the left bank of the Guadalaviar constantly kept the enemy on the alert, by petty skirmishes of advanced posts. We reconnoitred the roads, the canals, the fords, and every point which afforded a chance of forcing a passage. An enemy's post having been kept up at Liria, captain d'Outrement carried it in the most gallant style. In an action of cavalry on the right bank, we lost the chef-d'escadron Bordenave and captain Schmitz of the hussars; the chef-d'escadron Duchand of the artillery was wounded. The troops of general Harispe frequently crossed from one side to the other of the Guadalaviar. The enemy had no longer a single soldier on our side of the river, and our presence on theirs had now become familiar to them. We were enabled to reconnoitre more closely the works which they had raised; their time was engaged in completing and im-

proving their intrenchments, and their numbers were gradually increasing; marshal Suchet greatly lamented that his operation was necessarily becoming more difficult by every day's delay; but his plan was laid down of striking only a single decisive blow, and of waiting until he had collected all the resources which were to be placed at his command.

The emperor had at last determined that Severoli's and Reille's division should enter the kingdom of Valencia, and be temporarily placed at marshal Suchet's disposal. General Caffarelli was to protect the provinces of Navarre and Arragon during his absence. Severoli's division, which was composed of the 1st light regiment, the 1st and 7th of the line, and 1st regiment of Italian chasseurs, had already suffered some losses in the engagements that had taken place since its entrance into Arragon. The French division, consisting of the 10th, 20th, 60th and 81st regiment of the line, and the 9th hussars, was in the best condition and complete in point of numbers. This corps of reserve, under the orders of general count Reille, amounted in all to nearly fourteen thousand men, who were formed into twenty two battalions of infantry and six squadrons of cavalry, with forty pieces of mounted cannon. But it was neither united nor ready to act on the 21st of November, the day on which it received directions to commence its march. General Bourke's

brigade was stationed between Saragossa and Jaca, for the purpose of escorting the prisoners to France. The brigade of general Pannetier had been summoned to Castille by general Dorsenne. On its return to Navarre, general Reille ordered it to repair to Saragossa, called in Bourke's brigade, and on the 10th of December resumed his march towards Teruel, where general Severoli expected him. He was under the necessity of halting for some time at this place, with a view to watch the movements of the marquis de Montijo and of general Freyre, whose forces were proceeding towards the mountains of Cuenca. But the arrival of a corps of French troops from Madrid brought relief to this threatened point; general Reille continued his march, and reached Segorbe on the 24th of December. Marshal Suchet repaired to that town for the purpose of reviewing those troops, and expressed himself well satisfied with their state and composition, as well as with the spirit which animated them. He resolved to bring them at once into line with the main army, without waiting for the arrival of Pannetier's brigade, which was still at some distance in the rear.

The marshal had now at his command a force amounting to about thirty-three thousand men. He found himself in a condition to invest Valencia by shutting up the Spanish army within its lines. It was in furtherance of this object that he had

constantly solicited a great augmentation of forces previously to his commencing operations. The emperor, who was already directing his views to the war against Russia, had caught the idea held out to him, that the general submission of Spain would be greatly accelerated by the capture of a numerous Spanish army within the walls of Valencia; in attention therefore to this object, he had, whilst ordering the movement of general Reille, directed marshal Marmont, the commander-in-chief of the army of Portugal, then in Estremadura, to send a strong detachment towards Murcia across the provinces of Castille and La Mancha. Marshal Suchet, however, who had no precise knowledge of the destination of that detachment or of the time of its movement, could not avail himself of it in the combinations which he had to adopt. It was sufficient for him to be informed of the appearance of general Darmagnac in the vicinity of Cuenca, and he considered that the moment had now arrived to strike a blow. Freyre's division had not yet reached the camp of general Blake, who would not fail to be soon apprised of the movements of our troops; it was of the utmost importance, therefore, that we should not allow him any time to adopt measures for opposing the plans, which the arrival of our long expected reinforcement allowed us at last to carry into effect. General Reille received orders

to proceed to Liria, and from thence to Ribaroya by forced marches.

It was at this village that the army was about to cross the Guadalaviar. With a view to avoid the labyrinth of the canals on the right bank, a spot had been selected higher than the point at which they take their source, and on crossing to the opposite bank, we were to take possession of the sluices, and drain the water out of the canals. Every thing was in readiness in our camp for effecting the passage. Two wooden bridges for the infantry, were constructed in the night from the 25th to the 26th, and at some distance further on, a bridge of boats for the passage of the cavalry and artillery. Two hundred voltigeurs, each of them riding behind an hussar, forded the river for the purpose of protecting our pioneers, and forcing the Spanish posts. The latter fell back as they had frequently done on similar occasions, and during the ensuing night, they gave no demonstration of suspecting our preparations. General Harispe was the first to cross the bridge with his division; Musnier's division followed, and afterwards the cavalry, under general Boussard. But, notwithstanding the activity displayed, the troops could not be collected and formed on the right bank before eight o'clock in the morning. The corps of general Reille, which had marched night and day without stopping for the last thirty hours, had not yet reached the left

bank. General Ferrier occupied with the Neapolitans the suburb of Seranos and the redoubts: he was to remain on the defensive, and merely to keep in check any troops that might attempt to cross the bridges. The Italian division, stationed between Benimamet and Campanar, was to attack the intrenchments of Mislata. Habert's division, which had assembled at the Grao, had orders to attack those of the Lazaretto and of the lines in the direction of mount Olivete. Both these attacks were calculated to draw off the enemy's attention, and to engage a great part of their forces, whilst our right wing, by making a grand movement, was to advance towards the road to Murcia, and as far as the lake of Albufera, in order to cut off the retreat of Blake's army to the banks of the Xucar. It behoved us to act without the loss of a single moment, for fear the Spanish army should discover by broad day-light the direction taken by that wing, and, under the apprehension of being surrounded in its lines, should change its position before we could have it in our power to prevent it.

Harispe's division was despatched towards Torrente with the cavalry, with orders to cross the ravine. During the interval which must elapse until general Reille's arrival, the troops of general Robert were kept in reserve. A squadron of hussars belonging to the advanced guard preceded

the columns of general Harispe, through a country so covered with trees, that it was difficult to see any object at the shortest distance. The squadron fell into the midst of the main body of the enemy's cavalry, near Aldaya; it was charged and driven back upon our infantry, which was advancing in good order. The charge failed to make any impression upon our compact masses; but the gallant general Boussard, who accompanied the squadron, and had in vain exerted himself to cover the retreat, remained wounded on the field of battle, and fell into the enemy's hands. His aid-de-camp Robert, and several hussars were killed in endeavouring to protect him. Our cavalry rushed upon that of the Spaniards, routed and pursued it as far as Torrente, and succeeded in rescuing general Boussard, besides making a few prisoners.

In the mean time, a brisk cannonade was kept up on the banks of the Guadalaviar. General Palombini, in conformity with the orders he had received, put his troops in motion at ten o'clock in the morning, with the intention to cross the river and the canals which separated it from Mislata, a point occupied by Zayas' division. The 2nd light Italian regiment was the first to cross over the weir of a mill; general Balathier instantly sent some voltigeurs beyond the canal of Favara; and captain Vacani hastened to establish a bridge, which enabled the 2nd light regi-

ment, and shortly afterwards the 4th regiment of the line, to move forward, notwithstanding the efforts of the enemy, who had hurried to the spot with a view to oppose them. Colonel Henri was at the same time throwing a wooden bridge across the Guadalaviar, under cover of the artillery which we had mounted in a commanding position on the left bank; but the brigade of general Saint-Paul, in its impatience to reach the field of battle, rushed into the river, waded across with water up to the waist, and marched at once to the intrenchments of Mislata. Its progress was arrested by the canal which was of considerable depth and steepness. Captain Ordinari also attempted to throw a bridge across at the same point; but the enemy directed so sharp a fire against the column, before it could cross over and deploy in the plain, that its ranks were for a moment thrown into disorder, and it fell back into the Guadalaviar. General Palombini rallied the troop, and succeeded in bringing it back, at the moment when Zayas was on the point of bearing down with all his forces upon Balathier's brigade. The 5th and 6th Italian regiments of the line, animated by the example of their chiefs and the danger to which their comrades were exposed, crossed the canal with the utmost gallantry, and ranged themselves in order of battle on the left of the 4th regiment of the line and the 2nd light infantry. Some reserve corps brought up by general Blake

were on the point of taking part in the engagement, and of balancing our chance of success in that quarter; but Manisses and Quarte were attacked at the same moment, and the whole line of the Spanish intrenchments was forced by the charge made on our left.

As soon as the troops of general Reille had arrived in the rear of general Harispe, the latter continued his movement upon Catarroja, and general Musnier ordered a brisk attack to be made upon Manisses and Sant-Onofre. The divisions of Villacampa and Obispo, commanded by general Mahy, which had been called to Valencia as an auxiliary force, and were only intent upon securing the means of retreat, did not defend that position with as much obstinacy as general Zayas had displayed at Mislata. The 114th and 121st of the line and the 1st regiment of the Vistula forced the first intrenchments, and moved towards Quarte, which the enemy lost no time in evacuating, with a view to secure their retreat on the high road to Murcia. The troops of general Reille, which were coming up in the direction of Chirivella, overtook the rear of the column and made a few prisoners. The immediate effect of these operations was to relieve Mislata, where general Palombini was still engaged with the enemy. He was thereby enabled to make an advance movement, and it was on the field of battle itself that his gallant soldiers

gave their hands to their brave countrymen of Severoli's division. Being thus separated from generals Mahy, Obispo, and Villacampa, Blake found himself under the necessity of renouncing the idea of retreating towards the Xucar, if it ever entered into his contemplation. He returned, with generals O'Donnell, Miranda, Zayas, and Lardizabal, to the intrenched camp and to Valencia, which he could not take upon himself to abandon and leave wholly unprotected. The marshal, on his side, had proceeded to join Harispe's division, and sent it as well as the cavalry in a direct line from Torrente to Catarroja, so as effectually to surround the Spanish army. General Mahy had already reached the road to Alcira; we could, therefore, only come up with a few stragglers, the baggage and the artillery. Our troops, however, confined themselves to the important object which they had in view, and continued their march; they enclosed between them and the city all the enemy's troops which had not yet found time to effect their escape; they only halted at the places which formed in that direction the extreme limit of the field of battle, on the borders of the lake of Albufera.

Nevertheless, the success of this comprehensive manœuvre still depended upon the operation confided to general Habert, who had been ordered to cross the river as soon as the attack of general Palombini should have assumed a

serious character. Independently of thirty-six pieces of cannon, which kept up with the divisions, twenty pieces had been placed in a position on the left bank, to facilitate the passage above and below the town. After a brisk cannonade against the fleet, as well as against the enemy's lines, general Habert threw a bridge across at the entrance of the river, set his division in motion at noon-day, and advanced against the Spaniards under a dreadful fire of artillery and musketry. He had sent forward a detachment of about a hundred horse, with voltigeurs riding behind, who proceeded along the narrow flat shore on the outside of the Lazaretto, and turned by the gorge the intrenchments which the division was attacking in front. The Spaniards did not stand their ground, and our troops immediately established themselves in the intrenchments. General Habert, adhering to his instructions, extended his movement, with his right still leaning against the river; his left came up in this manner with Harispe's division. A road of difficult access, between Albufera and the sea, the existence of which was not known to us, again afforded the means of retreat to a Spanish column, which succeeded in reaching Cullera, at the mouth of the Xucar. This road was intercepted, as well as the high road, as soon as our troops had established themselves in the posi-

tions at which they were to encamp. At night-fall, the investment of Valencia was completed on both banks, and a body of nearly twenty thousand men, two-thirds of Blake's army, was enclosed by that operation.

It still remained for us to ascertain what might be the intentions of general Mahy with the troops which had effected their retreat towards the Xucar. The marshal despatched general Delort during the night, with the dragoons of the 24th regiment and five hundred voltigeurs, in the direction of Alcira, and sent colonel Christophe at the same time, with three hundred men of the 4th hussars, towards Cullera. Colonel Alphonse de Colbert, commanding the 9th hussars, was detached with his regiment to Chivas and Buñol, on the road to Cuenca. The cuirassiers remained as a reserve in the camp; the divisions of infantry, formed in two lines, presented a front on both sides. General Delort found general Mahy posted at Alcira, with three or four thousand men, in a defensive position, in the centre of an island, with an armed tête-de-pont. But on the first fire of musketry, the Spanish general evacuated the town, and the inhabitants voluntarily afforded every assistance on our entrance into it. General Villacampa, who occupied Cullera, withdrew at our approach, and joined general Mahy in the direction of

Alicante. Colonel Colbert brought back a hundred prisoners.

The result of the battle of the 26th was the capture of twenty-four pieces of cannon, and some hundreds of prisoners, and the investment of a large city, containing an entire army within its walls; it cost us nearly four hundred killed and wounded, mostly of Palombini's division, including about forty officers. The action of Mislata, which had a happy influence over the victory, was highly creditable to the gallantry of the Italian troops. Colonel Barbieri was killed gloriously fighting at the head of his regiment. Of the French, general Boussard was seriously wounded, as we have had occasion to mention; fortunately, however, none of his wounds proved mortal. The marshal in particular had to deplore the loss of his cousin, young Adolphe de Villeneuve, a highly promising officer, who commanded the hussars of his escort, and was killed by one of the last musket-shots fired in that action.*

* At the decisive moment of the battle, after marshal Suchet had despatched the columns of general Harispe on the road to Murcia, for the purpose of enclosing Blake within the walls of Valencia, had sent the troops of generals Reille and Musnier to the assistance of Palombini's division, he alighted at the village of Chirivella, and ascended a steeple, from whence he cast a rapid glance at what was going forward on both sides of the Guadalaviar. Just at that time a Spanish

The occupation of Cullera, Alcira, and Alberique, was sufficient to secure the front of the army in the direction of the Xucar: some troops which had been placed in observation on that line completely covered the siege. But the disappearance of the enemy's forces induced the marshal to remove his own to a greater distance, in order to avail himself of the resources of a rich and fertile country. He sent forward general Delort as far as Xativa or San-Felipe, which was occupied on the 29th of December, without the slightest resistance. We found there a million of cartridges and a considerable supply of rice. The population of that town, which amounts to fifteen thousand souls, gave as friendly a welcome to our troops as they had met with at Alcira; these favourable indications appeared an augury

battalion was retreating before the Italians, and in its hesitation as to the road it should take on its way back to Valencia, it approached the village of Chirivella. Our infantry had not yet reached that point: the only detachment there was the platoon forming the marshal's escort, which consisted of about thirty hussars and cuirassiers. They instantly mounted; the aides-de-camp hastened to place themselves at their head, and, by a vigorous charge, averted the imminent danger to which the commander-in-chief of the French army was for some moments exposed. The Spanish infantry withdrew, but kept up a random fire from behind the ditches and canals, which placed several of our men hors-de-combat. The aide-de-camp Mayer de Baldeg distinguished himself in this charge, as well as captain d'Hérouville of the staff, and young de Villeneuve, who commanded the escort; the two last named officers were mortally wounded on the occasion.

of the speedy submission of the district of Valencia.

The troops destined to carry on the siege encamped round the city at a distance of twelve hundred metres from the outworks, and in the following order: Habert's division, forming the extreme right, rested upon the Guadalaviar; on its left was Harispe's division, connected with it by intermediate posts, and extending as far as the high road to Murcia. On the other side of the road, the line was continued by the corps of general Reille, whose right was formed by Bourke's brigade; Severoli's division, on the left of the latter, joined Palombini's division, stationed on both sides of the Guadalaviar, one brigade being at Mislata, the other at Campanar. With a view to secure the possession of the left bank, which was wholly unprotected since the battle, the troops of Musnier's division were sent on the 27th of December to the suburb of Serranos and towards the high road to Murviedro. General Blake no sooner found himself shut up in Valencia than he formed the plan of quitting it with fifteen thousand men, and throwing himself amongst the mountains, from whence he might return at pleasure to disturb the operations of the siege. He crossed the upper bridge during the night of the 28th, and marched along the left bank. His advanced guard consisted of about three hundred cavalry and infantry under the orders of brigadier general Michelena. It drove back our first posts,

but put the whole line on the alert. As it was advancing by a hollow way bordered by a canal the first platoons that came up felt no difficulty in arresting the progress of the main column, which was endeavouring to debouch. The advanced guard alone succeeded in reaching the open country. The remainder were driven back, recrossed the bridge, and re-entered the town after suffering some loss. This abortive attempt spread discouragement amongst the inhabitants, and on the very next day, numbers of deserters began to arrive at our camp.

The marshal deemed it advisable to reinforce the troops on the left bank. Pannetier's brigade, which general Reille had been compelled to leave behind when he broke up from Arragon, had just arrived at Murviedro; it was instantly brought into line, and stationed in the rear of Campanar, between Beniferri and Benimamet. The 4th hussars came to encamp near Burjasot, a village at which the head-quarters were established. A few field works were erected for the purpose of more effectually protecting our camps on the right bank. Two redoubts were constructed, and a convent was fortified on the roads by which it was possible for the enemy to debouch. Intrenchments were raised at various points, in order that our troops might at no time be taken by surprise by the sorties of a garrison so formidable in point of numbers, and from

which we were stationed at so short a distance. In the night between the 30th and 31st, two thousand Spaniards presented themselves before Severoli's division: the 1st Italian regiment of the line allowed them to come within a short distance, marched up to them, and compelled them to retreat into the place.

Every thing was in readiness to commence an immediate and regular attack of Valencia. The fortified line which surrounded the town terminated in a point at its eastern extremity, towards mount Olivete, as we have already mentioned; in that quarter it was unprotected by artillery, and could be turned from the left bank. It was determined that an attack should be directed against that point; the principal one was made to bear upon the salient part towards the south, which was formed by the suburb of San-Vicente. During the night between the 1st and 2nd of January, 1812, colonel Henri and the chef-de-bataillon Plagniol, with three thousand men, led by general Pannetier, the commandant of the trench, opened the parallels on the two fronts of attack, at a distance of sixty and eighty toises from the place. Our pioneers did not suffer much, but the gallant colonel Henri received a mortal wound whilst completing the tracé. The army lost in him an engineer officer of distinguished talents and activity, who

had led the attack in seven successive sieges, and acquired the unbounded confidence of the soldiers. The work was brought to a completion on the following day; communications were opened in the rear, and cheminemens were pushed forward during the succeeding nights. The ordnance department, which had transferred its principal dépôt to San-Miguel de los Reyes, hastened to transport some pieces of cannon to the right bank of the Guadalaviar, behind the camps of the points of attack. Notwithstanding the heavy rains which had softened the ground, and rendered the roads almost impassable, four batteries were erected against the front of San-Vicente, and three against the front of Olivete, with incredible rapidity. The engineer department cut the road to Murcia by sapping, extended the parallel, brought it to rest against embattled houses, and ran the cheminemens to within a very short distance of the counterscarp.

The enemy had opposed the progress of our work by the fire of their artillery, and, in the night of the 5th of January, they added to it a heavy fire of musketry, the object of which was to mask the arrangements they were making in the interior of the lines. It was soon discovered that the Spanish troops were evacuating the camp, and retreating within the enclosure of the town; we immediately availed ourselves of this circumstance to

scale the points of attack, in order not to allow time for disarming them. Colonel Belotti on the right, and general Montmarie on the left, penetrated into the lines, took possession of, and established themselves in the suburbs; the first houses of the suburb of San-Vicente were only ten toises from the wall of enclosure of the town. The result of this engagement was the capture of eighty-one pieces of cannon. The whole Spanish army, together with the immense population of Valencia, were shut up within its walls. The besiegers could easily form an idea of the confusion which must prevail amongst the besieged, in the first moments of terror or uncertainty; and in order to increase it, mortar-batteries began to throw shells amongst them in the night between the 5th and 6th of January. All our camps remained under arms, with a view to be in readiness to repel the garrison, if it should again venture upon a sortie under the influence of despair. In the afternoon of the 6th, the marshal sent a letter to general Blake, proposing that he should surrender the town, and expressing an earnest wish to spare a fine city from destruction. This general gave a negative reply, on the following day, saying that *previously to the hour of noon on the 6th, he might have consented to change the position of his army by evacuating the city; but that the bombardment of the first twenty-four hours had been the means of proving*

to him how much he could depend upon the constancy of the troops and the readiness of the people to brave every danger. Notwithstanding the apparent firmness of this language, the city was a prey to that consternation which we had reason to suspect; and the hostile general betrayed the secret of his distress, by giving us to understand that he would, under certain conditions, have consented to evacuate the place.

But it was by no means the intention of the marshal to permit the escape of the Spanish army. His object was to compel it to surrender; to that object was directed the whole plan which he had laid down for the campaign, and he redoubled his exertions to secure it. The bombardment was kept up on the 7th and 8th of January. The enemy had obstinately persisted in maintaining possession of a few houses in the suburb of Quarte; and it became necessary to make a vigorous attack upon the Ursuline convent in which they were posted; on this occasion, we had to deplore the loss of captain Leviston, of the engineer department. We attempted to fix the mine to the wall of enclosure, near the gate of San-Vicente; but we were effectually prevented by the enemy's artillery. We made a fresh cheminement, and took possession of the Dominican convent. In the space of two days, five new batteries were constructed and ready to act. We were on the

point of opening the breach, when two Spanish officers presented themselves as the bearers of flags of truce. The proposals of general Blake, were to the effect that he should be allowed to quit Valencia unmolested, and withdraw to Alicante or Carthagena with his troops, arms, baggage, and four pieces of cannon. These proposals were rejected by the marshal, who laid down the basis of a plain and ordinary capitulation, with a condition for the exchange of two thousand French prisoners, to be taken from the island of Cabrera, Alicante, and Cadiz. General Zayas came on the following day to announce the acceptance of the proposed basis, and returned to the city, in company with general Saint-Cyr Nugues, the marshal's chief of the staff, for the purpose of concluding the capitulation with the commander-in-chief Blake in person. It was signed on the morning of the 9th of January, and immediately ratified by both parties.*

All hostilities had ceased as soon as negotiations were set on foot. The marshal had at heart to preserve the capital of the kingdom of Valencia, and to spare the inhabitants from the calamities of the war, from which there was yet a possibility of rescuing them. He expressed his satisfaction to the troops in an order

* See notes and explanatory documents, No. 21.

of the day, in which he enjoined them not to enter the city until the 14th. During the interval of four days, every one was prevented from passing the gates, and reviews took place within the camps, in order that the strictest attention might be paid to the discipline, good condition, and cleanliness of the troops. General Robert, appointed governor, and the chef-de-bataillon Bugeaud, town-major of Valencia, both officers of distinguished talents and of great firmness of character, entered the town with twelve hundred grenadiers and voltigeurs, took possession of the posts, magazines, and public establishments, and made the necessary arrangements for the assembling and marching out of the Spanish army, the entrance and quartering of the French army, the maintenance of tranquillity, and the quelling of any attempt at creating disturbance.

The capture of Valencia placed at our disposal eighteen thousand two hundred and nineteen prisoners of war, including eight hundred and ninety eight officers, twenty-three generals, with captain-general Blake at their head, besides twenty-one standards, two thousand cavalry or artillery horses, three hundred and ninety-three pieces of cannon, forty-two thousand muskets, a hundred and eighty thousand pounds of gunpowder, &c. The sick and wounded in the hospitals of the city amounted, according to the return, to eleven hundred and sixty-two. The

Spanish army marched out of Valencia on the 10th of January by the upper bridge, and, after laying down its arms, took the road to France. General count Pannetier escorted, with his brigade, a column of eight thousand prisoners on the road to Teruel; a column of equal strength was sent by the road to Tortosa; two thousand more proceeded towards San Felipe, where it was hoped that they would be exchanged against an equal number of French prisoners of war. With respect to the commander-in-chief Blake, he had no sooner signed the capitulation, than he expressed a desire to withdraw without a moment's delay; and he took his departure the next morning for Saragossa and Pau with his aides-de-camp. The Neapolitan adjutant general Florestan Pepe, who had greatly distinguished himself at the sieges of Tarragona and Valencia, having been recalled at this time by his government, the marshal commissioned him to accompany general Blake as far as the French frontier.

The marshal had himself set the example of remaining in the camp, in order that no one should presume to enter Valencia before the appointed day. On the 14th of January, he made his entry at the head of the army of Arragon, by the new gate of San-José, whilst general Reille, at the head of twelve thousand men, entered by the gate of San-Vicente. The inhabitans gave us a far more friendly reception than we could

have anticipated. The internal administration being protected by the presence of general Robert, had found time to adopt measures calculated to preserve the public peace, and to provide for our most urgent wants; their labours were not interrupted by the slightest indication of disorder, at a time when fears were entertained that the city would not escape devastation and plunder. Confidence and submission were immediately displayed without any apparent effort; nor was the public tranquillity disturbed for a single moment. The municipal authorities, corporations, and principal inhabitants, received and complimented the marshal at the residence prepared for him. His first act was to confirm the tribunal of arbitrators, who are daily called upon to settle the misunderstandings that arise with respect to water-courses, and whose sentence, given orally, is instantly carried into effect. There existed no object of more vital interest to a country, the incredible fertility of which is almost exclusively owing to its system of irrigation. This readiness to consult the welfare of the Valencians was received with every mark of gratitude.

The inhabitants, and the militia who had been organised for the purpose of concurring in the defence of the city, were disarmed without the slightest difficulty. A quantity of arms were seized, which had been stored up by the English

consul Tupper, who promoted the insurrection of the country by distributing those arms as well as by money and inflammatory writings. The marshal ordered the formation of a civic guard, composed of the principal inhabitants, with a view to maintain the public tranquillity. A few agents of disturbance, spies, and agitators, were arrested and sent to France, as well as friars, who were treated as prisoners of war, in consequence of instructions sent from Paris to that effect. This measure mainly contributed to the submission of Valencia. The clergy was protected, and public worship treated with the respect it deserved; the churches were not closed for a single day. We saw in the chapel of Nuestra-Señora the image of the virgin so highly prized by the Valencians; it still bore the insignia of generalissimo, with which it had been pompously invested by the marquis del Palacio previously to the siege. Company, the old and venerable archbishop of Valencia, returned to the capital with his clergy from Gandia, to which place he had retired, and resumed his functions. He was in the enjoyment of an immense revenue, which was almost wholly expended in alms. The public tranquillity was greatly promoted by his presence and example.

At ten o'clock at night on the 11th of January, being the day after the Spanish army had laid down its arms, marshal Suchet re-

ceived a letter from general Montbrun, dated Almanza the 9th of the same month, which was brought to him by an officer of the staff. That general had been detached from the army of Portugal, and was advancing by the road from Madrid to Valencia, with a corps composed of three divisions, including one division of cavalry. He announced, that in compliance with the emperor's orders, the object of his movement was to create a diversion against the Spanish army, and protect the operation of the army of Arragon; that he was about to manœuvre with a view to cut off or drive back into Alicante the corps of generals Mahy and Freyre, which occupied Alcoy and Concentaïna; that, under any circumstance, however, his instructions required him to return to the army of Portugal between the 15th and 20th, whatever occurrence might seem to call away his attention, or whatever orders he might receive to the contrary. The marshal hastened to thank him, in reply, for his intended co-operation, and sent him a copy of the capitulation signed in Valencia on the 9th of January. So far from urging him to delay his return, which the marshal duke of Ragusa, commander-in-chief of the army of Portugal, had prudently directed to take place on an early day, he endeavoured to deter him from marching upon Alicante, feeling apprehensive lest that town, being encouraged by the presence or the passage of a Spanish army, would

make defensive preparations which it had hitherto neglected to resort to; his anticipations were unfortunately realised. General Montbrun came within sight of the place, merely threw in a few howitzers, sent a summons to the governor, and immediately resumed the road to Madrid. But the town of Alicante, having recovered from its first alarm, only displayed the more eagerness to defend itself against any future attack, and made every preparation to sustain a siege. The measure which had been determined upon at Majorca, of immediately sending two thousand French prisoners to Alicante with a view to their being exchanged, agreeably to the capitulation entered into at Valencia, was suddenly suspended. We were definitively compelled to send to France the two thousand Spanish prisoners, whom we had kept in reserve at Alcira for the purpose of effecting the contemplated exchange. The satisfaction which the marshal had felt at the prospect of rescuing his fellow countrymen from their painful state of confinement could only be equalled by his mortification, at being under the necessity of renouncing that prospect, after having on two occasions obtained the reluctant consent of the enemy; the first time in his correspondence with general Cuesta, to which we have adverted at the end of the thirteenth chapter, and in the second instance, by the convention which he concluded with general Blake who was at the same time generalissimo

of the forces and a member of the regency of government.

The emperor was not slow in bestowing praises and rewards upon the army, for the campaign which it had just brought to a close*. The marshal was named duke of Albufera, and received, with the title of that duchy, a grant of the revenues attached to the lake and to the domains dependent upon it. The battle of the 26th December, which was brought to a close on the borders of the lake of Albufera, thus became for the marshal and for his name the occasion and the origin of a distinction, which in the eyes of a warrior derives all its value from the honour bestowed upon a military exploit, and the memory of a service performed.

* Part of those rewards remained a dead letter; and the endowments specially announced in the imperial decree as intended for the army of Arragon were never carried into effect. See notes and explanatory documents, No. 22.

CHAPTER XVI.

Occupation of Denia.—Siege of Peniscola.—Capitulation.—Battle of Villaseca and Altafulla.—Departure of the Poles from the army.—The corps of general Reille is sent to the Ebro.—Reduction of the army of Arragon.—The Spanish army at Alicante is reinforced.—Interview between the marshal and general Decaen at Reuss.—Appearance of an English fleet.—Affair at Castella and Ibi.—An English division lands at Alicante.—Arrival of king Joseph and of the army of the Centre at Valencia.—Arrival of the army of the South at Fuente la Higuera.—Departure of the armies of the South and Centre for Madrid

BEFORE he had even taken possession of Valencia, marshal Suchet thought of what he had yet to do to complete the subjection of the whole country. So early as this period, the major-general wrote thus to him: "The emperor has no doubt that you have an advanced guard towards Murcia, in order to put yourself in communication with the corps which is at Sorea." The taking of Alicante and Carthagena would close the last two points by which the war was fed in this part of Spain. The marshal concluded that the government had decided upon giving this direction to the military operations,

when he saw that the army of the South was to connect itself with his, for the purpose of seconding him, as those of Portugal and the centre had done. But the march of general Montbrun upon Alicante having served only to put that place into a better state of defence, general Harispe, posted in advance of the Xucar, with his division and Delort's brigade, had orders to confine himself to the duty of closely watching the motions of the 3rd Spanish army, and at the same time to take the utmost precautions against the yellow fever. The province of Murcia was infected with it; many of its inhabitants had perished in the course of the year which had just elapsed. At the time of the capitulation of Valencia, the marshal had required general Charles O'Donnell to deliver to him the map of the sanitary cordon established on, and in advance of the Xucar; and he took the greatest pains to preserve the army of Valencia from that dreadful scourge.

General Habert, with the third division, was posted at Gandia, on the left of general Harispe. Without striking a blow, he made himself master of Denia, a small town and port, protected by a fort in very good condition: he found there about forty vessels at anchor, and sixty-six pieces of ordnance. On the side of Las Cabrillas, we occupied Buñol, and the army of Arragon connected itself with the troops of the army of the

centre. Musnier's division had been directed upon Peniscola; but events having immediately summoned it to a greater distance, it was replaced by an Italian division. On the 20th of January, general Severoli established himself before the place, with two battalions of his division, two of the 114th, and one of the Vistula. Preparations were forthwith made for the siege; but the undertaking was attended with great difficulties.

The fortress of Peniscola is seated on a rock, rising out of the sea about one hundred and twenty toises from the coast, with which it communicates only by a neck of land about thirty toises in breadth. The town, which occupies nearly the whole surface of the rock, is closed on all sides by good works, and commanded by a strong castle, which formerly belonged to the Templars, and the *terre-plain*, which is twenty-five toises above the level of the sea. Springs of water gush forth naturally from the middle of this rock. In rough weather the isthmus is covered by the waves of the sea; and in all seasons an impassable swamp, commencing at the foot of the mountains and extending in a direction parallel to the coast, renders the works of a siege extremely difficult. This little Gibraltar, as our soldiers called it, might be considered, in some measure, unassailable by the ordinary process. In fact, besides the inundation, which the

Spaniards had artificially increased, they had cut the causeway which runs along it, and leads to the narrow neck which precedes the only front of the place accessible by land. This front had been strengthened by works and batteries of several stages, the rest of the circumference being unapproachable for us: it was protected by gun-boats. The English, since our arrival in the province of Valencia, had not ceased to keep within sight or reach of Peniscola, and in continual communication with the garrison, composed of one thousand men and commanded by general Garcia Navarro. It was the same officer who was taken prisoner in 1810, in the action at Falset, and had escaped from France and again taken up arms against us.

After a careful examination, it was resolved to commence the approaches, but to precede them by a summons and a bombardment. General Severoli sent an officer with a flag of truce, whose proposals were rejected. A first battery of twelve-inch mortars was established behind a knoll, nearly six hundred toises from the fort, a little above the Benicarlo road, which runs along the foot of the mountain. The troops were distributed on the contiguous heights and beach, the Italians on the right, the battalion of the Vistula in the centre near the siege-park, and the chef-de-bataillon, Ronfort, with the 114th, on the left, between the inundation and the shore. At this

point some intrenchments appeared sufficient to keep back, by posts, the garrison within the walls. On the 28th of January the mortars threw bombs into the place. In the night, between the 31st of January and the 1st of February, the chef-de-bataillon Plagniol, of the engineers, with a thousand labourers, opened a parallel almost entirely with fascines and gabions, of the length of two hundred and fifty toises, running behind the inundation and turning its southern extremity, so as to proceed by the beach to support itself on the margin of the sea. Colonel Raffron, of the artillery, hastened to construct batteries to the right of the parallel, towards the heights, whose foot is washed, in this part, by the inundation. Between the 2nd and 3rd of February, while the bombardment was continued, the cheminements were pushed in advance of the right of the parallel, and the isthmus and the front of attack were drawn closer. The batteries were finished, armed with pieces of large calibre, and put into a state to counter-batter the place.

During these operations, a vessel, which we had armed in the port of Denia, fell in with, at sea, and took a boat carrying despatches from the governor of Peniscola to the general commanding at Alicante. Through the presence of mind of a voltigeur, who was on board the vessel, the despatch was picked up out of the water the moment after

it was thrown overboard. Being forwarded immediately to marshal Suchet at Valencia, it acquainted him with the misunderstanding which prevailed between the English and the garrison. General Garcia Navarro expressed his indignation at the conduct of these allies, who required him to give up the command of the place; and he declared that he would rather surrender to the French and submit to the common lot of Valencia and the rest of Spain. The knowledge of these dispositions determined the commander-in-chief to renew his offer of a capitulation by general Severoli. Prunel, an officer of the staff, was sent to Peniscola with instructions. He negociated with the governor, and brought back an agreement, by which the fortress was to be delivered up to the French army, if the garrison were left at liberty to retire whithersoever they pleased. This condition was accepted: on the 4th of February, we took possession of Peniscola, where we found seventy-four pieces of ordnance. This useful conquest cost us only about sixty men killed and wounded by the fire of the place during the works. It completed the subjection of the province of Valencia, Alicante alone excepted, and rendered secure the Tortosa road, which was our principal communication with Catalonia and Arragon. It produced, in particular, a salutary effect by the conquest of opinion which accompanied it. The Spanish general,

after opposing the French to the utmost in his power, and necessitated to defend himself against English encroachment, submitted to the government of king Joseph; and, by the capitulation and his correspondence, he frankly manifested his wish to see Spain united under a protecting authority capable of terminating and repairing her calamities. It was the same sentiment that influenced most of the Spaniards, since known and ill-used under the denomination of *Afrancesados*. They felt, like all enlightened persons, the want of a change in the administration of their country, so favoured by Nature, formerly so powerful, now so weak and degenerate. This change was brought to them by a foreign hand, which they had at first repelled. Yielding afterwards to necessity, they ceased to aim at any thing more than to take advantage of the present and to prepare a better futurity for their country. If circumstances, which at that time it was impossible to foresee, overthrew their calculations and destroyed their hopes, this is no reason for judging of them severely or unfavourably. Events have since attained maturity; passions have had opportunity to subside; and now they would certainly not be afraid to appeal to the justice and the experience of their countrymen.

While the army of Arragon was occupied in the siege of Valencia, general Lacy had marched upon Tarragona with Sarsfield's and d'Eroles'

divisions, either to effect a mere diversion, or with serious views against the place which he closely blockaded. This gave marshal Suchet some uneasiness, knowing that an extraordinary supply of provisions collected there by his orders had been imprudently consumed. Scarcely had he entered Valencia when he received intelligence that the English had approached the harbour of Xalon, that they had artillery for landing, that they were in communication with the Spanish army, and that general Lacy, at Reuss, kept up a correspondence with the place. He ordered general Musnier, who had first been sent before Peniscola, to set out immediately for Tortosa, to collect two thousand quintals of wheat, and to march with part of his division to relieve and re-victual Tarragona. General Lafosse, commanding at Tortosa, was to precede him and to push on beyond the col de Balaguer, to make himself acquainted with the preparations and motions of the enemy. On the 18th of January, this general wrote from fort St. Philip, that, according to all accounts the Spanish army had moved off on receiving intelligence of the capture of Valencia. He advanced in false security as far as Cambrils; and finding no enemies, instead of sending out scouts towards Reuss, he continued his route direct by Villaseca, where he encamped on the 19th. His column consisted of a battalion of the 121st and about sixty horse. Not suspecting any

danger, he left his infantry to rest, and with his squadron pushed on rapidly to Tarragona. The enemy, ever on the watch for a favourable opportunity to surprise us, seized this moment. From five to six thousand Spaniards dashed in the twinkling of an eye from Reuss and its environs, and surrounded Villaseca. The chef-de-bataillon Dubarry, an intrepid old soldier, instantly formed his troops. He attempted to reach the Tarragona road, but was prevented by an overwhelming force. He endeavoured to approach that to the col de Balaguer, by which he had come, and which presented good defensive positions; one company only found means to escape in that direction through the multitude of enemies who appeared on all points. The rest of the battalion, being surrounded, maintained an obstinate conflict, broke the enemy's line at the onset, and took three hundred prisoners. These it was soon obliged to abandon; fresh reserves continually came up; it was overpowered by numbers, and after strewing the field of battle with killed and wounded, it was forced to surrender. At the first sound of the musketry, general Lafosse had left Tarragona with his cavalry and six hundred of the garrison. This succour arrived too late: general Lacy had retired, carrying with him his prisoners.

This success a few days afterwards inspired the Spanish generals with the confidence to march to

meet our army of Catalonia, which was coming to the relief of the thus threatened Tarragona. The commander-in-chief Decaen had just sent the general of division Lamarque and four thousand men to Barcelona. General Maurice Mathieu went out with this division, which he strengthened with three thousand men of his own. On the 24th he moved in front of the enemy in position at Altafulla, while general Lamarque turned their left. The valour of our troops and the precision with which this manœuvre was executed, put the Spaniards completely to the rout; they lost a thousand men and two pieces of cannon*. Two days afterwards, general Mus-

* The report of this affair by the Spanish general baron d'Eroles concluded thus: "I must confess that in this action the French treated our prisoners with a humanity deserving praise, and that general Lamarque won more glory by the generosity which he displayed than by the incontestible bravery of his troops." Here is a tribute paid to truth! It reflects honour on baron d'Eroles, and proves that he suffers not himself to be influenced by party-spirit, which in general renders men unjust. But this humanity, of which he makes mention on this occasion only, we have always practised. On the 3rd of December last, our soldiers carried their wounded enemies on their shouldiers from Trenta Passos to Barcelona. The same has been done on all occasions. All the letters from Spanish prisoners in France proclaim the kind treatment which they receive there; and yet the French prisoners at Bura and Cabrera are treated with the utmost inhumanity; they are ab-

nier, arriving from Tortosa, introduced a considerable supply of provisions into Tarragona: the troops of the garrison were relieved. General Bertoletti, a man of firmness and ability, was afterwards sent thither as governor. Marshal Suchet thanked general Maurice Mathieu for the efficacious succour which he had so seasonably afforded to Tarragona. He requested him to continue to pay attention to that place, apprehensive, from the turn which affairs were taking, that he should not much longer be able to do so himself.

Orders from Paris had already deprived him of a valuable portion of his former 3rd corps, the Polish legion. The emperor was then preparing for his expedition against Russia. For this war he called to him all the Poles who were serving in the French armies. The 1st, 2nd, and 3rd regiments of the Vistula, which, with detachments of the 4th and the squadron of lancers, formed a division of about six thousand veteran troops, left the army in the month of January, escorting a column of prisoners to Jaca and Pau, where they arrived in February, conducted by colonel Kosinowski. The marshal deeply regretted the departure of these brave troops and the distinguished

solutely perishing from want: they would be better treated in the hands of Hottentots.—*Extract from the Journal of the Government of Catalonia and Barcelona, dated February* 11, 1812.

officers by whom they were commanded. He charged colonel Kliski to carry to Paris twenty-two pair of colours and the keys of Valencia. The departure of general Chlopiski deprived the army of an officer of merit qualified to rise to the highest rank.

At the same time, General Reille proceeded towards the Ebro with his two divisions, which had hitherto been denominated corps of reserve: the government gave them the name of corps of observation of the Ebro, and charged them with the preservation of lower Catalonia and Arragon. This movement was to render the fortresses of Tortosa, Tarragona, and Lerida, more secure against all the attempts of the Spanish army, which was incessantly striving to surprise them. But general Caffarelli was no longer strong enough to defend Arragon and Navarre, against Mina, Mendizabal, Duran, and el Empecinado, who advanced upon all sides. General Reille was obliged to draw nearer to him, and soon afterwards to replace him. The brigades of Bourke and Pannetier, Abbé and Souliés had various actions to sustain with various success. The troops of general Severoli extended themselves in Catalonia, on the left bank of the Ebro. The marshal received orders to detach general Palombini's division to the right bank; it marched upon Molina and Calatayud, to re-

pulse generals Montijo, Villacampa, and Bassecourt, in Castille.

Thus were nearly twenty thousand more men taken from the effective force of the army of Arragon, placed in the province of Valencia. The rear of this army was, from that circumstance, covered by considerable forces; but it found itself reduced, on its own ground, to a number of combatants wholly insufficient to operate upon Alicante and Carthagena. In this object no co-operation was now to be expected from the army of the South or that of Portugal. The English, taking the offensive, had made themselves masters of Ciudad Rodrigo, and were preparing for the siege of Badajos. King Joseph was again invested with the chief command of the French armies in Spain. Marshal Jourdan, the conqueror of Fleurus, was placed with him as major-general. The intercourse between Valencia and Madrid increased: marshal Suchet had to send convoys of money and arms to that capital. Reduced as his army was, the marshal had no more than fifteen thousand effective men left; of these nine thousand infantry only, and sixteen hundred cavalry, were present under arms and fighting in line.

These forces were quite inadequate to preserve the country, and to overawe the Spanish corps which were again collecting at Murcia and Ali-

cante, in the hope of an effective co-operation on the part of the English, which was positively announced, and soon afterwards actually took place. At the moment when the speedy pacification of Spain might have been expected, a more general resistance than ever burst forth. Marshal Suchet was apprised that he should have to march towards Madrid and the Tagus; and the king sent him directions to form a camp of eight thousand men, between Albaceyte and San Clemente, in La Mancha. He represented that to take from him eight thousand men, would be equivalent to breaking up his army entirely. He then received instructions to detach only a corps of fifteen hundred men to Requena and Cuenca, for the purpose of replacing general Darmagnac. Notwithstanding the great diminution of his troops, he was beginning to feel some apprehension about their subsistence. The rich and industrious province of Valencia no longer furnished the most indispensable necessaries, such as corn and meat. The soldiers were allowed but three fourths of a ration of bread mixed with maize, and rice or vegetables to make up. To ensure to himself beforehand the coming crop, the marshal must have had recourse to administrative and military measures, which would have required his presence, at least for some time, at Saragossa; but he found himself obliged, to his regret, to give up

this design. A slight indisposition, contracted during the treatment of his wound at Saguntum, was aggravated by the fatigues of the campaign to a serious illness, which rendered him incapable of acting. He applied for leave to repair to Paris. The emperor begged him to remain at his post, and sent to him baron Boyer, his surgeon-in-chief, who arrived at Valencia with his son-in-law, surgeon Roux. Their attentions were productive of a speedy cure, and in two months the marshal was able to get on horseback.

General Palombini was ordered to proceed to Navarre: before his departure he sustained losses at Ateca and Pozzo-Ondon, and by his removal half of Arragon was left at the mercy of Villacampa and Duran. General Reille brought troops to replace him on the right bank of the Ebro. D'Eroles penetrated into the district of Benavarre, and fought a bloody battle at Rhoda with general Bourke. Lacy and Sarsfield again approached Tarragona, with hostile views and threatening forces. General Bertoletti, by vigorous sorties, several times drove off the enemy, who pressed him closely. It was at this period, when the French troops in Catalonia were scarcely sufficient to hold the fortresses, that the country was organised in departments and prefectures. Councillors of state and auditors were sent to administer their

civil government. Their pacific mission would have required more favourable circumstances. As the state of affairs kept general Reille at a distance, his temporary command over lower Catalonia devolved to general Decaen; and soon afterwards all Arragon and all Catalonia were united under the command of the duke of Albufera. He received orders to provision the fortresses of those two provinces, but not to take a single soldier from them; to maintain his ground in the province of Valencia; to execute such movements as the king should direct; and to correspond thenceforward with the minister of war. Hitherto, ever since the entry into Spain, all his correspondence, of any importance, had been direct with the emperor, through the medium of major-general the prince of Neufchatel; this ceased when the grand army put itself in motion for the Russian campaign. The marshal was solicitous to make a report of his situation to the minister. An aid-de-camp, whom he sent to Paris, was in time to see the major-general and to deliver his despatch to him. He brought back final instructions which concluded thus: "You are to direct all the forces that are under your orders for the general benefit of the country which you have under your command." These instructions were accompanied by a verbal recommendation, which told him, in three words, to *keep himself concentrated.*

This was, in fact, all that marshal Suchet could now do; and this situation rendered it very difficult for him to communicate with king Joseph, who anxiously desired to have one of his divisions at Madrid, and to call him thither himself. He represented that he could not repair thither without receiving, at the same time, orders to evacuate Valencia: that, even in this case, the weakness of his army would not permit him to march with more than three or four thousand men, unless he left the fortresses without garrisons, which he should never venture to do without express commands to that effect. The preservation of Valencia was too important, in the then state of the French armies of the Centre and the South, for the king to take upon himself, in the emperor's absence, to withdraw marshal Suchet from that province. The country of Valencia with its strong places, and those of Catalonia, was the natural point of retreat of those armies in case of reverses. It was, moreover, militarily requisite that the southern provinces should be evacuated before the eastern: the concentration of the armies of the south and north in Castille would have given our army in Portugal such a superiority over the English army, that, notwithstanding the reduction of Badajos, lord Wellington would not have been able to take the offensive as he did at that period. But he profited by the moment;

and, to second his principal operations against marshal Marmont, he combined with the regency of Cadiz an effective diversion against the eastern provinces, occupied by marshal Suchet. General Joseph O'Donnell had already collected from fifteen to eighteen thousand troops, in the province of Murcia. This army, which, two months before, could not prevent us from foraging at the very gates of Alicante, had acquired sufficient strength and consistency to take a position at Aspe, whence it threatened our advanced guard established at Castalla. The English generals Roche and Whittingham commanded divisions at Majorca and Alicante; Sicilian and English troops were announced, and a fleet constantly in motion excited apprehension for different points of the coast.

Letters from the minister at war, dated the 9th of June, mentioned the plan of a landing, projected by the enemy. Marshal Suchet took measures for opposing them, wherever they might make their appearance. A corps of fifteen hundred infantry of *élite*, with five hundred horse, and a light battery well served, were in reserve near Valencia, for the purpose of pushing on rapidly to Tortosa, if the enemy should land at the Alfaques, or between the mouths of the Ebro and the Guadalaviar. This would suffice to check the first columns, and to afford time for other reinforcements to come up. In

case the fleet should show itself off the coast of Catalonia, about Tarragona or further off, general Decaen, apprized of the circumstance, was to manœuvre to repulse the landing. To this end, the marshal had an interview with him at Reuss, on the 10th of July, and concerted with him the measures to be adopted. The assembling of the troops occasioned by this interview drew general Lacy and the Spanish army from the coast: at this intelligence the fleet from Majorca changed its course, and steered to the south. The marshal was satisfied with the state of Tarragona. That fortress, the defences of which had been in great part destroyed, with the exception of fort Royal and the enclosure of the upper town, was armed, provisioned, and above all, well commanded. It had nothing to fear but a regular attack, or a surprize like that which had the preceding year put Figueras into the hands of the Spaniards. The garrison and fortress of Barcelona had just escaped a horrible plot, the authors of which were apprehended and brought to trial. At the same period a great number of Spanish troops were suddenly collected about Lerida. The enemy kept up a correspondence with persons in the place, who remained undiscovered. In the night of the 16th of July, the powder-magazine of the great fort blew up; one hundred of the garrison, and many of the inhabi-

tants, perished by the explosion, and a breach was opened in the King's bastion. At this critical moment, which might have endangered the safety of the place, the firmness of general Henriod was not to be shaken. The garrison was instantly under arms; the inclosure, and the breach in particular, were covered with defenders. The Spaniards durst not make any attempt, and retired. The governor immediately set about repairing the damage occasioned by this accident.

On his return to Valencia, the marshal learned that general Villacampa was at the gates of Liria, and that general Bassecourt was attacking Cofrentes and Requena. He despatched a column, commanded by general Lafosse, in that direction; but scarcely had it set out when he was obliged to recall it, and to write to general Reille at Saragossa, to send general Paris upon Teruel, for the purpose of clearing the right flank of the army. On the 21st of July, the fleet from Alicante appeared off Denia and Cullera, between the lake of Albufera and the mouth of the Xucar. It approached near enough to the forts on the coast to be cannonaded. The marshal immediately assembled the corps of general Lafosse, and the corps nearest to Valencia, pushed on the 14th of the line from Alcira upon Cullera, and ordered the 4th hussars, with the light artillery, and part of

the 1st light and of the 114th, to proceed rapidly towards the point threatened. At Denia general Gudin, with the 117th, likewise held himself in readiness. In the evening the wind suddenly shifted, and became contrary and so violent as to oblige the fleet to stand out to sea in the night. On the 22nd it was dispersed, but in sight: the day was spent in watching it, and in making the necessary dispositions for repulsing a landing.

These various movements on the flanks of the army, or on its rear, had no other object than to divide our forces, and to occupy them at a distance, while an attack in front was directed against general Harispe, placed in the first line upon Alicante. That general, having with him a reserve at Alcoy, had posted a brigade, under colonel Mesclop, at Ibi, and general Delort, as an advanced guard, at Castalla. On the morning of the 21st, Joseph O'Donnell, at the head of ten thousand men, in four columns, marched upon Castalla. General Delort, with the 7th line, retired in good order to a position in the rear, near Ibi, which had been previously reconnoitred: he gave orders, at the same time, to the 24th dragoons, cantoned at Onil and Biar, to rejoin him, and to colonel Mesclop to come to his support. The latter was already attacked by general Roche, debouching with four thousand men, in two co-

lumns, on the Xixona road in the mountains. He caused him to be kept in check at the entrance of the defile by the voltigeurs of the 44th, and by a platoon of cuirassiers, supported by two pieces of cannon in the little fort of Ibi. Leaving, in addition, a few companies of reserve, he marched without delay upon the point to which he was summoned. General Delort, in position with his infantry and artillery, kept the Spanish general in check, and waited for the 24th dragoons, who were coming up on his right. The march of this cavalry on plain ground alarmed the Spaniards for their left, and they directed a battery of cannon against it. General Delort, relinquishing the defensive, then put himself in motion, and attacked briskly: he advanced at the charge-step. At the same instant, the brave colonel Dubessy, of the 24th, crossed under the enemy's fire a narrow bridge, without parapets, and vigorously charged with his dragoons the battery, which poured a shower of grape-shot upon them. The gunners were cut down, the battery carried, and with the same shock a brigade of infantry, placed in support at a little distance, was broken and put to the rout. General Delort, with his re-united forces, drove back and overthrew all general O'Donnell's columns, and pursued them to Castalla. There they endeavoured to rally, and to resist in the streets; but, after

a sanguinary conflict, they again gave way, and fled in disorder towards Alicante. The chef-de-bataillon, Herremberger, made the rearmost of the fugitives, who were endeavouring to gain the castle of Castalla, lay down their arms.

The portion of the 44th, with which colonel Mesclop had lost no time in coming to the support of general Delort, immediately pursued its route to Ibi. General Roche was master of the village. Colonel Mesclop marched upon him, forced him to retire, pursued him towards the hill, and attacked him in one position after another. The appearance of general Harispe, who hastened from Alcoy with the 116th, finally decided the retreat of the enemy. Beaten on both points, the Spaniards retreated to Alicante with the loss of three pair of colours, two eight-pounders, with the horses which drew them, three caissons, and more than ten thousand muskets. They had nearly four thousand men killed, wounded, or taken; and among the latter four colonels, five lieutenant-colonels, and one hundred and twenty-five officers: their loss equalled the number of the French soldiers who had fought against them. The skill and decision of general Delort determined this important success.

About this time general Maupoint, who had been stationed at Cuenca by command of the king, with the 116th of the line and one hun-

dred horse, was called to Madrid; and Palombini's division, which had but just entered Navarre, received the like order.

In the first days of August, a fleet of two hundred sail, from the Balearic islands, having on board troops which report represented as exceeding ten thousand in number, appeared off the coast of Valencia and Catalonia. It was an Anglo-Sicilian division, brought from Palermo by the English general, Thomas Maitland. On the 9th of August this fleet landed men, arms, stores, and artillery, at Alicante. Thus the enemy's army, beaten on the 21st of July at Castalla, found itself stronger and more numerous than before: it immediately resumed the offensive, and pushed its advanced guard to within a few leagues of Alicante. The reinforcements which it had just received sufficed to account for this sudden change of attitude; but it was, at the same time, the effect of the battle of Salamanca or Arapiles. Marshal Suchet again found himself on the point of giving way to superior forces. He applied for instructions as to the course which he should pursue, foreseeing the likelihood of a retreat, and the necessity of forming garrisons at Saguntum, Peniscola, and Tortosa, which would still more diminish his active strength. The situation of general Harispe at Alcoy and Castalla, and of general Gudin at Benidorme and Villa-

joyosa, was not more satisfactory. He concentrated his divisions around St. Philip, where he fixed his head-quarters. His intention was not to fall back without fighting, provided the enemy attacked him in front only, and the disproportion of force was not excessive. He threw up field-works about St. Philip, and on the high road from Valencia to Madrid. A bridge of boats was formed upon the Xucar, near Alberique, with an armed tête-de-pont. In these positions he collected about eight thousand men: at the same time he thought of drawing a reinforcement from Catalonia, and ordered general Pâris to come from Arragon, where he occupied Teruel with two regiments.

On the 29th of August, the enemy who had occupied the country in advance of Alicante, from which we had retired, commenced his retreat with some precipitation. The reports of those parts announced the approach of a corps of French troops coming from Madrid by La Mancha. On the 23rd, a detachment of cavalry arrived by Requena with despatches, containing official intelligence of the loss of the battle of Salamanca, the evacuation of Madrid, and the march of the king and his court upon Valencia, with the army of the centre. General Harispe had orders immediately to proceed towards Almanza, to facilitate this movement. On the 25th the junction was effected. On the same day,

general Maupoint, returning from Madrid with the 116th of the line, and a company of the 4th hussars, set out from Cuenca, after relieving the garrison which had been blockaded for eighteen days: he was preparing to pass the river near Utiel, when he was attacked unawares by Villacampa at the head of four thousand men. His little column, though surrounded, defended itself with valour, lost its baggage, two pieces of cannon, and about two hundred men killed and wounded. The intrepid chef-de-bataillon Ronfort cut his way through the enemy's lines and rejoined the general, who, after inflicting great loss on Villacampa, succeeded in leading off his column to Requena.

The forces which king Joseph brought with him consisted of Darmagnac's division, composed of seven French battalions, and five German battalions of Baden, Nassau and Frankfurt; Treillard's division, formed of four regiments of dragoons, amounting altogether to scarcely one thousand horse: four squadrons of Westphalian light horse and Nassau chasseurs; and several detachments, dépôts, or marching battalions, belonging to the armies of Portugal, the Centre, and the South. Palombini's division had come back with the king, but reduced and exhausted by continual marches and numerous actions since it had left the army of Arragon, and numbering no more than six battalions, in all, about two thou-

sand four hundred strong. The total of combatants under arms belonging to that army, including the royal guard and some Spanish corps of recent formation, amounted to no more than twelve thousand: but the number of military men out of service, and of non-combatants, civilians, horses, carriages, and equipages, which accompanied the column, increased at once the consumption of subsistence by forty thousand rations of provision, and ten thousand of forage. The marshal opened his magazines, his hospitals, his chests, his dépôts of arms, and his parks of artillery, to supply the wants of the moment. He prepared the departure in several convoys of all that could be sent off to France. The command of the army of the Centre was united in his hands with that of the army of Arragon. He availed himself of it to review the troops, and to fix regular cantonments, for the purpose of preserving tranquillity among the inhabitants, by assuring order to them. The population, though shaken by the success of the English army, remained quiet, and manifested even kindness and hospitality at the voice of marshal Suchet. King Joseph, a fugitive from his capital, was better received perhaps at his entry into Valencia, than he used to be at Madrid itself. The persons of his court were astonished to see that it was possible to go abroad without escort, traverse the roads and the country, and receive couriers from France, without fear of the

bands, and the Guerillas, by which the communications were every where else infested. The clergy and Company, the archbishop, set this example of fidelity to the sovereign whom they had acknowledged. All the authorities were maintained in their functions; and the people found its imposts not much increased, through the care which the duke of Albufera took to assess them, as far as he could, upon the general resources which his administration had provided since the harvest.

The English army had occupied Madrid. This event, which forced the army of the South to evacuate Andalusia, produced for that very reason a concentration of the French forces sufficiently imposing to dispute the victory once more in the centre of the Peninsula. The king, on leaving Madrid had directed marshal the duke of Dalmatia to meet them at Valencia. Unless lord Wellington made a movement to a great distance, which was by no means probable, to oppose this marshal, he would have no difficulty in passing through the province of Murcia: it was this direction that he took.

The combined Spanish and Anglo-Silician corps, which the army of Arragon had in front of it, was instantly reduced to impotence. Marshal Suchet pushed on his divisions, occupied Fuente la Higuera, Moxente, Alcoy, and Denia. Páris's brigade, which had come from Arragon, covered

the right flank of the army at Requena, against Bassecourt, Villacampa, and el Empecinado, united. General Isidore Lamarque's brigade, from Catalonia, stopped between Tortosa and Castellon de la Plana: it was composed of the 3rd light and the 11th of the line, and some marching battalions or squadrons belonging to the regiments of the army of Arragon. The reports which the marshal received from the two provinces of Arragon and Catalonia were unfortunately of such a nature as to give him uneasiness. The spirit of the population was daily changing to our disadvantage: the reverses of the French arms in the other parts of Spain were alienating from us the Arragonese, harassed by parties which were incessantly springing up, and ill protected by the insufficient force which we had to oppose to them. By this state of things our supplies of grain were greatly endangered.

On the 17th of September, the marshal, who frequently sent out scouts to meet the army of the South, received from one of them the first intelligence of the approach of that army. On the following days our columns advanced to Almanza and Villena: reconnoissances were directed upon Hellin and Jumilla. On the 2nd of October, the two armies were in communication. That of the South occupied Yecla, Albaceyte, Almanza, and Jorquera. The duke of Dalmatia desired a rest of six days for his troops. This time was der-

tainly requisite for the chiefs to confer together, and to combine the ulterior operations which circumstances commanded. The emperor was at this time in the heart of Russia: the instructions, which he had no doubt given to king Joseph, on leaving to him the command of the French armies in Spain, could be but general and subordinate to events. The evacuation of Madrid and Andalusia had greatly changed the aspect of affairs: still there remained a force sufficient to resume once more the offensive against the English army. Lord Wellington, after a short visit to the capital, had gone to Burgos. Favoured by the admirable defence made by the castle of that city, the armies of Portugal and of the North formed a junction on the banks of the Ebro. Those of the Centre and the South had only to march, and to effect a union, to restore affairs. In a conference which took place at Fuente la Higuera, in presence of the king, marshal Jourdan and marshals Soult and Suchet held a council: it was decided to march against the English, and not to abandon Valencia. The preservation of the eastern provinces was certainly, next to the beating of Wellington, the most important object of the king and the French in Spain. If they were to gain a battle, the maintenance of an advanced position upon Murcia and Alicante would be highly advantageous towards their establishing

themselves solidly at Madrid and occupying the South. If they were beaten and driven back towards the upper Ebro, as in 1808, Arragon and Catalonia, with its fortresses, would be a most valuable support, which marshal Suchet might preserve by retiring upon the lower Ebro, by a road on which the enemy would meet with obstacles, such as Saguntum, Peniscola, and Tortosa. The king, aware of the inadequacy of the army of Aragon to this task, had promised to leave him a reinforcement of six thousand men; but scarcely could marshal Suchet prevail upon him to leave him all his own troops. The two armies of the South and Centre marched towards Madrid by the country of Cuenca and La Mancha, after taking the fort of Chinchilla by the way.

After the departure of the king and the two armies, the three active divisions of the army of Arragon remained in advance of the Xucar, general Harispe at Moxente and Fuente la Higuera, occupying the col d'Almanza; general Habert at Albayda and Beniganim, occupying the col d'Adzaneta; and the 1st division, with the reserve of cavalry and artillery, at Canales and St. Philip, detaching a small corps to Denia. Marshal Suchet proceeded himself to Requena, where he halted twenty-four hours and left a brigade, to secure the communication with the armies on the Tagus. But in the space of twenty-

four days, he received not a single despatch to acquaint him with the movements which were making in the centre. He merely learned in an indirect way that the king had occupied Madrid, and was gone towards Old Castille. In this uncertainty, awaiting intelligence, he retained his position without attempting any thing against the enemy, and merely repelling his partial attacks on different points. Twice did general Donkin, with the 81st English regiment of the line, attempt to land at Xabea and at Denia. He was unsuccessful and indeed lost some of his men in retiring: for our troops attacked vigorously, and it was not without difficulty that he re-embarked his guns. General Delort, at Yecla, and general Gudin, at Alcoy, beat the enemy's advanced guards. General Harispe pushed a reconnaissance to the very gates of Alicante; but he could draw only a Calabrian battalion into the fight in which he took about fifty prisoners.

The Spaniards were reinforced, in December, by several corps coming either from La Mancha, or Andalusia, where there was thenceforward nothing to impede their movements. They made soon afterwards a march in advance upon the front of our army. Our troops fell back, agreeably to the order which they had received, and concentrated themselves by drawing nearer to the Xucar.

The enemy's movement however, was suddenly suspended and succeeded by a retrograde march. A report was circulated at the same time that the king had re-entered Madrid, and that the army of the South occupied Toledo and the banks of the Tagus. It was not long before this intelligence was officially confirmed.

General Dubreton had, by his vigorous resistance in the castle of Burgos, stopped the victorious progress of Wellington. General Souham having pushed forward to relieve the place while the king was marching with a mass of forces towards the Duero, the English general thought fit to draw nearer to Salamanca. The four French armies of the South, Centre, Portugal and the North, were thus united, and passed the Tormes in pursuit of the English army. The latter, avoiding battle, effected its retreat. It returned to Portugal, and there took up winter-quarters.

CHAPTER XVII.

Various affairs in Arragon, Lower Catalonia, and the province of Valencia, during the general operations.

In consequence of the return of the king, and the principal French army to the centre of Spain, marshal Suchet felt himself less isolated in his position of Valencia; but it was easy to forsee that a new and more vehement struggle would commence in a few months, when spring should give the signal for the resumption of hostilities. He therefore applied himself assiduously to such defensive measures as he had leisure to execute during this interval. The position of Moxente, on the high road in advance of the Xucar, was intrenched by considerable works, in such a manner, as to close the valley. The passes in the mountains to the left of Moxente, as far as Alcoy and the sea, were likewise shut up. A second bridge of boats was formed near the first over the Xucar. The city of Valencia, all the temporary fortifications of which were destroyed, had nothing but its ordinary enclosure, safe indeed from a coup de main and capable of some defence, but too extensive for even a numerous garrison amidst a population exceeding one hundred thousand souls. By isolating and fortifying the Custom-House, and pulling down a church which commanded it,

the former was turned into a sort of castle destined to receive a small garrison and a few mortars, to keep the town in awe. Saguntum had been put into the best condition with respect to arming and the fortifications. Captain Morlaincourt of the engineers had there constructed numerous and useful works. In the north part of the enclosure, above the theatre, was an extensive open space, where magazines were formed by means of buildings backed against the inner face of the wall. A reserve of wheat, sufficient for the consumption of the whole army for two months, was there stored away. A considerable park of field and siege artillery was shut up in the fortress of Tortosa, and that of Peniscola received its stores and garrison. The marshal thus provided the means of being able to depart at a moment's notice, and to keep the field, according as the movements of the enemy might require, certain of always finding points of support for keeping or recovering the province of Valencia. These dispositions, of which he transmitted a report to Madrid and Paris, where they were approved, could not be carried into execution without employing the resources of the whole country assigned as territory to the army of Arragon. Unfortunately, the cares of a good administration no longer sufficed to ensure us the possession of it. The growing resistance of the Spanish armies disputed the ground with us in

all quarters; and the submission to which the inhabitants were accustomed towards us was rendered more and more difficult to them.

Though petty combats have little interest after the grand operations which have been described, yet we shall recapitulate for the last time the series of obstacles which embarrassed the movements of marshal Suchet at the centre and to the very extremities of his command.

In Arragon, we could no longer, without great difficulty, preserve entire that influence which we needed, amidst hostile corps which were continually making incursions on both banks of the Ebro. Saragossa itself, where general Pâris commanded, was several times in danger. Nevertheless, the valour of our troops and the activity of their chiefs frequently made the Spaniards pay dearly for the boldness of their attempts. Some time previously, general Pannetier, at the head of the 10th of the line and a squadron of the 9th hussars, had surprised Mina and his whole party, joined to that of Malcarao and Irribara, at Robrès, near Huesca. Never perhaps did that able partisan incur more imminent danger. He was carrying off a convoy of baggage, which he had taken from the 60th regiment of infantry between Pina and Bujarolos, and was resting in the utmost security. General Pannetier marched at night to surround him, and so well did he take his measures, that

the enemy had scarcely time to run to arms. Mina escaped in his shirt over the roof of his house: his baggage and papers were captured. About sixty of his men were killed, and eighty lancers with their horses were taken. But, after one check, this chief soon appeared again at some other point. At the end of November, he attacked at La Garonetta, on the banks of the Gallego, a convoy on its way from Saragossa to Jaca, under the escort of a battalion of the Italian 1st light, cut off and took a company of the advanced guard, and would probably have made himself master of the whole convoy but for the firmness of Felici, the commandant, and the dispositions of colonel Colbert, who covered the retreat. Mina soon afterwards entered Huesca and besieged the little garrison which occupied the castle: but captain Conty of the 81st defended himself with vigour. Lieutenant Debœuf even made a sortie with thirty men, overthrew two hundred on the Cosso, and, though attacked by a superior force and wounded in the arm, he returned in good order, bringing back all his men. Mina abandoned his enterprize.

At the end of December, two thousand of his troops appeared toward Barbastro. Colonel Colbert marched against them with a battalion of the 10th of the line, one of the Italian 1st light, two Neapolitan battalions, and part of

his own regiment, the 9th hussars. He attacked them on the heights of Nuestra Señora del Poyo, carried three positions, and briskly pursuing the enemy, who rallied at Pozan de Vero, behind a river the banks of which were steep, he put him completely to the rout and caused him considerable loss: we had in this affair fifteen killed and fifty-three wounded. Two months afterwards, Mina's forces appeared with two sixteen-pounders and one four-pounder before the little town of Sos, on the frontiers of Navarre, and attacked it with their cannon. As soon as the breach was opened, a column of two hundred men presented itself: fifteen gendarmes repulsed it with valour and coolness. The fire of the artillery re-commenced, and the garrison was obliged to retire to the castle. Mina summoned lieutenant Martin of the gendarmerie, who commanded the place, to surrender with his garrison, and on his refusal he continued the attack. The establishment of his battery cost him ten men and an officer: he set fire to combustibles quite close to the gates, and sunk a mine under the angle of the church, the explosion of which opened a practicable breach. Immediately a flag of truce again appeared. Lieutenant Martin took advantage of the parley to reconnoitre the enemy's work closely, and to throw up an intrenchment behind the breach. He rejected the propositions, and

prepared to repel the assault: but the Spaniards, after losing six days, being informed of the approach of a relieving corps, thought fit to retire. General Paris having been apprized at Saragossa of the danger which threatened the garrison of Sos, came up at the head of a column, and deeming the place incapable of defence, he took away the garrison. Mina had obtained reinforcements in Navarre, and attacked general Paris between Sadava and Castillescar. The action was sanguinary, owing to the defiles which it was necessary to traverse. General Paris repulsed the attacks and returned to Saragossa, having had twenty-seven killed and one hundred and twenty-three wounded.

On the right bank of the Ebro, general Severoli experienced equal difficulty in protecting Arragon against the efforts of the enemy's parties. On the 16th of December, they had collected about three thousand men with artillery at Daroca: they commenced the siege of the castle, after posting a strong advanced guard at Encina-Corva and at the Port de Cariñena.* Notwithstanding the fire of five pieces in battery, lieutenant Perret of the 81st was not to be intimidated. His firmness afforded time to come

* Port, in Spanish *Puerto* is the term which denotes a mountain pass. Hence is derived the name of St. Jean Pied de Port in France.

to his relief. General Severoli beat the advanced corps of the enemy and delivered the garrison; but on his return, he found a considerable force collected to intercept his passage. He directed two battalions upon the flank of the enemy's position, and, attacking it in front at the same time, forced his way through by Paniza, and arrived at Cariñena with his artillery, and without much loss. The enemy, thrown into confusion, rallied, and took a position at Almunia. On the 22nd of December, that general again marched against him: he formed his troops into two columns of infantry, the artillery in the centre, and the cavalry deployed in reserve. The fight was kept up with obstinacy, though our cavalry could not act against that of the Spaniards, or against the infantry in ambuscade in the houses and trees. The chef-de-bataillon, Cigognari, having been directed to carry an embattled convent, which supported the centre of the Spaniards, decided, by the success of this manœuvre, that of the day. Villacampa and Gayan retreated into Castille, after losing about four hundred men.

Scarcely two months had elapsed when Villacampa again penetrated into Arragon with a numerous corps of troops, and, in concert with Sarsfield, approached Belchite and Alcañiz. The marshal immediately detached his first aide-de-camp, colonel Meyer, to general Pannetier, who

had just proceeded with his brigade from Segorbe for Teruel. They marched rapidly by Daroca to join general Severoli: the two hostile armies durst not await their junction and retired. Our troops marched to Calatayud and forced them to disperse in different directions.

In lower Catalonia numerous attempts were made by the Spaniards and the English, principally against Tarragona, the vicinity of which was favourable to disembarkations. General Bertoletti, however, found means to infuse his own spirit into the garrison, composed of two battalions, the one of the French 20th of the line, the other of the Italian 7th. Several times did this general attack and beat the enemy's corps which occupied Reuss or were approaching Tarragona. He foiled the stratagems employed to drive him to a distance and to surprise the place in his absence; and by his firmness he kept the fortress in good condition and secured the means of supplying it with provisions. The fort of the col de Balaguer was also attacked by Villamil, the chief of a band; but the brave captain Lefebvre of the 115th, with his little garrison, repulsed a nocturnal escalade: the English ship *Blake* was at a little distance, and seemed destined to support this attack. Colonel Pleque left Tortosa, marched to the Perello, and found the fort relieved by the retreat of Villamil.

We were harassed by Frayle, almost at the

very gates of Valencia, in our communications between Saguntum and Tortosa. This Guerilla chief, having attacked on the high road a convoy of artillery from Torreblanca, put to flight the peasants who drove it, killed the gunners, took one four-pounder and one hundred and twelve horses, burned eleven carriages, and dispersed the whole convoy. The marshal formed a moveable column to pursue him without intermission, and gave the command of it to the chef-de-bataillon Ronfort. The band was several times dispersed, but it was impossible to break it up entirely.

Between Buñol and Requena, it was found necessary to hunt down another Guerilla chief, Pendencia, who frequently intercepted the Cuenca road: captain Jacomet of the 1st light, overtook, beat, and put him to flight. At Requena, captain Villetard-Laguerrie, of the voltigeurs of the 3rd light, an active and enterprising officer, was informed of the march of a battalion from Murcia, sent by Villacampa to Alicante. Taking with him eighty voltigeurs and one hundred men from the dépôt of convalescents of the army of the South, he marched rapidly upon Xaraguas, where he surprised the battalion, attacked it, killed part and took the rest. Being himself attacked on his return by one hundred Spanish horse, he formed in a square, with the prisoners in the centre, and marching in order, reached Requena with his column, without being touched.

Marshal Suchet, pressed on all sides in the province of Valencia, which was occupied by his army, was scarcely able to maintain his ground there by his own means. He was necessitated to relinquish the direction of the affairs of Catalonia and Arragon to general Decaen and general Reille. The talents and activity of these two generals combated successfully against the mass of enemies and of obstacles which multiplied around them. Mont-Serrat, abandoned by the French, and where the Spaniards and English had again established themselves, was retaken with extraordinary valour. General Reille rendered the most signal service by beating the enemy's corps which successively aimed at making themselves masters of Saragossa; since the resources of the fertile Arragon still contributed to the subsistence of the French army. The administration of that province continued to be the object of marshal Suchet's principal solicitude. He sought, with not less assiduity and success, to obtain useful results from the administration of the province of Valencia. A rapid sketch of his proceedings with reference to this point, is given in the next chapter.

CHAPTER XVIII.

Statistical details respecting the kingdom of Valencia.—Organization of the country by the marshal.—Ordinary contribution.—War contribution.—Tranquillity of the country.—Convocation of a Junta at Valencia.

The kingdom of Valencia is one of the smallest provinces of Spain. Its superficial extent is about eight hundred and thirty-eight square leagues. Two thirds of this space are occupied by mountains of very great height, peaked rocks, and wild torrents of difficult access: and immense sands and swampy tracts dispute the remainder with agriculture. But these rocks and these mountains are the reservoirs of several rivers which fertilize the country; and the torrents themselves, mastered in their course by man, serve to impart to inert lands the benefits of irrigation. Here a brave and industrious race formerly displayed, with such success, its practical knowledge in the first of arts. Colonies of palm-trees, transplanted from the coasts of Africa, still attest its conquest and its long domination.

At the beginning of the twelfth century, the Moors still cultivated the plains of Valencia; but after their defeat by James I king of Arragon,

the whole kingdom was subdued. The conquerors divided the lands among themselves: victory enriched an army with the spoils of a whole people; and skilful and indefatigable husbandmen gave place to soldiers, whose ignorance would have suffered the fairest fruits of their exploits to perish in their hands, had not king James, whose great qualities rendered him worthy of the throne and superior to his age, prescribed by wise ordinances the observance of the rural laws. To this respect for the legislation of the Moors, and to the regulations which he enacted, the kingdom of Valencia has owed, and to this day owes, its agricultural prosperity.

In 1791 the population of this country consisted of seven hundred and seventy-one thousand persons, divided among five hundred and ninety-two parishes; of these agriculture employed eighty thousand, and manufactures sixty thousand: the rest of the population was composed of women, children, old men, domestic servants, the nobility and clergy, monks and nuns, merchants and tradesmen, soldiers, sailors, invalids, and pensioners of the state.

The soil refused to cultivation none of those productions which luxury or the wants of life require. Its inhabitants had even succeeded in naturalizing a great variety of exotic fruits and plants, as the lemon and orange tree, the sugar cane, cotton, and indigo.

Flourishing manufactures of silk, soda, woollen cloth, linen, paper, hats, leather, esparto, and jewellery, added to its national wealth. Such was the prosperity of this beautiful province, that the annual value of its productions of all kinds, exceeded ninety millions of francs (£3,750,000 sterling,) one tenth only of which was absorbed by taxes and the expences of administration.

The same causes, however, which had annihilated the public prosperity in Arragon during the war of invasion, had also destroyed that of the kingdom of Valencia. The export of rice, the war-taxes, the extraordinary consumption of provisions, and the suspension of labour, had cut off all the sources of reproduction. The principle of its ancient splendour still existed, it is true, in the fertility of its soil, and in the activity of its inhabitants; but a long peace and a protecting administration could alone revive it. In no part of the Peninsula, perhaps, had the people manifested so decided a hatred of the French, or indulged in more atrocious excesses against them. Inflamed by fanatics, they had massacred, in 1808, one hundred and eighty French, who had carried their industry into the country, and had long been considered as denizens. Accordingly, when marshal Suchet entered Valencia, on the 14th of January, it was not, as we have seen, till he had taken measures of precaution and security, which made a favourable impression upon

enlightened men, and prevented the reactions to which a population abandoned to itself is always liable.

A few days afterwards an amnesty was granted to all those persons who had borne arms against us: orders were sent to all quarters to favour their return. The magazines of the army were opened to the country people, whose farms had suffered from the events of the war. The war-taxes imposed by the Spanish government were abolished; and to give the people guarantees against arbitrary exactions, the commander-in-chief issued an ordinance, and caused it to be posted in every parish, informing persons liable to contribution, that the intendant of the army alone was authorised to impose taxes and requisitions, agreeably to his orders; that these charges should not be demanded till they had been legally assessed by the contadorerie of the province; and lastly, that they might, and indeed ought, to refuse payment of such as should not be contemplated in this measure.

These first arrangements speedily dispelled the unfavourable prepossessions which prevailed against us. A great number of citizens, whom fear had driven from their homes, returned, and on subscribing the act of submission, were immediately reinstated in the possession of their sequestrated property. The insurrectional junta of Valencia, which had fled to Alicante, having

dissolved itself in spite of the intrigues of the English agents, the commander-in-chief invited the members to avail themselves of the benefit of the amnesty, and even authorised them to hold public offices. All, with the exception of two, came and placed themselves with confidence under our authority.

To consolidate this system of pacification, it was requisite, as in Arragon, to place prudent and upright men, and such as were deeply impressed with the true interests of their country, at the head of the municipal administrations. The posts of political governors and corregidors were conferred on those whose understanding, fortune, and disinterestedness, might serve for a pledge of their good administration and maintenance of order. M. Vallejo* was appointed corregidor of Valencia, and M. Quinto director of

* While we were in Arragon, the president of the audience, or chief of justice, was M. Villa y Torre, a native of the province of Valencia, or married to a Valencian. After the reduction of Valencia, he came to spend some time with the family of his wife, and to revisit friends with whom circumstances had interrupted his intercourse. One of them, M. Vallejo, had quitted the country at our approach, as many of the Spaniards did, at the instigation of the regency of Cadiz. He betook himself towards Alicante, to await the result, and was soon informed that order and justice were established in his native city. Being apprised of the arrival of his friend Villa y Torre, he solicited of him a secret interview. The latter met him at night in a boat near the Grao, at some distance from the shore.

the police. Slight modifications were introduced in the organization of the royal audience and of the secondary courts; but the same magistrates continued to administer justice. The tribunal of the *acequieros*, charged with the superintendence of the rivers, irrigations, and harvests, was respected as a legacy bequeathed by the race to which the kingdom of Valencia owed that admirable institution. The finances could not but engage the particular attention of the commander-in-chief. The experience of the two preceding years in Arragon had demonstrated all the advantages of the changes which he had introduced in the mode of assessing and levying public contributions: the same system was applied to the contributions which were found established in the kingdom of Valencia.

The administration of the customs was charged with the receipt of the imposts, previously payable to the contadorerie of the province, and also of the duties laid on colonial commodities and English merchandize.

To the administration of the domains was at-

The conversation was short. "What kind of man is Suchet?" asked Vallejo. *Es hombre justo*—"He is a just man," replied Villa y Torre. "That is enough," rejoined the emigrant. A few days afterwards he presented himself, made his submission, and returned to his property and family. He afterwards filled with integrity the office of corregidor of Valencia.

tached the collection of the revenues specially appropriated to the treasury of the army. Another part of its duty was to collect for the imperial domain the produce of the sequestrated property, belonging to the suppressed religious orders and to emigrants who had not returned. These revenues, at first included under one title, were afterwards divided: one was called the ordinary domain, and the other the extraordinary domain.

The lottery, the posts, fines, the vales reales, and the other branches of the indirect taxes, continued to be managed by special administrators.

Frenchmen of known talents and probity were placed at the head of the domains and customs; but most of the Spanish officers were retained in their posts.

The provincial contadorerie was remodelled on the same plan and principles as that of Arragon.

A receiver and paymaster, appointed by the minister of the imperial treasury, united in one central point all the receipts and disbursements. Lafosse, inspector of the treasury, was especially charged with the superintendence of the receipts, an important duty, which could not be committed to an abler or more upright agent. Lastly, Combes-Sieyes, auditor to the council of state, a young man of superior talents, was

appointed particular intendant of the province of Valencia, and he had the supreme direction of all these agents, under the orders of the intendant-general, whose residence was fixed at Saragossa. Such was the organization given to the ordinary contributions.

But the resources which they produced were inadequate to defray the expenditure of the army: it had been found necessary to resort to extraordinary contributions. Previously to the reduction, and indeed to the siege, of Valencia, the emperor, by way of punishing the inhabitants for the massacre of 1808, had ordered a war-contribution of two hundred millions of reals, or fifty-three millions of francs, (£2,200,000 sterling) to be imposed on the province. The marshal was at first afraid that this enormous tax was disproportionate to the means still left to those by whom it was to be paid. The emperor, however, had formed a more correct estimate of the real state of things: the tribute obtained from Arragon had furnished him with a standard of what might be expected from the kingdom of Valencia, where industry and commerce had awaited only the return of tranquillity to show themselves again. This burden, moreover, was rendered less oppressive by adopting, as in Arragon, a better system of assessment and a simpler mode of collection; by accelerating the liquidation and the payment

of expences; by accepting in compensation of the war-tax grain, cattle, woollen cloth, linen, leather, and other necessaries required by the army; lastly, by preventing extortion, and allowing a sort of discount to such parishes as paid promptly.

To this end the kingdom of Valencia was divided into fourteen districts, in each of which a junta was appointed to make new books, after the pattern of those which existed under the Spanish government, in order to serve as a foundation for the ordinary impost. This impost, called in Valencia *equivalente*, corresponded with that which in Arragon was known by the name of *unica contribucion*, and of which we have treated in the tenth chapter of these Memoirs. The books were afterwards verified by commissaries chosen from among the different classes of persons liable to the contribution, and when this business was finished the contadorerie and the intendant proceeded to the individual assessment. Orders had been issued, that the income of proprietors, who had till then enjoyed exemptions and privileges, should be entered in these books; so that all the inhabitants, without any exceptions of classes or persons, were called upon for payment of the war-contribution.

The collection was entrusted to the corregidors on the spot; but near these magistrates were

placed French collectors, direct agents of the treasury of the army, whose duty it was to superintend the collection and to receive all the produce. They were required to follow a uniform mode of writing, in double parts, harmonising with that in the books of the receiver of the army. By way of checking the receipts, these collectors were furnished with books in duplicate, resembling those which are used in France. The allowances of the collectors consisted in a half per cent. on the extraordinary contribution, and three fourths per cent. on the other taxes. These allowances, a just recompence for their trouble, and the risks which they had sometimes to run, served them instead of salary, and out of them they had to defray the expences of installation, travelling, and offices, the loss of baggage, the purchase of horses, and in short, charges of every kind. If the contributions were paid in kind, the collectors derived no emolument from them.

Independently of these stationary collectors, distributed in each district, itinerant collectors were attached to the head-quarters: it was their duty to accompany corps of troops, sent on various military expeditions to all points of the territory, and into the contiguous provinces, and to receive the contributions which the officers commanding these expeditions were authorised to levy, or the levy of which they were

ordered to protect. Accordingly, the officers of the army were required to abstain from levying themselves any sum in specie, upon pain of been treated as extortioners. The itinerant collectors were under the same accountability as those who were stationary. Like them they carried checque books, out of which they cut the receipts which they gave. These receipts and the tallies were in Spanish, signed by the parties paying, and certified by the military officers directing the expeditions; so that, at their return, the collectors were able to make out their accounts, to produce regular vouchers for their receipts, and to have them verified by the inspector of the treasury.

Such was the plan adopted for the assessment and collection of the war-contribution. These precautions did not perhaps wholly obviate abuses, but they must at least have prevented a great number.

In support of these measures, and with a view to facilitate the payment of the tax, it was ordered that the assessed should be permitted to settle not only in commodities, but also in articles of gold and silver, and that these articles should be taken in payment by all the chests of the army.

Lastly, the provisional contributions paid by the *gobernacions* of Morella, Peniscola and Castellan de la Plana, occupied before the taking

of Valencia, were admitted in compensation of the extraordinary war-contribution.

In proportion as the results of the French administration in Valencia manifested themselves, the people, who had till then felt so great a horror of a foreign yoke, became quiet spectators of our occupation, because they were not disturbed either in their habits or their opinions, and enjoyed more liberty than under the Spanish government. Sure of reaping what they had sowed, they occupied themselves exclusively with their own pursuits. In our consumption manufactures found a market for their productions; commerce, secure from the revolting system of requisitions, was not afraid to launch out into bold speculations, for the purpose of supplying the army with articles which could not be obtained but from abroad. Such was the safety of all the roads, that people travelled under an escort of a few men only. Lastly, the payment of the impost, which, during the first three months of our occupation brought into the treasury no more than fifteen hundred thousand francs, and had required the employment of some vigorous measures, produced in the nine following months upwards of twenty-five millions, exclusively of the supplies of all kinds which poured into the military magazines.

Such a speedy settlement, in short, allowed the marshal to diminish the burdens which bore heavily upon Arragon: the contributions in kind,

which had been reduced one third in 1811, were again diminished one third; and the contributions in money, which amounted to nearly ten millions, were definitively fixed at four millions five hundred thousand francs per annum. Similar alleviations were afforded to the corregimientos of Tortosa, Lerida, and Tarragona.

The emperor had ordered that a fifth of the receipts of the war-contribution should belong to the Spanish government. Three millions of francs had already been despatched to Madrid agreeably to this decision. In the month of August 1812, events obliged the king of Spain to retire upon Valencia; two millions more in bullion were placed at his disposal. His guard was new-clothed, and the army under his command was furnished with supplies of all kinds to enable it to return to the capital. The army of the South, which had been forced to follow the same movement and to quit Andalusia, was also supplied with rice and brandy. More than nine thousand sick, wounded, and discharged men, who had belonged to these two armies, found in our cantonments and hospitals all the succours they needed; and as fast as they recovered, each received a month's pay, a great coat, and a pair of shoes, to enable them to rejoin their corps or to return to France.

About the same period, the army of Arragon advanced to the army of Catalonia the sum of three hundred thousand francs, to assist in pro-

visioning Barcelona for a siege. More than a hundred bat mules laden with quinquina and exotic drugs were sent off to France by Jaca, for the consumption of the military hospitals at home.

Lastly, several antique silver vases, which appeared to be of great value, and which had been found in the convent of Montessa, formerly belonging to the order of Templars, were despatched as objects of art to the royal treasury at Paris.

A year had elapsed since our entry into the kingdom of Valencia, and the extraordinary contribution of two hundred millions of reals was already paid, either in cash to the public chest, or in supplies delivered on account of that tax at the military magazines. The year 1813 was about to commence; it was expedient to provide for the expenses of this army. Solicitous to deserve the confidence of the Valencians, marshal Suchet resolved to summon them to vote, in some measure, the new subsidies which he required. For this purpose he assembled at Valencia a junta composed of the principal functionaries civil and judicial of the province, several members of the chamber of commerce, and a deputy for each of the fourteen districts of receipts. The intendant and purveyor in chief of the army were then directed to present a statement of the receipts, and expenditure of the past year, and of the presumed wants and resources of that which had just begun. These reports

were examined and discussed in several distinct committees, which drew up observations upon them. This done, the junta took the initiative on each of the points indicated, and submitted to the commander-in-chief a proposal for a tax of eighteen millions of francs to cover the expenses of 1813. It suggested at the same time various meliorations, and on its recommendation the commander-in-chief hesitated not to make reforms in several branches of the local administration. A junta of health was organised; the former board of management was re-established; the expense of collection was diminished; and a common purse was instituted for the benefit of the collectors. Provision was made by grants for the support of several charitable institutions; measures were taken to stop the dilapidation of the woods of ship-timber; orders were issued for the repair of several bridges and canals; and lastly a *presidio** was established as at Saragossa, for the performance of works of municipal police, and tending to promote the public health.

Of all the measures which were taken for the administration of that fine province, none had a more salutary influence than that of summoning the citizens to fix the amount of the burdens which they were to bear. They appreciated the

* A prison or house of correction, where men condemned to the public works are confined.

kindness and indulgence which, under the circumstances of the case, there was in this concession of power; they showed a more ready disposition to obey the acts emanating from the superior authority, and the collection of the tax was the more rapid and the more certain.

But we were not destined to enjoy this unexpected prosperity much longer. A few months after the adoption of this judicious measure, political and military events warned the commander-in-chief of the necessity that he might probably be under to evacuate on a sudden the kingdom of Valencia. He had caused the fortresses of Denia, Peniscola, Saguntum, Morella, Tortosa, Mequinenza, and Lerida, to be provisioned before-hand; and when the battle of Vittoria gave him the signal for retreat, he had nothing more to do than to send to those places the funds requisite for the payment of the troops which formed their garrisons.

Eighteen months had scarcely elapsed since the conquest of the kingdom of Valencia. During this time thirty-seven millions of francs (upwards of £1,500,000 sterling) the produce of the ordinary contributions and war-taxes, had been paid into the chests of the army. The amount of the disbursements was for pay, &c. 16,854,920 francs: for the *matériel* 6,186,304; for the public and local administration, the pensions of ecclesiastics, military men who had retired from the service,

and widows, and relief afforded, 2,143,864; for charges for the administration of the treasury of the army, 87,671; for bullion sent to France and payments made according to ministerial ordinances, 753,263; sums sent to Madrid to the king of Spain, out of the produce of the extraordinary war contributions, 7,000,000; lastly for articles furnished to the different fortresses retained by the army, 1,470,727 francs. All these disbursements amounted to 34,496,854 francs.

During the same interval the receipts in Arragon amounted to eight millions of francs and in Catalonia to seven. In those provinces disbursements for pay and *matériel* had been made as at Valencia: relief and pensions had been granted and work given to the indigent class; and all the expenses for objects of general and local utility had been regulated for the benefit and to the satisfaction of the inhabitants; and that without disposing of any part of the wealth of the church, without selling the smallest portion of the possessions of the clergy or those of the opulent proprietors whom the war had driven from their homes.

CHAPTER XIX.

Arrival of general Murray at Alicante.—Actions at Yecla, Villena, Biar, and Castalla.—General Murray lands before Tarragona.—He makes himself master of the col de Balaguer.—Rapid march of the marshal to Tarragona.—General Maurice Mathieu approaches the place.—General Murray reembarks.—General Harispe is attacked on the Xucar.—He beats and repulses the Spaniards.—The marshal returns to Valencia by forced marches.

THE close of the year 1812 had been marked by the disasters of the Russian campaign; but in the following spring the victories of Lützen and Bautzen seemed to restore the equilibrium and to prepare the possibility of a general pacification. It was an additional motive with the French government to make great exertions in the Peninsula After the departure of marshal Soult, who was called to the grand army, the principal armies, headed by marshal Jourdan, count Gazan, and general Reille, remained united under the command of king Joseph. The head-quarters, which had been removed during the winter from Madrid to Valladolid, were transferred in May to Burgos; Madrid was evacuated, and every thing announced a determination to act offensively at the opening

of the campaign. Wellington on his part had formed his plan of attack, which embraced the combination of closely pressing marshal Suchet's army in front and flank. General Murray had been sent to supersede Maitland in the command of the Anglo-Sicilian army at Alicante; and general Elio and the duke del Parque were placed at the head of the 2nd and 3rd Spanish armies, while general Copons succeeded Lacy in Catalonia.

Marshal Suchet resolved not to wait till the forces which threatened him should be augmented or united. He sought to make himself acquainted with their positions and their movements, that he might seize an opportunity to disconcert the combinations of the Anglo-Spanish army. This occasion seemed to present itself spontaneously in the first days of April. A Spanish division of Elio's corps came and posted itself at Yecla, within reach of Fuente la Higuera which we occupied in advanced guard, and at a considerable distance from the advanced guard of the enemy established at Villena. The marshal hoped to be able to cut off this division. He assembled the *élite* of his forces in the night of the 10th at Fuente la Higuera; thence he marched direct upon Villena with Habert's division, the cavalry, and the reserve, while general Harispe moved upon Yecla in the night, by a rapid march which was totally unperceived by the enemy.

Having come in sight of the Spaniards at day-break, that general saw them form immediately, to the number of four thousand five hundred men and two hundred horse, and gain the neighbouring mountains in the direction of Jumilla, to avoid an action. He forthwith pushed on his advanced guard, composed of voltigeurs and hussars, under the command of colonel Meyer. It pursued them closely, but they retired from one position to another; the main body of our infantry could not come up with them, and they had well nigh escaped even from our cavalry and light artillery. General Harispe ordered the advanced guard to make a movement for the purpose of charging the centre of the Spaniards. By this manœuvre the line was broken and part fled; but the rest, cut off from its point of retreat and driven back upon Harispe's division, had to fight against a superior force. Colonel Meyer, at the head of the hussars and a party of dragoons, dashed upon the enemy's column, was twice repulsed, and returned to the charge, till, pressed on all sides, having four or five hundred killed and wounded, the Spaniards laid down their arms to the number of twelve hundred, among whom were sixty-eight officers and one colonel. We took a pair of colours and two thousand muskets; our loss was eighteen killed and sixty-one wounded.

The marshal meanwhile occupied Caudete with ten battalions, ten pieces of ordnance, and

the cuirassiers, ready to attack any troops which might attempt to proceed from Villena to the relief of Yecla. Generals Murray and Elio actually did hasten up, and showed in advance of Villena about a thousand horse, supported by a battalion which occupied the town. The cuirassiers immediately deployed; the infantry and artillery advanced, and we entered Villena, after breaking open the gates with cannon-shot. The enemy's cavalry retired, and the battalion was left in the castle. The duke of Albufera ordered it to be instantly invested; judging that this garrison was not provisioned, and that it had been thrown into the place merely for want of time to take it away, he sent it a summons the following day. It capitulated, and one thousand men, fine troops, of the regiment of Velez-Malaga, were prisoners of war.

General Harispe's division immediately took a position on the road to Sax; and general Habert, followed by the reserves, was directed upon the Castalla road, where the enemy in retreat occupied the defile of Biar. The English line, commanded by Frederic Adam, was posted on heights of difficult access, with artillery in the intervals. The marshal attacked, with the 1st light and 14th of the line, and the 3rd light, 114th, and 121st, under the command of generals Robert and Isidore Lamarque: general Habert detached colonel Guillemet, with five

hundred voltigeurs, upon the left of the enemy, which was turned by the heights, while the centre was vigorously pushed. The English began their retreat in good order; but whenever they took a position, they were again attacked. The marshal caused them to be closely pressed by the cavalry: lieutenant Brosse, of the hussars, charged them several times with vigour at the head of the escort party; at night they hastened their retreat to Castalla, leaving in our power about a hundred prisoners and two pieces of cannon. We encamped within sight of the enemy's positions, at the outlet of the defile.

On the morning of the 13th, the Anglo-Spanish army, still keeping Castalla, occupied a hill in advance, which prevented us from seeing its camp and judging of its strength. The marshal sent his cavalry to the left towards Onil, with instructions to spread itself and thoroughly explore the plain, and detached upon his right six hundred voltigeurs, to take in reverse the left of the enemy on the hill. Colonel Abord, who commanded this column, met with a vigorous resistance, and was killed. Four battalions of the 3rd light and 121st, led by general Robert, then ascended to extricate the voltigeurs: but these battalions drew upon themselves the efforts of the enemy to such a degree, that they were soon forced to abandon

a ground to which they had climbed with the greatest difficulty, and to descend the hill again, leaving a great number of killed and wounded. The marshal regretting an action which he had no wish to turn into a general engagement, did not attempt to form the two columns anew, and to return to the charge; he rallied them, and called in his cavalry. His troops, formed in echelons, remained deployed before the defile. General Valée had placed the artillery on the line and in the defile itself, so as to defend properly the front of the position which was naturally formidable, having both its flanks supported. General Harispe, left in the rear, advanced to act as a reserve; and in this attitude the marshal firmly awaited the English army.

General Murray debouched from Castalla, and seemed disposed to attack. But the countenance of the troops, and the fire of our artillery, skilfully placed, caused him to relinquish this intention. A column attempted to break our left, and to surround our most advanced battery, commanded by the chef-d'escadron Capelle. Colonel Meyer hastened to it with a demi-battalion of the 16th, and repulsed the column: the officer who commanded it was killed by captain Lacroix. At night the enemy's army returned to its positions, and the French army went back to its own, without being followed in its movement. It had lost on these

three days about eight hundred men, among whom colonel Abord, the chef-d'escadron Colson, captains Rivière, Cory, Alberspit, and several others, were killed or had died of their wounds: the chef-de-bataillon, Herremberger, was severely wounded. We took from the enemy more than two thousand prisoners, who were sent to France by Tortosa and Saragossa.

After these three days' fighting, our success in which was counterbalanced by the fruitless attack of Castalla, the movements of the Anglo-Spanish army led marshal Suchet to conjecture that an operation was combined to compel him to evacuate Valencia. Fresh Spanish troops advanced by La Mancha, under the command of general Mijares. According to their usual manœuvre, they threatened the right flank of the army by occupying Cuenca, and approached Requena. Villacampa, instructed no doubt to support this movement, quitted, at the same time, the frontier of Arragon, which was the ordinary theatre of his operations, and proceeded towards the upper Guadalaviar. The duke of Albufera took occasion from this to call in Pannetier's brigade, which had long been posted on the right bank of the Ebro, and had defended it with perseverance against the troops of Castille. On the 13th of April, the very day of the fight at Castalla, colonel Colbert, at the head of his regiment, which from being

the 9th was now the 12th of hussars, and of the 10th of the line, commanded by the chef-de-bataillon Dubalen, had had a brilliant action at Borja with the corps of brigadier Sarsfield, four thousand strong. By judicious manœuvring, while he attacked him vigorously in front, he had managed to beat him, notwithstanding the disproportion of the forces, killed about one hundred men, and taken one hundred and forty prisoners. General Caffarelli and general Reille were called to the command of the army of the North and that of Portugal; general Clausel came to succeed them in Navarre. Marshal Suchet was particularly gratified to have for his neighbour this general, whom he had long known, and whose talents he esteemed. The attempts of Mina appeared less alarming to him. He lost no time in calling Severoli's division nearer to him, disposing, for an urgent danger, of the forces which Arragon was for the moment able to spare. Pannetier's brigade was placed intermediately between Tortosa and Valencia, that he might despatch it upon any point which might be threatened, without being obliged to strip the line of the Xucar and to leave it defenceless.

In the course of May, preparations for embarking were made at Alicante, and the Spanish forces began to concentrate themselves about that place. We soon afterwards learned that

the English and Sicilian troops and Whittingham's division, with a great quantity of artillery and stores, were destined for an expedition, concerning the real object of which there were a thousand conjectures. On the 31st of May the fleet set sail; it passed in sight of Valencia, steering northward. Our troops *en échelon* began to move towards Tortosa, watching the motions of the enemy, and waiting till the point of landing should be indicated. On the 2nd of June, the fleet appeared off Tarragona. The expedition consisted of about sixteen thousand men of all arms; general Copons, who was apprized of the circumstance, occupied Reuss with his army. On the 3rd the landing was effected in broad day, with an order, precision, and rapidity, which show that the English army is accustomed to maritime expeditions. Tarragona was immediately invested, but the first thing done by general Murray, the commander-in-chief of the expedition, was to send a corps of troops, with the requisite artillery, to attack the fort of the col de Balaguer. He hoped, by gaining possession of it, to cut off the only road for cannon by which marshal Suchet could arrive to raise the siege: the operation was therefore pushed with vigour. By the 5th the fort was battered in breach: and on the 7th the explosion of a powder magazine intimidated the garrison, composed of eighty men of the 11th

of the line. The commanding officer capitulated, and the English established themselves in the fort.

The Spanish army had meanwhile proceeded on the Altafulla road, to separate Tarragona from the succours coming from Barcelona. General Murray took position on the bank of the Francoli, on the Olivo, and on the Loreto: he prepared batteries to batter the upper town and part of the lower, which we still occupied. General Bertoletti did not shut himself up timidly within his walls. He occupied fort Royal and the ruins of the bastion of St. Charles, which, though demolished as well as all the outer works, furnished by its relief means of resistance capable of commanding respect. Captain Roussel, commanding the engineers, quickly made the most urgent repairs. The chef-de-bataillon Michelet, of the artillery, used equal activity in arming all parts of the fortress. Captain Darde, of the 20th of the line, at the head of eighty men, and some gunners working one twelve-pounder, was charged with the defence of fort Royal; lieutenant Delot, of the Italian 7th of the line, with about fifty men and one field-piece, was placed in the bastion of St. Charles. The governor caused sorties to be made by detachments, which penetrated to the heights of the Olivo, reconnoitred all the English camps, and by making them betake themselves

to arms, drew them under the guns of the place. The quarter-master-general Donkin, sent to propose a capitulation, in the name of general Murray and admiral Hallowell, was not admitted, and received an answer full of dignity and courage. The English had kept up till the 10th of June a brisk fire on the upper and lower town, in which the fleet also joined, but which was rather maintained with vigour than combined with prudence. The troops in column showed themselves several times, as if to threaten an assault, before the breaches were opened. These demonstrations could not produce any effect. The time thus lost in attacking was gained for the defence of the place, and Bertoletti, the governor, well knew that if he persevered he should be sure to be relieved, before he was menaced in his last enclosure.

Marshal Suchet, leaving to general Harispe the command of the troops on the Xucar, actually despatched Musnier's division, the reserve, and general d'Aigremont's brigade of cavalry, by forced marches upon Tortosa. In the very first days of June, he had ordered part of the garrison of Tortosa, in anticipation of his arrival, to relieve the col de Balaguer; but the fall of that fort disappointed his hopes, and forced him to march without artillery. On the 10th of June, his advanced guard arrived at Perello: the following day he sent Pannetier's brigade

on Valdellos, by mountain-roads on the left, being no longer able to operate on the high-road. The Westphalian light horse, commanded by colonel Plessen, charged the English dragoons with intrepidity, and made some prisoners. On the 12th, general Pannetier occupied the summit of the hills in the direction of Monroig, and kindled large fires to give notice of his approach to the garrison of Tarragona. The marshal was impatient to learn what was going on; but it was difficult to procure information. No inhabitants were to be met with: the country for a great distance is almost deserted, and so dry that the troops suffered two or three days from want of water. None of our scouts despatched from Valencia and Tortosa had yet returned. The marshal had lost no time in writing to generals Decaen and Maurice Mathieu, directing them to march on their side to the relief of Tarragona. General Maurice Mathieu was the nearest: his head-quarters were at Barcelona. He hastened forward with such rapidity, that on the 11th of June he reached Villafranca with a column of eight thousand men, nearly equal in strength to that led on by marshal Suchet himself. He took care to announce at the same time that he was closely followed by the main body of the army of Catalonia, and on the 12th he pushed on his advanced guard to Arbos.

While the two relieving corps, still at a distance from one another, were drawing nearer to save Tarragona, the garrison of that place, cut off from external communications, were ignorant of the efforts making for its deliverance. The combined English and Spanish army, on the contrary, was informed of all our movements, and perceived the approach of the storm, which it felt itself in no condition to face. The 12th of June was the day on which the heads of columns from Barcelona and Valencia pushed forward the furthest: the care which general Maurice-Mathieu had taken to circulate the report of the march of the whole army of Catalonia, determined general Copons to retreat, in order not to risk a general engagement. On the same day, the 12th, general Murray, threatened from the summit of the hills of Monroig upon his point of landing, came to the resolution to abandon his artillery, rather than endanger his troops; accordingly, he raised the siege and re-embarked.

General Maurice-Mathieu, at Villafranca, had ceased to hear the cannon of Tarragona, and was exceedingly uneasy on that account. As he could not venture to engage the whole of the enemy's troops single-handed, he repassed the col d'Ordal, and fell back, on the 12th, upon the Llobregat. The marshal, unable to proceed by the mountain-road, appeared on the 14th, with the main body of his forces, before the col de Balaguer. He

found a battalion of the enemy in position, covering the fort: but what was his surprise on perceiving the whole English fleet at anchor between the col and Hospitalet, to the number of one hundred and eighty sail, including transports! As soon as the French came in sight, it detached two frigates and a brig to cannonade them on the high road.

The command of the English army had just been transferred to lord William Bentinck. Its embarkation rendered it disposable, so that it could be despatched to any other point of the coast. The accounts received by the marshal were of such a nature as to recall him to Xucar; but it was of consequence that he should know the state of Tarragona. On the 15th he made a second movement upon Valdellos, by the mountains: general Pannetier perceived some English battalions and a regiment of cavalry retreating in the direction of the Hospitalet. The marshal, whose object was, not to form a junction with the army of Catalonia, but to save Tarragona, wrote to general Decaen, urging him to redouble his efforts, while the only object which he himself now kept in view, was to follow the motions of the fleet. On the 16th and 17th, he began to approach Tortosa, occupying Amposta and Perello; and was very soon informed of the raising of the siege of Tarragona. The eighteen

pieces of ordnance landed and placed in battery by the English had fallen into the hands of general Bertoletti, whose firmness on this occasion had saved the place committed to his charge. Count Maurice-Mathieu had turned back and marched not only to Tarragona, but to Cambrils. This last movement contributed to accelerate the re-embarkation of a part of the English army, which was still on shore near the Hospitalet.*

So early as the 11th of June, general Harispe had reported to marshal Suchet, that on quitting St. Philip, according to his instructions, to establish himself on the line of the Xucar, he had been followed by all the forces of general Elio and the duke del Parque. General Mesclop, commanding his rear-guard upon the high road, was closely pressed by a thousand Spanish horse. Seizing a moment when the enemy's column had halted in the village of Rogla, which was choaked up by it, he suddenly faced about and charged at the head of the hussars of the 4th regiment, with equal impetuosity and resolution. The Spaniards, cut in pieces and overthrown, fled in disorder to the village of Lanera, where the head of their infantry was arriving, and left in our hands about thirty prisoners, among whom were a colonel and two officers. General Elio himself

* See notes and explanatory documents, No. 25.

was detained for a moment during the affray, but escaped without being recognised. General Mesclop quietly finished his march to the bridge of the Xucar.

On the 13th, the enemy made his appearance there in force, but the day passed in an action with artillery; some parties of the enemy advanced and were repulsed. Our tirailleurs maintained their ground in advance of the tête-de-pont. During this demonstration, the duke del Parque attacked Alcira by the two roads of Carcagente and Gandia. General Habert, allowing the principal column of the enemy to come nearly to the suburb, marched against and charged it, at the head of the 14th of the line and a squadron of hussars, at the moment when it was beginning to deploy. The column was thrown into disorder and routed, having nearly four hundred men killed, and losing six hundred and twenty prisoners, with a pair of colours, taken by Knippers, the hussar. This action was so soon over, that general Habert had time to proceed immediately to the left, to support general Gudin. The latter, at the head of the 16th of the line, was advancing against a corps of three thousand men, which attacked him by the Gandia road: the 117th hastened up on the flank; the Spaniards were put to the rout, and retired with loss. The 2nd and 3rd divisions alone, with the cavalry of general Delort, thus maintained the honour of the army

of Arragon against forces nearly four times their number, who flattered themselves with the prospect of retaking Valencia while the English were endeavouring to reduce Tarragona. The marshal had relied on the talents and energy of general Harispe to compensate for the number of the soldiers during his absence. That general honourably performed his task, but in his report of the 14th, he thus wrote:

"Your excellency tells me that in our position we are able to see the enemy coming. You must nevertheless consider that, according to all the least suspicious reports and intelligence, the army which you have left here has in line and operations twenty-eight thousand infantry, perhaps the best troops belonging to Spain; from two thousand six hundred to three thousand cavalry, in good condition; and, including the reserves, about forty pieces of ordnance, provided with horses. Our prisoners will confirm these particulars, which are not exactly suited to lull us into greater security than we ought justly to feel."

While the affairs of Tarragona kept marshal Suchet in suspense near the col de Balaguer, he was extremely mortified at being unable to march to the support of general Harispe. In the night between the 17th and 18th, the English blew up fort St. Philip: this indicated an intention to withdraw from lower Catalonia. Their fleet actually set sail, standing to the south-

ward: when off the mouth of the Ebro, it approached the coast. A report was circulated in the country, that it would land troops at the Alfaques or at Castellon de la Plana, to cut off the marshal's communication with Valencia. With a united force of fifteen or sixteen thousand men, lord William Bentinck might justly hope to beat eight thousand, coming up successively and fatigued with a toilsome and rapid expedition: but we reached Tortosa and La Rapita before him. Eighteen vessels were driven ashore by a violent gale and stranded: the fleet lay-to for the purpose of rendering them assistance, and succeeded in saving thirteen; the other five were taken with their crews. The marshal, hastening his march, arrived on the 22nd at Castellon de la Plana, with four thousand men, eight hundred horse, and six pieces of light artillery, at the moment when the fleet was in sight, crowding sail, but luckily having a contrary wind. Off Valencia it again approached the coast, and a frigate, being detached to pick up a small cruiser which we had off Murviedro, standing too close in-shore, ran aground. General Rouelle, commandant of Saguntum, hastened up with two companies of grenadiers and two pieces of cannon, and the enemy manned his boats with troops to repulse ours: but the fire of our artillery and musketry killed many of his men. The captain of the frigate

lost no time in throwing his guns and stores over-board, and, by thus lightening her, got her off.

Marshal Suchet returned from Tortosa to Valencia in forty-eight hours, after taking measures for the safety of Tarragona, and directing general Maurice-Mathieu at Barcelona, and general Robert at Tortosa, to supply general Bertoletti as speedily as possible with the powder which he needed. On his way he found at Vinaros and Benicarlo, Castellon and Valencia, the inhabitants assembled to receive him with the ringing of bells, triumphal arches, festivities, and demonstrations of joy which he was far from expecting, after the apprehensions which had just agitated all minds. The last affair at Castalla, the landing of the English at Tarragona, and the approach of the Spanish army upon the Xucar, had naturally been considered as foreboding the speedy defeat of the French, and the evacuation of the province of Valencia. The marshal, placed in a very critical situation, had, contrary to the general expectation, successfully extricated himself from it by the rapidity of his movements.* The people of Valencia, who

* Marchal Suchet adopted, in its full extent, the maxim of marshal Saxe, that victory often depends as much on the celerity as on the courage of troops. To make his soldiers good marchers had been his principal study in all the commands which he had held, and especially since he had been

had seen the fleet going and returning, and our columns keeping up with it, and ready for it at points so distant from each other, convinced by their own eyes of the reverses of their troops and their allies, reverted without effort, to sentiments of sincère submission, and even confidence and esteem for the army. It was such sentiments that we had already extorted from the Arragonese, under similar circumstances, and by the same means. They loudly proclaimed their joy to see us confirmed in the occupation of the country, and expressed their wishes that the vicissitudes of war might not again disturb the security which they enjoyed under an authority that they had ceased to consider as inimical.

at the head of the army of Arragon. He was fond of quoting a letter from Napoleon, when first consul, to Massena, who was shut up in Genoa—this letter was intercepted by the English, and published in their newspapers—in which he says that, "The French soldier is the nimblest and most intelligent of the soldiers of Europe"—a definition as remarkable for its precision as for its truth.

CHAPTER XX.

Battle of Vittoria.—Evacuation of Valencia.—The army returns to Arragon.—General Pâris is under the necessity of evacuating Saragossa.—The army re-enters Catalonia, and establishes itself at Villafranca.—The Anglo-Spanish army attacks Tarragona.—The marshal relieves the place and blows up the fortifications.—General operations.—Battle of Ordal.—Passage of the Bidassoa by lord Wellington.—The army of Catalonia forms a junction with the army of Arragon under marshal Suchet's orders.—Administration in Catalonia.—Reduction of the army.—Treaty of Valençay.

MARSHAL SUCHET had no sooner returned from his rapid expedition to Tarragona, than he bent his attention to recover and extend his advantages over the Anglo-Spanish army of Alicante, which had ventured as far as the river Xucar. By a movement upon Canales and San-Felipe, he compelled it to retreat within the lines of Castalla. He sent general Musnier to occupy Requena, where general Elio had established himself, and to drive general Villacampa from his position on the upper Guadalaviar. But at the moment when he least expected such an event, he received in-

formation of the battle fought at Vittoria on the 21st of June, in consequence of which the main army, commanded by king Joseph, had been forced to retreat beyond the Pyrenees, and to seek protection under the walls of Bayonne. The position of the marshal was so completely altered by that occurrence, as to make it imperative upon him to evacuate the kingdom of Valencia without delay. We have already seen that he was long prepared for the necessity of adopting such a course. In conformity with the instructions of the minister of war,* he had neglected no means of preserving his conquests as long as circumstances would permit, whilst

* Letter from the minister of war to marshal Suchet, dated the 18th of May, 1813.

"I cannot but applaud the determination you have adopted "of withdrawing some of the troops from Arragon, for the "purpose of reinforcing your army and of maintaining your "present positions. The essential object at this moment is "to avoid losing ground, and to gain time, until the period "when the emperor shall have brought his campaigns to a "close, and shall have it in his power to afford assistance to "his armies in Spain, if such a course should be found neces- "sary. Such, I repeat, must be the main object in view at this "moment, and you will not fail to estimate its importance. "You have been led by some misunderstanding to suppose "that I limited to a month the time you would have to hold "out; but M. de Saint-Joseph himself is satisfied that he "mentioned several months instead of one, as you have "erroneously apprehended, and he fully recollects what I "stated to him on the subject, that we had chiefly in view

the emperor was negotiating in the north a continental peace. The fort of Saguntum contained a two months' supply of provisions for the whole army, and a large park of artillery was kept in reserve at Tortosa. We were therefore, at liberty to break up our cantonments, and to manœuvre as circumstances might require, entertaining as we did a full conviction that we should have every resource at command whenever it might be in our power to return. This course appeared the more plausible, as general Clausel, upon his arrival at Saragossa on the 1st of July with fourteen thousand men, announced that he was going to take up a position on the Gallego, for the purpose of affording assistance either to the army of Arragon, or to the king if he should resume the offensive. The marshal accordingly adopted the determination of falling back towards the Ebro, so as to be enabled to concert his movements with general Clausel. The army broke up from its position, and recrossed the Xucar, taking the precaution to destroy the bridges. The enemy followed us in our retreat, though with circumspection

" to gain time, until the emperor should have been enabled " to settle matters in the north. I can never sufficiently " press this point upon your attention, and I trust you will " be enabled to carry it into effect.

Signed, DUKE DE FELTRE."

and at a distance, and contented themselves with taking possession of the ground we had previously occupied, in proportion as we left it and continued our retrograde movement.

The marshal quitted Valencia on the 5th of July, at the head of his columns; and the retreating movement was carried on simultaneously and by echelons along the whole road as far as Tortosa, taking the direction of Caspe. The conduct of the troops was marked by the most scrupulous discipline, and the inhabitants in return manifested the most friendly sentiments. Not a single musket-shot was fired, not a straggler was attacked on the march. Provisions in abundance awaited our arrival at every place; the greatest attention was bestowed to the transport of the sick. The army was in good condition, and its pay was not a day in arrear. The contributions drawn from the kingdom of Valencia had, for the most part, been employed in this object, and consequently expended on the spot; the country was by no means exhausted. Public tranquillity had uniformly prevailed, notwithstanding the existing state of warfare; assassinations, which were formerly of such frequent occurrence, were altogether unknown during the eighteen months of our occupying the province. In some places, the inhabitants manifested their friendly sentiments so far, as openly to express to the marshal the regret

they felt at his departure.* This was a very unexpected homage for a retreating French army to receive, in a country where the first year of the war had been marked by such savage animosity against them.

* As the marshal was passing with his staff through a village near Castellon de la Plana, on the morning of the 6th of July, he found the inhabitants assembled in the principal square, and refreshments prepared for the troops. The municipal authorities presented themselves to him with as much eagerness as on his first arrival when he brought victory in his train, and with far more unanimity than on that occasion. The curate, a highly respectable man, whose character, solid information and virtues, gave him considerable influence, addressed the marshal in a loud voice in presence of all his countrymen, who applauded and drowned in their enthusiastic acclamations a speech which was more particularly entitled to notice at such a moment, considering that a Spaniard gave utterance to it.

"We are aware, M. le maréchal," said the curate, "that "events over which you have no controul have made it "necessary for you to retreat from the kingdom of Valencia; "we regret your departure, and do not renounce all hope of "seeing you once more amongst us."

The English colonel Otto Bayer, whom generals Bentinck and Clinton have since frequently sent on missions to marshal Suchet at Barcelona, for the purpose of treating respecting an exchange of prisoners, appeared to take a pleasure in relating to us that, during the progress of our retreat from Valencia, the English army, which followed the French troops as far as the Ebro, had every where witnessed the praises and unequivocal testimonies of esteem and attachment bestowed by the people upon the army of Arragon and its commander-in-chief.

The retrograde movement of the army towards Arragon, on its way to the banks of the Ebro, necessarily brought it back to Catalonia, a country the defence of which was of the highest consequence to us, it being an object for us, under any circumstances, to retain possession of the military road to Barcelona, and thereby to cover an important frontier of France. In case of our returning with an intention to renew offensive operations, (supposing that such a course were still practicable) Tortosa was to be our point of departure, and Saguntum presented to us an advantageous point-d'appui in advance of the Ebro. That fortress, in which considerable works had been erected during the last eighteen months of our occupation, was in a complete state of defence. A garrison of twelve hundred men was thrown into it, with ample supplies for a twelvemonth, and placed under the command of general Rouelle, an old colonel of the 116th regiment, and a very gallant officer. The small fort of Denia, which was occupied by a hundred and twenty men, under the orders of the chef-de-bataillon Bin, was the only point we retained in advance of Valencia. This capital had no other works of defence than its old walls of enclosure; the temporary fortifications, and all the external works which had enabled it to hold out against us, were no longer in existence; a kind of castillo, erected by the marshal for the

purpose of overawing the city, was destroyed. Peniscola, in the rear of Saguntum, remained in the possession of a garrison of five hundred men, under the chef-de-bataillon Bardout, an officer of tried courage; and a garrison of a hundred and twenty men was thrown into the small fort of Morella, under the command of captain Boissonade of the 44th regiment. The latter point secured to us a road across the mountains, through which a corps of infantry, unencumbered with cannon, might at any time return from Arragon to the kingdom of Valencia. With respect to the town of Tortosa, it was calculated, from its strength and situation, to become of the highest importance. The marshall determined to leave in it a garrison of five thousand five hundred men, well provided with every thing that it could stand in need of, and governor of a firm and prudent character, who should be competent to second his future operations. His choice fell upon the general of brigade baron Robert, whose talents and capacity had often attracted his notice. His command was, eventually, to embrace within its range the fortresses and troops which were at a still greater distance in the rear, and it was accordingly denominated the division of the lower Ebro.

Previously, however, to his reaching Tortosa, the marshal was informed that general Clausel,

having been recalled in consequence of recent events, was leaving the banks of the Ebro, and re-ascending the Gallego, in the direction of Jaca. Finding it impossible to transport any artillery along that road, he had left it at Saragossa, under the protection of the castle and of the weak corps commanded by general Pâris. The latter general himself, as well as the capital of Arragon, was threatened by the corps of Duran and Mina, who were powerfully seconded by existing circumstances. This intelligence only increased the marshal's anxiety to accelerate his movement towards the frontier of Arragon, in order to rescue general Pâris from his impending danger, and to rally the corps of general Musnier which had proceeded across the mountains. This officer, who was bringing back an Italian brigade of Severoli's division, after having evacuated and destroyed the castillos of Teruel and Alcañiz, bent his march towards Caspe on the 12th of July. On the same day, the marshal was pushing his columns as far as Favara. The army thus found itself placed in advance of the Ebro, with its right at Caspe, its centre at Gaudessa, and its left at Tortosa. General Pâris had been ordered to draw nearer to Mequinenza; but he was attacked at Saragossa by Mina, who took possession of the Monte-Torrero. As he was making preparations to march against the enemy's forces, he discovered

that they were much superior in numbers to his own, and were manœuvring to cross the Ebro; he accordingly commenced his retreat during the night, evacuated Saragossa, and proceeded in the direction of Alcubiere. The enemy overtook him the next day, and attacked him in the defile, where his progress was obstructed by the large quantity of baggage which was following the column. General Pâris being unable to open a passage on the road to Lerida, effected his retreat towards Huesca and Jaca; but he lost his baggage and a great many of his troops. Whilst this occurrence was taking place, general Clausel, who had advanced from the banks of the Gallego towards the frontier of Navarre, returned to Jaca through the Cincovillas, and took up a position, with his corps-d'armée, close to the frontier of France. The city, and at a later period the castle, of Saragossa surrendered to Mina's forces.

Marshal Suchet considered the loss of Arragon as an irreparable misfortune. It was no longer in his power to maintain himself in advance of the Ebro, and every circumstance was combining to recommend his connecting his operations with general Decaen, for the purpose of securing the defence of Catalonia. The army crossed the Ebro at Mequinenza, Mora, and Tortosa, on the 14th and 15th of July. The general of brigade Isidore Lamarque received

orders to proceed along the banks of the Ebro, and rally the small garrisons of Belchite, Fuentes, Pina, and Bujaralos, the safety of which was endangered by the departure of the column under the orders of general Paris. He succeeded in rescuing them, and bringing back to Lerida five hundred and thirty-nine men, who, must otherwise have infallibly fallen into Mina's hands. The main body of the army, on its way along the high road to Tortosa, was cannonaded between the Hospitalet and Cambrils by the English fleet. The impossibility of maintaining the line of the lower Ebro whilst Arragon was in the enemy's power, or of providing for the subsistence of the army in the unproductive neighbourhood of Tortosa, and the danger of having the defiles in our rear occupied by hostile troops, which might come by sea to take up a position between us and the fortresses of Catalonia, induced marshal Suchet to direct his movement towards Reuss, Valls, and Tarragona. On reaching the latter place, the capture and preservation of which had been attended with such serious difficulties, and which was already in a great measure demolished, he closely inspected its condition, directed the removal or destruction of whatever he deemed it inexpedient to leave in the enemy's power, and ordered mines to be dug under the principal

points of its enclosures, though he still hesitated in respect to its evacuation.

Whilst the works of the artillery and engineer departments were going on at Tarragona, he proceeded in person to Lerida, by way of Monblanch, in order to strengthen and complete its defence. He found the governor, Henriod, a prey to the acute sufferings of a confirmed gout, which, without at all impairing his mental energies, deprived him of that physical activity so much called for by the duties of his situation. He deemed it necessary to procure him the enjoyment of the repose he stood so much in need of, and transferred the command of Lerida to general Isidore Lamarque, providing him at the same time with all the resources and instructions which were calculated to facilitate our retaining possession of the place. General Bourgeois expressed a desire to be allowed to defend Mequinenza, and was left in it with four hundred men and a twelve month's supply of provisions and ammunition. The small fort of Monzón was confided to captain Boutan of the 81st regiment. These two points might be considered as the advanced posts of Lerida, which thus became a protection to the right flank of the army, which was thenceforward confined within the limits of lower Catalonia. The marshal returned to Tarragona, left general Bertoletti at that place, with directions to prosecute the works which had been commenced, and pro-

ceeded towards the plain of Villafranca, where his army concentrated itself for the purpose of drawing its subsistence from the resources of the country, without removing to too great a distance from Tarragona, or beyond the reach of Barcelona and of general Decaen.

The first official intelligence received by marshal Suchet from the minister of war respecting the battle of Vittoria did not reach him until the end of July, or beginning of August; it was calculated to lessen the extent of the evil, and to cherish the hope of a speedy improvement in our affairs in the north of Spain.* It announced a powerful accession of strength in the arrival of marshal Suchet, duke of Dalmatia, who came to collect the fragments of the army defeated at Vittoria, and to assume the chief command of that army. The emperor was desirous that it should immediately undertake offensive operations, with a view to the relief of Pampeluna, San-Sebastian, and Santona, which were either blockaded or besieged by the enemy. But the first movement undertaken, on the 28th of July, in furtherance of that object, was not attended with the success which had been anticipated. Lord Wellington, after having suspended for a moment his operations against those places, resumed them on a

* Ministerial correspondence of the 8th and 22nd of July. See notes and explanatory documents, No. 24.

sudden, and the Anglo-Spanish armies followed up their advance movement. Lord William Bentinck crossed the Ebro, and the fleet approached Tarragona and Barcelona. Marshal Suchet repaired to the latter place, the continued occupation of which was the principal object aimed at by our operations in Catalonia, and he particularly enquired into the measures adopted for protecting it from danger. His division remained at Villafranca, they occupied Villanova de Sitges, in order that by spreading themselves over a greater extent of country they might diminish the difficulty of subsisting, which was beginning to be seriously felt; and the advanced guard was established at Arbos and Vendrell.

Lord William Bentinck and the duke del Parque having left round Tortosa and our other places in the rear the forces requisite for blockading them, had approached and regularly invested Tarragona on the 29th of July. The Spanish troops under the orders of general Copons hovered upon the right flank of our positions, with a view to cut off our supplies, and they seized every opportunity of fighting us in detail, or of taking us by surprise. On the 27th of August, a battalion of the 1st light Italian regiment, which was ordered to defend the mills of San-Saturni, was suddenly attacked by two thousand men, and lost two hundred men in killed, wounded, and prisoners. We had been for a long time without any

intelligence from general Bertoletti; but the constant firing kept up by his artillery afforded sufficient indication that the enemy had attacked him, and the marshal was aware that the place which he defended could not remain much longer in its present unprotected condition. Nevertheless, the numerical superiority of the enemy compelled him to wait until general Decaen should have it in his power to join him with a part of the army of Catalonia. This general brought with him eight thousand men, under the command of generals Maurice Mathieu and Maximien Lamarque, who formed a junction with the army of Arragon at Villafranca on the 14th of August. The marshal sent forward Harispe's and Habert's divisions, with the cavalry of general Delort, by the road of Vendrell and Altafulla, for the exclusive purpose of drawing off the enemy's attention to that quarter, as his columns would have been too much exposed to the cannon of the fleet had they remained near the sea-shore. This demonstration answered the expected object, of inducing the enemy to relinquish the positions of Brafin and of the col de Santa-Christina. We occupied them, and the army proceeded on the 15th, by a rapid movement, beyond la Gaya. The troops of general Decaen approached Valls and Francoli. The enemy were already drawn up in order of battle, in front of Tarragona; but it was not their

intention to come to an engagement in that position, and they effected their retreat during the night, in the direction of Reuss and Cambrils. In the year 1811, marshal Suchet had awaited the approach of general Campoverde on the same spot; urged on by the necessity of defending the works of a siege which was drawing to a close, he had determined to offer a simultaneous resistance to a numerous garrison and to an army which was advancing to its relief, whatever danger might be found to attend so hazardous an experiment. In 1813, Lord William Bentinck justly considered that he was not called upon to incur the same risk; he listened therefore to the dictates of prudence, when he postponed the attempt to recover Tarragona, the actual condition of which was, however, well known to him. He withdrew in good order; and the marshal sent troops in pursuit of him during the 16th and 17th. The defiles of the Hospitalet, flanked by the whole English fleet, prevented our following up any longer a retreating enemy, whose numerical strength was superior to ours, and who had not yet been defeated. The marshal's attention was thenceforward directed to the demolition of Tarragona, previously to evacuating it. Every thing being in readiness for that operation, the principal part of the old enclosure and of the still remaining fortifications was blown up during the night of the 18th. We abandoned the town altogether,

after having dismantled the greater part of it. General Bertoletti, at the head of two thousand men, with six pieces of cannon, joined the army which returned to its positions, and which, owing to the scarcity of provisions, resumed the line of the Llobregat, as soon as the resources of the plains of Villafranca were exhausted.

By stationing himself on that line, the marshal preserved his communications with Lerida, and covered the city of Barcelona as well as the road to Perpignan. It also afforded him the means of keeping up a direct intercourse with the marshal duke of Dalmatia, who commanded in the western Pyrenees, and whose efforts were at that time directed to the object of raising the siege of Pampeluna. In furtherance of this object, the duke of Dalmatia had proposed a plan, according to which the army of Arragon would have threatened the right flank of lord Wellington's army on the frontiers of Navarre, by proceeding towards the castle of Saragossa which still held out, and towards Jaca where general Pâris was still in possession of the defile. This operation was to coincide with a simultaneous movement on the part of marshal Soult, who would recross the Pyrenees and attack the English. But in the execution of such a plan, the small army of Arragon might run the most serious risks, and its removal from Catalonia, at a moment when a numerous army was closely fol-

lowing us, might endanger the frontier of France. The minister of war was fully sensible of the justice of these objections, and marshal Soult himself soon admitted the difficulties of such an undertaking.* The minister, however, having, in the beginning of September, announced a reinforcement of conscripts for the armies in Spain, the duke of Dalmatia indulged the hope that it would enable him to recross the Pyrenees, to prevent, for a time at least, the surrender of Pampeluna, and to maintain the war on the Spanish territory. He accordingly proposed to marshal Suchet that he should join him with all the disposable forces of the armies of Arragon and Catalonia, a junction which he however recommended should take place on the French side of the Pyrenees, at Tarbes and Pau, and that they should return together to Arragon by Oleron and Jaca, and advance from thence to meet lord Wellington in the province of Navarre. The minister of war was urging marshal Suchet, at this period, to avoid approaching the frontier of France, and to keep the enemy in check, as much as possible, on the banks of the Ebro; when therefore the plan of a concentration of forces was presented to him, he foresaw the difficulty that would obstruct its being carried into effect,

* Ministerial correspondence, 13th and 17th August, and 9th September; see notes and explanatory documents No. 25.

though he did not fail to submit it to the emperor for his approbation, and to prepare for its eventual adoption; the minister consulted marshal Suchet himself as to its practicability, and the inconvenience and advantages with which it might be attended.*

Marshal Suchet lost no time in replying to the dukes of Dalmatia and Feltre, and communicating to them his situation and his ideas respecting the proposed plan. He found himself to his great regret under the necessity of removing to a distance from the fortresses, and abandoning to their own resources the garrisons he had left in them; but he was much more alarmed at the danger of exposing the French territory to an invasion. In his projected march through Arragon, along the left bank of the Ebro, which had been originally proposed, he would have had a greater prospect of drawing after him, and consequently of keeping at a distance from France, the forces under lord William Bentinck, as it is more or less incumbent on a hostile army to follow the movements of its adversary. In the present case, on the contrary, he would be instrumental in bringing the enemy into the heart of our southern departments, and placing them at his mercy. He therefore represented the danger of a retrograde movement

* Ministerial correspondence, 18th September; see notes and explanatory documents No. 25.

through France on his way from the eastern to the western Pyrenees, adding that a peremptory obstacle to the contemplated combined movement was to be found in the impossibility of manœuvring as a corps-d'armée by the road of Jaca, which is not passable for artillery. Reverting then to a plan which was not altogether impracticable, as it was only attended with difficulty and danger, he offered to advance between the Ebro and the Pyrenees, with a hundred pieces of field artillery, including thirty pieces of mountain cannon, in order to effect a junction with marshal Soult, who would debouch from Jaca with his infantry and cavalry, but necessarily without cannon. To enable him to undertake this movement, it was requisite that the forces with which he took the field should be augmented to thirty thousand men in five divisions, three of the army of Arragon, and two of the army of Catalonia.* Two conditions were,

* In a despatch dated Villafranca, the 16th of September, he wrote to marshal Soult as follows:

"Having addressed to your excellency my observations "concerning the plan you have been pleased to communicate "to me, I beg to submit to your consideration a counterplan "which I consider far less dangerous in practice. Never- "theless, M. le maréchal, I cannot disguise from myself "that it is also attended with serious objections. The least "delay in executing the combined operation of both corps-d'ar- "mée would occasion the loss of one or the other, and beyond "all doubt, of the whole artillery. I therefore think it of the

in his opinion, indispensable to the accomplishment of the plan; the first was that he should be furnished with conscripts, and be authorised

"utmost importance that we should maturely weigh every "consideration before we adopt any definitive plan. I feel "as you do, and not without the most painful anxiety, how "important it is to raise the fallen fortunes of the emperor "in Spain, and especially to ward off any kind of danger from "the frontiers of the empire. These two paramount interests "claim the most mature deliberation. I am fully aware that "by persisting any longer in a defensive system of operations, "the besieged fortresses must be exposed to the risk of being "taken; but can this inconvenience be put in competition "with the consequences that might attend the loss of two "armies? France could not replace them by others at the "present moment, and the empire would, by their defeat, be "thrown open to our enemies."

He added, in conclusion, as follows:

"Your Excellency is pleased to tell me that in the event of "a junction, a measure which would raise our forces to "seventy or eighty thousand men, we should both com-"mand, and that the good understanding between us "would afford a pledge of our success. To this I have "to reply, that in such a case I should with the utmost cheer-"fulness place myself under your orders, satisfied as I am "of the indispensable necessity that the supreme command "should be vested in one officer only. Thus far I agree "with you, M. le maréchal, that distant as we are from each "other, the orders concerning the detail of the service are "often of a nature not to admit of their being carried into effect, "and that the general command should be limited to the "object of effecting advance or retrograde movements on a "comprehensive scale, with such modifications as circum-"stances may appear to require."

to employ them as garrisons in the fortified towns; the other, that previous to the contemplated movement, he should defeat the Anglo-Spanish army opposed to him, conformably to the recommendation contained in the minister's instructions to him of the 13th of the preceding April. The second of these conditions, which depended upon himself, was in a great measure fulfilled at the exact time when its necessity was manifestly established.

General Bentinck had taken up a position at Villafranca, and stationed a strong advanced guard within some intrenchments at the col d'Ordal, whilst general Copons, with Whittingham's and Sarsfield's divisions, threatened our right on the Llobregat, in the direction of Martorell. Marshal Suchet determined to carry the position, and to advance against the enemy for the purpose of offering battle. He invited general Decaen to join some of his forces to his own, and in the evening of the 12th of September he assembled the divisions of generals Harispe and Habert, as well as the cavalry, at the bridge of Molinos del Rey. Our columns began to move at eight o'clock at night, and proceeded towards Ordal. Three redoubts established upon commanding heights at the summit of the col, with the high road winding between them, had from a distance a full sweep over the sinuosities of its track as it ascended the mountain. Those redoubts were occupied by general sir Frederick Adam, aid-de-camp to the

prince regent of England, at the head of a picked division of English and Calabrese troops, with a reserve of cavalry in the rear; the mountains on the left were lined with Spanish camps, which assisted in the defence of the principal point of attack. This very steep position presented serious obstacles to our progress, as we could only reach it by marching through a defile nearly three leagues in length. General Mesclop, who led the column of general Harispe's division, after having dispersed with grape-shot a squadron which was advancing along the road, sent forward the voltigeurs of the 7th, and caused them to be supported by the remainder of the regiment, whilst the 44th was proceeding in another direction against the first redoubt. A platoon of sappers, which was marching with our advanced guard, arrived there at the same time as the voltigeurs. The enemy made an obstinate resistance, and twice drove us from the redoubt. The fire of a second redoubt at a higher elevation, and within a short distance from us, bore down the assailants as soon as they had succeeded in gaining a firm footing. General Mesclop brought them back sword in hand by beating the charge; the chef-de-bataillon Feucheres was wounded, and several gallant soldiers were killed in the struggle. The redoubt fell at last into our power, the greater part of the men who defended it having been killed. The marshal immediately or-

dered Habert's division to advance along the left of the road; and the reserve of general Harispe stationed itself in the rear of Mesclop's brigade. The battalion of the 116th regiment, led by captain Bugeaud, made a movement indicative of an intention to turn by the left the second redoubts; they were at the same time attacked in front, as well as the intrenchments which supported their flanks on the crest of the mountain. Every position was vigorously carried; and the enemy commenced their retreat under protection of their cavalry, leaving many killed and wounded behind them. General Delort was sent in pursuit; he charged the Brunswick hussars with his usual boldness and rapidity, took four pieces of mounted cannon, and brought back five hundred prisoners. The loss of the enemy amounted altogether to nearly twelve hundred men. The 27th English regiment of the line was almost annihilated; its colonel and brigadier-general Adam were wounded.

The marshal continued his march during the night in order to arrive before day-break in front of Villafranca, to which place general Decaen was also repairing by the Llobregat and the Noya. But, independently of the length of the road which retarded his progress, that general had to encounter many obstacles, and to sustain an action in the defiles against the corps of d'Eroles and Manso, and the Calabrese troops, which successive-

ly attempted to arrest general Maurice Mathieu in his movement. The gallant general Ordonneau, who commanded the advanced guard, sent forward the chef-de-bataillon Pallegri, at the head of the 18th light regiment, and opened a passage by driving the enemy before him. On the 13th, the early part of the day was already past, and yet the column, notwithstanding its utmost exertions, was still at some distance from Villafranca, where the English army had placed itself in order of battle, on receiving the news of the engagement at Ordal. Marshal Suchet had accelerated his march, and arrived within a league of the place. He then ordered the advanced guard to halt, and deployed his infantry behind a curtain which concealed it from view. He flattered himself that time would thus be afforded for completing the general movement, and that he might overtake the hostile army. He beheld it drawn up in three lines, with a ravine running along the high road in front, the bridge of which was broken down. Lord William Bentinck, however, on learning the approach of the corps of general Decaen, determined not to await its approach; he commenced his retreat as soon as he perceived that the troops belonging to the army of Arragon were marching to attack him, on the right and left of the road, in the direction of San-Cugat and Villafranca. Our cavalry and artillery advanced in concert;

but the infantry was delayed by the necessity of crossing the ravine and defile of Villafranca. The enemy had again formed in order of battle behind the town. The hussars and cuirassiers under general Delort overtook the rear guard, charged them sword in hand, and directed a fire of grape-shot against them. Meanwhile general Meyer, at the head of the 24th dragoons, and of the Westphalian light horse, was moving along the right against the enemy's flank. He fell in with the black hussars, and the 20th English regiment of dragoons. Being in the front of the column, he found himself opposed to colonel Bentinck, the commander of the enemy's cavalry. The two chiefs exchanged a few sabre thrusts; the encounter soon became general; and a corps of infantry placed in ambush succeeded in checking us for some moments. We lost a few men, and lieutenant Bondurand, aid-de-camp to general Meyer, was wounded and taken prisoner. Bugeaud's battalion, which opened the march, hastened up to the spot, and turned the scale of the combat. The enemy's army was in full retreat; their cavalry was again charged by our dragoons; the black hussars were driven back, and only succeeded in recrossing a ravine and another bridge after losing about a hundred horse. The Spaniards retreated in the direction of Igualada, where they lost a few men and some horse belonging to the

dragoons of La Mancha. The English continued their movement upon Tarragona, by the road of Altafulla. It would have been unsafe for us to pursue them along the sea-shore; general Meyer was ordered to halt at Vendrell with the advanced guard. The marshal called for an account of his loss, which amounted in all, to two hundred and seventy-one men and eighty-three horses put hors-de-combat. The enemy suffered a much greater loss; a considerable number of their wounded were removed to the hospital of Barcelona.* It was a source of mor-

* An English officer of dragoons had been killed on the field of battle. A flag of truce came to solicit permission to search for the body, and pay it the last duties. Marshal Suchet hastened to acquiesce in his request; and the military of both armies paid deference to this pious ceremony, by a kind of tacit armistice. Some proposals of exchange on behalf of several isolated prisoners were afterwards accepted on both sides, with reciprocal cordiality. Colonel Otto Bayer, who enjoyed the confidence of general Bentinck, came frequently to Barcelona for this purpose. The staff were much pleased with their intercourse with that officer, and with his exertions to obtain, at our request, a mitigation of the lot of some of our countrymen, who were detained as prisoners of war in Spain and in England. On the occasion of one of his missions to Barcelona, he was commissioned by general Clinton, the successor of lord William Bentinck in the command, to visit the English soldiers wounded at Ordal, whom we had brought away, and caused to be attended in the hospital with the care that was due to their condition. He was so much affected at what he witnessed and heard on that occasion, that

tification to marshal Suchet that he had been unable to bring the enemy to a more general engagement. Had it not been for the delay which the Spaniards and the natural obstacles of the country threw in the way of general Decaen, the corps on the right would have rapidly gained ground, whilst we were carrying the positions of Ordal; and on the morning of the 13th of September, the enemy would have found themselves so situated in our front, as to have been unable to avoid an engagement. We flattered ourselves that with our united forces we could not fail to defeat them, and to obtain so decisive a result, as to recover, for a time at least, a superiority in Catalonia, which was needed as a counterbalance to the state of our affairs in another quarter.

The objections raised by marshal Suchet to the plan by which it was intended that both armies should operate a junction at Pau, were deemed to be well founded. Marshal Soult wrote to him from St-Jean de Luz, on the 28th of September, that he assented to his counter-plan, and would forthwith prepare to give it effect, whilst he waited for the determination of the minister of war. The minister on his side

upon his return, and in consequence of his report, general Clinton wrote a letter to marshal Suchet, in which he expressed the liveliest gratitude for the generous treatment bestowed on his fellow countrymen.

approved the last project laid down by marshal Suchet, but with a modification which proved fatal to it. He announced that little reliance could be placed on a speedy reinforcement of conscripts, which was demanded for the service of the garrisons, and for enabling the active part of the army to give its attention to other duties.* At a moment, therefore, when the marshal did not consider himself sufficiently strong in point of numbers to commence operations, he was authorised to undertake them, without being afforded the requisite means. Events were, nevertheless, hurrying on to a crisis in the midst of all this uncertainty and inconsistency of conduct. The fortress of San-Sebastian had fallen on the 8th of September; Pampelune was almost at its expiring struggle. On the 7th of October, the army under the orders of lord Wellington forced the passage of the Bidassoa, seized upon the positions of the Croix-des-Bouquets and of the Baïonnette, and transferred to France the theatre of war, of which the Pyrenees had hitherto marked the boundaries.

This circumstance completely altered the aspect of affairs, and it was no longer possible for the French armies in Spain to assume the offensive. Marshal Suchet, nevertheless, entertained the impression that he was yet in time to afford

* Ministerial correspondence, 2nd of October—See Notes and explanatory documents, No. 25.

relief to the distant garrisons. He again urged the speedy arrival and junction of the forces, which had been contemplated with the intention of his marching into Arragon, and he trusted that he might, at their head, make a successful movement along the banks of the Ebro. The minister adopted his views; and the emperor himself, on his return to Paris, suddenly broke the uniform silence he had maintained respecting the other plans which had been anteriorly submitted to his decision, and appeared anxious that they should be carried into effect.* The orders transmitted unfortunately enjoined that, previously to the intended movement, a portion of the army should be left at Barcelona, Figueras, and Puycerda. The duke of Albufera in vain solicited that the combinations held out to him as a means of promoting the success of his operations should be carried into effect. It was a source of deep mortification to him to find that valuable time was consumed in such unnecessary delays. He did not yield to the government in a desire to rescue the garrisons of the fortresses; and he sought every means of accomplishing that object. He personally felt a lively interest in those fortresses, which had been won by the valour of the army of Arragon, and in the fate of the soldiers of that army, whom

* Ministerial correspondence, 15th and 27th of November. See notes and explanatory documents, No. 26.

he had left to defend them. He kept up, by means of spies, a correspondence in cypher with the governors of Tortosa and Lerida, and had satisfactory reports concerning their situation, as well as that of the more distant fortresses, with which they had contrived to maintain an intercourse. He encouraged them by the assurance that his whole attention was directed to them, and that he would proceed to their assistance as soon as he should receive the reinforcements of which he was in immediate expectation. But the government merely testified its confidence in him, without complying with his requests in such a manner as to enable him to justify that confidence. He was named, at this period, colonel-general of the imperial guard, and the army of Catalonia was annexed to his command. He did not derive any increase of forces from this official annexation; for we have already seen that, previously to it, that army was already at his disposal, when he stood in need of it for carrying on any active operations. The divided command which had heretofore subsisted was attended with effects of a conflicting nature, in regard to the administration of the troops, to which it was highly desirable to put an end. The marshal felt the necessity of such an annexation, though he refrained from originating it by any suggestion which, as emanating from him, might have appeared self-

interested. The force of circumstances alone determined the government to adopt this course.

The army of Catalonia was chiefly composed of old regiments, whose courage and discipline had been tried in numberless engagements, and who had been for many years inured to fight against the Catalonians, the most formidable soldiers of the Spanish insurrection. That army, which had been successively commanded by marshals Gouvion Saint-Cyr, Augereau, and Macdonald, and subsequently by general Decaen, had only acted at certain intervals in a detached and independent character. It was destined to carry on operations in the vicinity of the fortresses, and was to draw its means of subsistence from the frontier of France. It has been asserted that, in the beginning of the war, the emperor was advised by an experienced general officer to establish himself, in the first instance, in the fortresses of Catalonia; in order that, previously to penetrating into the heart of the Peninsula, he might have a point-d'appui in the event of his being under the necessity of effecting a retreat, and a ready means at his command of resuming offensive operations. The soundness of this advice was fully borne out by events; had it not been for the occupation of Pampeluna and Barcelona, the whole of Spain would have shaken off our yoke after the campaign of 1808. The Ebro

was recrossed with the intention of embarking in a campaign of invasion, and entering the capital, a course adopted through political, rather than military considerations; but we could not recover possession of the Peninsula without undertaking many sieges. In 1813, the resistance of the inhabitants was subdued; and, by the aid of the fortresses we might have maintained our ground, had it not been for the intervention of the English army and the issue of the northern war. If the French army in Catalonia was not called upon to act a brilliant part, its services proved, at least, of the highest utility. The retaining possession of Barcelona was alone sufficient to afford employment to the division of general Maurice Mathieu, who nevertheless took an honourable part in several operations carried on in lower Catalonia; a fact sufficiently attested by the preceding chapters. The defence of upper Catalonia was confided to an officer of no less distinguished talents. General Maximien Lamarque commanded there a division intrusted with the duty of covering our communications with France, of protecting the valleys of Ampourdan and Cerdagne, as well as the fortress of Gerona, and of securing the means of subsistence for Barcelona, all access to which place by sea was effectually prevented by the English fleet. Whenever he had to introduce a convoy into the place, general Maurice Mathieu undertook

an advance movement, with a view to favour his approach to it. The hostile army, though always defeated, obstinately lay in wait for him at San-Celoni, or in the defile of Trenta-Passos; it afterwards retreated to the central position of Vich, from whence, by performing one or two marches, it alternately threatened Manresa or Granollers, Hostalrich or Santa-Coloma, the valley of Ampourdan or the French frontier in the direction of Campredon, and the Seu d'Urgel. But the Spaniards were constantly kept in check at all points, and were defeated at Ripoll, Besalu, Bañolas, La Garriga, and Mataro, in engagements which were highly creditable to the skill of the general officers of the division and to the bravery of the troops. The most remarkable of these actions was fought at La Salud; fifteen hundred Frenchmen, whose numbers were soon reduced to nine hundred, resisted for the space of two days the whole Spanish army.* Victory was for a long time doubtful, and on any other theatre would have obtained that celebrity to which it was justly entitled. After vanquishing the Catalonians, general Lamarque exerted himself to bring them to obedience, and by perseveringly adhering to measures of prudence and vigour, he had succeeded in establishing the

* Report of general Lamarque concerning the action fought at La Salud. See notes and explanatory documents, No. 27.

ascendency of our arms over the country.* When marshal Suchet assumed the command of the gallant troops transferred to him by general Decaen, he expressed his satisfaction at their past conduct, and his admiration of the achievements in which they had displayed such signal proofs

* Extract from the report of general Lamarque to the minister of war, dated the 21st of November, 1812.

"It is not by overrunning the country, but by occupying it, that we shall succeed in reducing it to submission. Let us follow the example of the Moors, who were placed, like us, in the midst of a population which resisted their invasion, and who obtained the ascendancy over them by means of those numerous towers erected by them on elevated spots, at the openings and extremities of the defiles, and made available as defensive posts and as signal stations. But instead of fortifying isolated points, or a barren tract of country, let us secure possession of the towns from whence the enemy derives his chief resources; let us, above all, occupy the sea-ports, by which he communicates with the English, who provide him with arms and ammunition. When we shall have erected small fortresses, and left a garrison of two or three hundred men at Palamos, San-Feliù, Canets, Arents del Mar, and Mataro, we may adopt the same course in respect to Vich, Olot, and Bañolas. We may then declare the mountains in a state of blockade; and the insurgents, being in want of provisions, and having no means of obtaining fresh supplies of arms and ammunition, will be under the necessity of disbanding. We will at the same time widen the passes, and repair the roads, in order that the cavalry and artillery may proceed in any direction without encountering obstacles in their progress; and in a few months we shall have brought to an end by the aid of the pick-axe, a war in which very little result can be obtained by the firing of musket shot.

of courage. His attention was immediately directed to the object of providing for their wants.

The army of Arragon had been four months and a half absent from Valencia, from whence it had brought away a treasure of 3,631,370 francs, after leaving upwards of 1,500,000 francs in the fortresses occupied by garrisons; but it had not succeeded in collecting any contributions since that period. It had lent 500,000 francs to the army of Catalonia, and 120,000 to Barcelona, for the purpose of meeting the exigencies of the service. When marshal Suchet quitted that place at a later period, he left in it a sum of 433,379 francs, and eight months' supply of ammunition and provisions for ten thousand men. The country was still enabled to furnish resources to a certain extent, although it was in a great measure exhausted, not so much by the French army, which usually derived its subsistence from France, as by the Spanish insurrectionary government. In the midst of our military operations in Catalonia, that government still enforced obedience in the province, and had constantly collected the regular contributions, which amounted in all, during a period of five years, to the enormous sum of 77,146,512 francs. The marshal, on his arrival, found Catalonia organized into prefectures, under the superintendence of MM. de Chauvelin and Degerando, councillors of state. But the aspect of affairs

was ill suited to the march of the administration in ordinary times.* The agents of the public authority could only reside in the fortified towns or at head-quarters; and their orders could never be carried into effect, except by sending a column of troops to enforce them. It became necessary to abandon a system which was incompatible with a state of warfare. The controul of the administration accordingly devolved upon the commander-in-chief; he bestowed his utmost attention on an enquiry into the local resources and their application, principally with a view to secure the subsistence and pay of the troops. He had always shewn himself anxious to prevent any arrear in the latter object, not only for the sake of the soldier and of military discipline, but likewise for the sake of the government, to which a general cannot render a worse service than to bring back an army with claims for long arrears, the settlement of which falls as a heavy weight upon the public treasury. The army, thenceforward united, retained in a great measure its former organization; its collective force amounted to about thirty-two thousand men.

* The province had been divided into four departments, the Ter, Mont-Serrat, the Segre, and the mouths of the Ebro, the chief towns of which were Gerona, Barcelona, Puycerda and Lerida.

Had the whole of these forces been available, they might have placed marshal Suchet in a condition to carry on operations in conformity with the plans anteriorly proposed; but the possibility of their being followed up was greatly modified by circumstances. Not only was it out of the marshal's power to dispose immediately of the conscripts who had been announced to him; not only was he altogether compelled to relinquish the hope of being joined by the detachment under general Pâris; but he found his numerical strength rapidly decreasing, owing to the departure of general Severoli, who received orders to return to Italy. The marshal regretted the necessity of separating himself from the gallant Italian troops, who were recalled beyond the Alps by the dangers impending over their country. This was also the time at which all the German troops incorporated in the French armies in Spain were suddenly disarmed, in virtue of a decree of the emperor, and in consequence of the issue of the campaign of 1813. This measure was carried into effect in Catalonia against the 1st light infantry regiment of Nassau and the Westphalian light horse, though with all the delicacy and attention which the circumstances required and to which the claims of those troops to our esteem so justly entitled them. We were thus deprived at one and the same moment of the services of two

thousand Italians, two thousand four hundred Germans, and a thousand gendarmes* who returned to France, as well as of nearly eight hundred picked soldiers who took their departure for the purpose of being incorporated in the imperial guard. It is moreover to be observed that, as eight thousand conscripts had been selected for the army from the dépôts of Perpignan, Narbonne, Montpellier, Nîmes and other places, each regiment was under the necessity of sending a hundred and twenty men, forming the skeleton of a 6th battalion, to receive, arm, and clothe those conscripts, and organize them into divisions of reserve. But we were never joined by those reserve divisions, which it was found impossible to form; in addition therefore to the above, the army lost the services of upwards of two thousand picked men, whether officers or subalterns, all veteran soldiers.

The defence and provisioning of Barcelona was the object which attracted the marshal's chief attention†. That city had proved of the utmost importance to us ever since the commencement of the war; it was the arsenal and general dépôt

* The gendarmerie on foot, who, during the whole period of the occupation, had supplied the garrisons of the fortresses or strong-holds on the left bank of the Ebro, received orders to return to France as soon as the army of Catalonia was compelled to fall back to the frontier.

† See notes and explanatory documents, No. 28.

of the army. When the question of a movement towards the Ebro was under agitation, the marshal deemed himself authorised, in consequence of a hint thrown out by the minister, to propose that we should confine ourselves to the possession of the citadel and fort of Montjouich, in order that we might keep the field with an additional force of five thousand men; he was thus endeavouring to make up for the absence of the promised reinforcements, which it would soon be found impossible to send, although an expectation was still held out to him that his army would be raised to forty thousand men. His proposal on the subject of Barcelona was answered in the negative. The retention of the whole place was deemed indispensable towards the object of our maintaining ourselves in Catalonia. It was possibly contemplated at that early period that we should preserve our resources unimpaired for the purpose of effecting exchanges, in the probable arrangements which circumstances had prepared and matured, between the French government and prince Ferdinand, who was detained at Valençay since the year 1808.

Towards the close of the month of December, an aid-de-camp of the minister came to the head-quarters of marshal Suchet, with the duke of San-Carlos who presented himself incognito, and was the bearer of a treaty concluded at Valençay, which restored the throne to Ferdi-

nand, the very prince whom the Spaniards had proclaimed king, for whom they were fighting, and in whose name they were governed. Under any other circumstances, this treaty might have answered its object, of inducing the Spaniards to desist from the war, by giving them what they had originally demanded when they flew to arms, restoring their fortresses, and removing all the French troops from the Peninsula. But the general state of affairs in Europe might well lead the Spaniards to consider this act as one of a compulsory nature; besides which, the execution of the treaty depended upon the dispositions of those who wielded the public authority at Madrid. It was probable that they would not let them go without certain guarantees and conditions, and their resistance would naturally be encouraged by the English, who were interested in augmenting the state of embarrassment to which France was reduced. General Palafox made his appearance a few days after the duke of San-Carlos. The marshal, who had repaired for a short time to Gerona, afforded protection to both personages on their way, without betraying their secret. He concerted with them the arrangements best calculated to facilitate the success of their mission, and it was agreed that the present attitude of the French army of Catalonia should be kept up, with a view to second the execution of the article relative to the surrender

of the fortresses. These preliminaries only required the assent of general Copons, which was accordingly applied for. Marshal Suchet had received from the minister for foreign affairs the plan of a military convention, with full powers to conclude it. But the Spanish general declared that his hands were bound by his instructions, and he either durst not or would not treat. We were therefore under the necessity of relinquishing or adjourning the hope of effecting that object, and of awaiting the arrival of king Ferdinand himself, before we could venture to hope for the return of our garrisons.

CHAPTER XXI.

Invasion of France.—Arrangements made by marshal Suchet previously to his evacuating Barcelona.—Desertion of Vanhalen.—Departure of a division of ten thousand men for Lyons.—Treacherous surprise of the towns of Lerida, Mequinenza and Monzon.—The garrisons are taken prisoners.—A second column of ten thousand men is sent to Lyons.—The army falls back to Figueras.—Return of king Ferdinand to Spain.—Operations of the army under marshal Soult.—The army of Arragon and Catalonia recrosses the Pyrenees.—Occurrences at Paris; the armistice.—The duke d'Angoulême reviews the army at Narbonne.—The whole army of the South is placed under the command of marshal Suchet.—Return of the garrisons from Spain.—Conclusion.

THE 1st of January 1814 was the day fixed upon for the passage of the Rhine and the invasion of the empire by the allied armies, along the whole line of its frontiers, with the exception of the Alps which the viceroy, prince Eugene, still protected by means of the army of Italy under his orders. As soon as the heart of France became the theatre of the war, it was easy for marshal Suchet to perceive that he could no longer expect any reinforcements, nor prepare to carry on offensive operations. His only duty and his only object thenceforth was to rescue

the garrisons, as far as he might have it in his power to do so, to preserve his army unimpaired, and to contribute to the defence of the territory. As early as the 5th of December, he had written to the minister of war that he found himself under the necessity of drawing closer to the town of Gerona. Although the knowledge of the treaty of Valençay, and of the mission of the duke of San-Carlos, led him to prolong his stay by every means in his power in a position in advance of Barcelona, still the risk of thus endangering the subsistence of that place would soon compel him to make up his mind, and commence a retrograde movement. In anticipation of such a course, he wrote to apprise the governors of Tortosa and Lerida, that they could not fail to be shortly relieved, either by the arrival of troops which would be sent to their assistance, or perhaps by the conclusion of a peace; and he pointed out to them the direction by which, happen what might, the garrison of Tortosa, whose supply of provisions would be exhausted in the month of April, might retreat towards Lerida in case of need, rally the troops at that place, and reach Venasque and France by a rapid march across the mountains.

He appointed governor of Barcelona general Habert, who had performed the duties of that post since count Maurice Mathieu's departure, and for whose character and virtues he enter-

tained the highest esteem. He was thus under the necessity of depriving the active part of his army of the services of a valuable officer, at a moment when he had to submit to another serious loss, in the person of general Harispe, who was called away to the western Pyrenees, where his local influence as a Biscayan, and his perfect knowledge of mountain warfare might, under more auspicious circumstances, have enabled him to render very important services. Barcelona was in a satisfactory state of defence. The marshal, however, could not but regret the necessity he was under of leaving there, at his departure, a corps of troops equal in number to a strong division; for it required no fewer than eight thousand men to maintain possession of the place and to overawe its population. This feeling was much increased, when, on the 10th of January, he received instructions from the minister, directing him to assemble his cavalry on the frontier of the Pyrenees, and as soon as he should be informed of the effect produced by the mission of the duke of San-Carlos, to lose no time in ordering it off to Lyons, with his artillery and one half of his infantry. The preparatory measures were to be entered upon, even if the arrangements which had been negociated with Spain should fail of the desired success, as those measures were called for by the most rigorous necessity.

The communications with France had be-

come sufficiently rapid to enable the marshal to receive at Barcelona on the 16th the fresh orders from his government, which were only sent off six days before. He replied on the same day, and announced that he would immediately send the cuirassiers to the frontiers, under the pretence of relieving the dragoons in the valley of the Ampourdan; he deemed it proper, on this occasion, to renew the proposal previously rejected, of merely retaining the forts of Barcelona, that, by thus abandoning the town, he might have an additional corps of five thousand men at his disposal. He had hitherto found it impossible to procure any intelligence respecting the duke of San-Carlos, but he pointed out a course of conduct by means of which our movements would not be rendered dependent upon the issue of a doubtful negociation. His idea was, that Ferdinand should be forthwith sent to Barcelona, and that we should trust to that prince's honour for his restoring to us the garrisons left in the fortresses which were to be surrendered to him. He added, that if the government would allow his infantry to remain unbroken, and abstain from ordering him to Lyons with the active portion of his forces, it was probable that a more useful result would be obtained in the quarter to which it was intended to send assistance; but the government could alone decide upon and direct the adoption of such a move-

ment. The marshal concluded his letter to the minister by stating, that, being on the eve of quitting Barcelona, he should delay his retrograde movement until he received an answer, which would dispel all doubts from his mind as to the emperor's final determination in regard to that place.

On the same day, 16th of January, whilst the marshal was explaining his situation to the minister, the Anglo-Spanish army came to attack us on the Llobregat, which we occupied from Molinos del Rey as far as San-Boy, as well as at the mouth of that river. General Mesclop frustrated for some time the enemy's efforts on the right bank; being pressed, however, by superior forces on the high road, and on the road to Martorell, he recrossed the bridge. General Pannetier, who commanded the division, took up a defensive position with his artillery on the left bank, whilst the small forts, forming a tête-de-pont, gave full employment to the enemy's artillery, and covered the defile. The marshal sent forward eight battalions of Habert's division to the support of general Pannetier, and even endeavoured to entice the enemy to the left bank of the Llobregat, near the redoubts of San-Feliù, whilst he directed the advance of the troops encamped at Granollers. But the enemy did not venture beyond the attack they had attempted on the right bank, and they avoided coming

to an action. We suffered a loss of about thirty men killed and a hundred and fifty wounded.

An unusual occurrence at our head-quarters, on the 18th, created uneasiness, which was shortly afterwards realized in the most painful manner. A Spanish officer, named Vanhalen, of Belgian or Dutch origin, who had been in the service of king Joseph at Madrid ever since the commencement of the war, had of late been employed, by order of the duke de Feltre, with the staff of the army of Catalonia. He suddenly deserted. This was not a solitary instance of the kind, since it had become manifest to many that the party whose interest they had espoused was rapidly losing ground; and the circumstance would have scarcely attracted notice, had he not attempted, by means of fabricated orders, to carry away with him a detachment of between a hundred and fifty and two hundred horse. Fortunately for us, the officer who commanded them entertained a timely suspicion of the meditated treachery; he refused to proceed beyond the line of advanced posts. Being foiled in his attempt, Vanhalen escaped alone, on a horse which he had obtained by unfair means, leaving unpaid several petty debts which he had incurred in the town of Barcelona.

The minister of war and the major-general issued positive orders, on the 14th of January, for the departure for Lyons, in the utmost haste, of

between eight and ten thousand infantry, and two thirds of the cavalry of the army. The minister directed that a field equipage of eighty pieces of cannon should be sent off at the same time;* he concluded, by recommending that the marshal should hold himself in readiness to follow his troops at the shortest notice. The marshal paid immediate obedience to this order, and again renewing his last proposal, insisted upon the necessity of deciding what was to be done in respect to Barcelona. He despatched ten thousand one hundred and eighty-three men including two thousand one hundred and thirty-two horse, the latter under the orders of general Digeon; the infantry in three brigades, commanded

* "His majesty intends to employ in the defence of Lyons the field equipage of eighty pieces of cannon which you have collected at Figueras, as well as the ammunition caissons. I accordingly direct general Valée to send that equipage forward to Lyons by means of requisition horses, and to concert measures with the prefects, to whom I am transmitting instructions concerning the transport of that convoy. His majesty has observed with the highest satisfaction that the exertions of your excellency and of general Valée have enabled you to organize that equipage, which will prove of great utility under existing circumstances. You have rendered another equally important service to the state and to his majesty by sending twenty thousand muskets to Perpignan from the fortresses of Catalonia. I request your excellency will urge by every possible means the transport of the muskets which it is further intended to transmit to Perpignan."—(Letter from the minister of war, dated 14th of January, 1814.)

by generals Esteve, Gudin, and Ordonneau, under the orders of general Pannetier. The marshal placed the remainder of his army in échelons, so that he might have it in his power to commence operations without delay whenever he should receive instructions to that effect, and he sent to Figueras and Perpignan the inspectors of reviews, the public administrations, the military chest, the paymasters, the reserves of artillery, the field equipages, and whatever was calculated to impede a rapid march. With respect to himself, he calculated that he might receive a reply to his letter of the 16th on the twelfth or thirteenth day; he was unwilling as yet to withdraw himself from Barcelona, remained there until the end of the month, and only took his departure on the 1st of February, when the continued silence of his government dispelled the hope he had indulged until the last moment. General Habert, who was left in the character of governor, was also named commander of the division in lower Catalonia. We have seen that general Robert had been likewise placed in command of the division of the lower Ebro. The troops left in the fortresses thus partook of the organisation of the active part of the army; so that, when the moment of acting should arrive, an order of the commander-in-chief, on its reaching Barcelona, being transmitted to general Robert, and by the latter to the most distant places, might completely answer the object

of occasioning a general movement of the garrisons, and of enabling them to combine their march in the manner most conducive to the advantage of the service. The remainder of the army, being reduced to two divisions and a reserve of cavalry, was concentrated at Gerona and its immediate vicinity.

The marshal had been a fortnight in that place, when, on the 18th of February, and not sooner, he received intelligence that his suggestions concerning Barcelona were approved of, and that king Ferdinand would soon make his appearance.* The first point was no longer practicable, Barcelona being blockaded by the hostile army. The accomplishment of the second object was too long delayed, and the favourable moment was perhaps gone by. The duke of San-Carlos, when he returned in the early part of February, had made known the difficulties Ferdinand would have to contend with, in the resumption of his authority. Nevertheless, his presence, at the moment when he should again set foot on the Spanish territory, might have a powerful effect upon the minds of the people and of the army; his anxiety to be at last set at liberty would naturally lead him to favour the exchange of the garrisons, as a set-off against the fortresses, in the manner proposed by the French government. Unfortunately, however, a fresh accident deprived us of a portion of these gar-

* See notes and explanatory documents, No 29.

risons, the loss of which was not less distressing than it was unforeseen.

Vanhalen, the officer who deserted from our ranks, had, whilst employed in the staff of the army, applied himself to acquire a knowledge of, and to imitate the hand-writing, as well as the cypher, signature, and seal, with which we carried on our secret correspondence. Provided with such weapons for betraying us, he repaired to the Spanish generals; and with a view to efface from their minds the guilt of his past conduct, he suggested a skilfully concerted plan; the success of which might be promoted by the negociation recently attempted to be set on foot upon the basis of our evacuating the fortresses. On the 13th of February, Vanhalen, who held the commission and wore the uniform of an officer in the French staff, presented himself before Lerida, the blockade of which was formed by d'Eroles' division. He came with pretended letters from the marshal, which directed the general of brigade Isidore Lamarque to evacuate the place, to deliver it up to the Spaniards, and to repair by the shortest road to the outposts of the French army, in virtue of a convention which might be considered as the preliminary to a general peace. There was every motive for suspecting the intentions of a man who, although the bearer of so important a mission, cautiously avoided entering the town. The first

pledge which a flag of truce should afford of his sincerity is his placing himself in the power of those with whom he is sent to treat. The council of defence assembled in the fortress hesitated for a long time; but the designs of treachery prevailed, so far did it succeed in obscuring the understanding of the most incredulous. The fortress was surrendered after certain formalities, which had been designedly stipulated with a view to increase the deception; and the garrison commenced its march, with a field battery, and accompanied by a division of general d'Eroles', who pretended to have received instructions to prepare supplies, and to enforce the terms of the convention. The garrisons of Mequinenza and Monzon, after having, in the first instance, rejected Vanhalen's proposals, followed the example and the conduct of the garrison of Lerida.*

* A circumstance worthy of notice, in respect to the garrison of Monzon, creates a peculiar interest in its favour. This small fort was occupied by ninety gendarmes on foot, four artillery men, a corporal, three officers, a surgeon, and the private of engineers Saint-Jacques. These hundred gallant men resisted with inflexible courage the attacks of three thousand soldiers belonging to the corps of Mina, from the 27th of September 1813 to the 14th of February 1814. After having established regular batteries, the besiegers dug thirteen mines in succession, in their gradual approach to the fort. The besieged were, therefore, principally engaged in works of defence, which were intended to counteract the effect of the mines, and the superintendence of them was necessarily confided to the

The column passed through Cervera and Igualada. In the latter town a chef-de-bataillon of the 42nd regiment, whose anxiety of mind prevented his indulging in rest, drew aside his colonel and general in the dead of the night, and in the

private of engineers, who entered with heart and spirit upon the duty. One is a a loss what to admire most, the manner in which a person of so inferior a rank won the full confidence of the garrison, the wise deference paid by the commandant of the fort to his advice and professional knowledge, or the unbounded zeal displayed by the gendarmes in the performance of every duty required for the defence which they had undertaken to carry on. Inexperienced in this species of warfare, the garrison had no other guide or adviser than a mere private of engineers; feeling, however, animated and electrified by the token of intelligence and courage exhibited by this intrepid soldier, it unhesitatingly engaged in all the works, faced every danger, and successfully carried on all the details of a siege. Saint-Jacques was a Piedmontese, who had recently enlisted in the corps of engineers, as a common miner; he had scarcely had time to become familiar with the service of mining; he had however been present at the siege of Saragossa, the impression of which upon his memory was, no doubt, of great assistance to him; and the constant superiority exhibited in the defence of Monzon, over the attacks of the besiegers, is owing to the sagacity with which he took advantage of its position. A few details on this subject will probably be found of service to military men, especially to young men whose instructions are directed to the theory and practice of the art. No other circumstance could prove to them in a clearer light how they may be brought by the casualties of a state of warfare to perform duties of the highest importance, and often far above their habitual functions.

See notes and explanatory documents, No. 30.

midst of the soldiers who were bivouacking around them, and addressed those officers in the following words: *Rest assured we are betrayed; we may yet effect our escape, whilst the Spaniards are asleep and scattered about the place. Let us leave behind us our baggage and artillery; we will gently awake our soldiers, and make the best of our way to the mountains, in the direction of Vich and of the frontiers of France. Our regiment is well acquainted with the country; when we shall have had the start of the Spaniards by five or six hours' march, nothing will any longer arrest our progress.* The general reflected for a moment on this proposal, but the difficulties which would attend its being carried into effect appeared to outweigh the motives of a mistrust in which he was beginning to participate. The sinister language of the inhabitants, and the assassination of some soldiers, made him determine to complain to the Spanish general. The answer given was calculated to encourage the deception, and the column continued its route. At night the provisions were not forthcoming; but a promise was given that they should be supplied at the next stage. On the following day our soldiers reached the defiles of Martorell, exhausted with hunger and fatigue; they halted at this spot, piled their arms, and waited for a distribution of provisions. They now perceived, however, that the whole Spanish army crowned the heights on the right and left,

d'Eroles' division occupied the road in their rear, and the English army stationed at Palleja effectually closed the road in front. Thus situated, they were informed that they were prisoners of war and victims of a stratagem. We may well imagine how great was the confusion of some and the despair of others; a few were for attempting a fruitless resistance. The general was made to sign a fresh convention which was infringed on the first opportunity that offered for so doing, a course as easy as it was disgraceful, especially when directed against unarmed soldiers. Two thousand Frenchmen were compelled to submit to treachery, to force, and to superiority of numbers. Instead of being sent in the direction of Barcelona, they were made to take the road to Villafranca. Proud of his late success, Vanhalen presented himself before Tortosa; but general Robert possessed in an eminent degree the gift of prudence, a quality which is so essential in a governor of a fortress. He mistrusted the mission and the emissary, and proposed an interview, which the Spanish generals no doubt considered as a dangerous experiment for Vanhalen to venture upon. He withdrew under pretence of repairing to the governor of Saguntum. The column of prisoners from Lerida reached Villafranca in the midst of the threats and insults of a population purposely excited

against them; they were thrown into prison, received every kind of ill treatment, suffered much from want and sickness, and were reduced by deaths to a most deplorable condition. Marshal Suchet was deeply afflicted at learning the fate of these gallant soldiers; he complained to generals Clinton and Copons of the infringement of the laws of nations and of war, and tried in vain every means to procure their exchange.

In consequence of orders from the minister of war, he renewed, soon afterwards, a negociation with general Copons for the surrender of all the fortresses except Figueras. His chief of the staff accordingly opened a communication with brigadier-general Cabanès, chief of the staff of general Copons. But negociations can only succeed by being efficiently supported; and the marshal found that he was daily curtailed of the means by which alone he could maintain the attitude required for promoting the success of the negociation. In the first days of March, he was directed to send off to Lyons in all haste a second division of ten thousand men. The question of his proceeding thither in person with the rest of his army had however been abandoned. He was told that the influence of his name, the junction of his remaining forces with all those that were within his reach, and the directing them according to the best of his judgment, would no doubt enable him

to arrest the progress of the enemy; and that no more could be expected of him. Those instructions reached him on the 7th of March. On the 8th, a column of nine thousand six hundred and sixty-one men was assembled at Figueras and despatched under the orders of general Beurmann. Distressed beyond measure at being reduced to a state of utter inability to act, he brought back to Figueras the remains of the army of Arragon and Catalonia, after having evacuated and blown up several fortified posts, such as Besalù, Olot, Bascara, Palamos, &c. and delivered up Gerona to the Spaniards in a dismantled condition. The further he moved from Barcelona and the other fortresses, the greater was his apprehension of being unable to withdraw their garrisons. Nevertheless he still clung to a last ray of hope. Prince Ferdinand had just received passports, by the emperor's command, which were to enable him to repair from Valençay to the army of marshal Suchet. There was just ground for expecting that his intervention would bring the subject of the return of our garrisons to a favourable issue, and that his presence would remove every difficulty. But the minister himself was far from manifesting so much confidence. He ordered that the prince should be sent to *Barcelona*, and that the fortresses should be delivered up to him; but he recommended at the same time that *precautions and gua-*

rantees should be taken for the return of the garrisons. This restrictive clause placed the marshal in a delicate position, since it was highly expedient that he should win the prince's good-will, in order to obtain from him whatever the latter might have it in his power to grant*.

Ferdinand arrived at Perpignan on the 19th of March, with his brother and uncle the infantes don Carlos and don Antonio. He gave the marshal a distinguished reception, praised his campaigns, and even went so far as to thank him for the manner in which he had carried on the war against his subjects. This cordial reception confirmed the hopes which the frank and conciliating disposition of the duke of San Carlos had excited. The marshal entered into a negociation with him respecting the surrender of the fortresses. The negociator had however penetrated the intentions of the Cortès with respect to king Ferdinand's return; and he knew that, whether owing to fear or to the bias of their opinions, the generals would not acknowledge his authority, until they should have received instructions from Madrid to that effect. Under these circumstances it was difficult to conclude any thing in a definitive manner. The king was most anxious to take his departure, and to repair immediately, not to Barcelona as we intended, but to Valencia; he readily

* Ministerial correspondence, 3rd, 4th, and 6th of March; see notes and explanatory documents, No. 31.

promised to accelerate to the best of his power the exchange of the garrisons for the fortresses in which they were doing duty. The marshal then stated with the utmost candour the embarrassment he felt owing to that part of his instructions which directed him to escort the prince to Barcelona, and to claim guarantees for the return of the garrisons. He had written to Paris and was in daily expectation of receiving the explanations he stood in need of. It was agreed on both sides that so long as they should not have arrived, a delay which could only be of a few days, prince don Carlos should remain at Perpignan, and that Ferdinand should cross the frontier without delay. The latter took his departure on the 22nd, stopped at Figueras, where the swelling of the waters detained him during forty-eight hours, and visited the fort which bears his name. The marshal availed himself of this accidental delay to hand in a note wherein he solicited the mitigation of the fate of the French prisoners in Spain, and renewed his application for the return of the garrisons. He received the assurance of an early change in the condition of the prisoners; with respect to the other point, he obtained a written promise to which Ferdinand affixed his signature*. An order was immediately despatched, directing that

* In order to afford a solid proof that he had determined of his own free will to abide by the promises he had made, the prince delivered that paper to the marshal on the 24th of March, previously to quitting Figueras and the French army; but he

prince don Carlos should be allowed to quit Perpignan. Ferdinand crossed the river on the 24th of March, with the sound of music, amidst salutes of artillery, and in presence of the French and Spanish armies ranged in the form of an amphitheatre on both banks of the Fluvia; he was received by general Copons and his staff, and greeted by the acclamations of the inhabitants, who had hastened from every quarter to witness the sight. He directed that notices should be sent to the governors of Barcelona, Tortosa, and Saguntum, with a view to prevent all hostilities during his journey through the country.

The marshal transmitted his orders to all those points. The artillery of our forts fired salutes on the passage of the king of Spain, who proceeded through Saragossa to Valencia, and at a later period to Madrid. The negociation having been left in the hands of general Copons, experienced

dated it from Gerona, where he slept on the 25th in the midst of the Spanish army. On the following day, the 26th, he caused another letter to be written to the marshal from Gerona, in order to thank him for having so readily sent his brother don Carlos to join him.

These details will explain the surprise which marshal Suchet must have felt when he received, some time afterwards, a decree of the provisional government of France, bearing date the 2nd of April, which set forth *that the measure of detaining the infant don Carlos at Perpignan and ordering him to be escorted to the first Spanish outpost was as unseemly as it was contrary to the conventions.* See notes and explanatory documents, No. 32.

fresh delays. The generals were bound down by the rigid decrees of the Cortès. Ferdinand however, until the moment of his arrival at Valencia, maintained a language and a conduct which led to expect that he would soon carry his promise into effect.

At the moment when marshal Suchet sent off his second column of troops in all haste in the direction of Lyons, he exerted himself to give an active impulse to the raising, arming, and clothing of the conscripts, who, conformably to the instructions of the minister, were to be organised into divisions of reserve in the departments of the Gard and of l'Herault, and were afterwards to join him.

Desertions were of more frequent occurrence, because France was giving way to a state of discouragement. The marshal soon acquired the distressing proof that he had few resources to expect from those dépôts*. He made prepara-

* This may be seen from a statement of both dépôts at that period:

IIIrd Division of reserve of the Pyrenees established at Montpellier.			IVth Division of reserve of the Pyrenees established at Nimes.		
1st light infantry.	1	man.	18th light infantry.	188	men neither clothed nor armed.
7th regt. of the line.	326	not clothed 206 armed.	23rd do.	374	do. do.
14th do.	434	neither clothed nor armed.	5th regt. of the line.	196	do. do.
16th do.	400	do. do.	20th do.	481	do. do.
44th do.	174	do. do.	60th do.	585	do. do.
114th do.	186	do. do.	67th do.	820	do. do.
116th do.			79th do.	837	clothed, not armed.
117th do.	14	do. do.	102nd do.	527	neither clothed nor armed.
121st do.	113	do. do.	115th do.	512	do. do.
			143rd do.	232	do. do.
	1648			4752	

The above 1,648 men destined for the regiments of the army

tions for the defence of Figueras, selected general Palmarole to take the command of that fortress, and communicated his arrival in its vicinity to marshal Soult, with whom he still kept up an active intercourse. He took a lively interest in what was going forward in the western Pyrenees, and in all the movements of the English and Spanish armies.

When the minister of war wrote to marshal Suchet directing him to send a portion of his army towards Lyons, he addressed to him at the same time a formal order from the emperor on the subject, and intimated the necessity of yielding up some parts of the territory, and hastening to the assistance of the centre; but he gave him likewise carte blanche for the defence of the eastern frontier.* Orders of the same nature, and causes of kindred origin had weakened, in the direction of Bayonne, the army of the marshal duke of Dalmatia, which was opposed to the forces under lord Wellington. After having detached a considerable body towards the Loire, and been compelled to retreat in consequence of

of Arragon, and 4,752 destined for the army of Catalonia, in all 6,400 conscripts, who would have proved a useful reinforcement at the moment of our forming the garrisons of the fortresses in the Roussillon, not only did not join but were never placed in a condition to join their regiments.

* Letter from the minister dated 1st March; see notes and explanatory documents, No. 33.

the sanguinary battle fought at Orthez, it had moved towards Cacères and Aire, and from thence to Vic de Bigorre and Plaisance by ascending the Adour. The duke of Dalmatia acquainted the duke of Albufera with his position on the 12th of March; apprised him that on that day he was effecting an advance movement, and marching against the English army assembled in the vicinity of Aire, his object being to prevent their undertaking operations in the direction of and with the intention of obtaining possession of Bordeaux.* But by a second letter under date the 22nd of March, he announced that he was on the point of taking up a position on the Garonne under the walls of Toulouse, it being out of his power, owing to the disproportion of forces, to maintain his ground without the support of a strong line in his rear.†

We received intelligence at this period of the entrance of the Austrians into Lyons, and of the retreat of marshal Augereau towards Vienne and the Isère. A report was spread that the English were in possession of Bordeaux: marshal Suchet was still in a state of uncertainty respecting the latter event, when he received official intimation of it in a letter from the minister of war, who

* Letter from marshal Soult, dated 12th of March; note No. 33.

† Letter from marshal Soult, dated 22nd of March; note No. 33.

accordingly recommended that he should thenceforward concert his operations with marshal Soult.* The marshal lost no time in despatching to Toulouse an officer of confidence; and he wrote to marshal Soult on the 27th of March that he should, from the force of circumstances, be placed under the necessity of falling back upon Narbonne, although motives of the most serious nature, and considerations of the highest importance, still required his presence beyond the Pyrenees; and he requested to be informed of the point towards which he intended to retreat, in case lord Wellington should force his position on the Garonne.† The duke of Dalmatia acquainted him in reply that he was taking up a strong position at Toulouse, in which he might have it in his power to maintain himself for a whole month; he was waiting to attack the enemy at the passage of the lower Garonne, and at any rate to forestall him on the road to Montauban: he did not suppose the English would attempt to cross the upper Garonne in the direction of the Ariège, a movement from which they could derive no useful result, and which would compel them to withdraw from the coast; he stated

* Letter from the minister dated 15th of March; note No. 88.

† Letter from marshal Suchet to marshal Soult dated 27th of March; note No. 83.

in short that he was fully determined to avoid as much as possible any operation calculated to bring him in closer contact with marshal Suchet.* Two days afterwards the enemy sent a division of infantry and cavalry with some pieces of cannon to the right bank of the Garonne above Toulouse. But this corps was unable to make any progress; it was arrested in its movement by the badness of the roads, and by the troops collected by general Puget at Carcassonne and general Lafitte at Foix, which were sent forward with the utmost rapidity to oppose their advance. This manœuvre on the part of the English was nothing more than a feint attack; the duke of Dalmatia was not deceived by it, and he continued his preparations for offering battle to lord Wellington on the road to Montauban.†

Marshal Suchet had long prepared his plan of operations. He had to keep in check the enemy in front, either with a view to save his garrisons, or to protect the French territory; and it now fell to his duty to cover *the heart of the threatened empire*, according to the minister's expression. The knowledge he possessed of the views of his government on that subject, removed every doubt from his mind as to the course he should adopt.

* Letter from marshal Soult to marshal Suchet dated 29th of March; note No. 33.

† Letter from marshal Soult to marshal Suchet dated 31st of March; note No. 33.

Whilst enjoining to the marshal, in the month of January, to send a detachment towards Lyons, the duke de Feltre wrote to him as follows: *It is likewise the emperor's wish that you should prepare to march in person with the remainder of your army, as soon as you shall have received the news that the treaty of Valençay has been ratified in Spain.* The major general wrote under the same date to confirm the emperor's orders, and to communicate instructions to him, which were in all respects analogous to those he had addressed to the marshal duke of Dalmatia; the concluding part of those instructions was conveyed in the following words: *As soon as you shall have received positive intelligence of this state of affairs, you are to make every arrangement for bringing your army back to Paris by forced marches; the emperor will be impatient to receive more detailed accounts from Spain, and hope at the same time to be informed of your having commenced your movement towards the Loire.** On receiving the reply of the 29th of March, in which the duke of Dalmatia manifested the determination of avoiding rather than of approaching him, the duke of Albufera naturally conceived that marshal Soult acted conformably to positive instructions, and according to the dictates of

* Letter from the minister dated 14th of January; note No. 33.

Ditto from the major general same date; note No. 33.

prudence. There could assuredly be no means more effectual for arresting the progress of the English army, either in the Eastern or in the Western part of France, than to attack them at the passage of the Garonne, and to keep possession of Montauban for the purpose of covering the road to Limoges and Paris.

Marshal Suchet, on the other hand, who only commanded some parts of the 10th military division, owing to a casual extension of his authority, had his own dépôts, his sick, his difficulties, and his resources, in the departments of the 9th division, at Montpellier, Nîmes and Saint-Esprit, at which places his conscripts were collected, armed, and equipped. Not only had the better part of his forces been called away in that direction, and removed from him by the water conveyance of the Rhone; but he had reason to apprehend, from information sent to him by general Habert, that the English troops united in front of Barcelona would embark, and come to threaten the coasts of Languedoc or Roussillon in his rear. He was accordingly preparing* to carry his line of operations through Narbonne and Beziers, in the event of his being ultimately compelled to resort to that course. Colonel Prudhomme of the engineers had repaired by his orders

* Letter from marshal Suchet to the minister, dated 28th of March, note No. 33.

to the latter town, to form the military establishments and provide the means of defence. The positions which the country was calculated to present to us were carefully reconnoitred. Narbonne was more particularly an indispensable point-d'appui for the army, on the only artillery road by which it could possibly carry on operations on its return from Spain. All the measures which circumstances permitted were resorted to for the purpose of providing for the defence of that important post. The marshal dreaded the moment when, after crossing the Pyrenees, he might be compelled to establish garrisons in Figueras and Perpignan, or in other words to weaken his forces so far as to have it no longer in his power to keep the field. On the 28th of March, the minister had returned to him, with his approval, an estimate which related to the provisioning of the fortresses of the Eastern Pyrenees. He rated at upwards of eleven thousand the number of men in garrison who would stand in need of regular subsistence.* The marshal exerted himself to reduce that estimate to seven thousand men, by confining his calculation to the number which was indispensably necessary for garrison duty.

But he had already bent his attention to devise some means by which he might more than repair the loss of men which those garrisons would

* Letter from the minister dated 28th of March; note No. 22

entail upon him. After Lerida had been taken by surprise, he had no distant garrison to claim from the Spaniards excepting those of Saguntum and Tortosa. Saguntum was supplied with provisions for upwards of twelve months; and it formed, with the garrisons of Denia, Peniscola, and Morella, a force which scarcely exceeded two thousand men. Tortosa, on the contrary, had nearly five thousand men, whose provisions would not last beyond the end of April. They were commanded by general Robert, a man of determined character: it did not appear impossible that, by an unexpected and rapid march, they should succeed in joining the eight thousand men under general Habert at Barcelona; and the latter officer, being then at the head of both garrisons united in a compact body, might abandon the empty fortresses to the Spaniards, force his way to the French army, which on the news of their approach would undertake a movement in advance for the purpose of joining them. The marshal addressed to general Habert instructions to that effect,* and applied to his government for orders for his own guidance † Had it not been for the rapid succession of events, the army of Arragon and Catalonia might perhaps, by this bold operation, have

* Letter from marshal Suchet to generals Habert and Robert dated 31st of March; note No. 33.

† Letter from marshal Suchet to the minister, dated 2nd of April, note No. 33.

been reinforced by a corps of between twelve and thirteen thousand men; and would thus have found itself almost as numerous as previously to the departure of its two divisions in the direction of Lyons, or at least in a condition to render further and important services.

His effective force amounted at that time to eleven thousand three hundred and twenty-seven men under arms and fit for duty, a number which included a thousand and eighty-eight horse. Lamarque's division was at Figueras and in its immediate vicinity; Mesclop's reserve, in the rear at La Jonquière and the Pertuis; a battalion and a regiment of cavalry were at Perpignan, to which place marshal Suchet frequently repaired after king Ferdinand's departure, in order to superintend the measures requisite for the defence of the territory, without moving to too great a distance from the troops. He received in this town, during the night between the 4th and 5th of April, a letter from marshal Soult dated the 3rd, wherein he returned to the idea of a co-operation which he had hitherto seemed desirous of avoiding. There can be no doubt that without receiving the previous order of the minister, and the approbation of the head of the state, it was impossible for marshal Suchet to adopt the determination either to quit the frontier where he had been stationed, and thereby abandon his

garrisons in Spain to their fate, to march away with his whole force, and accordingly abandon the eastern Pyrenees to the enemy, or to leave garrisons in our fortresses, and thus reduce his effective force to a number far too insignificant to be of any weight in the scale, under circumstances of so serious a nature. Not only was it too late for such an order to be conveyed to marshal Suchet, but he would not even have had time to reach the banks of the Garonne. For, had he taken his departure when he received the duke of Dalmatia's first letter, his troops would never have been able to commence their march before the 5th or 6th of April, or reach Toulouse before the 13th or 14th, at soonest; the battle was fought on the 10th of that month.*

The false reasonings, however, which have been so freely indulged in respecting the occur-

* The distance from Figueras to Toulouse is sixty-three leagues on the post map; in the route of march it is laid down as follows:

From Figueras to La Jonquère	3	leagues			
— to Boulon	6	do.			
— to Perpignan	5	do			
— to Salces	3	do.			
— to Sigean	5	do.			
— to Narbonne	5	do.			
	28		¼		
Brought forward	28	leagues	¼		
From Narbonne to Lezignan	4	do.			
— to Carcassonne	8	do.			
— to Castelnaudari	8	do.			
— to Villefranche	5	do.			
— to Toulouse	8	do.	½		
	63	leagues	¾		

The army could not perform that distance in less than eight or nine marches, even by doubling some of the shortest. Its numbers and positions on the 5th of April were as follows:

rences in the South at that period, were owing to an ignorance of facts and of the respective

Lamarque's division.	Men.	Mesclop's Reserve.	Men.
3rd light.	690 at Alfar.	11th of the line...	817 at Llers
5th of the line ...	1,701 at Villafant.	114th —	1,569 at La Jonquère and the Pertuis.
14th —	1,688 at Figueras.	143rd —	643 at Perpignan.
60th —	1,591 do.		
121st —	1,540 Villasacra and Villatenim.		

Meyer's cavalry.	Men.
29th of chasseurs	519 at Villabertran and Figueras.
24th of dragoons	563 at Toulouse and Perpignan.

Infantry 10,239 : Cavalry 1,088.—Total 11,327 men ready for service.

With this force marshal Suchet was under the necessity of raising the garrison of Figueras to its full complement before he could recross the Pyrenees, a course it was likewise incumbent upon him to adopt respecting the fortresses in the Roussillon, if compelled to withdraw from that frontier. Now, those places or fortresses were, independently of Narbonne, seven in number, viz.

NAMES OF THE FORTRESSES.	Number of the garrison as laid down by the minister of war.	Numbers as reduced by marshal Suchet.
Perpignan	3,600	3,600
Collioure. St-Elme and Port-Vendres	2,150	1,000
Bellegarde	1,000	600
Fort des bains	300	100
Pratz de Mollou	1,000	500
Villafranche	800	200
Mont-Louis	2,500	1,200
	11,350	7,200

This comparative statement clearly shews, that if the first estimate had been strictly attended to, the whole of marshal Suchet's troops would have been shut up in the fortresses of Roussillon; that the marshal was adopting measures for withdrawing a fourth or a third part of his small army from that particular duty; and that if he had even availed himself of

positions of both armies and their chiefs. The duke of Dalmatia, in his letter of the 3rd of April, did not propose that the duke of Albufera should join him at Toulouse for the purpose of fighting the English. He asked him to send a reinforcement to general Laffite, in the department of the Ariege, or to proceed thither in person, if he deemed such a course useful and practicable.* Marshal Suchet was of opinion that such a movement would be attended with serious inconvenience to his own army, without being productive of any useful advantage to the army of marshal Soult. For, on the one hand, that marshal and general Laffite coincided in their statements to him, that the English meditated to march upon Lyons; and although he was at a loss to account for a manœuvre of that nature, he found himself more than ever called upon to provide for the defence of Narbonne, in order that his communications with the line of the Rhone should in no case be endangered. On the other hand, the duke of Dalmatia announced in the said letter of the 3rd of April, that the English were following up their move-

the men in the dépôts, the sick, and the convalescents, in order to make up the numbers requisite for the garrisons, he would scarcely have been able to keep a division of four or five thousand men in the field.

* Letter from marshal Soult, dated 3rd of April; note No. 33.

ment by the lower Garonne, between Bordeaux and Toulouse. What advantage could possibly result in this case from a remote and uncertain direction towards Saint-Gaudens and the upper Garonne, which could only be accomplished by leaving the eastern Pyrenees open to the enemy? The circumstances communicated by marshal Suchet to the minister of war a few days before, respecting his position, were repeated in his reply of the 6th of April to marshal Soult's letter, in which he explained his inability to act in the manner suggested to him.* On the 6th and 7th of April, the duke of Dalmatia reiterated his request that a movement should be effected in the direction of the Ariege†. But those letters afforded him fresh grounds for persisting in his determination to establish himself at Narbonne as soon as he should have crossed the Pyrenees. Lord Wellington had planned his movement towards the mouth of the Tarn, and not that of the Ariege; the passage of the Garonne had just been effected; the English were marching on the high road from Montauban to Toulouse; and marshal Soult himself expected that they would advance

* Letter from marshal Suchet to the minister, dated 2nd of April; note No. 33. From the same to marshal Soult, dated 6th of April; note No. 33.

† Letter from marshal Soult to marshal Suchet, dated 5th and 6th of April; note No. 33.

to attack him in the direction of Castlenaudary. There could not exist a more urgent motive for recalling the army of Arragon to Narbonne. Marshal Suchet saw that the moment was near at hand when he should be under the unavoidable necessity of abandoning the negociation, the garrisons, and the fortresses. The battle of the 10th of April tended to accelerate that unpleasant catastrophe. Marshal Soult communicated the intelligence to him by his letters of the 10th and 11th, intimating at the same time that he was retreating towards Villefranche, Castelnaudary, and Carcassonne; he made him, on the same occasion, and for the first time, a *formal proposal* to join the whole of his troops (after having provided for the safety of every fortress) and to march towards the Ariege by way of Quillan, in order to effect the junction of both armies, and with the Pyrenees for a resting point to carry for the second time the theatre of war to the upper Garonne. But whilst he pointed out this intended movement, he added: "Should you decide upon taking the road to Narbonne, I request you will apprise me of such determination*. Marshal Suchet had not the choice of two roads for joining his colleague; the road from Perpignan to Foix through Quillan was wholly impassable for the

* Letter from marshal Soult to marshal Suchet, dated 10th and 11th April; note No. 33.

artillery* ; besides which, the department of the Ariege was a theatre unfavourable to military operations, since the English general Hill, in his movement of the 31st of March, had well nigh lost his artillery in that quarter ; and it was impossible to assume offensive operations without support, without provisions or means of communication, except by compromising the existence of the army, and abandoning the defence of the interior of the country, in the presence of a numerous and successful enemy. Whilst the duke d'Albufera laid before the duke of Dalmatia the various reasons which prevented his marching towards the Ariege, he informed him, according to his desire, that he would now endeavour to join him by the way of Narbonne†. He was thenceforward wholly engaged in accelerating the movement of his troops. Previously to making them recross the Pyrenees, he terminated his operations by destroying the fort of Rosas, which general Lamarque blew up at his departure. The columns of infantry and cavalry were all sent in the direction of Narbonne ; and marshal Suchet repaired thither in person in order to be on the spot before their arrival‡.

* That road was opened by the government in 1820.

† Letter from marshal Suchet to marshal Soult, dated 12th of April.

‡ The moderation and dignified deportment of marshal Suchet deserve to be held up to public notice and admiration,

It was at this place that he received from Paris a communication of the events which had just sub-

in this narrative of his conduct at the period of the battle of Toulouse. He has been fully sensible of the erroneous impressions entertained on that subject; he adduces facts and dates in refutation of conjectures; he lays before the public the documents in the cause which has in some respects been referred to public opinion for award; he writes concerning this circumstance of his life with the same absence of bitterness, anger, or complaint, which he displayed when speaking of it. He would perhaps have found it difficult to adhere to this principle of moderation which was inherent in his benevolent mind, had he read the calumnies heaped upon him in the work ascribed to Montgaillard. Fortunately, however, the scandal of the numerous personalities contained in that book has revolted every lover of truth and justice under whose observation it has fallen. But the perfidious insinuations, the false assertions, vanish before the plain and naked statement of facts, such as they actually occurred.

From a perusal of the duke of Albufera's Memoirs and of its accompanying explanatory documents it is quite evident:

1st. That marshal Suchet was not influenced by mere pretences, but by solid reasons, when he prolonged as much as possible, and to the very last moment, the stay of his army on the other side of the Pyrenees in the year 1814;

2ndly. In proportion as he drew nearer to France, his army was from the force of circumstances reduced to so insignificant a number that he would shortly have been quite unable to keep the field;

3rdly. He did not refuse to connect his operations with those of the duke of Dalmatia; he had long been prepared for so doing; but the latter, on making known to him his position and his views, on the 29th of March, announced his determination to avoid all contact with his colleague.

4thly. Marshal Soult never sent twelve officers with

verted the empire, put an end to the war, and restored the Bourbons to the throne. Colonel

despatches to marshal Suchet, for the purpose of prevailing on this officer to join him at Toulouse. On the 3rd, 5th, and 7th of April he requested him to effect a movement towards the Ariege, which neither the strength nor the position of the army of Arragon, any more than the state of affairs rendered it possible for him to carry into effect;

5thly. On the 11th of April, being the day after the battle, marshal Soult formally urged marshal Suchet, for the first time, to join him in order to fight the English, by proceeding through Quillan in the department of the Ariege; or if he took the road to Narbonne, for the purpose of effecting that junction, to inform him of the circumstance.

6thly. On the following day, the 12th, marshal Suchet replied, that being unable to pass through Quillan, he was about to join him by way of Narbonne; the army of Arragon and Catalonia immediately set itself in motion for that place; and on the 13th of April he received the news of the events at Paris, which put a complete stop to military operations.

The motives which develop the above facts and establish their truth are consigned in the correspondence of both marshals, which clearly exhibits what both did, what they aimed at, and what they had it in their power to accomplish. Marshal Suchet, who, throughout life, and especially at the Var and the Mincio, had displayed the sentiments of a Frenchman devoted to his country, never belied his exalted character. He felt no apprehension of obeying the commands of marshal Soult, under whose orders he had already been placed at the camp of Boulogne. The claims of seniority which he respected, the interest of France which he valued above every other consideration, were sufficient to mark out the line of conduct it behoved him to adopt. We have already seen a proof of this in his letter to marshal Soult, dated Villafranca, 16th of September, 1813, chapter xx, page 340.

Saint-Simon brought him the particulars of the entrance of the allies into Paris on the 30th of March, the emperor's abdication, and the acts of the senate and of the provisional government.

The marshal assembled the generals and superior officers of the army, and laid before them the documents he had just received; there was but one opinion as to the course to be adopted. The army had at all times displayed an unshaken fidelity to France. It continued to fulfil its duty by acknowledging the princes who were recalled to the throne after a long period of exile. The marshal sent in the adhesion of the army of Arragon and Catalonia, and immediately apprised marshal Soult of this proceeding.

Colonel Saint-Simon had passed on his way through the army of the latter marshal after traversing Lord Wellington's army. The hostile general had commissioned him to inform the French marshal that he was authorised by his instructions to agree to an armistice; marshal Suchet availed himself of this opportunity to procure the return of his garrisons. The garrison of Tortosa, whose supply of provisions was on the point of being exhausted, those of Lerida, Mequinenza, and Monzon, which were still detained prisoners under various pretences, were the occasion of deep anxiety to him. He had some obstacles to encounter in this fresh attempt; but hostilities had abated and were

in some degree suspended by the force of circumstances.

On the 19th of April the marshal received from the major-general, the prince of Neufchatel, and from general Dupont, the new minister of war, a communication of the general armistice concluded at Paris. He immediately despatched lieutenant Lusignan of the cavalry, his aid-de-camp, to make known the circumstance to marshal Soult at Carcassonne and to Lord Wellington at Toulouse, and he commissioned general Lamarque to come to a friendly understanding with the Spanish general Copons. This business was brought to a favourable termination, and the fate of the fortresses was at last definitively settled on both sides to mutual satisfaction.

Marshal Suchet sent the chefs-de-bataillon Castres and Dora, and captain Verny, one of his aides-de-camp, with orders for the governors of Barcelona, Tortosa, and Saguntum, to deliver up those places. They were accompanied by an English and some Spanish officers, with a view to secure the due fulfilment of the treaty. In transmitting to general Habert and the other governors the necessary instructions for their march to the frontier, the marshal communicated to them, as he had previously done to the army, the events which had lately taken place in France.

He repaired a few days afterwards to Toulouse, with the principal officers of his army, presented himself before his royal highness the duke d'Angouleme, who gave him the most flattering reception, dwelt upon the reputation for valour and good discipline which the army of Arragon had acquired, and expressed a wish to find himself in the midst of French soldiers. He had already shewn the greatest kindness to our wounded, visiting them in person at the hospitals of Toulouse, and affording them every pecuniary assistance. General Harispe, who had been wounded in the foot, by a cannon shot, in the battle of the 10th, received from the prince a letter expressive of his sympathy and regard, and containing the following words: *I am well aware of the distinguished services you have rendered our common country; to have so served it, is to have well served the king; those two interests shall never be separated.* The marshal returned to Narbonne, for the purpose of receiving the duke d'Angouleme, who was on the eve of proceeding to that place. He addressed an order of the day to the army, on the 1st of May, which contained that letter so worthy of a French prince, his object being to enable every one to judge of the extent to which he was warranted in anticipating that the honour of the army would remain unimpaired, and the happiness of the country ef-

fectually secured. The prince arrived at Narbonne on the 4th of May. He reviewed the army of Arragon and Catalonia in a plain at a short distance from the town, where it was assembled to the number of about twelve thousand men, with thirty pieces of cannon. The troops were in the best possible condition, went through the exercise of fire-arms, and manœuvred before him, in a manner which drew forth his warmest approbation. The army of Arragon had never ceased to consider general Harispe as belonging to it; it accordingly felt honoured by the praises bestowed on one of its most gallant chiefs; and the prince won every heart by the condescension and kindness he evinced towards every individual in the army.

The marshal afterwards accompanied his royal highness to the review of the army of the Pyrenees, which was distributed on various points, such as Carcassonne, Castelnaudary, Lavaur, and Montauban. This army was now united to the army of Arragon and Catalonia, and took the denomination of army of the South, and was placed under the orders of marshal Suchet, who transferred his head-quarters to Toulouse. He there entered into arrangements, in concert with general Murray, lord Wellington's quarter-master-general, respecting the departure of the English army, which broke up its encampment

and proceeded to embark on the coast of the British channel; the chef-de-bataillon Dupau, of the engineer department, and other officers, were ordered to proceed in the capacity of commissaries, with the columns of English troops, as far as their place of embarkation. The marshal adopted arrangements at the same time for dividing his army into detached corps, in order that it might withdraw to a distance from, and thereby relieve the southern departments of France, as soon as the English forces should have commenced their retrograde movement. Several leaves of absence were granted; all urgent reforms were effected, employés whose services were no longer necessary were discharged; and a considerable number of artillery horses, the maintenance of which cost the nation no less than twelve thousand francs per day, were temporarily distributed among country farmers, to whose care they were entrusted, a measure no less advantageous to agriculture, than to the public treasury.* The army was soon dispersed, and sent to the different French garrisons. The marshal was afterwards summoned by the king to take his seat in the chamber of peers.

Previously, however, to his final departure, he had the satisfaction of again beholding, on their

* See notes and explanatory documents, No. 34.

return, the veterans of his old army of Arragon, whom he had so deeply regretted the necessity of leaving behind, to garrison the Spanish fortresses. Obstacles which it was impossible to anticipate, had still delayed that long wished for moment, even after the arrival of the officers sent to general Copons by marshal Suchet and lord Wellington. It was deemed necessary that general Valée, who was expressly commissioned by the king for that object, should repair to Spain, and carry into effect what had been so long stipulated. The garrisons of Lerida, Monzon, and Mequinenza, which were unjustly detained as prisoners of war, and amounted to seventeen hundred and twenty-seven subalterns and soldiers, and sixty-seven officers, were the first to make their appearance at Oleron, which they reached by crossing the province of Arragon, and the intervening mountains. At the close of the month of May, and in the early part of June, the garrisons of Figueras, Hostalrich, Barcelona, Tortosa, Peniscola, and Saguntum, successively returned to France, part of the latter garrison by sea. The chef-de-bataillon Bin, and captain Boissonnade, the former in command at Denia, the latter at Morella, had been compelled to capitulate after sustaining a vigorous siege; they were exchanged, as well as their garrisons, at a later period.

About twenty thousand Frenchmen were thus

restored to their country,* after having stood their ground to the last moment in the different places confided to them, and preserved some valuable resources which were not all lost after their departure. Twenty eight pieces of cannon, sixty-six caissons and various other ordnance stores, originally brought from France, were removed with the garrisons, and lodged in dépôts at Port-Vendres and Perpignan. Barcelona contained a very numerous artillery, mostly of French calibre. Marshal Suchet, during the last six months of 1813, had endeavoured to supply our arsenals from that source. In conformity with his orders, general Valée directed the removal to Perpignan of three hundred and sixty pieces of cannon, two hundred caissons, two hundred gun carriages, thirty thousand muskets and upwards of six millions of cartridges.

Besides procuring the acquisition for France of that immense matériel, the army of Arragon had secured by its conquests four times the same amount in the campaigns and sieges it had carried on during a period of five years. We subjoin the statement thereof which was drawn up at the termination of the war; and in order to render it more complete, we annex to that statement an account of the standards and the prisoners taken from the enemy during the same space of time, the

* See notes and explanatory documents, No. 35.

total of which prisoners exceeded eighty thousand men.*

* Numerical statement of the prisoners, standards and artillery taken from the enemy during the years 1809, 1810, 1811, 1812 and 1813, by the army of Arragon under the orders of marshal Suchet duke of Albufera.

Names and Dates of the places taken, and of the engagements fought.	Prisoners		standards.	Pieces of artillery.
	officers	soldiers.		
1809.				
15 and 18 june.	Battles of Maria and Belchite.....	261	4,185	4	34
1810.					
23 april...	Battle of Margalef.....	280	5,337	4	3
14 may....	Capture of Lerida.....	313	7,435	10	133
8 june....	Capture of Mequinenza....	78	1,322	....	45
26 novemb.	Battle of Ulldecona.....	92	2,800		
1811.					
2 january.	Capture of Tortosa.....	417	9,044	9	182
9 ditto.	Taking of San-Felipe at the Col de Balaguer.....	14	108	....	11
29 may to 29 june.	Capture of Tarragona and its forts.....	608	11,214	23	337
25 july....	Capture of Mont-Serrat...	1	30	2	10
10 october.	Capture of Oropesa.....	5	210	....	6
25 ditto...	Battle of Saguntum.....	272	4,409	4	12
26 ditto...	Capture of Saguntum.....	139	2,433	6	17
26 decemb.	Investment of Valencia.....	.....	500	1	24
1812.					
9 january	Capture of Valencia.....	921	17,298	21	393
19 ditto...	Occupation of Denia.....	.....	.....	....	66
4 february	Capture of Peniscola.....	.....	.....	....	74
21 july....	Battles of Castalla and ditto	134	3,038	3	2
1813.					
11, 12, 13 april.	Actions fought at Yecla, Villena and Biar.....	114	2,686	2	2
12 june...	Under the walls of Tarragona.....	.....	.....	....	18
12 septemb.	Battle of Ordal.....	.....	500	....	4
from 1809 to 1814...	Separate actions fought by various generals and other officers.....	247	5,656	5	42
		3,896	78,205	94	1,415
		82,101			

With respect to the administration of Catalonia, marshal Suchet had, as it were, merely crossed the province, and the course of events did not allow him to bestow upon that object the same degree of attention which he had shown to the administration of Arragon and Valencia. Nevertheless, he did not wholly neglect it, and he succeeded in raising sufficient resources to meet the wants of the two armies, in the midst of circumstances of a most critical nature. We have seen that the French army in Catalonia had been subsisted, since the commencement of the war, by provisions sent from France for its support. Not only however did this resource fail towards the end of 1813, but the marshal was informed that his army would perhaps on its return to the frontier be at a loss to procure the means of subsistence; as early as the month of September the minister wrote to him as follows:

"I cannot disguise from your knowledge that in the present state of affairs, the position of your army on the frontier would subject it to meet greater difficulties than could attend its remaining in the interior of Catalonia. A concurrence of circumstances has had the effect of so much embarrassing the imperial treasury that we are unable to issue the regular pay of the army under the orders of the marshal duke of Dalmatia; and were you unfortunately to take up a position analogous

to his own, we could only provide for the subsistence of your troops by resorting to the oppressive course of requisitions upon the country, the bad consequences of which would infallibly increase as they acquired a wider range."

It had therefore become necessary to provide for the subsistence of the army without resorting to government for assistance; the marshal succeeded in this object*. The arrears in the pay

* When the sphere of operations became confined to Catalonia, the marshal duke of Albufera bestowed his attention on the details of administration; and under so skilful a chief every thing assumed a new aspect. The pay of the army had hitherto been many months in arrear; he issued it up to the day. We had always drawn our supplies from France, and seven or eight thousand men were constantly employed on escorting the convoys from Perpignan to Barcelona. He not only derived from the province the means of subsisting the army, but he also collected ammunition for the service of Barcelona, Hostalrich and Figueras. His attention was first directed to the object of preventing the exportation of corn, which was carried on to so great an extent that the valley of the Ampourdan supplied the Spanish army, the Balearic islands and the English cruisers. Hitherto the contributions had never been paid, notwithstanding the exertions made by agents whom the government had sent to Catalonia for that express purpose. Better versed in practical measures of administration than those agents, he drew up fresh regulations, and adopted fresh measures to secure the object in view; and we were quite at a loss to account for his success in procuring resources from a country which had never yielded any to our exertions. (Extract from the notes of General Max. Lamarque respecting the campaign in Catalonia.)

of the army employed on garrison duty were, generally speaking, brought up to the moment of their re-entrance into France. Previously to recrossing the frontiers, the regiments received a distribution of meat, in live cattle, for a month's consumption; and in order to avoid resorting to requisitions in France, for that indispensable article of food, the cattle were taken from the Spanish territory. We were unable to establish any regularity in the mode of requisition, as we had done on every former occasion, by deducting the amount from the contributions to be levied on the country. But, a short time afterwards, some Spanish commissaries came to Carcassonne, when they were paid for the cattle, partly in money, and partly in kind by the restoration of the cattle remaining in Figueras at the time of our surrendering that fortress. The marshal not only put off as long as possible the moment when his army must necessarily become a burden to France, but he even brought back to it a part of the resources which his administration had carefully treasured up for a future day. Upwards of seven thousand metrical quintals of corn and flour, the produce of the contributions, or of the national domains of the Ter and the Segre, were sent to Perpignan and Narbonne. A large quantity of medicines and of hospital and barrack stores, which had been kept in reserve at Barcelona and Figueras was also transported to the eastern Pyrenees, and

became a seasonable supply for the fortresses of that department. In short, when the marshal re-entered France he had still a small sum of public money remaining in the military chest, and he directed a further issue of pay which was effected with the residue of the contributions we had levied in the Spanish territory.

The summary result of marshal Suchet's administration in the provinces of Arragon, Valencia, and Catalonia, of which he held military possession in 1809, 1810, 1811, 1812, 1813, and 1814 exhibits a total of receipts amounting to seventy three millions of francs, and the regular and proper application of the whole amount.

This result was obtained by a strict adherence to order and economy in the midst of a state of warfare. The soldiers were trained to victory and good discipline. The inhabitants of the country found their misfortunes mitigated by the moderation of their conquerors; and it may be asserted, without fear of contradiction, that they often blessed the hand which ruled over them with firmness, but with rigid impartiality.

NOTES

AND

EXPLANATORY DOCUMENTS.

NOTE 16.

PAGE 14, VOL. II.

At the moment when the army of Catalonia had just been weakened by sending off its best troops to the army of Arragon, while the latter was seeking to employ promptly the reinforcement which it had received, and the chiefs of the army were the one at Saragossa, and the other at Barcelona, Suchet to prepare all that was necessary for undertaking the siege of Tarragona, Macdonald to move with his little army nearer to upper Catalonia, and to clear the line of operations with France; the Spaniards, seeing that the opportunity was favourable, seized it with address, and executed the plan which they had formed for surprizing Figueras. There were in that place two Catalan storekeepers, named Jean and Palapos; they were under the orders of a French commissary, and had contrived to gain his confidence to such a degree, that they were intrusted with the keys not only of the inner magazines, but also of the subterraneous magazines, which communicate with the ditches of the fortress by the little postern, under the draw-bridge of the principal gate. Colonel Rovira, a bold and enterprising man, whom we have frequently had occasion to mention, easily succeeded in seducing the two Catalan storekeepers, by means of a small bribe, and in obtaining from them the keys of the postern. He found them, indeed, so strongly attached to the national cause, that they voluntarily offered to expose their lives to all hazards, in order to facilitate his occupation of the place, by remaining, on the night agreed upon, in the magazines, for the purpose of opening the doors to the assailants, lighting them with torches, and leading them to the quarters of the garrison and general, by which means the defence would be rendered null and the victory secure. These measures being thus concerted, Rovira chose seven hundred of the bravest of the Miquelets of upper Catalonia: these were to confront the first dangers, and to clear the way for a more numerous column of

regular troops, commanded by general Martinez, hoping that this disposition would render the conquest easy. At the beginning of April, every thing was ready for an attempt at night to surprize the fort. Macdonald was isolated at Barcelona: Baraguey-d'Hilliers had divided his weak force between Gerona, Hostalrich, and the coast of Palamos: there could not be a more favorable opportunity for re-taking Figueras, and there was no reason to apprehend that the place could be speedily invested. It appears, therefore, that the Spaniards waited only for the junction of all their corps, and the moment when the most active portion of the garrison, consisting of one hundred and fifty Italians, under the command of the chef-de-bataillon Mazzoni, should have quitted the place. On the morning of the 9th of April, the governor actually sent out the Italian column for the purpose of collecting provisions, and dispersing some assemblages formed, it was said, in the contiguous valley of Avinonet. The guard of the bastions was committed to some convalescents, who, being for the time incapable of active service, remained in dépôt in the fort, and who were employed without fear in this service, the place being reputed impregnable by surprize. The commandant, being in great want of soldiers, neglected the outer works, and had but a weak guard at the drawbridge of the horn-work of St. Roche, on the principal road leading from the town to the fort. All these circumstances led the Spaniards to expect, with confidence, that they should be able to arrive, without being seen, by the ditches of the work of St. Zeno, at the above-mentioned postern, and to penetrate into the interior without obstacles. Such was the negligence of the commandant, that one would have imagined, though wrongfully, that he purposely suffered himself to be surprized by the enemy, as if to demonstrate how little he feared him, and that with the mere guard of his palace he should have it in his power to oppose a victorious resistance to several thousand Spaniards. All the remonstrances of the prudent captain Madron, of the engineers, with whom I passed some days in the fort, were useless, and failed to induce him to assume an attitude more worthy of the important post committed to his charge. The soldiers burned the barriers and the palisades, and he gave himself no concern about it; neither did he, for the purpose of strengthening his defences, think of barricading the two doors, which, being at the extremity of the spacious subterranean stables, opened into the bottom of the ditches, or of throwing up intrenchments, in order the better

to overlook the outer works, to increase the security from without, and to diminish the labour of the troops. Personally brave, he would have disdained any precautions for skreening himself from the perils of war, and despised those who did not, like him, laugh at menaces and dangers.

Meanwhile the Spaniards, having matured their plan for surprising him, descended on the 9th of April, under the command of colonel Rovira, from the hills of St. Lorens and Llers, and, favoured by a very dark and rainy night, they arrived at the side of the aqueduct, climbed upon the glacis of the horn-work of St. Zeno, entered the covered way unseen, and while the sentries, under careless inspection, were indulging in the silence in a sound nap, from the confidence produced by that of their general, and by the height of the walls, the Spaniards descended into the ditch, advanced softly, stooping and covering their arms, lest their glistening should betray them, reached the postern, and waited for the two storekeepers, who were in the pay of the French. If, in the scarcity of men, the fortress had had any other guards whatever, like the Capitol and other places, the army would have been spared a great misfortune, and the commandant the disgrace of being surprized. The invalids of the garrison, the persons least capable of defending the place, had been posted, as I have said, at the gates and the bastions. Fifty only were shut up in the lower stables, to prevent surprize from this quarter, and could not leave them without an express order from the governor. The chef-de-bataillon, Mazzoni, had returned some hours before to the place; his one hundred and fifty Italians were harassed by their fatiguing march in the day; and having orders to make a still more arduous one the next, they had been exempted from all duty whatever, that they might rest themselves in their quarters during the last hours of the night. All, therefore, both officers and men, were abed, and wholly unprepared to concur in the defence of the place, when the Spaniards penetrated into the subterraneous magazines. Thence they proceeded, without obstacle, to disarm the Neapolitan guard, posted at the principal entrance, and which was extremely quiet, the gate being shut, and the drawbridge up. There the first musket-shots were exchanged; the report apprized the garrison of the unexpected danger, and intimated to the Spanish reserve, which was on the glacis, that the enterprize had already, in part, succeeded. This reserve immediately put itself in motion, under general Martinez,

for the purpose of assisting Rovira. It pursued the same route, without being perceived by the garrison, amid the profound darkness which prevailed; and so speedily did it spread itself in the fort, that in a few moments it was completely occupied by three thousand combatants, in spite of the resistance of the small body of Italians which had recently come back to the place. These, having flown to arms at the first alarm, marched against the assailants, and began a conflict which was short, but warm, and attended with equal loss on both sides. It was about the middle of the fortress where this affair took place. The Italians had thirty-five men in killed and wounded put hors-de-combat. The remainder of this little corps, unable to resist so superior a force, attempted to join those who were still together in the barracks, or shut up in the stables; but being anticipated on both points, was obliged to submit to the same fate as the rest of the garrison. The Spanish troops had been promptly established wherever it was necessary, through the provident care of general Martinez, assisted by Rovira, Darguinès, and the two storekeepers. The governor, who ought above all others to respect the maxim which says, that *in war stratagem is more to be feared than force*, despised it: he was taken in his chamber, and at the same time, all the other officers in the fort, among whom were one colonel, two chefs-de-bataillon, four captains, and six lieutenants, were made prisoners. The convalescents and the guards, forming a total of five hundred men, not in a condition to defend themselves, were taken, some on the place or in the bastions, others in the barracks. They were shut up pell-mell, some of them almost naked, in cellars long disused, but which might be easily guarded. In vain did the fifty soldiers in the lower stables attempt to dispute the entrance with the enemy; they were taken, ill treated, and shut up with the others. The Spaniards were then at leisure to post their guards, and to man the batteries, the gates, and the powder-magazines of the bastions, without any difficulty. The whole business was finished in less than an hour. Being then in perfect security respecting the possession of the fort, they fired three guns to proclaim the complete success of the expedition to the points of the coast and the remotest upper valleys, and to induce the inhabisants to send speedily provisions and reinforcements to the place which had been thus retaken. (Extract from Vacani, tome iii, p. 24 and 25.)

NOTE 17.

PAGE 47, VOL. II.

Extract of a Letter from M. Mrozinski to colonel Saint-Joseph.

Scarcely had we quitted Gratallops when some musket-shots were fired at us. Armed men presently began to make their appearance upon the hills on our right, whence their fire commanded the road which we were to pursue. It behoved us to make ourselves masters of this position. We descended the hill, and drove off the enemy without difficulty; but on reaching the plateau, we perceived that it was only the advanced guard of a detachment of five or six hundred men, which was coming from towards Povoleda, and was already within musket-shot of us. The enemy wished to gain possession of the position before us, and furiously attacked us, while the rest of our detachment was still climbing the hill; our men repulsed him with the bayonet. He sent some detachments on our right to annoy us there, and directed his principal column upon our left. It attacked us three times, and was always repulsed with intrepidity; but the Spanish sharpshooters and the armed peasants, who hastened up in bands, surrounded us on all sides, and soon put upwards of seventy of our men, that is half our detachment, hors-de-combat. Captain Dulceron, of the 115th, sub-lieutenant Barthaire, of the same regiment, and sub-lieutenant Suchodolski, of the 1st of the Vistula, were among the wounded. We believed that sub-lieutenant Leclerc, of the 1st of the Vistula, was killed, but afterwards learned, that having pushed on too far on our left in pursuit of the enemy, he had been surrounded, wounded, and taken. Night put an end to the combat. We could no longer think of retreating, because we had no means for removing our wounded. Some mules from Mora had been taken while we were ascending the hill; besides, the road to Mora had been occupied during the action by Guerillas, whose number was increasing every moment.

I was ignorant of the name of the Guerillas with whom we had just been engaged; but I have since learned that el Cura de la Palma was of the number, and colonel Villamil commander-in-chief.

We retired in the evening to the hermitage; we pierced the thick walls with our bayonets to make loop-holes, and barricaded the doors. Our men were exhausted with fatigue. A little rain-water was found in a reservoir, but there was not sufficient for our wounded alone. I was obliged to place a sentry over it, to ensure to them this sole relief. The officers, though all wounded, took upon them the command of different parts of the hermitage.

Having provided for our defence, our next care was to acquaint the garrison of Mora with our situation. We had with us five Spanish soldiers in the service of king Joseph, belonging to the company which was at Mora. I hoped that one of these men might reach that place. I represented to them, that if we were obliged to surrender, we French and Poles should be made prisoners of war; "but you," said I, "can expect nothing but the most cruel death. You are of this country; you speak the language; it will be easy for you to get to Mora, and for your own sakes indeed you must try to do so." They replied, that they saw no possibility of passing through the Guerillas, who inclosed us on all sides; and that if it was their fate to be massacred by their countrymen, they should prefer putting it off for a few hours longer. Thus all my hopes of informing colonel Kosinowski of our situation were disappointed. The peasants whom we had taken as hostages at Gratallops had escaped during the action, excepting three whom we had taken with us into the hermitage. I led them to the altar, and made them swear upon the crucifix that they would go to Mora. I thought I could perceive that my address on the enormity of the crime of perjury had somewhat awakened their religious sentiments, and I sent them off by different routes, at intervals of half an hour. None of them reached Mora.

The number of the Spanish troops had further increased during the night: about fifty horse were on the Mora road; we were surrounded by their infantry bivouacs; and their guards advanced to the very hermitage. To spare the little ammunition that we had left, I had forbidden the men to fire unless we were attacked. We refused to receive a flag of truce sent to us with a trumpeter. The Spaniards collected wood and straw, and heaped them up around the hermitage, for the purpose of burning us alive. We placed a few men on the roof to fire upon them; they accordingly directed all their fire against this post, and wounded several men; we withdrew the others. Twice more were flags of truce sent to us, but we received them as we had done the first. At night we found ourselves in a desperate

situation; we had reckoned upon the arrival of succours before noon, and none had yet appeared. We began to think of taking advantage of the darkness to cut our way through the enemy, with such of the wounded as were able to follow us, when all at once we perceived troops approaching by the road from Mora: it was colonel Dupeyroux with the 115th. The Spaniards fell back, and our men leaping the wall, pursued them in their precipitate retreat. The 115th received us with extreme joy: the soldiers offered us wine and victuals; the officers gave us their horses and mules to carry the wounded. Colonel Dupeyroux conducted us to Falset.

The commandant of Falset, having the preceding evening heard the reports of muskets from towards Gratallops, had sent thither a trusty person, who brought him intelligence of what was passing; and the commandant had sent information of it to colonel Kosinowski at Mora. The 115th was that day passing through the place on its way to Reuss. Colonel Kosinowski communicated our situation to colonel Dupeyroux, who proceeded without loss of time to Gratallops. As he heard no firing by the way, he concluded that we must be already taken; and it was not till his arrival that he learned that we were still on the defensive, and almost without ammunition.

This affair procured me the most gratifying recompence. When the marshal applied for a Polish officer for his staff, I was proposed by colonel Kosinowski.

Signed COLONEL MROZINSKI.

Warsaw, October 7, 1825.

NOTE 18.

PAGE 105, VOL. II.

Report of Contreras.

On the 28th current, at day-break, the enemy opened his fire to batter in breach the curtain of the front of St. John, in the angle which it forms with the left flank of the bastion of St. Paul.

Our artillery and musketry behaved heroically, several times silencing his fire or annoying him for the purpose of retarding the operation of the assault with which we were threatened.

The situation of Tarragona at this moment of conflict was most critical; for I found it impossible to save the garrison by sea, having neither vessels sufficient, nor time and means for embarking the troops. Nor was I better able to open myself a passage by land, because the enemy with his whole army awaited my sortie to drive me back.

To treat of capitulating was not consistent with the heroic defence which the place had made, and the garrison, moreover, anxiously desired to keep themselves free from the French. The marquis of Campoverde had promised to come with the army to my relief. *The English had arrived two days before, with another division of troops, to my assistance; but they decided not to land when they saw the danger which the place was in of being taken by assault. Thus, with succours of Spanish or auxiliary troops in sight, I found myself reduced to mine alone.*

In this state, knowing the activity of the enemy, who was not likely to lose a moment to attack us before the effect of the ill-combined operation for raising the siege,—an operation which had already lasted several days,—*I took the resolution, worthy of Spanish honour, my own energy, and my personal reputation, and determined to perish fighting rather than treat about surrender.*

I calculated before-hand the two infallible consequences which must

follow my resistance, namely, if I was victorious, the enemy confounded, put to the rout, obliged to retreat and raise the siege; or if I fell, and the French stormed the town, the general massacre of the troops and the inhabitants, the pillage, violence, &c.

However, notwithstanding all this foresight, and before I took the resolution to receive the French on the breach and to repulse them, I examined whether my force was adequate to this the most heroic of the enterprizes undertaken in war, and which few decide to hazard.

I found that I had eight thousand men, the best and most inured to war in Spain, who had immortalized themselves in the defence, and who lacked but this last effort to complete their work.

Being therefore resolved to withstand the assaults of the enemy, I formed in front of the breach two battalions of provincial grenadiers and the regiment of Almeria. I ordered them not to fire a single shot, but to advance to repulse the French column, which would likewise come up to the breach without firing, and merely with bayonets fixed, (for thus it is that this terrible operation is performed) to charge this column the moment that it should appear, and to drive it back with such horrible carnage that it should not dare to return. I ordered wine, brandy, and tobacco to be distributed among the soldiers; I talked to them myself till I inflamed them, and took all the precautions which ought to be taken in such a such a case: but the issue did not answer my hopes; for though they had defended the breach with valour, and had received the French there with a firmness worthy of praise, repulsing their first column, they did not follow my instructions, which were, to attack in its movement the assailing column; and the regiment of Almeria soon abandoned the ground where it was placed to support the grenadiers and to serve for a reinforcement and reserve.

In short, two thousand of the enemy's grenadiers, supported by from four to six hundred more, exclusively of the main body of Suchet's army, which surrounded the place on all sides, stormed the breach. Our troops, upon the whole wall, began to retire, intimidated and in confusion; and though the officers and myself did all in our power to stop them, and to make them return to the charge and defend themselves in the streets, it was impossible. The soldiers, thinking to find safety in flight, hurried to the side next the sea, leaped the walls and the stockades, and sought to escape, but

were made prisoners by the enemy who cut us off on the side towards the Barcelona road.

In proportion as our troops gave way the enemy advanced, occupying the walls of the old and new enclosure, and entering the streets, where men, women, and children were killed, wounded, or at least pillaged, without distinction. *The tragedy was less sanguinary, because the French officers, full of generosity, rescued all whom they could, exposing themselves to the danger of being sacrificed by their own soldiers, who, athirst for pillage, thought of nothing but robbery and murder.*

It was in this state of things, that, repairing to the gate of St. Magin, with the intention of endeavouring to rally all the men I could, for the purpose of charging the French and escaping by favour of the night, or cutting our way through the enemy, I was wounded by the thrust of a bayonet in the abdomen, and made prisoner by a party of French. A report was spread that I was killed, and the confusion became general: what served in particular to increase it to the utmost was, that the soldiers threw away their arms that they might run away and escape, and thus fell into the hands of the enemy who took them prisoners.

In short, Tarragona, after one of the most obstinate sieges, during which I omitted none of the measures dictated by the art of defence, with insufficient hands and means, fell *amidst the horrors caused by the heroism of a garrison which refused to listen to any proposal for capitulation or accommodation*, in the night of the 28th of June, a memorable day to posterity for the tragic end of that ancient capital of Hither Spain, which witnessed during this siege the destruction of its churches and its edifices by six or seven thousand bombs and grenades, and by numberless cannon balls; which has filled with consternation the islands of Majorca and Minorca, and the shores of the Mediterranean, the hospitals of which are crowded with its wounded defenders; which, finally, has seen the last moment of its existence, and suffered the sacrifice of those many slaughtered victims rather than submit to the slavery of the besieger, who is left master, not of a strong fortress or a magnificent city, but a heap of ruins, serving for the tomb of innumerable martyrs of the purest and most exalted patriotism, for the Spanish monarchy and liberty, who have deserved by their death that their memory should be engraven on marble and bronze as an example to our successors in future ages.*

* This is one of the sentences omitted in the *Moniteur*.

On the following day, general count Suchet caused me to be carried on a bier to his head-quarters at Constanti, where I found generals Courten, commanding the division of troops which defended the opposite front to that which was attacked; and Cabrer, commandant-general of the engineers; brigadier Messina, commandant-general of the division which defended the front attacked, and other chiefs who had been made prisoners, with seven thousand eight hundred and odd men, including four hundred officers, who were conducted to France.

General Suchet ordered me to be brought to him, and in the presence of the principal officers of his army and ours, he addressed me, saying that I was the cause of the atrocities committed by his troops in Tarragona, in having defended myself longer than is prescribed by the laws of war; that those laws authorized him to punish me with death itself, for not having demanded a capitulation as soon as the breach was opened; that, having taken the town by storm, he had a right to destroy every thing with fire and sword, and it was for this very reason that the besieged ought to hoist the white flag, and to capitulate as soon as the breach is opened.

I replied, that *though the law authorizes the assailant in storming to give up the garrison and the inhabitants to pillage and the sword, and therefore admits of capitulation at the moment preceding the assault, still it does not forbid the garrison to defend itself and to endeavour to repulse the assailants*; that I had resisted because I had a force sufficient to repulse his, which I should not have failed to do, had the orders which I had given been executed; that besides I expected succour the following day from the marquis of Campoverde, the shipping, &c.; that after resisting till a breach was opened, I should have passed for a coward had I not had the courage to defend it, and that there is no law which forbids one to endeavour to repel the assault.

General Suchet, convinced by the force of my reasons, urged with the dignity becoming my character of commander-in-chief of so valiant a garrison, acknowledged that had I succeeded in repulsing him, that would have totally changed the aspect of the war in Catalonia; and that he himself, knowing that I expected speedy succour, had accelerated his attack as much as possible, because he feared that delay would protract his object, which was to obtain possession of the place. *He afterwards treated me, as well as the general and subaltern officers, with all the distinction to which we were entitled by our resistance, which the French confess to have been the most obstinate that*

*could be made.** In fact, if other fortresses have stood a longer siege, it was because they were not attacked so regularly, or by so formidable a train of artillery, or with such desperate valour. The siege of Tarragona has in consequence been the most sanguinary ever known. The losses on both sides exceed eighteen thousand men, which will not surprize any one who witnessed the incessant and tremendous fire reciprocally kept up night and day with all sorts of arms, and the number of killed and wounded in the sorties. Thus the French have lost, principally by our projectiles, nineteen officers of engineers, thirty-one of artillery, fourteen colonels or commandants of regiments, general Salme, and more than twelve thousand men. On our part we lost thirty-two officers of artillery, and in the whole upwards of six thousand men.

The garrison behaved heroically in the defence till the moment of assault. It then shewed some weakness; the soldiers gave way, and were intimidated: the officers, on the contrary, all went forward that night, and, sword in hand, endeavoured to make the soldiers stand their ground and resist, and even attack the French, who pursued them in the streets and slaughtered them; but their terror increased every moment, and they would rather suffer us to cut them in pieces than return to the fight.

Every thing conspired against this poor garrison. Campoverde, on quitting Tarragona, offered to come with an army to relieve it, which he has not done, though promising it every day, as is attested by the letters which I have preserved, and copies of which I subjoin. The kingdom of Valencia sent general Miranda with a division of troops, which landed at Tarragona; and the next day he re-embarked and went to rejoin the army of Campoverde. On the 26th an English division arrived: in the night of the same day, colonel Skerret, who commanded it, came on shore and asked me what I wished him and his troops to do? I replied, that if he would land and come into the place, he would be received with general joy, and treated as he deserved; that he might choose any post which he wished to defend, and I would give it him; but that this post must be of his own choosing as I would neither order nor advise him. Next day, the 27th, the commanding officers of artillery and engineers of the English division came and reconnoitred the front attacked; and, judging that the place was incapable of resistance, they returned to their ship. Thus, every

* See further on, page 429.

body fled from the place after having come to its succour;* and this desertion of those who might have assisted us was the worst of all, for it made such an impression on the minds of our soldiers, that they gave themselves up for lost. Thus was their courage depressed, and it was only revived by my continued exhortations, because they saw my serenity and the confidence I felt that the enemy could not enter if they did what I ordered them. But the effect of my arguments subsided in a few hours: reflection soon represented to them that they were abandoned, and this fatal idea swayed them every where, and incessantly.

If the marquis of Campoverde had not offered to come to our relief and forfeited his promise; if general Miranda had not come to the place with his division, merely to leave it again; if the English division had not appeared; and lastly, if the garrison had not been told every day and every moment in the last extremity that it would be relieved, then, aware that it had nothing to depend upon but its own strength, it would have done more. But it was this combination of things, excellent in appearance and mischievous in reality, because they were done without plan, either good or bad, that disheartened the garrison; it was this that occasioned the fatality to which I have already adverted—a fatality which deprived the troops of part of the merit which they had earned till the moment of the assault, in which, had their firmness been kept up a quarter of an hour longer, they would have seen the enemy stop, and then fall back, and consternation would not have seized our soldiers, as it did to such a degree, that they disregarded all my efforts and those of my officers, to rally and make them return to the charge. But the officers, who held out to the end, and signalised themselves on that day, deserve all the esteem of the nation and the government, and they ought to have a decoration to distinguish them in the whole army, and which I think should consist of a red cross with equal branches, suspended from a royal crown of gold, with the palm which forms the arms of Tarragona, and on the reverse, this inscription: "*Rather die than surrender.*†

* This assertion contradicts the statement of colonel Jones in his work on the War in Spain, when he says that "the governor Contreras, a brave and sensible man, feeling that to press his allies to land, would be to sacrifice them with his garrison, recommended rather that the British should co-operate with the Catalan army under Campoverde in an attack of the rear of the besieging force, when his garrison should sally out."

† This paragraph was also omitted in the *Moniteur*.

But this distinction ought to be worn by those only of whom I annex a list: for many, shunning difficulties and dangers, quitted Tarragona without permission; others applied for it upon pretexts far from honourable, feigning illness or stooping to base expedients to hide their cowardice. These, so far from deserving any distinction, ought to be dismissed from the service, otherwise they will have the impudence to appear again in uniform, and to assert that they were at the siege.

Most of the corps were commanded by captains, because the superior officers had gone to amuse themselves at Villanueva and other places. These officers ought to be removed, and the captains promoted to the ranks held by them; otherwise justice will not be done, and justice must be done.

The same inclosed list mentions the officers who deserved to be recommended by me to his highness,* independently of the decoration to which I have said they are entitled. His highness will do what he shall think proper in regard to them.

As for myself, I have never solicited any thing, and all that I now desire is, to be exchanged, if possible, that I may be able to return and again take the field. Till his highness shall be pleased to comply with this wish I request that part of my pay may be sent to my wife who is in Majorca; this is a thing which I would not ask if my estates were not in the possession of the enemy.

Before the place fell, I spoke and wrote plainly, declaring that, owing to the operations in progress, or more properly speaking, projected, the place would be infallibly lost, together with the garrison and the army. The superior junta of Catalonia can inform your excellency of every thing, for I communicated to it at the time all that passed. It did on its part, all that it could do in favour of an attempt to raise the siege, the only operation which ought to have been thought of, and which should have been executed in concert with me, without delay, and without regard for the number or quality of the enemies to be encountered. But all was to no purpose: from day to day that object was more and more lost sight of at head-quarters, as is proved by the last despatch of the commander-in-chief, in which he orders me to send him three thousand of the best troops belonging to the garrison, to embark them in the night between the

* Such was the title given by the Spaniards to the Regency of Cadiz, which governed in the name of the absent king.

27th and 28th, and to put them under the command of colonel O'Ronan. This colonel came to me at eleven o'clock at night; I sent him off to embark with the regiment of Almeria; but he did nothing of the sort, and the said O'Ronan has not since been seen. The same letter shews what confused and mistaken notions prevailed at head-quarters. The marquis of Campoverde believes that a division of one thousand English entered the place, whereas the commandant assured me that only one thousand men left Cadiz on the 9th current. Again, he requires me to have the troops which he demands, embarked the same night; but he knows not that the thing was impossible, because I possessed no other means for the purpose than those lent me by the English, and it was, at the time, not in the power of the English to furnish the requisite number of boats.

Lastly, from the copies of letters which I enclose, your excellency will be enabled to judge that I have left nothing undone; and his highness may depend upon it that in no action, whether successful or disastrous, will the honour of the Spanish arms be better supported than it has been in the defence of Tarragona. On this point I may refer to the testimony of the enemy, *notwithstanding his practice of depreciating our glory and affecting a kind of contempt for our valour.**

The enemy's general, who appreciated the opinion of those who have filled posts of the importance of that which I have recently held, and the influence of first reports, frequently false, exaggerated, or painted with other colours than the simplicity and truth necessary for the information of the nation and the government, has procured for me an officer to be the bearer to your excellency of the narrative of what has passed.

I hope that your excellency will think fit to order this report to be printed at the foot of the letter. This is befitting the national honour, the immortality of Tarragona, of the principality of Catalonia, of the worthy officers and soldiers of the garrison, and of my own reputation, which might suffer if it were seen that I give no account of myself and my operations.

God preserve your Excellency many years.

Signed, JUAN SENEN DE CONTRERAS.

Constanti, June 30th, 1811

To his Excellency the Minister at War.

* See above, pages 425 and 426.

NOTE 19.

PAGE 108, VOL. II.

The Spanish general Contreras, and the English colonel Jones, have both attacked the character of marshal Suchet in regard to the storming of Tarragona, with as little truth as decency. The former, wounded and taken prisoner in the assault, owed his life to a French officer of engineers, who exposed his own to save him. We have seen how he was treated at head-quarters: while on the way to France, he wrote the following letter to marshal Suchet:

"Castle of Saragossa, August 15th, 1811.

"Monseigneur,

"It is with the warmest satisfaction that I have heard of the happy return of your excellency to this city. As I take, monseigneur, the greatest interest in what concerns you, so the feelings of my gratitude for your kindness to me make it a duty to assure you of my joy on this occasion. May God long preserve your excellency."

Signed, "JUAN SENEN DE CONTRERAS."

Before he set out, Contreras had delivered to the marshal his official report to the minister at war of the Spanish Regency, on the taking of Tarragona. At his request, the marshal permitted a Spanish officer, the bearer of this report, to go to the enemy's advanced posts; he knows not what was the destiny of that officer and his despatch. He merely took a copy of that paper, which was sent to Paris, and printed in the *Moniteur* of July 19th, 1811.

General Contreras, after a year's detention in France, at the castle of Bouillon, found means to escape, went to England, and thence to Madrid, where he published in 1813 an account of the siege of Tarragona. He there imputes to the marshal all the blood that was

spilled on the 28th of June; he complains that his report was suppressed in Spain and garbled in France; he therefore gives it, he says, as it was in the original. By way of answer, we shall merely refer to the preceding note, which contains the entire report of Contreras, translated word for word from his publication in 1813. If the reader will take the trouble to compare it with the *Moniteur*, he will find that in the latter nothing was suppressed but two or three sentences of immoderate length, which are now faithfully rendered; and he will acknowledge that the confessions or contradictions of general Contreras, in the passages in italic, are sufficient to justify completely the person whom he pretends to accuse.

Colonel Jones who published in 1817 a work on the war in Spain, treats briefly, and with some inaccuracies which might be pointed out, of the military operations which took place in the eastern part of the Peninsula. In his account of the sieges conducted by marshal Suchet at the head of the army of Arragon, he says that that general never granted a capitulation; he expatiates on the *atrocities at Tarragona;* he says that *in the assault of that place thousands of the inhabitants perished by individual cruelty; that the French army was entirely abandoned to its own inclinations; that these cruelties excite abhorrence for him who directed them; that nevertheless, this fortunate chief was not only elevated to the rank of marshal for the massacre at Tarragona, but his character rose in the estimation of most of his countrymen.*

As to the facts of the case, colonel Jones is egregiously mistaken, when he sets down the four thousand men killed in the town as inhabitants, whereas, they were almost all soldiers. Some of the inhabitants, doubtless, perished during the last sanguinary scene of so obstinate a siege. Several of them, in the fury with which they were inflamed, kept up an incessant fire upon our troops from the entrenchments, the roofs, and the embattled houses of the Rambla, where our victorious columns, after storming the breach, were for a moment checked. The French soldiers, who were no cooler than their adversaries, put to death all whom they encountered; but the defenceless population, those who shun instead of provoking danger, had in great part taken refuge in churches, where they were spared amidst the carnage, as were the wounded in the hospitals. The assault, with which general Suchet threatened before-hand his enemy, who refused to avert it, ought not to draw upon him such intemperate reproaches. His method was to shew great severity and energy, while practising justice and prudence. Being obliged to take both Lerida and Tarra-

gona by storm, he was unable to do it without causing the blood of the vanquished to flow more copiously than that of the victors. But see how he took possession of Tortosa, Valencia, and all that part of Spain which was the theatre of his operations.

With respect to the principles on which colonel Jones seems to found his judgment, it may be asserted that he makes a false application of them, and himself refutes his own words. Here is a passage literally transcribed from his book:—"Were the subject coolly and dispassionately considered, the censure would be equally divided between the aggressor and the commander of the suffering party. It is the paramount duty of a general to use every means in his power to bring his operations to a successful termination, and to preserve the lives of his own men; and there seems no other such effectual mode of preventing similarly obstinate defences to those of Gerona and Saragossa; as for the assailants to avail themselves of the power of retaliation which victory furnishes. It is no more than the custom of war justifies and self-preservation demands. In a battle, if a division stand the charge, the successful party make no scruple to bayonet all those they overtake; and no reason can be assigned why troops fighting behind a wall should be differently treated, and have the privilege of destroying their opponents till the last moment, and when they can no longer do so with impunity be greeted with friendship. Till a certain period of the attack, it is perfectly safe to continue the defence; if the garrison persevere longer, they do it at their own risk: it is optional with them. It was so at Tarragona; and the principle of putting to the sword, after the assault of a breach, all those found with arms in their hands, seems so fully justified by right and policy, that general Suchet, on the abstract consideration of the subject, cannot be censured for having done so."

After these observations, what becomes of the reproaches directed against marshal Suchet by general Contreras and colonel Jones? Both prove that it did not depend on the French general to avoid the assault. That is quite enough to settle the question.

For the rest, only turn to the particulars of the storming of Badajoz, by the English in 1812,* and those of the storming of St. Sebastian,

* "Some of the scenes which ensued, are too dreadful and disgusting to relate; where two or three thousand men, many of them mad drunk, others depraved and unprincipled, were freed from all restraint, running up and down the town, the atrocities which took place may readily be

as related at the time in the Spanish newspapers, in terms of which we will not take advantage. In the latter place, three thousand French sustained against the English a siege, which began on the 28th of June 1813, and lasted seventy-three days, (sixty-six of which the trenches were open, and the firing occupied twenty-five) repulsed three assaults, and after the fourth, made on the body of the place on the 31st of August, shut themselves up in the fort, and capitulated on the 8th of September. There they witnessed a sight which is thus described by colonel Pinot of the engineers in his report:

"The unfortunate inhabitants of St. Sebastian then suffered from its allies all the horrors of an enemy's town taken by storm. During the days of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th of September, the pillage and burning of the town continued. On the 6th it was but a heap of mouldering embers."

In quoting facts, we mean not to throw odium on the chiefs of the English army. Every soldier who has seen any thing of war, knows but too well that *assault is the most severe and the most dangerous act of the profession*, and that the soldier, after being excited and inflamed preparatory to it, cannot be in a moment restrained and calmed in a fury, which, like intoxication, gets the better of him. Contreras attests the humanity of the French officers at Tarragona. The English officers no doubt, made the like efforts to put a stop to the massacre at St. Sebastian. In order, however, to judge with equity of cases which have some resemblance, it is right to observe how different were the respective positions of the parties. At Tarragona, the French and the Spaniards were declared enemies: at St. Sebastian, the English were friends and auxiliaries of the Spaniards.

imagined:—but in justice to the army, I must say they were not general. Many risked their lives in defending helpless females, and although it was rather a dangerous place for an officer to appear, I saw many of them running as much risk to prevent inhumanity, as they did the preceding night in storming the town."—*Eventful Life of a Soldier.*

NOTE 20.

PAGE 190, VOL. II.

The next operation of this sucessful commander was to dislodge the baron d'Eroles from Montserrat, which had been strongly fortified by him, and from whence he made incursions to the very gates of Barcelona. On the 24th of July, the French made various attacks on each side of the mountain, and the Spaniards, not being in sufficient numbers to resist at all points, were quickly overcome, and Eroles himself, with difficulty avoided being made prisoner. Soon afterwards the French forces concentrated at Tortosa to prepare for further conquests, leaving a number of scattered posts to keep the principality in subjection, and to maintain the communication with Arragon, by the road of Lerida.

Suchet advanced in September with twenty-five thousand men, to make the conquest of Valencia. Success depending much on celerity of movement, he endeavoured by a circuitous route to avoid the delay of reducing the castle of Oropesa, which commands the great road. His battering artillery, however, could not follow by the same track, and appearing before the citadel of Murviedro, without other means of attack, he ventured a general escalade, in which he was repulsed with great loss. After this check he remained inactive till the 18th of October, when his artillery arrived; and as, during the time thus lost, the Spaniards had assembled a force to relieve the garrison, he hastily threw up some distant batteries, from which he formed a breach, and without further preparations gave the assault. The approach proved narrow and difficult, and the columns were driven back with loss; as also on a second attempt. Suchet then went regularly to work, and on the 24th had brought his operations nearly to a close, when the advance of general Blake, with a considerable army, caused the attack to be suspended, and the besieging force to be concentrated to oppose

him. That officer, after separating from the allies on the Guadiana, in June 1811, having been repulsed in an attempt to assault the castle of Niebla, returned to Cadiz, from whence, at the end of July, he sailed with a body of troops to Almeria, and united with the army of Murcia, mustered twenty thousand men under his command. Soult immediately moved all his disposable forces in that direction; and on the 9th of August, in a general action near Lorca, so completely dispersed the Spaniards, that not more than eight or nine thousand men united at Lebrilla, to which place Blake retired his head-quarters. The fugitives, however, by degrees collected, and various reinforcements were sent to their support; and on the invasion of Valencia, the command of the army of that province was likewise conferred on general Blake, increasing his force to thirty or thirty-five thousand men, being nearly all the veteran troops in Spain, including the corps which so gallantly fought at Albuera. The different divisions were commanded by distinguished officers, and the cavalry and horse-artillery were of superior quality. With this force Blake boldly advanced to relieve Murviedro, and on the 25th October attacked the French army near Puzol. The Spanish troops fought with gallantry, and at first, obtained some partial success; when, elated with the prospect of a victory, Blake ordered a wide movement to prevent the retreat of the French, of which Suchet took advantage, to attack with a compact body the weakened centre of the Spaniards. He easily overpowered it, and the circumventing wings with difficulty escaped the fate they were preparing for their enemies; by force of marching, however, they effected their retreat with the fugitives from the centre, and the whole recrossed the Guadalaviar; on which Murviedro capitulated. Suchet, a few days afterwards, pushed his advanced posts into the suburbs of Valencia, on the left of the river; but the Spanish army having taken up a strong line on the opposite side, the preparations to force the passage could not be completed till the 25th of December: he then crossed, after some opposition, near Quarte and Mislata, and also near the mouth of the river. A portion of the Spaniards retired towards Murcia; but the great body, with the commander-in-chief, shut themselves up in the towers which had been constructed to strengthen the town; from whence, on the night of the 28th, they made a feeble and unsuccessful endeavour to escape.

On the 1st of Janaury 1812, ground was broken before the advanced line; and on the 4th, when the approaches were yet at some

distance, the Spanish army abandoned the defence of them, and retired into the town. A bombardment followed, and after three days' continuance, during which the trenches were regularly pushed forward, general Blake, wishing to spare the citizens the horror of a storm, capitulated on the 9th of January, delivering up prisoners of war sixteen thousand good troops.— [*Account of the War in Spain and Portugal,* by lieutenant colonel Jones.]

NOTE 21.

PAGE 234, VOL. II.

Capitvlation concluded between marshal count Suchet, commander-in-chief of the army of Arragon, and the general-in-chief Blake, commanding the 2nd and 3rd Spanish armies, for the surrender of the city of Valencia.

Article. I.—The city of Valencia shall be delivered up to the imperial army: religion shall be respected; the inhabitants and property shall be protected.

Art. II.—Those who have taken an active part in the war, or in the revolution, shall not be called to account for the past. Those who may wish to leave the city within three months shall be at liberty to go, with the authorisation of the military commandant, and to remove their families and property elsewhere.

Art. III.—The army shall march out with the honours of war, at the Seranos gate, and lay down its arms beyond the bridge, on the right bank of the Guadalaviar. The officers shall retain their swords, as well as their horses and equipages, and the men their knapsacks.

Art. IV.—The commander-in-chief Blake, having offered to set at liberty the French prisoners, or allies of the French detained at Majorca, Alicante and Carthagena, a like number of Spanish prisoners shall remain in the places in the power of the French, till the exchange can be carried into effect, man for man, and rank for rank. This arrangement shall apply to the commissaries, and other military *employés*, prisoners on both sides. The exchange shall take place successively, and commence on the arrival of the first column of French prisoners.

Art. V.—On this day, the 9th of January, as soon as the capitulation shall be signed, the sea-gate and the citadel shall be given up to companies of the grenadiers of the imperial army, commanded by colonels. To-morrow, at eight in the morning the garrison shall march

out of the place, by the Seranos gate, while two thousand men shall march out by the gate of St. Vincent, and proceed to Alcira.

Art. VI.—The retired officers who happen to be at this moment in Valencia, shall be at liberty to remain there if they please, and a provision shall be made for their maintenance.

Art. VII.—The generals commanding the artillery and engineers, and the commissary-general of the army, shall each deliver to the French generals and commissaries, an inventory of all that belongs to their respective departments of the service.

Done at Valencia, January 9th, 1812.

The general of brigade, chief of the staff, of the army of Arragon,
Signed, SAINT-CYR NUGUES.

The general of division,
Signed, JOSE' DE ZAYAS.

APPROVED, the commander-in-chief, captain general,
Signed, JOACHIM BLAKE.

APPROVED, the marshal of the empire,
Signed, COUNT SUCHET.

NOTE 29.

PAGE 241, VOL. II.

Decree of January, 24th, 1812.

NAPOLEON, emperor of the French, &c. &c.

We have created, and create marshal count Suchet, duke of Albufera.

He shall enjoy the titles, prerogatives, and domains attached to the said duchy, conformably with the letters patent, which will be drawn up in our council of the seal, &c.

Decree of January 24th, 1812.

The lake, the fishery, and all the appurtenances to the domain of Albufera, shall be given in full property to marshal Suchet, to form part of the dotation of the duchy of Albufera, which we have conferred on him by our decree of this day.

The said estates shall be held by him as fiefs of our crown. In failure of male and legitimate heirs, they shall revert to the crown.

Another decree of the same date.

NAPOLEON, emperor of the French, &c.

Wishing to reward the services rendered by the general officers, and soldiers of our army of Arragon, we have decreed, and decree as follows:

Lands situated in the province of Valencia, to the value of a capital of two hundred millions, shall be annexed to our extraordinary domain in Spain.

The intendant-general of our extraordinary domain, shall cause immediate possession to be taken of them. The prince of Neufchatel, major-general, shall transmit to the intendant-general, a list of the generals, officers, and soldiers of our armies in Spain, and especially of our army of Arragon, who have distinguished themselves, that we may bestow on them marks of our satisfaction, and imperial munificence, &c.

NOTE 23.

PAGE 316, VOL. II.

Extract from the report made by the general of brigade, baron Bertoletti, governor of Tarragona, to the general of division, count Maurice Mathieu, superior commander in lower Catalonia, on the siege sustained by that place from the 2nd to the 13th of June, 1813, against the Anglo-Spanish army commanded by general Murray, seconded in this operation by the English squadron, under admiral Hallowell.

Our means of defence began to diminish: the soldiers were exhausted with fatigue, and, notwithstanding their good living, the excellent spirits with which they were animated, and their devotedness, they needed rest. We had reason to suppose that it was the enemy's intention to silence all our guns on the front of attack, that he might then proceed to decisive operations.

I felt satisfied that we should not be abandoned. From the report of some deserters from the enemy I had been informed that the troops of the army of Arragon, which, I was assured, were commanded by his excellency, the marshal duke of Albufera in person, had proceeded by Tortosa towards the Perello, and were advancing from fort St. Philip to the col de Balaguer. A very brisk cannonade, which we heard towards that quarter, increased our hopes, and caused us to give credit to the report of those deserters. How indeed, could the marshal help coming to the relief of Tarragona, his own conquest?

Upon you too, general, I placed strong reliance, and though I was acquainted with the weakness of your force, yet your proximity, and especially the warm interest which you had always manifested for the

fortress of Tarragona, served to strengthen my hopes. I was not disappointed in my expectations; and the simultaneous march of the marshal's troops and yours, his attack on Valdellos, yours on Arbos, and lastly, the union of these bold and skilful manœuvres, produced the desired effect, and extricated us from the danger.

On the 12th of June, at nine in the morning, the twenty-five pieces of cannon, with which the five batteries of the enemy were armed, began to slacken their fire.

At ten the ships stood off and ceased firing.

At twelve o'clock there was no firing but from the fortress, and a general bustle was perceived in the camps. A moment afterwards, strong colums were seen descending from the position which they occupied behind the Olivo, filing off along the Francoli, crossing the fields, and proceeding towards the points of embarkation. Farther off, on the road leading from Constanti to Torre den Barra, appeared a strong body of cavalry, pursuing the direction of Villaseca; lastly, several officers on horseback were going through the camps, and carrying orders to the batteries. Preparations for re-embarkation were already observed upon the beach; the gun-boats were so placed as to protect it; but though every thing indicated this intention, we could not yet believe that it was serious.

At four P.M. we could no longer doubt it, the design of the enemy being decisively expressed. He set fire to all the batteries, and the troops embarked with the utmost expedition.

At eight, all the camps had disappeared, and a few battalions were all that was now left on shore.

At nine, I sent out detachments and scouts, which reported that they had not found any enemy's posts between the Francoli and the house of Satorras.

At ten, I caused the battery of the Terre-Rouge to be occupied.

By two A.M. on the 13th, I set all in motion to take possession of the enemy's batteries, and at four we were at work demolishing them all.

The 13th, 14th, and 15th, were employed in removing into the place all that the enemy had abandoned. Eighteen pieces of cannon of large calibre, an immense quantity of projectiles, planks, gabions, sixty bales of sand-bags, and an infinity of other articles for sieges, were left in our power.

Fortunate and astonishing as was this event, I felt nevertheless, very

serious uneasiness at seeing no troops arrive either from one side or the other, but your coming, general, on the 16th in the evening, dispelled it at once.

During the siege we had ten men killed and eighty-five wounded, of whom ten had to suffer amputation. All the deserters and peasants agree in stating the loss of the enemy at a thousand or twelve hundred men, among whom are several officers."

"The general of brigade, governor of Tarragona,"

Signed, "BERTOLETTI."

NOTE 24.

PAGE 333, VOL. II.

Extracts of letters from the Minister of War to marshal Suchet.

July 8th, 1813.

In the action of the 21st near Vittoria our loss in men was inconsiderable; but the English, according to their own accounts, have suffered severely, owing to our great superiority in cavalry. Our losses are therefore reduced to *matériel*, that is, to one hundred and twenty-four pieces of cannon, and six hundred carriages, partly caissons and partly ammunition-waggons. Nevertheless, at the moment I am writing, the king's army has at least sixty mounted pieces, and by the end of the month, it will have more than one hundred and fifty. There were four hundred caissons at Bayonne, and a very great number at Toulouse; so that he will want for nothing, and the whole disaster will be retrieved with the exception of some effective which will be supplied with all speed. The king, in consequence of the issue of the 21st, has retired by Navarre upon the frontiers of the Pyrenees; and the four armies of the South, the Centre, Portugal, and the North, are now united between Saint Jean Pied de Port and the sea. General Clausel, on his part, being at Saragossa with twenty thousand men, covers your flanks in such a manner, that you need feel no uneasiness. I am therefore of opinion, that when once rid of the English fleet, you will be able to act according to circumstances, and in case they require it, to contract your position as you may think it expedient for making head against the enemy. You will thereby give our army time to return into Spain, to relieve Pampeluna, which is threatened by the enemy, and to drive the English army beyond the Duero, or at least, beyond the Ebro.

July 22nd, 1813.

I have no doubt that the emperor will approve all the dispositions which you made on quitting Valencia, and that such as may follow will be dictated by a spirit of providence, and at the same time of resolution, appropriate to your new situation, and of which you have often set the example.

Signed, DUKE OF FELTRE.

NOTE 25.

PAGE 339, VOL. II.

Extracts from the correspondence of the Minister of War with marshal Suchet.

August 13th, 1813.

The operation of the marshal duke of Dalmatia has had this result, that it has obliged the enemy to suspend the sieges of Pampeluna and St. Sebastian. The English general seems disposed to resume the works against those two places; but the marshal on his part, is also preparing to thwart his plans.

The duke of Dalmatia has suggested to me how advantageous, under these circumstances, would be a diversion of the army of Arragon on the right flank of the English army, and what influence it would have on the sequel of the operations: he conceives that it would be possible to effect this movement in the direction of Saragossa and Jaca, where your excellency would unite to your force the troops of general Pâris, which still occupy that débouché. In forming this supposition, the marshal duke of Dalmatia was not indeed aware of the strength of the enemy's army which is opposed to you; but if that army were to receive a considerable check, perhaps this rather bold supposition would deserve consideration; and if it could be realised without too much exposing the fortresses of Catalonia, and especially without uncovering the eastern frontier of the Pyrenees, there can be no doubt that the operations in the west would soon assume a more satisfactory aspect. At any rate, monsieur le maréchal, these views must always remain subordinate to the laws of necessity, the wants of the moment, and the ulterior operations of the enemy. It is for you to judge upon the spot of what is possible and above all what is best suited to the service of the emperor.

August 17th, 1813.

Since I had the honour to write to your excellency on the 13th current, I have received intelligence from the marshal duke of Dalmatia, who informs me that he has written to you on the 10th and 14th, and despatched one of his aides-de-camp to communicate to you his views on the means of combining your operations with his. The marshal seems to hope, as I perceive from his despatches, of which he has sent me a copy, that it will be possible for you to effect a diversion in his favour towards Saragossa, and to manœuvre upon the flank of the English army. The need he has in his situation of such a movement is the most pressing motive that he could urge to induce you to attempt it; and on this point I have nothing to add to the observations which he has addressed to you, or to those which I have myself had the honour to communicate.

Your excellency knows that the fort of Saragossa fell, on the 2nd instant, into the hands of the enemy. The taking of that fort, already very unfortunate, inasmuch as it has occasioned the loss of a considerable *matériel* of artillery, and a great quantity of things of all kinds, appears to me to be an additional obstacle to the wishes of the duke of Dalmatia.

Immediately after the reduction of the fort of Saragossa, the enemy proceeded towards Jaca, and it is to be feared that general Paris will soon have before him a force greatly superior to his own.

September 9th, 1813.

The plan which the duke of Dalmatia has proposed to you is no doubt impracticable, at least, in the present state of affairs; but I can assure you for certain, that the marshal, when he conceived that plan, had not an accurate notion of your situation, and that he was not acquainted either with the force of the enemy, who is before you, or with that which you are able to oppose to him. The proposal of the duke of Dalmatia cannot, therefore, be considered as being founded on the real state of things, but on an imaginary state, which, on the first explanation could not fail to be reduced to its true value. Accordingly the marshal, as soon as he gained a more accurate knowledge of your situation, was the first to be sensible that the hope which he had conceived of a diversion on your part towards Saragossa must be at least deferred.

Signed, DUKE OF FELTRE.

September 13th, 1813.

Informed as you are by the letters of the marshal duke of Dalmatia, of the side assigned in his plans to the armies of Arragon and Catalonia, you must, on your side, and from this very moment, prepare to concur, in as far as you are concerned, in the general plan, and dispose your means in such manner as to be able, at the first notice which I shall transmit to you of the emperor's assent, to put yourself in motion with all your disposable troops, leaving all the fortresses of Catalonia and Arragon well guarded, well provisioned, and in the best possible state of defence.

As, however, notwithstanding the advantages of this plan, the consequences which might attend it in case of failure, are truly serious; as its execution is strictly circumscribed by a very narrow space of time, beyond which the object for which it is conceived is done away with; and as, finally, in what concerns the armies of Arragon and Catalonia, there may be obstacles which it is physically impossible to overcome, or dangers of manifest evidence, I request you, monsieur le maréchal, to acquaint me with every thing that is likely to influence the resolution which we are still in time to take on this subject, and to communicate to me without reserve whatever in your opinion may confirm the adoption of this plan, or ought to determine its postponement. The honour of the emperor's arms, and, to a certain degree, the safety of the empire, are here at stake.

Signed, DUKE OF FELTRE.

October 2nd, 1813.

The last despatches of your excellency will acquire a new degree of interest in the estimation of his majesty, from the plan of operations which you have sketched in them, and particularly from the assurance just transmitted to me by the duke of Dalmatia that he has eagerly adopted it, and consequently renounced that which he had himself proposed. I have lost no time in making the emperor acquainted with so satisfactory a concurrence; and all that is now requisite for putting this new plan in execution, is to be assured of the approbation of his majesty.

I have no doubt that the duke of Dalmatia wrote to you immediately

to signify his adhesion to the plan, and to acquaint you with all the minor arrangements which will be required for its execution.

On all the other points the duke of Dalmatia seems perfectly to agree with you: but there are some which he has not thoroughly examined, of which I am better able to judge than he, and on which I ought not to leave you in a false confidence. Among the principal bases of your plan of operations, your excellency introduces the new organization of the armies of Arragon and Catalonia; and in this organization you suppose that, with the aid of the conscripts, the levy of whom is going at this moment, and for whose repartition you have proposed to me a new plan, each of the corps respectively, will be raised to a certain degree of force, which will increase the total force of the army to the standard absolutely necessary for engaging in operations. Your excellency reckons upon these reinforcements as speedy; you expect their arrival by a specific time; and you even consider conscripts scarcely raised as soldiers fit to march and fight. Reason and prudence nevertheless forbid one to view things in this light. The levies of conscripts always present some deficit: the measures indispensable for their arming, equipment, and first instruction, always occasion some delay; and the plan of operation conceived by your excellency cannot be complete unless it has foreseen the various difficulties, and created means of conquering or counterbalancing them. At any rate, while awaiting the emperor's orders respecting this plan, all the preparations will be continued in the supposition of its speedy execution. I have requested his majesty to explain himself on this point, and I hope it will not be long before I receive an answer, which the marshal duke of Dalmatia desires not less anxiously than yourself, and which will put an end to all uncertainty.

Signed, DUKE OF FELTRE.

NOTE 26.

PAGE 350, VOL. II.

Correspondence of the Minister at War with marshal Suchet.

November 15, 1813.

On examining the dispositions which your excellency has already arranged, in case you should receive orders to march towards the lower Ebro, I perceive, like yourself, very serious difficulties in the execution of the plan, as at present combined. The frontier is totally uncovered; and I think, upon the whole, that whatever movement you might have to make with a corps of operations, the first and indispensable condition of such a movement would be to leave a strong garrison in Barcelona, a similar one at Figueras, and a good division at Puycerda.

Signed, DUKE OF FELTRE.

November 27, 1813.

The emperor has cast his eyes on the situation of the troops at Saguntum, Peniscola, and Tortosa, as well as on the strength of the garrisons which defend them, and his majesty has thought that it would be expedient to call in those garrisons, and blow up the fortresses.

The emperor desires also, that a report on the situation of Mequinenza and Lerida should be addressed to him. His majesty enquires whether you cannot make an operation for the purpose of communicating with those places, withdrawing their garrisons, destroying the artillery, and employing the powder in blowing up the fortifications. I have the honour to request your excellency to send me as soon as possible the report which his majesty wishes to have on this subject.

Signed, DUKE OF FELTRE.

NOTE 27.

PAGE 354, VOL. II.

Report of the general of division, Lamarque, to his excellency the commander-in-chief, count Decaen.

The messenger sent by your excellency from San Celoni, to inform me that you have given up your design of proceeding to Vich, not having reached me, it was my duty to conform to the orders contained in the note in cypher of the 3rd of July, which I received in the evening of the 5th.

Accordingly, I collected from fifteen to sixteen hundred men, and made them take provisions for six days; and at eight in the evening of the 6th, we crossed the hills of Llora and the Anzias, to post ourselves at the foot of the position of La Salud, from which I was to push on to the plateau of Vich. In order to reach it, we were obliged to ascend for two hours almost perpendicularly, and we arrived at a breach in the rock, from two to three feet wide, the only practicable pass in this part; a handful of resolute men might there stop an army; but the attack of the Miquelets, who preceded my column, was so brisk and unexpected, that the enemy's posts had scarcely time to fire a few musket-shots before they fled. At six in the evening of the 7th, after a march of more than twenty hours, my detachment was formed on the position of La Salud, which I carefully reconnoitred, as though I had foreseen that I should the next day have to contend there with almost the whole Spanish army.

On the 8th, after pushing a party upon Rupit, we marched towards Lesquirol; at the junction of the two roads of Grau and La Salud, we fell in with a Spanish regiment and about twenty horse; they

exchanged a few musket-shots and retired upon Lesquirol, striving to defend its bridge thrown across a deep ravine which separated us from it. I observed in the little plain on the other side, three battalions of the enemy and one hundred and fifty horse: as I occupied the commanding positions, I did not hesitate to attack in front, while some companies of voltigeurs, and our Miquelets, crossed by a wooden bridge a quarter of a league below the village. These troops, finding themselves overpowered, defended it but faintly; they retreated, closely pursued through the corn-fields by our Miquelets.

Not wishing to involve myself too much, and somewhat surprized to find the enemy in such force, I left six hundred men, commanded by captain Sempé of the gendarmerie, a distinguished officer, on the other side of the river, and caused two knolls which command the village to be strongly occupied: then, sure of my retreat, I followed the enemy half-way to Roda, where I took a position before a stream with deep banks, the passage of which was disputed by the enemy. From the heights which we occupied, I was two leagues and a quarter from Vich, which we saw distinctly. We discovered, at the same time, a mass of infantry, which I estimated at from two to three thousand men, on the plateau between Roda and Manleu. I had no doubt that it was part of the enemy's army fleeing before your column, and striving to reach Saint-Hippolyte. It was then four o'clock, and your excellency had intimated that you should be at Vich by noon at latest.

A faint fire of musketry continued, when, about six o'clock, the enemy advanced upon my right, and attacked, with two pieces of artillery and a howitzer, a knoll, occupied by a company of voltigeurs of the 60th. I hastened thither with two hundred men of the same regiment, and three companies of the 23rd of the line. The fire was very brisk, and the attacks were renewed till nine in the evening: we lost not an inch of ground.

I had executed your order, to follow the enemy if he retired, and I thought it would be all up with him the next day. What removed even the slightest doubt from my mind was, that we had heard, towards Vich, the report of cannon and a great fire of musketry, which we could not attribute to any other cause than your arrival. This firing of cannon and musketry is accounted for by the newspaper of that town, which states, that on the 8th, salutes were fired in all the cantonments, on account of victories alledged to have been gained in the North.

We were in this position, our centinels facing those of the enemy, and our vedettes touching one another, when, on the 9th, at a quarter to three in the morning, captain Travers, of the 81st, brought me an order to retire upon Gerona. That brave officer, who had set out with one hundred men, had been attacked in the village of St. Feliu, and fired upon part of the way, but had thought of nothing but executing his mission. I had not a second to lose; in a quarter of an hour it would be day-light. Our advanced posts fell back in silence; we passed through the town in good order, and my echelons were formed on the other side of the bridge, when the enemy appeared with heads of columns of twelve to fifteen hundred riflemen, who rushed upon us. I could have continued my movement; but it was necessary to cool their ardour, that I might afterwards be able to retire with some degree of quiet. The two battalions of the 60th awaited them at half musket-shot, and kept up so steady a fire from two ranks, that such part of them as had debouched was driven back into the village, leaving the bridge and the contiguous ground covered with dead and wounded.

We then continued our movement, carrying with us our wounded, our baggage, and even the convoy of cattle which I was taking to Vich. On reaching the point where the roads to Grau separate, I was obliged to hasten my march, the enemy having on my right a road to arrive at La Salud, and to cut off all retreat. I directed adjutant-commandant Monistrol to occupy all the ridges and little knolls with platoons of infantry and detached companies, and we passed rapidly through the defile of two leagues which separated us from La Salud, whilst at every step we stopped the enemy. It was impossible to attempt to descend: the stones rolled from the heights would alone have sufficed to destroy us.

I formed my fifteen hundred men, determined to fight any force that should present itself. This position left me hopes of receiving the succours which I was very sure your excellency would send me; it did not permit the enemy to take me in flank, or to turn me, having in our rear the immense perpendicular precipice up which we had climbed.

It was seven o'clock, when the enemy covered all the heights in much greater number than on the preceding evening. A prisoner informed me, that the three brigades of Manse, Fleires, and Villamil, a numerous cavalry, a reserve of baron d'Eroles', composed of a regiment which the Russians have sent back, that is to say, from

eight to nine thousand men, were at this point. The attack began with the greatest vivacity on the right and on the centre, but our troops sustained it with intrepidity: they were nevertheless forced to abandon a small eminence which connected our line. The chef-de-bataillon, Schepern, recovered it by charging with a demi-bataillon of the 60th. The enemy renewed his efforts, and I took three hundred men of the brave 23rd of the line to this point. The action was kept up several hours with the greatest obstinacy. The enemy was alternately driven back upon his reserves, and drove back our troops. It was there that the chef-de-bataillon, Sagne de Neufchatel, an officer of great experience, and of a courage at once cool and enterprizing, received a mortal wound.

The fire of musketry was general along the whole line. The enemy, repulsed on the right and the centre, brought up three battalions on our left, to which I sent colonel Lenud with part of his regiment and two hundred Wurtzburg troops. The conflict was long: the enemy in vain attempted several charges, and we maintained our ground. It was now eleven, and we had been fighting since three in the morning; the day before we had been engaged upwards of ten hours, and our two mountain pieces had ceased firing for want of ammunition. In all quarters there was an outcry for cartridges; the chests were empty; we had expended more than two hundred thousand: I ordered those of the cavalry to be taken, and such as the wounded had left, and some of the latter actually crawled back to the field of battle to carry them to their comrades. Such was our situation, when I was informed that the head of a column was seen coming up at the foot of the hill. I communicated this intelligence to the troops, who received it with shouts of *Vive l'empereur!* This shout, the companion of great joys, a protector in great dangers, was repeated with enthusiasm: our tirailleurs even ceased firing, and waved their shakos at the points of their bayonets. The enemy, disconcerted, ceased his also, and we had a respite of half an hour; I sent orderly after orderly to hasten the arrival of the troops; but from the nature of the ground, it took more than an hour to reach those whom we saw so near us; and it was two hours before they could lend us their assistance. The fire had meanwhile re-commenced; but, so far from making progress, the enemy had abandoned to us some positions, when, at two in the afternoon, general Beurmann arrived with the four battalions of the 23rd light and the 115th. Up to this time, fifteen hundred French, now reduced to fewer than twelve hundred,

had fought single-handed against so disproportionate a force. Profiting by an inequality of the ground, which concealed them from the view of the enemy, I formed those two fine regiments into close column, and all at once they debouched from the middle of our feeble line. Colonel Peyris fell upon the enemy with the 23rd light, the drums beating a charge, and the band playing alternately: all the men of my little detachment who had still any cartridges, moved upon the left. General Beurmann turned the right with part of the 115th, and placed in battery three pieces of mountain artillery, which fired grape-shot, and did great mischief. The enemy made, for some time, a most vigorous resistance. His cavalry would have charged our tirailleurs, but the chef-d'escadron, Saint-Simon, dashed upon it, with one hundred and fifty chasseurs of the 29th and some lancers of the gendarmerie, and pursued it to the foot of the knolls covered by our infantry. He was slightly wounded, as well as two officers of the company of *élite*. The enemy, no doubt conceiving that the whole army was there, commenced his retreat. This retreat was soon changed into a complete rout. He left behind his dead and great part of the wounded, halted but a moment at Lesquirol, and did not attempt to rally till he was more than six leagues from the field of battle.

I cannot bestow too high praise upon the troops: I wish I could mention all who were engaged. General Beurmann had a horse killed under him; captain Leveling, his aid-de-camp, was wounded; adjutant-commandant Monistrol signalized himself by his courage and coolness; colonel Lenud served with distinction; nothing could be more brilliant than colonel Peyris and the chef-d'escadron Saint-Simon; the chefs-de-bataillon Schepern and Delivany distinguished themselves; the former had a horse killed under him. I owe a tribute of praise to the chefs-de-bataillon Menestrier, Sagès, and Henrion. My aid-de-camp Escard was wounded; my two other aides-de-camp, Peyris and Poudens, had horses killed under them; captain Honoré, of the engineers, was always in the midst of the fire. I must not pass over in silence the activity of the commissary at war, Monier, or the zeal invariably manifested under difficult circumstances by M. Chopi, surgeon-major of the division: he was ably seconded by sub-assistant surgeon Bardon, of the 29th chasseurs, who had a horse killed while going to the relief of the wounded, and received a severe wound himself. Our loss amounts to no more than four hundred men, hors-de-combat; including thirty-one

officers, of whom only two were killed. In less than three weeks, three-fourths of these wounded will have rejoined their colours. The loss of the enemy must be considerable: he admits nine hundred men, and I think it may be stated at twelve hundred.

I shall have the honour, general, to address to you, applications on behalf of those who have found the most favourable occasion for distinguishing themselves; and I shall request you to submit them to his excellency the minister at war.

Accept the assurance of my respectful attachment,

The general of division,

Signed, Baron MAX. LAMARQUE.

Gerona, July 17, 1813.

P. S. I hear that in their flight many of the Spaniards threw themselves from the top of the rocks, and that the number of wounded which has reached Vich is so great, that it has been found necessary to place them in private houses, the hospitals being incapable of holding them all.

NOTE 28.

PAGE 359, VOL. II.

Despatch from marshal Suchet to the Minister at War.

I have the honour to announce to your excellency, that I shall make you acquainted with the changes effected in the fortress of Barcelona, since my arrival in this city, with respect to its defence and its provisionment. But in the first place, I must declare to you that till the period of the retreat of the armies from Spain, this place was not considered as in the first line; it had not been deemed necessary to put it into a state of complete defence, and this declaration I make solely with a view, that the difference of situation which results may not be imputed to negligence in any individual.

I shall begin with submitting to you the operations of the artillery. Agreeably to my orders, general Valée has daily, since the 23rd of August, employed one hundred artillery-horses for the purpose of arming Mont Jouich, and removing thither besides, to be placed in dépôt, seven hundred and fifty-six pieces of brass ordnance, of which more than one hundred pieces are 24-pounders, one hundred and fifty mortars, and five hundred 12-inch bombs; a million infantry cartridges, and a hundred thousand kilogrammes of ball. Five thousand gabions have been made and conveyed into the place, and materials collected for making two thousand more. One hundred and fifty men, instead of the fifteen hands previously kept at work, have been employed in the workshops of the arsenal: they have repaired the articles requisite for arming, and are preparing a change of them. A field-equipage of fifty pieces, and carriages and other things requisite for a siege-equipage of thirty, have been put in a state for service, and are disposable at Mont Jouich. The arming of

Mont Jouich and of the citadel is finished; the former has sixty-eight pieces of ordnance, the latter eighty; the body of the place will be armed with one hundred and thirty. General Valée has performed this operation with a celerity and a method, which I have several times had occasion to remark to your excellency. I must here repeat, that the powder is not in proportion to the arming and the projectiles; there would be required, in this case, from one hundred and fifty to two hundred thousand pounds; the supply, however, will be adequate to the firing of only seventy thousand shot.

The engineer department was at first engaged, about the end of August, in making fascines, gabions, and palisades. It has begun embattled tambours in the re-entering places-d'armes, which are on the point of being finished. In the different reconnaissances which I have made of the place, with general Maurice Mathieu and the officers of engineers, it has been considered indispensable to form a work on the hill of Mont Jouich, for the two-fold purpose of assuring to the garrison of the fort the possession of part of the hill, and preventing any cheminement on the front of the city, which is defended only by a wall of enclosure, ill flanked, and without ditches. This work is begun, as well as a line between the place and Mont Jouich, and a lunette of earth at the point where this line joins the covered way of the place. The company of miners of the army of Arragon is engaged in this operation; and these different works fulfil the object of your letter of the 23rd September. I have determined, besides, upon the occupation and arming of the walls of earth in the ditches of the town, between the bastion of St. Anthony and the intrenched bastion. These walls, which were prejudicial to the defence, will be converted into respectable batteries, which will pour cross-fires upon this whole front. That on the left will be faced sufficiently to secure it from a coup-de-main, and will even be tenable after the descent of the ditch; the sappers of Arragon are employed upon this. On all the important points the palisading will soon be completed; twenty thousand palisades and a great quantity of gabions have been brought into the place. The chef-de-bataillon Lafaille, who commands the engineers of the place, is an active and zealous officer.

The stores have been greatly augmented since the arrival of the army of Arragon. This result had, nevertheless, been represented to me as impossible to be obtained. Your excellency will have perceived, from my last letters, that in this particular, as in every other, I have been obliged to see with my own eyes, and to direct every thing

myself: this has enabled me to ascertain, from the accounts of the receivers, that the receipts of the months of August and September surpassed all expectation. I have desired the states-general, which I shall assemble, to send you also exact statements of the receipts and expenditure, and of what is still left.

You will observe, that if the emperor should order the reduction of the place, as the hints given by your excellency afforded me occasion to mention in my despatch of the 13th, eleven hundred thousand rations would suffice for provisioning the citadel and Mont Jouich for a year, and that consequently two millions of rations, of all kinds, would furnish the army with the means of retaining the positions in which it is established; whereas if I am to maintain myself there, I must expend in the purchase of subsistence the small funds yet left in the chest of Valencia. To this advantage is attached another of great importance under the present circumstances, that of rendering five thousand more men disposable.

Signed, The MARSHAL DUKE D'ALBUFERA.

NOTE 29.

PAGE 371, VOL. II.

Despatch from marshal Suchet to the Minister at War.

Gerona, February 4, 1814.

I waited at Barcelona till the evening of the 31st, for an answer to my letter of the 15th, despatched at nine in the morning of the 18th, from Perpignan, by express. Concluding from your silence that the emperor adopted none of my proposals, I resolved to leave Barcelona, and proceed to upper Catalonia.

I left Barcelona well armed, and supplied with every thing till the end of August, with a garrison of seven thousand five hundred French, under the command of the general of division Habert, and the generals of brigade Lefevre and Saint-Clair. Your excellency had intimated in your letter of the 5th January, that you would appoint a governor for Barcelona. As you have not sent one, I have thought it right to leave there the general-of-division Habert, with a commission as commandant, which he has exercised for two months past; and I hope he will strictly follow the instructions which I have left him, and honourably defend the important fortress of Barcelona.

M. Treillard, the prefect, has expressed a wish to continue at his post: I have applauded his resolution.

I have thrown into Hostalrich a garrison of three hundred and fifty men, provisioned for six months.

I have formed the rest of the army into two divisions of infantry, and a brigade of cavalry, forming twelve thousand nine hundred and seventy-one men in line. I am stationing these troops in the environs of Gerona, to ascertain the movements of the enemy, and to act according to the forces which he may present.

I am going to take measures for drawing from Montpellier as many conscripts as I can, to strengthen the battalions that I have left, and thus render my little corps-d'armée more respectable.

I had hoped to bring to the emperor forty battalions, inured to war. Circumstances have obliged me to leave ten of them at Barcelona.

I have sent off twelve for Lyons, and thus I find myself disappointed in all my hopes. If the ten thousand conscripts you mention arrive soon, I shall use the utmost efforts to train them speedily and to constitute a new army of from twenty to twenty-five thousand men.

Signed, The Marshal Duke d'Albufera.

From the Minister at War to marshal Suchet.

February 11, 1824.

The emperor orders me to acquaint you, that he leaves you carte-blanche relative to Barcelona, of which you may keep what you please, provided nothing prevents or retards the arrival at Lyons of the troops which are required of you. On this occasion, I must inform you that the emperor, as he has not heard a word concerning what is become of the treaty with Ferdinand, presumes that M. de S. Carlos is detained somewhere or other; and in this state of things, his majesty has determined to propose to king Ferdinand to repair incognito to Barcelona, and to deliver the fortresses to him, on condition that the French garrisons shall be sent home. While waiting to know whether king Ferdinand will accept this proposal, the execution of which must be conducted with all possible celerity and the most profound secrecy, I am anxious to apprize your excellency of it, that you may, on your part, make all the necessary arrangements for the purpose, and that at the moment of king Ferdinand's arrival, every thing may be disposed for the march of the garrisons which shall be sent to you, and for their union with the army which you command. I request you to answer me without delay on this point, and to let me know the measures which you may have thought fit to take in order to assure this important operation. I conclude this letter by repeating the last orders of the emperor on this subject: do what you please, but above all things, let troops arrive at Lyons.

Signed, Duke of Feltre.

NOTE 30.

PAGE 374, VOL. II.

The following extract is taken from a narrative, accompanied by a plan, of the siege of Monzon, in 1813 and 1814, printed at Montpelier in 1823. We give the journal of the siege, preceded by some notes, drawn up from memory, by Saint-Jacques, since his return to France. This private of engineers had been charged with the direction of the works of defence, and also with the distribution of provisions, and the superintendence of the articles of subsistence. His notes will shew what resources he contrived to draw from his own funds, and to what a degree he combined with the talents for conceiving and that for executing an operation.

Notes furnished by the private of engineers, Saint-Jacques.

On the first day of the siege, as soon as I perceived the enemy, I brought into the castle from the town four bullocks, for the sick and wounded during the siege, and more than a dozen bags of sugar, which served us to make drink during the last days of the siege.

At one time, when we had neither wine nor brandy, our beverage consisted of water, vinegar, and sugar, all boiled together. I contrived this beverage to prevent the garrison from falling ill from fatigue. But we were not reduced to this drink till the last fortnight. I had stinted the allowance of sugar to four ounces each man per day, exclusively of the miners, to whom I gave as much as they liked.

During the whole siege I fixed the allowance of water at twenty-five bottles per day for fifteen men, exclusively of the miners.

Towards the end of the first fortnight of the siege, I intimated to the commandant and the two officers of gendarmerie, that it was necessary that their horses should be killed, in order to spare the

water. They required of me a written declaration to this effect, which I did not refuse them. The same day the horses were killed. They were reimbursed for them at Toulouse, agreeably to the orders of the marshal duke of Albufera.

At the commencement of the siege, I found myself in the fort with four shovels, two masons' hammers, two saws, three hatchets, and three pickaxes. I had neither candles nor baskets for the mines. I had neither anvil, nor charcoal, for repairing the implements.

When I perceived that the enemy shewed an intention to attack us by mines, I applied to the garrison for volunteers to work with me as miners. Twelve gendarmes, the corporal of artillery, and two gunners, offered themselves for such times as they should not be on duty at their batteries.

As soon as the enemy had begun to work his mines, I was obliged to have the bullocks killed, that I might get their tallow to make candles for the counter-mines. These candles were made by a gendarme.

I appointed a gunner, who was a smith, to repair the implements: he used a bomb for his anvil, and a goat-skin for bellows. I had charcoal made for the repair of the tools with the wood in store.

The first two mines which I took from the enemy furnished me with pickaxes, three masons' hammers, four shovels, and ten earth baskets.

It frequently happened that I employed the whole garrison, night and day, to protect the miners and other attacks. I then set the women of the garrison to work, to clear away the earth from the counter-mines. At other times, it was they who had to make bread. I also made them pull to pieces the infantry cartridges which we were obliged to undo, in order to obtain the powder necessary for the counter-mines.

In the night between the 5th and 6th December, 1813, the enemy came to the foot of the fort with ladders to storm. I prepared on the parapets pieces of wood and heaps of stones, procured by the demolition of the convent of the Trinity, which I had brought beforehand into the fort, and which rendered us good service on this occasion, since we had no further trouble than to push down upon the enemy, stones, grenades, and hand-howitzers.

This attack is not mentioned in the journal of the siege. Many other things have been omitted. We had so much to do at once, that we had not always time to write down every thing.

I had fifty slings made beforehand, for hurling stones: and several of the soldiers threw grenades with their slings, which answered extremely well.

We had a considerable quantity of provisions left at the surrender of the fort, excepting wine and brandy, our stock of which had been exhausted for a fortnight.

Journal of the siege of Monzon in Arragon, from the 28th September, 1813, to the 14th of February, 1814.

On the 27th September 1813, the enemy came and encamped on the plateau, called La Fontaine, at the distance of nine hundred toises from the castle. The next night he took position in the town.

The 28th at six, A.M., the enemy attacked our advanced posts. We attempted to drive him from his positions: but he was too strong, and we were obliged to retire. We maintained ourselves in the ruins of the old fort, till the 10th October.

October 10th, the enemy began a battery on the point of the plateau of the powder-works, three hundred toises from the castle.

The 11th, at six A.M., the enemy commenced the siege, with a very brisk fire from his battery, armed with one 12-pounder, and a six-inch howitzer. The fire lasted with the same vivacity till evening: we killed several of the enemy, and demolished his battery.

The 12th, the enemy sent a flag of truce to make proposals, if we would surrender. We answered that we would not.

The 13th, the *garde du génie* Saint-Jacques, perceived that the enemy, availing himself of the scarp of the ravine, which separates the castle from the plateau of the powder-works, began a mine on the side next to the old fort.

The 16th, the *garde du génie* collected all the tools which were in the castle, and began, in the communication leading from the postern to the old fort, a countermine, with ten gendarmes, working as miners, and one gunner.

The 21st October, the Spaniards commenced a battery on the point of the old fort.

The 23rd, we threw several howitzers at the enemy. Ogliero, the gunner, was wounded.

The 26th, at six A.M., the enemy unmasked the fire of his battery,

It was armed with one 16-pounder, two 12-pounders, and a 6-inch howitzer. We answered it briskly with two 8-pounders. At 8, A.M. one of the enemy's 12-pounders was dismounted. Their battery was partly demolished; several of their gunners were killed and wounded.

The same day, Saint-Jacques perceived that the besiegers had a second mine, which, like the first, was directed against the fort. The entry to it was about fifteen feet distant from the first. He determined, therefore, to direct his countermine in such a manner, that it should be between the two mines of the enemy.

The 28th, Saint-Jacques judging that his breach was sufficiently advanced to reach and destroy the enemy's mines, caused the mine to be charged. The mine being charged, the commandant of the fort sent a flag of truce, to see if the enemy was disposed to suspend his works. They returned for answer—let each defend himself. Though the countermine was charged, Saint-Jacques took care to keep the pick-axes going, that the enemy might not suppose that the counter-mine was charged.

The 29th October, Saint-Jacques proposed to the commandant to make a false attack, and then beat a retreat, to draw the enemy over the counter-mine which was charged. The commandant complied with the suggestion of the *garde du génie;* and at the moment when the enemy were crowded together over the mine, (about 11 P.M.) the *garde du génie,* set fire to the mine, and blew it up. The explosion destroyed the enemy's two mines, and a great number of soldiers and peasants perished in and over them.

The 2nd November, Saint-Jacques perceived that the enemy was at work at two new mines. He judged that the first was considerably advanced towards the wall of the fort. He debouched in consequence from his grand communication, cut a trench of some yards, and commenced a new counter-mine, for the purpose of meeting the enemy's, and taking his new mine by main force. But when he was within fifty or sixty feet, the nature of the ground obliged him to relinquish his intention of taking it by assault. He therefore determined on blowing it up, and caused the mine to be charged immediately.

The 25th at P.M., the mine was fired: the explosion was so great, that it destroyed the enemy's mine, and the miners and peasants perished in it.

The 26th November, we dug in the trench previously opened a well sixteen feet deep, to proceed against the other mine of the enemy's, at which he had been working for twenty-five days past.

The 3rd December, at 2 P.M., we forced our way by our countermine into the enemy's mine, by means of howitzers, hand-grenades, and the fire of musketry. The enemy made a vigorous resistance, so that the firing was very brisk for two hours. Five miners, and several grenadiers and peasants were killed. We there found several tools which we secured.

The same day we made ourselves masters of sixty feet of the enemy's mine, and three branches. These branches were not more than forty feet from the wall of the fort. Saint-Jacques and Hivert, gunner, having entered the enemy's mine, those brave men, though alone, set fire to their howitzers and hand-grenades by means of a candle only, and succeeded in driving the enemy, in spite of the fire of small-arms, from the grenadiers in his mine.

In the night between the 4th and 5th, the *garde du génie*, having perceived that the enemy had begun several other mines, had the trench lengthened some feet, opened a new well eight feet deep, and began a branch to meet the enemy.

The 9th December, the *garde du génie* perceived that the enemy was beginning another mine, on the point near that part of the town, which is called the place of St. John, and directing it under the battery of 8-pounders, and under the barrack of the great reservoir. The *garde du génie* then had a well dug in the commandant's cellar, to meet this new mine of the enemy's, by means of the branch.

The 15th December, at 4 P.M., our branch from the well met a mine of the enemy's. Not being strong enough to resist beyond the fort during the night, and being obliged to abandon the mine to the enemy, and to retire to the fort till the next morning, before leaving, the *garde du génie* directed the corporal of artillery to charge a howitzer with five ounces of sulphur, and discharged it into the mine, to prevent the enemy from working during the night; and that the stench of the sulphur might remain in the mine, and hinder the enemy from returning to it, he caused the mouth to be closely stopped up.

The 16th December, the *garde du génie* descended from the fort with his miners, the garrison being under arms, and on the ramparts to protect them. He re-entered the mine broken through the night before, and soon found the communication of the enemy's three mines. At 10 A.M., they fell in with the enemy, who was intrenched in the general communication of his three mines. They drove him back

from his intrenchments, took the bayonets which protruded from the loop-holes of bags of earth, and pulled down the bags and the wooden stanchions. They made themselves masters of the three mines, by means of howitzers and hand-grenades, and pursued the enemy till out of his mines. The firing lasted four hours under ground. Meanwhile we continued the trench, in order to occupy the ground above the branches, and to cut them off from the three mines: and, in spite of the fire of the enemy's artillery and musketry, we succeeded in cutting by sapping the top of the branches, and in preventing the entry of the enemy by making the earth fall into them. The enemy's miners, whose retreat was thereby intercepted, were buried under the ruins of their mine, as well as the soldiers and the peasants.

In this action Saint Jacques was wounded in the head, by a fragment of a howitzer. A gendarme on the rampart had his leg carried away above the knee, by a cannon ball, and died in consequence. The corporal of artillery, by his side, was wounded in the right arm by a musket-ball.

We found in the mines and took a great number of tools, sand-bags, and baskets for removing earth, of which we were entirely destitute, and which did us good service.

We immediately fell to work to destroy and barricade the mines with fir timbers; but the *garde du génie* preserved different parts of them towards the fort, to make use of them upon occasion.

The distances of the four branches taken from the enemy on the 16th December, from the foot of the wall of the fort, were: the first nine feet, the second twenty-five, the third forty-five, and the fourth from twenty-five to thirty feet.

The *garde du génie* made a communication from the commandant's cellar to these mines and branches.

Our branch had met, at the distance of nine feet from the rampart, an enemy's mine which embarrassed us a good deal in continuing our progress towards the enemy's mine. The *garde du génie* then began a second branch on the left, twenty-five feet from the other, and caused it to be charged.* While this business was going on, he let the pick-axes continue working, to keep the enemy's miners in their mine. At 11 A.M., he set fire to it. The explosion was so violent as to form a considerable funnel; it destroyed a great length of the enemy's mine,

* We were obliged to destroy ten thousand cartridges to complete the charge of this mine.

and their miners perished. After this explosion, the *garde du génie* caused the branch to be continued.

On the 9th of January, Saint Jacques, with Hivert, the gunner, left the fort at 11 P.M., with two howitzers, six hand-grenades, and a lighted match in a tin tube. Having softly approached an air-hole in the enemy's mine, within half pistol-shot of the post which was guarding that mine, they lighted their howitzers and grenades, and throwing them into the hole, killed several grenadiers who were lying down in the mine to shelter themselves from the cold.

The 12th January, we fell in with the mine which the enemy was carrying under the battery of 8-pounders. We burst into it with two great petards, which overthrew the enemy's miners. The same day we demolished ninety-six feet of that mine, in spite of the fire of the batteries, and of fifty grenadiers who guarded the mine under ground and outside. Next day we descended and demolished the remaining fifty feet.

The 15th January, the *garde du génie* perceived that the enemy had begun a branch of a trench which debouched in a street of the town; that this branch passed under the ruins of the convent of the Trinity, and ran towards the first gate of the fort; and that he had even begun quite close to the first barrier a new mine, which he was directing under the powder-magazine.

The 10th January, the enemy began a new mine to run under the store house for provisions. The *garde du génie* immediately had a well, forty-seven feet deep, dug in the grand communication, and began a branch to meet this new mine.

Between the 20th and 22nd January, the enemy formed a parallel running from the first barrier to the angle of the advanced work, and began a new mine.

The 25th, he began a third, which he directed under the advanced work and the lower battery.

The 2nd February, the *garde du génie* caused several howitzers and hand-grenades to be charged. He had the post of the advanced work reinforced, and a hole made in the wall of the advanced work to descend into the ditch. At the same time he had a small ladder prepared to mount the wall of the ditch at the extremity of the enemy's trench, which ran from the first barrier to the angle of the advanced work, and which the enemy formed merely for the purpose of making his three mines debouch there.

These preparations were finished about 2 P.M. The *garde du*

génie, two gunners, and four gendarmes acting as miners, then made a sortie by the ditch of the advanced work. After mounting the little ladder, and entering the enemy's trench, they hid themselves behind a heap of earth, which the enemy had thrown out of his mines.

A moment afterwards, part of the enemy's miners and grenadiers being in the trench basking in the sun, they lighted their howitzers and hand-grenades, threw them into the trench, and dashing forward with the bayonet, made themselves masters of the three mines which the enemy was forced to abandon, in spite of the battery on the point of the old fort. Two French deserters in the enemy's service, a priest, and several grenadiers, were killed or wounded in this attack. These miners were guarded by twenty-five grenadiers. We took several tools in them.

The 14th February, we entered the mine. The combat under ground lasted an hour, and ended in our driving the enemy from his mine. He there lost three of his miners who were killed.

The 18th February, the enemy sent a flag of truce to require of us to surrender ourselves prisoners, and declaring that Lerida and Mequinenza were no longer occupied by the French. We demanded permission to send an officer of the garrison to Lerida, accompanied by a Spanish escort, to ascertain whether the French had abandoned those two places, and required that a Spanish officer should remain with us till ours had returned.

Our officer, having come back, declared that the intelligence was true. We refused to surrender ourselves prisoners, and insisted on marching out with arms and baggage, and forty cartridges in each knapsack, and on taking with us one piece of cannon loaded, and with lighted match, all along the road to the French army in Catalonia, with sixty rounds of ammunition, thirty of grape, and thirty balls.

The enemy assented to all our demands: but unfortunately for us, he afterwards violated the laws of war. We arrived at Lerida according to the conditions of the capitulation. The enemy being there five thousand strong, with several pieces of cannon, he forced us to surrender ourselves prisoners, and after stripping us of our baggage, he conducted us to Tarragona.

During the four months and a half which this siege was sustained against three thousand of Mina's troops, the loss of the enemy amounted to four hundred and sixty put *hors de combat*: ninety thousand francs were expended on the works of the attack.

On our side we had but ten men killed and wounded.

NOTE 31.

PAGE 379, VOL. II.

Letters from the Minister at War to marshal Suchet, duke of Albufera.

March 3rd, 1814.

I have laid before the emperor the despatches which you did me the honour to address to me, under date of the 19th of February ult. His majesty desires that you would open a negociation with the Spaniards to offer to deliver up to them all the fortresses (Figueras excepted) that we hold in Arragon, Catalonia, and the province of Valencia, on condition that they will send home all the troops composing their garrisons. Such a convention would be an important service under the present circumstances, inasmuch as it would give back to the emperor a great number of veteran troops. I hope your excellency will omit no means for succeeding in this negociation, and fulfilling the expectation of his majesty in this particular.

The emperor desires me at the same time, to repeat to your excellency the order which I had the honour to transmit to you on the 1st current, directing you to send to Lyons one division of the army which you command.

March 4th, 1814.

I had the honour to transmit to your excellency on the 2nd current, a fresh order from his majesty, enjoining you to send off by post to Lyons, a second column of ten thousand infantry.

Perfectly aware of the situation in which the eastern frontier of the Pyrenees would be placed by so considerable a diminution of the army under your command, I immediately called the attention of the emperor to the necessity of replacing, at least in part, the resources which are thus taken from you.

Till his majesty shall communicate to me his views on this subject, I think that you are sufficiently authorised by your present position to call in and collect around you all the resources of the departments nearest to the frontiers, such as the Ariège, the Aude, and the eastern Pyrenees, and particularly the levies, the organisation of which general Lafitte is superintending.

I have acquainted the duke of Dalmatia with the instructions which I have addressed on this head to your excellency, and I request you to give orders in consequence to the general commanding the 10th military division.

March 6th, 1814.

Agreeably to an order which I have this moment received from the emperor, I have just caused passports to be delivered for prince Ferdinand and the princes of Spain, who will immediately leave Valençay and proceed to the army which you command.

It is his majesty's intention that you should send the prince forthwith to Barcelona, and cause all the fortresses in which we have garrisons to be delivered up to him, after you have taken sufficient precautions to ensure the return of these garrisons to France.

On this point the emperor desires me to repeat, through the duke of Bassano, the order which I yesterday transmitted, and which authorises you to treat with the Spanish generals for the delivery of these same places. His majesty seems to have no doubt that the Spanish generals will subscribe conditions so advantageous. The intelligence which your excellency gives me from Madrid, in your despatches of the 24th of February, leads me to hope that the difficulties which you taught me to anticipate are removed, and that the arrival of the prince will completely decide the success of the negociation.

The emperor desires me to repeat on this occasion the order which he has given me, and which I had yesterday the honour to address to you, relative to the departure of a new column for Lyons.

Signed, DUKE OF FELTRE.

NOTE 32.

PAGE 381, VOL. II.

Copy of the Note delivered at Figueras by marshal the duke of Albufera to the duke of San Carlos.

At the time when the Peninsula was almost entirely subdued, the Spanish government found itself necessitated to confine all its prisoners in an island. The French, who have been sent to Cabrera have there been enduring, for five years, the severest sufferings. Without clothes and without shelter, exposed to the cold in winter, and scorched by the sun in summer, they have been obliged to make holes for themselves in the ground: they have no other provisions than what are brought to them every two or three days, and these supplies are frequently delayed. Many have died: some, driven to despair, have attempted upon planks to reach the coast of Valencia or Catalonia. It may be said, that no where in Europe, excepting in the prison-ships of England, are the prisoners worse off.

The present circumstances certainly permit an end to be put to treatment so much at variance with the Spanish character and the right of nations. The duke of Albufera proposes that a negociation shall be entered into for an exchange of the prisoners at Cabrera, and that meanwhile permission be granted to send them a vessel with a supply of shoes, shirts, great coats, and some other of the most indispensable articles of apparel.

Should this proposal for exchange appear premature, or too difficult of execution under the present circumstances, the marshal duke of Albufera requests the duke of San Carlos to have the goodness to obtain permission for the removal of the French prisoners from Cabrera to the continent, where their condition, from this change alone, will be considerably meliorated.

Figueras, March 23rd, 1814.

To his excellency the duke of San Carlos.

Translation of a note sent to the marshal duke of Albufera at Figueras, by the duke of San Carlos.

Gerona, March 25th, 1814.

The king offers to your excellency to cause the garrisons of the fortresses of Lerida and Tortosa, which are to be delivered to the troops of his majesty, to be sent as speedily as possible to the army under the command of your excellency: he offers also to cause the negociation opened for the delivery to the same troops of the fortresses of Saguntum, Peniscola, Barcelona and its forts, and Hostalrich, to be concluded.

Signed, DUKE OF SAN CARLOS.

Written in the margin,

I approve this offer,

FERDINAND.

Letter from the duke of San Carlos to the marshal duke of Albufera.

Gerona, March 26th, 1814.

I receive with particular pleasure, the agreeable letter from your excellency, dated yesterday, 8 P.M. and I congratulate myself exceedingly to learn that his royal highness the infant Don Carlos is arrived, and that, after inspecting the fortress of Figueras, he will have the satisfaction to rejoin this day his august brother and his uncle. The character of your excellency is too well known to me to permit me to doubt, for a moment, the attentions and homage which your excellency has paid to his royal highness. The king, my master, has read your excellency's letter, and orders me to express his royal gratitude and the esteem which he feels for your person.

As his majesty, on account of the roads, will pursue his journey along the sea-coast, and will pass near Barcelona and its forts, I request your excellency to have the goodness to send me, as soon as possible, an order for the commandant of that place, to respect the carriages of his majesty and his retinue. I shall take care to give timely notice of the passage of his majesty to this commandant.

Signed, DUKE OF SAN CARLOS.

NOTE 33.

PAGE 383, VOL II.

Extracts from the correspondence of the Minister at War, the marshal duke of Dalmatia, and the marshal duke of Albufera.

Letter from the minister to the marshal duke of Albufera.

March 1st, 1814.

Monsieur le maréchal,

An order of the emperor's which I have the honour to address to your excellency in a letter of this day, directs you to despatch immediately by post to Lyons a fresh column of ten thousand infantry.

I can only repeat to your excellency that this order must be executed with the utmost celerity, and that the least delay may influence the operations which his majesty is directing in person.

I know, that by the departure of these troops the eastern frontier of the Pyrenees will be left unprotected; but the silence which his majesty observes on this point will tell you plainly enough, that when the heart of the empire is threatened, we must not hesitate about the temporary relinquishment of remoter parts. It is left to me to compensate for this silence by intimating that the state of affairs authorises you to lay down your own plan of operations, and to employ all your remaining resources in the manner which shall appear most beneficial to the service of his majesty. If, by collecting all that will be disposable about you and in the frontier departments, you can keep the enemy before you in check for some time, you will have fulfilled the expectation of his majesty. Your means are certainly not such as we could wish; but your military talents and a name long formidable to the enemy must be considered as an equivalent in these circumstances.

I think then that, with the small resources left you, the only course

you can pursue is to concentrate your forces and to keep the field, without distributing in the fortresses (excepting those which it is indispensable to keep) troops which would be lost for the operations, and would not check the enemy.

Signed, DUKE OF FELTRE.

Letter from the marshal duke of Dalmatia to the marshal duke of Albufera.

Vic de Bigorre, March 12th, 1814.

Monsieur le maréchal,

Since the letter which I had the honour to write to you on the 28th of February last, the army has been engaged in fresh actions at Cazères and at Aire, and I have moved it upon the upper Adour, between Vic de Bigorre and Plaisance, to give it a few days' rest, and to prepare it for marching anew against the enemy, who have concentrated their army on both banks of the Adour, towards Aire and Barcelona. I begin my movement to-day.

The enemy have sent parties towards the lower Garonne, but I have not yet heard that they have despatched columns thither with a view to make themselves masters of Bordeaux. I hope that my movement will oblige all these detachments to return.

Signed, THE MARSHAL DUKE OF DALMATIA.

Letter from the marshal duke of Dalmatia to the marshal duke of Albufera.

Martres, March 22nd, 1814.

Monsieur le maréchal,

I have the honour to inform you that I am proceeding with the army upon Toulouse, where I hope to arrive to-morrow. I have kept upon the Adour, ascending towards the sources of that river as much as possible. There has been some action every day, but no general affair since I last wrote to you. There is too great a disproportion of force for me to be able to keep my ground without a good line.

I do not think that the enemy mean to cross the Garonne above Toulouse; and every thing leads me to believe that they will direct

their operations upon the lower Garonne, where they have already effected a passage towards Langon, which has had no result, the troops which had gone to the right bank having precipitately re-crossed to join their army at the time of my last movement. Being at Toulouse, I shall be better able to prevent his engaging in new enterprises of that nature; and I shall moreover have it in my power to provide the troops with shoes and other indispensable necessaries, of which they are in urgent want.

Signed, THE MARSHAL DUKE OF DALMATIA.

Letter from the Minister of War to the marshal duke of Albufera.

March 15th, 1814.

Monsieur le maréchal,

Your excellency must have been informed, from the direct communication which you have with the army of the marshal duke of Dalmatia, of the general action which that marshal had on the 27th of February last near Orthez with the army under Lord Wellington, and of the necessity under which he found himself, after a bloody battle, but otherwise honourable to the troops of his majesty, to effect his retreat to Aire and thence to Rabastens. On the 11th current the marshal still had his head-quarters in that town.

The marshal, in taking this direction, which is conformable with the views of the emperor, hoped to cover both Toulouse and Bordeaux, ready to attack the enemy in flank if he attempted to march upon Toulouse by Auch, or to fall upon his rear if he proceeded towards Bordeaux, not supposing that he would dare to weaken himself by sending a detachment to the latter city.

It appears, however, that with the aid of several Spanish corps recently arrived from Spain, the English heavy cavalry which had been left on the Ebro, and perhaps too of some reinforcements from England, lord Wellington has been enabled, without materially weakening himself, and even without the duke of Dalmatia being apprised of the circumstance, to detach a corps under the command of general Beresford, who marched by Mont Marsan and Roquefort, upon Bordeaux.

It is with regret I have to inform you, that on the approach of the enemy, general L'Huillier was obliged to evacuate that great city

with the few troops under his command, and that the English entered it on the 12th instant.

This most unfortunate event, but which it was difficult to foresee, will augment the difficulties of the situation of the duke of Dalmatia, and by its re-action influence that of your excellency. It appears important to me that under such circumstances you should more and more combine your operations with his, and that you should lend each other that mutual support which so critical a juncture requires.

I am impatient to learn the arrival of the princes of Spain on the frontiers, the effect which their presence will produce, and that which must result from the negociations which you have been authorized to commence with the Spanish generals for the delivery of the fortresses (Figueras excepted) and the return home of the garrisons.

Signed, DUKE OF FELTRE.

Letter of the marshal duke of Albufera to the marshal duke of Dalmatia.

March 27th, 1814.

Monsieur le maréchal,

By your last despatch you inform me that you are marching with your army to Toulouse. This disposition, which leaves my right quite uncovered, would seem to render it imperative upon me to re-cross the Pyrenees without loss of time, and to proceed towards Narbonne. You give me room to hope that the enemy will not attempt to pass the Garonne above Toulouse. Reduced to twelve battalions and six squadrons, I keep my force collected above Figueras, to hold the enemy in check, to favour the evacuation of the stores, and to afford time for concluding the negociation for the return of our garrisons and the delivery of the fortresses. If events had not retarded the execution of this last measure, the proceedings of the Cortes and the English would have been thwarted, and those troops would have been already in line. The return of king Ferdinand cannot but revive our hopes; but it will take time, and I fear that events are too urgent to terminate successfully.

I charge the chef-de-bataillon Mrozinski, to deliver this despatch to your excellency: he is a trustworthy officer, to whom I request you to communicate your opinion of Wellington's plans, and on what point you purpose to retreat, in case (though that I think far distant) the enemy should succeed in forcing you upon

Toulouse. If I have determined to ask you these two questions, it is only because it is necessary for me to obtain accurate information, that I may know what course to pursue, and forward ammunition beforehand to Narbonne and Montpellier.

Signed, THE MARSHAL DUKE OF ALBUFERA.

Letter from the marshal duke of Dalmatia to the marshal duke of Albufera.

March 29, 1814.

Monsieur le maréchal,

The chef-de-bataillon Mrozinski has delivered to me the letter which you did me the honour to write me from Perpignan on the 27th. I have detained him only to afford him time to take a few hours' rest, and shall send him back to you immediately.

I thank you for having been pleased to communicate to me your delivery of king Ferdinand to the Spaniards. Let us hope that this event will contribute to alter the state of affairs in the south of the empire: it is only to be regretted that it did not take place some months ago. I have no doubt the king's presence must have produced a great excitement amongst the Spaniards who are opposed to us; but I have great doubts whether those who are with lord Wellington's army will prove quite so tractable; certain it is, that he exercises a very powerful influence over them, although he sets little value upon their co-operation. Should you, however, procure the return of our garrisons and our prisoners of war in Spain, you will have rendered a most important service.

You are probably aware that the emperor has directed the formation of an army on the Dordogne, to be called the army of the Garonne, of which he has given the command to general Decaen. Six thousand of the last troops which left Catalonia under the orders of general Beurmann constitute the nucleus of that army, and are to reach Libourne between the 29th and 31st of the present month. I hope this junction of forces in the west will be productive of a salutary effect, and arrest the enemy's advance towards the lower Garonne. I further hope that a useful diversion will spring out of it, by means of which we may recover possession of Bordeaux.

The enemy, who had sent twelve or fourteen thousand men towards Bordeaux, have left in that city a garrison of only four hundred

English and six hundred Portuguese, besides stationing two or three thousand men between the Garonne and the Dordogne. The remainder have come up to join lord Wellington, who is before Toulouse with the whole of his army.

I have had intrenchments thrown up in the suburb of Saint-Cyprien, forming a tête-de-pont, but do not apprehend an attack from the enemy in that quarter, unless he is prepared to sacrifice a part of his army. It is probable, however, that he will endeavour to cross the Garonne above Toulouse, although he manifested, the night before last, an intention of crossing it two leagues above the town. When he shall have effected the passage, I shall advance to meet him, however great may be the disproportion of forces, as it is of the utmost importance that I should not be forestalled at Montauban, where I have also caused a tête-de-pont to be established.

I have not heard of the enemy's having sent any troops across to the right bank of the Garonne, in the direction of the Ariege. I am even of opinion that they will not attempt to do so, as it could not lead to any result, it being their object to follow all my movements, to remain united, and not to keep at too great a distance from the coast. I do not think, therefore, that they will advance in your direction, unless I should be under the necessity of proceeding thither, a course I am determined as much as possible to avoid resorting to.

I have to make head against very numerous forces, especially in point of cavalry; some of the inhabitants who have seen it file off, estimate its numbers at twenty thousand men, consisting of all the English cavalry, including the royal guard, the whole of the Portuguese cavalry, and three Spanish regiments, which have even remained in the vicinity of the fortresses, whilst we have no more than two thousand light horse to oppose to this mass of cavalry. The disproportion in the infantry and artillery is equally great.

If it were possible for me to remain a month on the Garonne, I should bring into our ranks six or eight thousand conscripts, who are at present an incumbrance to me, and are even in want of muskets; I am expecting some from Perpignan with the utmost impatience.

I have left at the disposal of general Lafitte a legion of the upper Garonne, seven hundred strong, and have written to push on a detachment towards Saint-Gaudens and Saint-Martory, for the purpose of annoying the enemy's rear and collecting information. He may accomplish this object without encountering very great obstacles on his way, and will be enabled, at the same, time to cover the department of the Ariege.

Signed, The MARSHAL DUKE OF DALMATIA.

Letter from the marshal duke of Dalmatia to the marshal duke of Albufera.

31st March, 1814.

Monsieur le maréchal,

I hasten to inform you that the enemy threw, last night, a bridge over the Garonne, above its point of junction with the Ariège, and sent across a column of troops which is estimated at ten thousand men, including two thousand cavalry and some pieces of artillery. This column has ascended the left bank of the Ariège, taking the direction of Hauterive and Cintegabelle. I have sent detachments to reconnoitre, but am ignorant whether it will continue its movement towards Pamiers and Foix, or proceed to Villefranche for the purpose of turning my left and cutting off my communication with lower Languedoc.

I have caused general Lafitte to be apprised of that movement, which is perhaps nothing more than a feint attack, and am preparing to offer battle to the enemy in the vicinity of Toulouse, or between that town and Montauban, if a second passage should be effected, as I am warranted in supposing will be the case.

Signed, THE MARSHAL DUKE OF DALMATIA.

Letter from the Minister of War to the marshal duke of Albufera.

14th January, 1814.

His majesty desires I will intimate to you, monsieur le maréchal, that you are to detach immediately towards Lyons a division of eight or ten thousand men from the army under your orders, and make them proceed in all haste to that destination; you are also to send off in the direction of that city two thirds of the cavalry belonging to your army.

It is moreover his majesty's intention that you should prepare to march in person with the remainder of your army, as soon as your excellency shall have received intelligence of the ratification by Spain of the treaty of Valençay.

Signed, DUKE OF FELTRE.

Letter from the Prince Vice Constable, major-general, to the duke of Albufera.

14th January, 1814.

Monsieur le duc d'Albufera.

I send you copies of the orders which I am transmitting to the marshal duke of Dalmatia; the emperor desires I will enjoin your co-operation in the same arrangements, with this difference, that your troops are to take the direction of *Lyons* instead of Paris. In moving your troops towards Lyons, you will accordingly be guided by the news you receive of what is taking place in Spain. You will perceive by my letter to the duke of Dalmatia, that those arrangements are of the most pressing nature. Be particular in furnishing me with an exact statement of the daily progress of the troops you are to send towards Lyons, in order that we may have it in our power to send them any marching instructions we may deem necessary. The above directions must, however, depend upon the state of affairs in Spain.

Signed, ALEXANDER.

Letter from the Prince Vice-Constable, major-general, to the duke of Dalmatia.

14th January, 1814.

Monsieur le maréchal,

The emperor orders me to send you an officer of my staff, and I have selected for this mission my aide-de-camp the chef d'escadron Montgardé. The emperor desires that I will reiterate the orders which must have been sent to you direct from the minister of war, and that you will send to Orleans one half of your cavalry and of your light artillery. You will be pleased to expedite the departure of those troops, as we are in the most urgent want of them. Send me the itinerary of their march, so that I may know where to find them every day, and may, if necessary, accelerate their movement. The enemy has crossed the Vosges, taken up a position on the Moselle, and sent detachments as far as the Saône. The emperor directs me to inform you that it is indispensable you should send off in all haste twelve thousand men of your army, by different roads, in the direction of Paris, in order that we may employ them in covering the capital.

The duke of San-Carlos, minister of the prince of Asturias, whom the emperor has acknowledged as king of Spain, reached the advanced

posts of the army of Catalonia on the 18th of December, and was the bearer of the treaty entered into and concluded with king Ferdinand. We learn by information from Spain that the Spaniards have received the intelligence with enthusiasm, and that their troops are in consequence withdrawing their co-operation from Lord Wellington's army. As soon as you shall have positive news of the fact, you will make arrangements for sending your army by forced marches in the direction of Paris. The fresh division of conscripts which is forming at Bordeaux may be sent to Bayonne for the purpose of doing the garrison duty of that place.

The emperor is in the utmost impatience to receive more circumstantial information from Spain, and he is no less anxious to learn that you have commenced your movement towards the Loire.

Signed, ALEXANDER.

Letter from the marshal duke of Albufera to the Minister of War.

28th March, 1814.

Events are daily hurrying on, and whilst I am endeavouring to maintain my ground under the walls of Figueras, in order to bring the negotiation for the return of our garrisons to a favourable issue, I have the mortification to learn that marshal Soult has retreated to Toulouse, and that marshal Augereau is at Vienne. The upper Garonne being thus unprotected, the English may proceed through Saint-Girons, avail themselves of a new road leading to Carcassonne, and reach Narbonne before me. General Lafitte writes to me from Foix that Mina's corps is just reported to be moving along the Pyrenees, with a view to form a junction with general Copons.

Finding myself thus painfully situated, I have sent one of my officers to the marshal duke of Dalmatia, with a request that he will make me acquainted with his real position, and with his views, in the event of his being compelled to quit the banks of the Garonne. My conduct will be guided by his answer; and I shall do all in my power to prevent the enemy from forestalling me at Narbonne. The Spaniards who have united all their forces to present them to the king, threaten us with an attack as soon as he shall have quitted Gerona; should such a movement take place, it will necessarily be concerted with Lord Wellington's operations.

The governor of Barcelona informs me, under date the 19th of

March, that, according to the declaration of a deserter from the English hussars, general Clinton was to march across the country with a portion of his army for the purpose of joining Lord Wellington, or to proceed by sea to some other point. I shall endeavour to ascertain the fact of the departure of the English, if it should actually take place, and hasten to inform you of it, in order that you may be duly apprised of their destination.

Signed, THE MARSHAL DUKE OF ALBUFERA.

The Minister of War to the duke of Albufera.

28th March, 1814.

I have received the letter in which you acquaint me that you have deemed it necessary to send additional supplies to the fortresses of the 10th military division, in case of siege, and that you have issued orders in consequence. As I fully concur in the opinion which existing circumstances have led you to form, I have just requested the minister who superintends the war department to recommend, in the strongest manner, that the commissary of the 10th division should complete the said supplies without delay, beginning with the forts of Mont-Louis and Prats-de-Mollo. The proportions are therefore settled in the manner in which your excellency has determined, namely:

Fortresses.	Men.	Days.		
Perpignan.....	3,600 (and 100 horses)..	240	instead of ..	70
Collioure.....	2,000.....	180	.....	60
Fort St. Elme.....	150.....	180	.....	60
Fort les Bains.....	300.....	180	.....	60
Prats-de-Mollo.....	1,000.....	180	.....	60
Villefranche and.....	600.....	180	.....	30
Castle thereof.....	200.....	180	.....	40
Mont-Louis.....	2,500.....	180	....	30
Bellegarde.....	1,000.....	180	.....	
Lourdes.....	300.....	60	.....	

As your excellency makes no mention of the two latter places, nothing shall be altered in the arrangements previously determined on.

Signed, DUKE OF FELTRE.

Letter from the marshal duke of Albufera to general Habert, governor of Barcelona.

31st March, 1814.

Events are hurrying on with such rapidity, that marshal Soult may possibly have been forced by the enemy near Toulouse, and may thus compel me to recross the Pyrenees in all haste, so as to avoid compromising the safety of the handful of troops which are still under my orders. Should that occurrence come to pass, the hopes I entertained of bringing you away with me may be again disappointed for the present, and all my exertions up to this moment to secure the return of the brave garrison of Tortosa may prove wholly unavailing.

If, as you seem to think, the English have broken up their encampment and marched to join lord Wellington, you may, perhaps, be carelessly watched by the Spaniards, who will be exclusively bent upon reaching and even crossing the Pyrenees. In such a case, you are called upon to act a brilliant part, and to save the brave garrison of Tortosa, which would then proceed to join you at Barcelona, either by taking the main road, if free from obstruction, or the road through Falset, Montblanch, Igualada, Terrassa, and Saria. The success of this enterprize would be attended with the happiest results; it would expedite the settlement of the negotiation already entered upon, and restore to the emperor, by force of arms or otherwise, a column of twelve thousand experienced soldiers, who would prove an invaluable resource at this moment. The advantages which would attend your success are such, that even if the garrison of Tortosa were to be shut up within the walls of Barcelona, you would have sufficient provisions to subsist upon for upwards of six months, before the expiration of which period a peace will have been concluded.

Not a moment should be lost in transmitting to general Robert the order by which I am directing him to carry into effect all those instructions which you may think proper to issue for his guidance.

Let me know by any means in your power what you have been able to accomplish for the garrison of Tortosa; should you succeed, make immediate preparations for quitting Barcelona at a moment's notice, and hasten to join the imperial army by forcing your way through any hostile troops that may attempt to oppose your retreat. There is a garrison in the fort of Hostalrich which you are to bring away, and blow up the fort. The enemy has not yet placed any garrison in

Gerona; you might ford the Ter under the walls of the town, or else avoid the latter altogether, by passing through Abisbal, and fording the Ter and the Fluvia. You will find Figueras occupied by a garrison, and abundantly supplied with provisions. Bellegarde and Perpignan are to receive garrisons, and your movement will produce the more powerful effect in proportion as it will be more unexpected.

Signed, The MARSHAL DUKE OF ALBUFERA.

Letter from the marshal duke of Albufera to general Robert, governor of Tortosa.

31st March, 1814.

The difficult circumstances in which France is placed, call for fresh exertions on the part of her children. I desire you will carry into effect all the arrangements you may receive from the general of division Habert, and endeavour as soon as possible to join him at Barcelona instead of Venasque. The fortune of France will watch over you, and soon enable you to join an army in which you are held in the highest regard and esteem. Your gallant soldiers are, one and all, ever dear to me.

Signed, The MARSHAL DUKE OF ALBUFERA.

Letter from the marshal duke of Albufera to the Minister of War.

2nd April, 1814.

Monsieur le duc,

I have reason to believe that his majesty (king Ferdinand) and the duke of San-Carlos have taken every necessary step to prevail on the Spanish general to receive the Spanish fortresses from us, and send back our garrisons; but the orders of the Cortes and the influence of the English have rendered their exertions unavailing.

In this state of things, I have determined to write the annexed letter to general Habert, in order to save at least the garrison of Tortosa, and to endeavour to promote the return to France of troops which the force of events has unfortunately prevented our recalling at an earlier period.

As the former operation will require some time, we may possibly receive a reply from Madrid, if the king should succeed in establishing his authority in that capital; should his answer be too long delayed,

I request your excellency will take the emperor's orders, to the end that I may be authorized to desire that general Habert will execute the bold movement I am marking out for him, even if the force of events should have prevented his being joined by the garrison of Tortosa. I request an answer from your excellency on this point.

Signed, The MARSHAL DUKE OF ALBUFERA.

Letter from the marshal duke of Dalmatia to the marshal duke of Albufera.

3rd April, 1814.

Monsieur le maréchal,

The enemy's column, to which I adverted in the letter I had the honour of writing to you on the 31st March, as having crossed the Garonne at Pinsaguel and the Ariege at Cintegabelle, retrograded yesterday morning, and has for the most part recrossed the Garonne. I am ignorant whether it will ascend that river to cross it a second time at Carbonne, and move in a direct line towards Pamiers; but I have great doubts of it, as such a movement could have no object in view; the reports which I receive lead me, on the contrary, to suppose that the enemy are preparing to effect a passage between the mouth of the Tarn and Toulouse. Be this as it may, I am preparing to offer them battle in whatever direction they may make their appearance, and have ordered that Toulouse be placed in a state of defence.

If you had nothing to apprehend on the side of Spain, and could reinforce general Lafitte in the department of the Ariege; if even you entertained the idea of proceeding thither in person with the whole of your disposable forces, such a diversion would be productive of the best effect, especially if you were to push forward the head of your column of troops towards Saint-Martory and Saint-Gaudens by Saint-Girons; it is even probable that it would enable me to resume the offensive, as it might coincide with the diversion which will infallibly be produced by the army of the Garonne now assembling at Libourne, as mentioned in my letter of the 29th; but I repeat it, this movement naturally depends upon your existing situation, and I have no doubt that if it shall appear to you to be possible and useful, you will immediately undertake it.

Nevertheless I deem it necessary to inform you, that a report is circulating amongst the enemy's troops, of its being their intention to

proceed towards Lyons. Should this be the case, it would then be indispensably requisite that we should concert our operations, and I would in that case request you to acquaint me with the plans you have in view.

Signed, THE MARSHAL DUKE OF DALMATIA.

Letter from the marshal duke of Albufera to the Minister of War.

April 2nd, 1814.

I have informed your excellency of the uneasiness I felt at marshal Soult's movement upon Toulouse; the aide-de-camp I had sent to him has since brought me his despatch of the 29th ult.; from which I learn that he is contending against very numerous forces, especially in respect to cavalry, which he estimates at between twelve and fourteen thousand men, whilst he has no more than two thousand to oppose to them: he adds, that he is inclined to retreat to Montauban in preference to any other place, if he should be compelled to give way.

By a despatch of the 31st, which has this moment been handed to me, the marshal states, that the enemy has thrown a bridge over the Garonne, above its junction with the Ariege, that a column of ten thousand men, including two thousand cavalry and some cannon, have ascended the left bank of the Ariege, and proceeded in the direction of Hauterive and Cintegabelle. The marshal seems to be in doubt whether the enemy will continue his movement towards Pamiers and Foix, or proceed to Villefranche, in order to turn his left, and cut off all communication with me. On the other hand, general Lafitte writes me word from Foix, on the 31st at midnight, that some hostile detachments have advanced to within four leagues of Foix, and have announced the movement of a corps of sixteen thousand men; the general persists in believing, that the enemy meditates an attack upon Narbonne. This movement gives me great uneasiness, as it will compel me to recross the Pyrenees in all haste, and confide the defence of the fortresses of the Roussillon to very weak garrisons.

I am adopting every measure requisite for placing Narbonne beyond the reach of a coup-de-main, and am taking the same precautions at Beziers; but I have not been able to collect supplies

of ammunition or provisions along any part of that line. I am endeavouring to remove a quantity of cartridges, &c. from Figueras, but find every difficulty in procuring means of transport.

Should the enemy succeed in taking possession of Toulouse, I should be compelled to move towards Narbonne, in order to prevent the cutting off of my communications with France. I must, henceforward, be prepared for every kind of obstruction on the road from Perpignan to Toulouse; I am, therefore, directing the prefect of l'Hérault to concert with the prefects of his neighbourhood the means of forwarding my despatches to Aurillac; and I request your excellency will prevail upon the count de Lavalette to establish a line of estafets at that point; you will readily perceive the importance of such an arrangement.

The conscripts desert to an alarming amount; notwithstanding my efforts, therefore, to form a small army, I shall not succeed in that object. I have had great difficulty in raising the garrison of Figueras to nineteen hundred men; I have left a battalion of the line at Mont-Louis, and am forming two battalions of conscripts in the dépôts of the 143rd and 115th regiments, intending them as the nucleus of the garrison of Perpignan; I shall afterwards manœuvre with the few troops remaining under my orders, for the purpose of arresting the progress of the enemy. I should exceedingly regret the necessity of recrossing the Pyrenees, abandoning two departments which I had preserved for the last ten months from all hostile invasion, and almost irretrievably losing all hope of the return of our garrisons from Spain.

Signed, THE MARSHAL DUKE OF ALBUFERA.

Letter from the marshal duke of Albufera to the marshal duke of Dalmatia.

6th April, 1814.

Monsieur le maréchal,

The chef-de-bataillon Mrozinski has handed to me your letter of the 29th, and I have received those you have written to me on the 31st ultimo and 3rd instant. The state of affairs in Spain does not admit of my removing from the frontiers. The English and Spaniards are assembling all their forces in Catalonia. Barcelona is closely invested by eighteen thousand men. I am informed that the English regiment of

Dillon has been withdrawn from Carthagena and landed at Tarragona. The garrison of Peniscola is reduced to seventy or eighty men; the explosion of a powder magazine has killed the governor, the staff, and several soldiers; the siege has already lasted three months. Six thousand men are blockading Saguntum. Tortosa, which is now in great want of provisions, is attacked by the whole of the second army, amounting to ten thousand men and three hundred horse. General Copons y Navia has between fifteen and eighteen thousand men under his orders, and threatens to invade the French territory.

I occupy a position on the banks of the Ter, by means of which and of my garrisons I am enabled to keep large forces in check in the vicinity of the Pyrenees; nevertheless, as soon as I was apprised of the movement made by the English in the department of the Ariege, I hastened to send towards Perpignan a part of the small body of troops remaining under my command, ordered Narbonne to be placed in a state of defence, and directed general Pouget, who is stationed at Carcassonne, to send a hundred and fifty men in search of information in the department of the Ariege, and to communicate with Toulouse, a service which he is still directed to carry on. Circumstances, however, prevent my marching to the upper Garonne, without exposing the rest of the south of France, and renouncing the advantages of the negotiation entered into for the return of our garrisons and the restitution of the fortresses.

You appear to think that I shall render a signal service by procuring the return of those garrisons. You might perhaps be of a contrary opinion were you to be aware of the number of the enemy's forces which are detained before the fortresses. Half the troops I have left in them are composed of conscripts, as is the case respecting the garrison you have left at Bayonne.

If the English should carry into effect their intended movement towards Lyons, I shall have no other course to adopt than to collect our scanty battalions at Narbonne, defend the place as long as possible, retreat towards Beziers, which is now preparing for a defence, and lastly, towards Montpellier, thereby covering all the departments of France which are not yet invaded, and affording assistance to the army stationed at Lyons.

The distance from Figueras to Perpignan is three marches, two from Perpignan to Narbonne, and as many more from the latter place to Carcassonne. This estimate of the distance to be performed will

enable you to judge how unimportant would be any movement I could attempt to make towards that point with the insignificant army under my command.

King Ferdinand has already passed Barcelona; he stopped on the 31st at San-Feliù near that city. The English, Spaniards, and Sicilians, were under arms to receive him. It is quite clear that the former will use every exertion to light up a civil war in Spain. The Cortes dread the presence of the king, and have published a violent manifesto, of which I send you a hasty translation. It is attempted to force the nation to make war, and to prevent Spain from signing any peace without the concurrence of the allies; the king will therefore be compelled to declare for war.

This state of things is the more unfortunate as I find myself daily reduced in numbers, owing to the necessity of forming fresh garrisons; and now have no more than a division under my command. I am compelled to leave three thousand men at Figueras, in pursuance of an order of the 19th of March, and must adopt measures for the defence of Perpignan. You may judge from this statement how little it will be in my power to arrest the English; thus circumstanced, however, I greatly rely on the powerful diversion you will have it in your power to make in the enemy's rear, whilst the army of the Dordogne will be enabled to cross that river, rescue Bordeaux from the enemy, and cover the right of your army.

According to the last news received from Valence, our army will have again moved forward towards Lyons, and reinforcements just arrived from Italy would warrant the anticipation of our soon resuming the offensive.

I intend proceeding to Narbonne to-morrow, in order to satisfy myself respecting the progress of the works and the preparations for defending that place.

Signed, THE MARSHAL DUKE OF ALBUFERA.

Letter from the marshal duke of Dalmatia to the duke of Albufera.

5th April, 1814.

Monsieur le maréchal,

My letter of the 3rd of this month will have prepared you for the event of the enemy's crossing the Garonne below Toulouse; the passage actually took place at Grenade, yesterday morning before day-

break. The enemy's advanced guard immediately took the road to Toulouse; his outposts halted in front of mine, on the height of Fenouilhet. I am ignorant of what has taken place in the direction of Montauban; but as every defensive preparation has already been made in that quarter, I do not entertain any apprehension respecting it: I am, besides, fully prepared to give the enemy battle, and the engagement would have probably taken place before now, but for the badness of the weather.

I am very anxious to be made acquainted with the arrangements you may think proper to adopt in consequence of the proposal contained in my letter of the 3rd. This is the moment for acting, and I think we may obtain very signal advantages, if we carry on our operations in concert. I have written to desire general Lafitte to collect all the troops he may be able to dispose of, and proceed to reconnoitre in the direction of the upper Garonne, and on the road from Saint-Gaudens to Toulouse, in order to intercept that communication, and annoy the enemy.

Signed, THE MARSHAL DUKE OF DALMATIA.

7th April, 1814.

Monsieur le maréchal,

The adjutant commandant Ricard handed to me this evening the letter you did me the honour to write to me under date of the 6th. I have only detained him during the time requisite to converse with him, and to reply to your letter. This superior officer will inform you of my situation, and of the situation of the enemy; and state the motives which make me still desirous, notwithstanding the observations you have taken the trouble to lay before me, that you should make a diversion towards the upper Garonne, either by a movement in earnest, or by a mere demonstration.

I am determined to give the enemy battle near Toulouse, whatever may be their numerical superiority; in furtherance of this intention, I am fortifying a position which leans against the town and the canal, and offers me an intrenched camp susceptible of being defended, whether the enemy should direct their attack by the road of Montauban, or advance by the one leading to Castelnaudary. I hope that

all the works will be completed in four days. I have caused the most important to be armed this very evening.

M. Ricard was with me when I received the unpleasant news of the entrance of the enemy into Paris; this heavy misfortune confirms me in the determination of defending Toulouse, whatever may be the consequence; the preservation of that city, which contains establishments of every kind, is an object to us of the highest importance. But if I should unfortunately be compelled to quit it, the movement I should adopt would necessarily bring me into closer contact with you. In such a case you could not stand your ground at Perpignan, as the enemy would unavoidably follow the direction I should have taken. It is therefore for the advantage of the service, even as regards your own situation, that you should make a diversion towards the upper Garonne by the shortest road; the effect it would produce would be in proportion to the means you would employ in accomplishing it.

The enemy appear surprised at my determination to defend Toulouse; they have undertaken nothing since they crossed the Garonne, four days ago, an inactivity perhaps owing to the unfavourable weather. Their army is stationed between Lespinasse and Saint-Jory: they have sent a detachment on the road to Montauban; but I have not heard of their having made any attempt against that town. They have also a large corps of observation before the tête-de-pont of Saint-Cyprien. I do not, however, assume that they have renounced the idea of attacking us; I believe, on the contrary, that they will advance to-morrow, or next day, to meet me. I shall expect, with the utmost impatience, M. le Maréchal, a communication of what you will have determined, after perusing the contents of my letter, and hearing the observations which the adjutant commandant Ricard is directed to make to you.

Signed, THE MARSHAL DUKE OF DALMATIA.

Letter from the marshal duke of Dalmatia, to the marshal duke of Albufera.

10th April, 1814.

Monsieur le maréchal,

The battle I announced to you in my preceding letters has taken place this day; it was most sanguinary; the enemy have dread-

fully suffered, but they have succeeded in establishing themselves in a position which I occupied to the right of Toulouse. The general of division Taupin has been killed; general Harispe had his foot carried off by a cannon shot; three of my generals of brigade have also been wounded. For the rest, I am preparing to renew the engagement to-morrow, if the enemy should attack me.

I have no hopes of being able to maintain my ground in Toulouse for any length of time; I may, perhaps, have even to force my way through in attempting to quit it. I recommend you to regulate your arrangements, and issue orders to general Lafitte accordingly. I propose writing to you to-morrow, if the communication be still free and unobstructed.

I have just received the letter you did me the honour to write to me on the 8th. The observations you are pleased to address to me, on the subject of the requisitions for the subsistence of the troops which have been made to the prefect of the Aude, will not give rise to any discussion, as I shall probably not have occasion to consume those provisions.

Signed, The MARSHAL DUKE OF DALMATIA.

Letter from the marshal duke of Dalmatia, to the marshal duke of Albufera.

11th April, 1814.

Monsieur le maréchal,

Agreeably to what I led you to expect by the letter I did myself the honour of writing to you yesterday, I am under the necessity of retreating from Toulouse, and fear it will be impossible to avoid fighting my way to Baziéges, to which place the enemy has just sent off a column of troops, for the purpose of cutting off my communication. I propose taking up a position at Villefranche to-morrow, as I trust the obstacle thrown in my way will not prevent my movement; I shall retreat the day after to-morrow in the direction of Castelnaudary. I propose halting there if possible; in the contrary case, I shall take up a position on the Aude at Carcassonne, in order that you may have time to adopt your arrangements.

I have done myself the honour to propose to you a diversion on the upper Garonne. Matters are now come to such a crisis, that there can be no longer any hesitation in respect to the course to be adopted; otherwise, we shall find ourselves compelled to meet on the shores of the

Mediterranean, in the direction of Beziers. This may yet be avoided; but that can only be done by the prompt junction of all your troops with the army under my command, after you shall have provided for the safety of the fortresses; I make this express proposal to you, and request you will immediately acquaint me with your determination.

If you decide upon our combining our operations, you will, no doubt, deem it proper to proceed at once with all your forces towards Quillan, from whence you might effect your junction at Carcassonne, and we might then immediately advance through the department of the Ariege, and again convert the upper Garonne into the theatre of war, with our flank resting upon the Pyrenees. This movement would be decisive in its effect, and I have no doubt that by saving the south of France it would compel the enemy to recall the whole of the troops which they have detached along both banks of the Garonne; by this movement we should enable count Decaen to recover possession of Bordeaux, and perhaps to operate a diversion in our favour.

I send you my aide-de-camp captain Bonneval, who will make you acquainted with my situation, and return at once with your reply. I sincerely hope it will prove favourable to my proposal, and, under any circumstances, that it will acquaint me with the course you may think proper to adopt.

I propose your marching to Quillan, under the conviction that you would reach it as soon as I could arrive at Carcassonne; that direction appears, besides, to be the shortest you can take, even if you proceeded towards Mirepoix and Pamiers; but if you should move in the direction of Narbonne, I request you will apprise me of the circumstance.

Signed, The MARSHAL DUKE OF DALMATIA.

Letter from the marshal duke of Albufera to the marshal duke of Dalmatia.

12th April, 1814.

Monsieur le maréchal,

The chevalier de Bonneval has handed to me this evening the despatch of the 11th, by which you inform me of your retreat towards Villefranche and Carcassonne. This event has the more surprised me as your letter of the 10th led me to expect the contrary. On considering the course you propose, which is, that I should proceed with the

whole of my forces towards Quillan, in order that we may effect a junction at Carcassonne, make an advance movement through the department of the Ariege, and again convert the upper Garonne into the theatre of war, with our flank resting upon the Pyrenees; I find in the first place that you are strangely mistaken in respect to the road leading from Perpignan to Quillan, since it hardly admits of the passage of mules, and I should be compelled to carry on operations in a wretched country, and without artillery or field equipage. In the second place, how are we to move forward through the department of the Ariege, and transfer the theatre of war to the upper Garonne, whilst the difficulty of the roads is such, that general Hill was very near losing his artillery by venturing upon them? What assistance shall we derive from the Pyrenees which the Spaniards will immediately cross in formidable numbers? In short, from whence are we to derive ammunition and provisions, and what communications could we keep up with the interior of France, after we should have quitted the high road to Montpellier, through which the enemy would send forward detachments to open an intercourse with the Austrians? I can by no means agree with you in opinion that the movement you propose would save the south of France, and compel the enemy to call back all the troops he has sent forward along the Garonne. I believe, on the contrary, that it would complete the disorganization and ruin of the scanty remnants of our forces. Neither do I think that such a movement would in any manner facilitate the operations of general Decaen towards Bordeaux. My opinion is founded upon various letters you have written to me, in which you have constantly pointed out to my notice that the superiority of the enemy's infantry is in the proportion of three to one, and of their cavalry, in that of fourteen to two. Surely, Monsieur le duc, such a superiority imperatively requires that we should adopt a defensive system, which may enable us to preserve our ammunition and to procure the supplies requisite for the subsistence of the troops.

I am alive to the many disadvantages resulting from the meeting of two corps on the same road, and should consider it highly desirable that, as regards the army under your command, you should make choice of the road leading from Carcassonne to Saint-Pons, whilst I should occupy Beziers, where I am causing fortifications to be erected. By this movement, you might draw your means of subsistence from the department of the Tarn, whilst we should be so near each other that the enemy would have great difficulty in making any attempt upon our

positions. I merely submit this proposal with a view to avoid the obstruction that would be created by two armies operating on one and the same road.

I am specially invested with the command of the 9th military division; I wish to be sparing of its resources, and to leave to the extraordinary commissioner Pelet de la Lozère the exclusive duty of apportioning them according to our wants and the relative strength of our armies. I am urging the duke of Castiglione to call in the requisitions he has made in the departments of l'Herault and the Gard, since he is better able than we are to subsist his army, considering that the 7th and 8th divisions are free from invasion.

I shall repair to Narbonne to-morrow, and propose having, at that place, three thousand men by the 14th, and the remainder of my infantry in the night of the same day. I, therefore, hope that by the 15th I shall have withdrawn from Spain and Roussillon all our small detachments, a circumstance I have directed colonel Ricard to state to you; we might, in the course of that day, approach towards each other, in order to confer together respecting the best course to be adopted.

Signed, THE MARSHAL DUKE OF ALBUFERA.

NOTE 34.

PAGE 404, VOL. II.

Letter from marshal Suchet, duke of Albufera, to general Dupont, Minister of War.

Carcassonne, 11th May, 1814.

My report of this day informs your excellency of the measure I have resorted to, of distributing amongst the farmers the horses belonging to the parks of artillery, the engineer department, and the military equipages of the army. I find so great an advantage in being thus enabled to provide for the subsistence of those horses, that I do not hesitate in requesting you to solicit of the king a decree containing the regulations which have been put in practice on this subject, with such modifications as you may deem necessary. The first result will be a saving to the treasury of twelve thousand francs a day; and the orders I have issued for the immediate adoption of this measure will thereby be confirmed, save and except such alterations as I shall have to make in it, in conformity with the terms of the decree.

In ordering that the horses and mules should be delivered over to the farmers, I determined that a declaration of the value should be drawn up in the presence of the prefect, that the companies of the train of artillery and of the field equipages should collect their harness in a particular place, to be provided for the purpose in the principal town of the prefecture; that the captain commanding should keep a register of the names of the farmers to whom the horses and mules were delivered up, so that if the measure should not eventually be adopted, or the horses be required for any other service, they might be withdrawn at a moment's notice. If adopted, I recommend its being extended to all the horses of the artillery and of the equipages of the army, as soon as the English shall have taken their

departure; for I am of opinion that, in the exhausted condition to which the South has been reduced by the presence of a hundred thousand horses during a period of eleven months, it is well worthy of his majesty's benevolent intentions to direct that the number of horses requisite for artillery movements in the towns of Perpignan, Toulouse, and Bayonne, should be reduced to three hundred.

Signed, THE MARSHAL DUKE OF ALBUFERA.

NOTE 35.

PAGE 406, VOL. II.

Letter from the marshal duke of Albufera to general Dupont, Minister of War.

Toulouse, 11th June, 1814.

The garrison of Figueras, consisting of two thousand three hundred and ninety-seven men, arrived at Perpignan on the 28th of May, leaving the place supplied with a year's provisions for five thousand men; the troops of the garrison are paid up to the 1st of April, 1814.

The brave garrison of Tortosa, which consisted of four thousand six hundred and fifty-two Frenchmen, gave full occupation for eleven months to a hostile corps of fifteen thousand men; it has earned a signal share of glory by its courage and constancy in bearing privations; it reached France on the 31st of May. Its worthy governor, general Robert, is a gallant and intelligent officer whom I recommend to his majesty's special benevolence. He brought back eight pieces of cannon, a large quantity of caissons and artillery carts, and eighteen thousand tools; this corps has been paid up to the 1st of March, 1814.

Barcelona and its forts were defended by seven thousand eight hundred and fifty-three men. This fine division returned to France on the 1st of June, and brought back the French artillery; it had raised immense defensive works, and kept an Anglo-Spanish army of twenty-five thousand men in check. All the troops have been paid up to the 1st of June, 1814; at the moment of their departure from Barcelona, there remained in the place seven months' provisions for ten thousand men.

I beg to lay before you the copy of a letter from general Rouelle, governor of Saguntum. Your excellency will not fail to notice the proper feeling which prevails in the most distant of our garrisons. After having erected very considerable works, and stood a blockade of eleven months with admirable constancy, it reached the Boulou or

the 8th instant. Previously to their final departure from the fort, some of our officers went to Valencia, where they met a very cordial reception. The strength of the garrison of Saguntum is eleven hundred and thirty-two men; and they left behind them a quantity of provisions sufficient for the subsistence of fifteen hundred men during a period of five years and upwards.

The small garrison of Peniscola, amounting to two hundred and fifty-six men, returns to France with that of Saguntum, after having sustained a siege and a bombardment by sea and land, and witnessed the destruction of part of its works of defence, and the death of the governor, who was buried under the ruins; the gallant captain Hardy, who succeeded the governor is deserving of the king's protection.

The garrison of Hostalrich, amounting to three hundred and thirty-one men, has also returned.

The sick belonging to all these fortresses, the baggage, ammunition, &c. have arrived by sea at Port-Vendres or Cette. A corvette and a brig which happened to be at Barcelona have set sail for one of the French ports.

The garrison of Santona, two thousand strong, landed at Blaye on the 24th of May, and will be sent to La Rochelle; it made a glorious defence.

Thus have twenty thousand Frenchmen, military men or employés in the administration, been restored to their native country.

Signed, The Marshal Duke of Albufera.

THE END.


00036499

Digitized with financial assistance from the
Government of Maharashtra
on 13 February, 2016